In Congress, the Pentagon, various federal budget offices, and defense-study organizations, the question often being asked is: How do we pay for the future fleet being proposed by the Navy? As previously addressed in this column, the planned 12-submarine Ohio replacement program threatens to break the bank. The Government Accountability Office has estimated the cost to design and build the 12 submarines at $96 billion over the next decade and a half.1
Over the past decade total shipbuilding appropriations have averaged just under $16 billion per year. The Navy has proposed a shipbuilding budget for the next decade that averages about $19 billion per year (in constant 2015 dollars). The probability of this increase occurring in the near future is virtually nil because of the Budget Control Act (BCA, i.e., “sequestration”), the increasing non-Defense entitlements (Social Security, Affordable Care Act, etc.), the size of the federal debt, and—especially—other service requirements for modernization.
In an effort to ease the shipbuilding burden, in 2015 a National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund was established by Congress. The fund is intended to provide a means of paying for the Ohio replacement submarines (SSBNX) outside of the Navy’s shipbuilding account. The funding mechanism, initiated by Representative Randy Forbes (R-VA), has come into conflict with the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, chaired by Representative Rodney Frelinghuysen (R-NJ); hence, the account exists, but at press time there was no money in the fund.
While there is no question that the United States requires nuclear deterrence (strike) forces, funding is a complex issue. Surprisingly, the nuclear modernization programs—for all services—currently planned would increase the overall defense budget by less than 2 percent over the BCA budget caps during the next decade, according to the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.2
Still, $96 billion for the Ohio replacement over a decade and a half could bankrupt the Navy’s shipbuilding budget. The service’s ship-procurement plans call for one nuclear-propelled carrier of the Gerald Ford class every five years, 12 ballistic missile submarines between Fiscal Years 2021 and 2035, and an average of two attack submarines (SSNs) per year. Amortizing the follow-on Ford-class carriers over five years (total cost is some $15 billion per ship), about $6 billion per SSBNX (after the lead ship), and almost $5 billion for two SSNs per year totals some $14 billion per annum—close to the total average shipbuilding account over the past decade.
The Navy hopes for an increase in shipbuilding funds to about $19 billion annually to provide for destroyer-type ships, littoral combat ships, amphibious ships, and auxiliary ships. Again, the probability of an increase in the basic shipbuilding fund is small.
If the Navy can convince the various stakeholders that the Ohio replacement is a national requirement, there may be funding for the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund. But if such a funding effort is successful, will Air Force and aerospace-industry supporters in Congress demand a “National Air-Based Deterrence Fund” to pay for the planned Long-Range Strike-Bomber (LRS-B) outside of Air Force procurement funding? And what happens in a few years when the Navy requires funding for the replacement missile for the Trident D-5? And a few years after that, when the Air Force needs funding for the replacement for the land-based Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles?3
Thus, in many respects the establishment of the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund was very shortsighted. Much more saleable and much more practical would have been setting up a National Deterrence System Fund under Title 10 provisions—to encompass all strategic offensive weapons: submarine- and land-launched ballistic missiles, and land-based aircraft with a nuclear-strike capability. Of course, other options are available for the sea-based component, such as submarine-launched cruise missiles with nuclear warheads for strategic strike.4
Such a national, all-service deterrence fund could be sponsored within the Department of Defense by the combatant commander, U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM). This would be similar to the current situation wherein the combatant commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), has budgetary control over special equipment for various special-operations forces that is separate from its respective service procurement and maintenance funding. Although SOCOM’s budget is much smaller than would be a STRATCOM budget for acquisition of strategic weapon systems, the concept could be similar.
The Navy-only/Ohio-replacement appeal for special funding is unlikely to be approved. An all-service fund for strategic weapons would have a much better possibility of gaining congressional and White House support. Further, more credibility for such a funding method could be attained by an objective review of the future requirements for strategic offensive systems. During the Cold War the Polaris/Poseidon and then Trident programs were easily approved because of the imminent threat of nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union during that period. That threat has dissipated: Today neither Russia nor China poses a realistic nuclear threat to the United States for at least the near term.
With SSBNX submarines expected to be in service into the 2070s if not longer, an objective, long-view analysis of overall U.S. strategic-system requirements should be undertaken outside the military services. Such an analysis should look into the “mix” of systems—aircraft, land- and sea-based missiles—and whether for the future the “triad” should be retained, or possibly a “dyad,” and whether the sea-based portion should be only submarine-launched ballistic missiles or a combination of ballistic and cruise missiles.
The national strategic-deterrence issues are far too important to be left to the whims of military service officials, or to the peculiarities of congressional politics and funding procedures.
1. The best published analysis of Ohio-follow-on program costs is Eric J. Labs, “Finding Funding for the New Boomer,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 14, no. 2 (February 2015), 62–67.
2. Todd Harrison and Evan Braden Montgomery, Are U.S. Nuclear Forces Affordable? (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2015), 4.
3. The Air Force plans to purchase 80 to 100 LRS-B aircraft at a $550 million average unit procurement cost in base year 2010 dollars. It will be stealthy, use mature technologies, and will have an open architecture for future features. An initial operational capability is planned for the mid-2020s with certification to carry nuclear weapons approved two years later; optional manning is still being discussed
4. See Norman Polmar, “The Potential Budget-Buster: Part Two,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 140, no. 12 (December 2014), 84–85.
Mr. Polmar, a columnist for Proceedings and Naval History magazines, served as an adviser or consultant to three Secretaries of the Navy and two Chiefs of Naval Operations.