Any strategy built on the mantra of “doing more with less” will fail. We must do more with more. To do this at a time of austerity in our defense spending, the United States must reinvigorate its multilateral engagement to bring in allied capabilities and investments to replace our decline in expenditures. We must expand beyond our historical key alliances (including Britain, Canada, and Australia) and leverage an underutilized partnership with a counterpart that is mature and poised for increased leadership on the world stage. We need to take the next step and allow Japan, the “Britain of Asia,” with her economic and industrial might, to in earnest embrace her moniker.
Japan has been a security partner of the United States for nearly 65 years.1 However, for much of this time Japan contributed relatively little to regional security, or to its own self-defense. The primary reason for this was a prohibition against the Japanese people waging war, as written into Article IX of Japan’s post-World War II Constitution.2 While the strict confines of Article IX were pertinent in the postwar 1940s and 50s, these same restrictive measures have proven anachronistic in the modern era. Building on the Japanese desire to engage with the United States on more equal terms in security and the need to shift to being a net provider—and not consumer—of security and stability in the East Asia region, the Diet (Japanese Parliament) has recently reinterpreted this constitutional constraint.3 From the Japanese perspective, the reinterpretation will provide a more permissive environment for peer-level military cooperation with the United States. While a mutually beneficial security relationship between the two countries already exists, the new growth potential of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) provides an opportunity for an exponential increase in this interdependence. Sharing the security burden on an equal footing with the Japanese is the most surefire way to allow for the collective defense of the East Asian region and beyond.
‘The Armitage Report’
Interacting with Japan in the capacity of a principal defense ally is not a novel proposal. Most of the strategic-level supporting points were made as early as 2000 in the Institute for National Strategic Studies’ Special Report “The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership,” more commonly known as “The Armitage Report.” The document—named for one of the authors, former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage—argued that Japan could “become a more equal alliance partner.” The thesis was that, if cultivated, we can build a defense partnership with the country that reflects the level of integration that we have historically had with our British counterparts.4 This has led many observers and commentators to refer to Japan as the “Britain of the Far East.”5
Recognizing the need to evolve the security-relationship, in April representatives from the two governments reworked the U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation.6 This update is the first since 1997 and advances specific parameters to recalibrate U.S.-Japan cooperation. The guidelines include measures that will allow for increased information-sharing, combined operations and exercises both inside and outside the East Asian area, and increased personnel exchanges. While these modest steps do represent progress, as we continue to expand the doctrine of this relationship we should do so with a clear image of the next generation of Japanese defense forces consisting of a well-trained, well-equipped maritime force with global reach and fifth-generation fighter aircraft.7
Even under the current relationship structure, Japan’s capacity to perform as a U.S. ally has changed. An evolution of the Japanese people’s attitudes toward their own military has allowed for a marked expansion of the country’s national defense forces and was a driving factor behind the “Britain of Asia” concept. Sociopolitical events of the past two decades spurred this change. The first event was the first Gulf War. In the early 1990s, Japan was the second-largest economy in the world, and appeared to be growing at a rate that would see it eclipse the United States. However, as a military coalition was built to drive the Iraqi forces of Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, it became clear that Japan’s voracious appetite for economic prosperity was not going to translate into the ability to wield either diplomatic or kinetic power. Due to Article IX, Japan was barred from directly supporting coalition military efforts overseas. As such, Japanese support in the first Gulf War was limited to $13 billion in financial contributions and the imposition of sanctions against Iraq.8 The international community condescendingly referred to these actions as “checkbook diplomacy.” When Kuwait formally thanked the individual coalition countries for repelling Iraq, Japan was left off the gratitude list. While the Kuwaiti omission did not offend the average Japanese citizen, it rattled Japan’s conservative establishment. Despite attempts by conservatives to strengthen Japan’s defense capabilities, policy remained largely unchanged through the rest of the 1990s.
Seeking Changes
The real wake-up call came in 1998. On 1 September of that year, a North Korean Taepodong-1 ballistic missile flew over Japan’s main island of Honshu, shocking the Japanese.9 This was the culminating manifestation of how naive the general Japanese populace was about the threat posed by their North Korean neighbor, and how incapable Japan’s own defense infrastructure was. This event was the driving catalyst to begin developing a proficient force able to work with key allied partners in defense of Japan. Before this incident, building a meaningful peer-level defense partnership was not possible.
Subsequent events have reasserted the importance of a stronger Japanese defense capability. More recently was the beheading of two Japanese nationals at the hands of ISIS in January 2015. Although Japan has a highly trained Special Forces Group, due to the country’s unfamiliarity with the Middle East region and having no assets in place to leverage during the crisis, the government was powerless to stop the executions. In an opinion piece following the first beheading, Kyle Mizokami wrote that “Japan’s prosperity at home is linked to the global economic system, which is in turn affected by events in the Middle East and elsewhere.”10 Japan got the message.
These events provided the backbone for the rationale of current Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s 11-bill package aimed at reinterpreting the role of Japan’s defense forces.11 The upper house of the Diet approved the bill bundle on 20 September after the lower house approved it during the summer. Although complete reinterpretation or a constitutional amendment of Article IX was not politically possible for the Abe administration, the newly approved bills allow for a significant expansion in a number of areas for the JSDF. Japan is now legally permitted to come to the aid of allies in combat (known as “collective self-defense”). Also, Japanese lawmakers no longer have to pass a special temporary law to send forces abroad for multinational peacekeeping operations; all that is required is the approval of the Diet. Japan now can provide a wider range of supplies, including ammunition, to allied partners. The most marked change is that the new laws now allow the JSDF to use force when necessary.
Enhancing the Maritime Partnership
Recognizing this change to the status quo of Japan’s defense policy, the most significant follow-on questions for us as naval professionals are: What should we do to enhance the U.S.-Japan maritime partnership, and if there are significant hurdles and costs that will be incurred, why should we do it? The answer is that there are a number of benefits to deepening these ties that will have an additive effect in reducing our own defense expenditures and ensuring global stability.
First, the indispensable value of having a near-peer naval ally with a vested interest in many of the same strategic-level maritime-domain issues that we devote high sums of money and manpower to (e.g., ballistic-missile defense, mine countermeasures, freedom of navigation, and cybersecurity) requires little additional amplification. Due to the similarity in its geography to Britain, Japan is heavily dependent on the maritime environment and the maintenance of open sea lines of communication. It should not be forgotten that Japan is still an economic powerhouse that boasts the world’s third-largest economy.12 As the development of Japan’s national-security agenda progresses, we anticipate seeing a security policy that is both in step with the overarching strategy of the Western allies, but that also allows Japan to meet its own security goals. Being able to count on Japan, with her Aegis-equipped ships and Izumo-class helicopter destroyers, when we form a coalition to restore peace and stability in an area away from the immediate vicinity of the Japanese islands would provide a force multiplier.13
A second benefit to the U.S. Navy of a deepened relationship would come through the ability to cooperate in the development of military weaponry and technology. With the 2014 revision of Japan’s Three Principles on Arms Exports, third-party nations can now buy weapons developed by the Japanese or in conjunction with them.14 Previously, even defensive weaponry built in cooperation with another country could not be sold outside Japan. Countries such as Vietnam, Thailand, and India immediately swooped in following the change in doctrine. The most notable example of this is the ongoing talks between Japan and Australia regarding the Royal Australian Navy’s acquisition of the Kawasaki/Mitsubishi Soryu-class diesel-electric submarine.15 Japan’s inability to export bilaterally developed systems to third-party nations had until this point limited U.S.-Japanese codevelopment efforts.
With many of the most restrictive export prohibitions now removed, the field would seem to be ripe with opportunities for codevelopment. There are numerous advantages in doing so, the simplest being that collaboration is cheaper, as both sides would share development and initial production costs. Economy of scale also would benefit such programs, as both nations would seek to field units of developed systems. Conventional wisdom says that “two heads are better than one.” No one would second-guess the quality and ingenuity of Japanese industry. Having our highly professional weapons manufacturers working with Japan’s best will undoubtedly result in world-class gear. Furthermore, using equipment identical to that of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) strengthens our partnership by expanding the ability to conduct productive personnel-training exchanges. Having our operators seeing firsthand how the Japanese defense forces use the same piece of gear from our own inventory and reciprocally sharing our tips and techniques with them will increase both the competence and confidence of both nations’ forces. This will clearly provide an assurance that the Japanese have the weapons and training necessary to cover our “portside” in a contingency.
Why then must we codevelop with Japan and not another allied partner? A strong supporting reason is that Japan already has the industrial capacity for much of this type of development in shipbuilding (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki Shipbuilding), aerospace (Kawasaki Heavy Industries), and the robotics domain to an extent that some of our other allies do not.16
Intelligence Sharing
Japan’s burgeoning intelligence apparatus is another great place to increase cooperation. Fortuitously, with the Japanese National Security Council’s passing of the 2013 Act of the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets on 6 December 2013, a number of obstacles were removed that prevented comprehensive information sharing and increased intelligence cooperation.17 Previously, a deterrent to further bilateral sharing of privileged information was the lack of repercussions for Japanese nationals who either intentionally or negligently disclosed classified information. The Specially Designated Secrets act, which appears to be a combination of our own Executive Order 12958 and CAPCO provisions, now prescribes prison terms from two to ten years for such offenses.18 Further strengthening its overall information security posture, Japan introduced the Basic Act of Cybersecurity in November 2014.19 This established the Japanese Cybersecurity Strategy Headquarters, which is responsible for the preparation, promotion, and implementation of cybersecurity strategic plans. These measures now provide an information-security framework for U.S. custodians of classified information to shift from “need to know” to “need to share” with our Japanese partners.
While combined intelligence centers and information-sharing agreements with the Japanese already exist, to normalize this relationship we should look at our naval- intelligence relationship with Britain as a model, and restructure these centers to increase their function and diminish the “stovepiping” that is often present when working with a foreign partner. Another measure would be to promote the attachment of a Japanese naval liaison officer at all major service and combatant command intel centers. Adding another competent partner to our own trusted intelligence network would be an investment that saves money and lives.
A promising trend over the past few years has been the U.S. Navy and JMSDF increasing interoperability by holding combined exercises and training. Such events have allowed the JMSDF commanders to develop their operational maturity and leadership as they have the opportunity to act as the “group commander” of a multinational force. Continuing our naval cooperation with Japan in annual combined exercises, such as Iron Fist and RIMPAC, encourages Japan to operate with the United States and also enhances the credibility and confidence of Japanese forces. A potentially useful tool from the U.S.-Japan Guidelines for naval leaders working with the Japanese is the Alliance Coordination Mechanism. While it is not entirely apparent what form or structure this mechanism will take, the emphasis on “timely information sharing” and “common situational awareness” is indispensable. Large-scale multinational exercises are the perfect venue to test the mechanism.
Teaming up for Mine Countermeasures
As an example, a specific maritime-domain warfare area that will benefit from the use of this mechanism is mine countermeasures.20 MCM is an area of supreme mutual operational interest and cooperation, and would profit greatly from increased “timely information sharing” and “common situational awareness.” Japan possesses a capable MCM force with operational experience, second only to the United States. However, an impediment to further MCM integration revolves around the fact that for mine warfare and MCM mission planning the U.S. Navy uses the proprietary Mine Environmental Decision Aides Library (MEDAL), while the JMSDF uses a different planning system not compatible with MEDAL. The current state of limited systems interoperability with the Japanese highlights the MCM mission as an area with room for growth.
In almost any imaginable mine-warfare-related contingency, American and Japanese mine sweepers, explosive ordnance disposal, and airborne mine-countermeasures aircraft would almost certainly be operating side-by-side. By synching our mission-planning software, mine-threat databases, and common operating picture with the Japanese, as well as sanitizing spaces appropriately to allow for a combined operations-intelligence floor, we will have accomplished both of the goals of the Alliance Coordination Mechanism and allowed for seamlessly synchronized mine-warfare operations. While MCM provides one specific example of how we can increase tactical integration between our two forces, this coordination mechanism is applicable in many other naval core-mission areas.
The Navy also engages the JMSDF through mil-mil exchanges but on a limited scale. The April Guidelines open the door for increased bilateral military service personnel exchanges. If we are to engage Japan as a principal ally, and not merely as a regional partner, it is expected that the frequency and significance of exchanges will reflect that. Not all exchanges need to be of PCS-tour duration. Something as simple as the exchange of personnel on a larger-scale during exercises allows for us to develop a rich understanding of how the Japanese do business, and also helps us to identify strengths and shortfalls in the relationship.
Other venues for interaction include increasing or initiating educational opportunities at the Japanese Joint Staff College, the JMSDF Staff College, or granting fellowships to Japanese defense think-tanks such as the National Institute for Defense Studies. There are also plenty of out-of-uniform opportunities for cultivating a deeper understanding of the future direction for Japan’s strategic policy. Some of these include increasing the opportunities for postgraduate education at top Japanese universities such as Waseda or Tokyo University. Schools such as these feature some of the best East Asian–focused graduate programs in the world, and are also the programs that the next generation of Japanese executive-level decision makers are attending.
For us to depend on Japan in defense matters, as we do Britain, the key is engagement. Training individuals to a proper level of engagement proficiency will require the dedication of specialized U.S. service members and civilians who are able to work through language and cultural barriers. While many JMSDF personnel speak English quite proficiently, if our engagement level is to increase it is also crucial to maintain a cadre of Japanese-speaking sailors dispersed throughout the fleet where they engage with the Japanese in the normal course of their duties. If this capability is not ubiquitous already, increasing the category for Japanese on the Navy’s Strategic Language List should provide the incentive to maintain an adequate reserve of proficient personnel.
Over the past two years Japan has completed substantial changes to its defense policy. Now, on the heels of those changes, there is an opportunity for us to develop a cohesive vision for the future of the U.S.-Japan naval partnership. In the 2015 release of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power, our uniformed maritime executive leadership called for a “bold and innovative approach” in regard to cultivating a “deeper cooperative relationship with our allies.”21 Bringing Japan into the fold as our “Britain of Asia” is that bold, innovative approach.
1. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Milestones: 1945–1952 Occupation and Reconstruction of Japan,” www.history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/japan-reconstruction.
2. Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “The Constitution of Japan,” www.japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html.
3. “Don’t Expect Too Much of Japan’s Defense Reforms,” The Diplomat, 9 October 2015, www.thediplomat.com/2015/10/dont-expect-too-much-of-japans-defense-reforms/.
4. Institute for National Strategic Studies: National Defense University, “The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership,” 11 October 2000, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a403599.pdf
5. Kosuke Takahashi, “Japan to Become ‘Britain of the Far East’,” 24 February 2005, www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/GB24Dh03.html.
6. Kyle Mizokami, “Inside the New U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines,” 29 April 2015, http://news.usni.org/2015/04/29/inside-the-new-u-s-japan-defense-guidelines. “The Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation,” 27 April 2015, http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/20150427_--_GUIDELINES_FOR_US-JAPAN_DEFENSE_COOPERATION.
7. Japanese Ministry of Defense, “The Next Fighter Models of the Air Self-Defense Force,” www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2011/12/20a.html.
8. Nakanishi Hiroshi, “The Gulf War and Japanese Diplomacy.” 6 December 2011, www.nippon.com/en/features/c00202/.
9. U.S. Information Agency, “North Korea’s Missile Test Over Japan: A ‘Provocative’ ‘Shot Across the Bow’,” 3 September 1998, www.fas.org/news/dprk/1998/wwwh8903.html.
10. Kyle Mizokami, “ISIS has inadvertently sent Japan a blunt message: Militarize,” The Week, 28 January 2015, www.theweek.com/articles/535979/isis-inadvertently-sent-japan-blunt-message-militarize.
11. “Japan Enacts Major Changes to its Self-defense Laws,” Stars and Stripes, 18 September 2015, www.stripes.com/news/pacific/japan-enacts-major-changes-to-its-self-defense-laws-1.368783.
12. CNN, “World’s Largest Economies: 2015,” www.money.cnn.com/news/economy/world_economies_gdp/.
13. “Japan’s Building 2 Aegis Destroyers,” The Diplomat, 23 July 2014, www.thediplomat.com/2014/07/japans-building-2-aegis-destroyers/. “After the Izumo, What’s Next for Japan’s Navy?,” The Diplomat, 30 March 2015, www.thediplomat.com/2015/03/after-the-izumo-whats-next-for-japans-navy/.
14. “Japan Ends Decades-Long Ban on Export of Weapons,” New York Times, 1 April 2014, www.nytimes.com/2014/04/02/world/asia/japan-ends-half-century-ban-on-weapons-exports.html?_r=0.
15. Clint Richards, “Australia May Buy ‘Off-The-Shelf’ Japanese Subs,” The Diplomat, 3 September 2014, www.thediplomat.com/2014/09/australia-may-buy-off-the-shelf-japanese-subs/.
16. Kyle Mizokami, “Japan’s Emerging Defense Export Industry,” 23 February 2015, http://news.usni.org/2015/02/23/japans-emerging-defense-export-industry.
17. Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, “Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets Three Designation Criteria Disclosed,” 14 October 2014, www.jimin.jp/english/news/126424.html.
18. Administration of William J. Clinton, “Executive Order 12958—Classified National Security Information”, 17 April 1995, www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-1995-04-24/pdf/WCPD-1995-04-24-Pg634.pdf.
19. DAC Beachcroft, “Japan—The Basic Act of Cybersecurity Passed by National Diet,” 6 November, 2014, www.dacbeachcroft.com/publications/publications/japan-the-basic-act-of-cybersecurity-passed-on-by-national-diet.
20. LT Joseph S. Marinucci, USN, “U.S., Japan Maritime Self Defense Force Mine Countermeasure Activities,” 26 February 2015, www.pacom.mil/Media/News/tabid/5693/Article/570980/us-japan-maritime-self-defense-force-mine-countermeasure-activities.aspx.
21. A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, March 2015, www.navy.mil/local/maritime/150227-CS21R-Final.pdf.