On 15 May, ministers from the eight Arctic states gathered in Kiruna, northern Sweden, for their biennial meeting under the Arctic Council. The meeting was an excellent example of the difficult separation between securitization and militarization in the High North. While ministers used the meeting to sign the Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response agreement, which highlighted the necessity for maritime safety and security in the region, there is also a growing military presence in the High North of assets that seem ill-suited to maritime-security operations. The Arctic Council specifically omits discussion of security and defense issues from its mandate, largely to avoid the potentially contentious issues of Arctic military deployments, but the lack of discussion furthers the idea that this is a competitive militarization of the region.
This raises the question of whether increasing military presence in the Arctic is driven by a desire to ensure safety and security within a wider international cooperative architecture, or by a desire to secure national sovereignty claims in disputed areas and insure against the activities of erstwhile enemies and current rivals. In short, is the growing military footprint in the Arctic a case of militarization or simply securitization?
Northern Exposure
The increased military deployments to the Arctic come amid rapid climatic change in the region that is creating newfound opportunities in hydrocarbon exploitation, mineral extraction, fishing, trade, and tourism. Seasonal sea ice in the Arctic is retreating at a rate far greater than previously expected. Minimum sea ice extent in 2012 was reached in September at approximately 1.32 million square miles, the lowest level since 1979 and almost 50 percent smaller than the 1979–2000 average.1
As a result, more areas of the Arctic are open to navigation than have been for perhaps thousands of years. This brings with it the possibility of new and more efficient trading routes between Asia and Europe. For centuries, Europeans sought the mythical Northwest Passage, finally conquered by the indefatigable Roald Amundsen in the early 20th century. However, it is the Northern Sea Route (NSR) along Russia’s extensive coastline that presents the more immediate opportunity. In late 2012, the Ob River became the first liquefied natural gas tanker to pass through the NSR traveling from Norway to Japan.2 Traffic remains limited along the NSR but is growing: In 2012, 46 vessels sailed the entire route, compared to just 34 in 2011 and four in 2010. In the very long term, there may even be a more direct route over the North Pole during summer.3
These routes are much shorter than traditional paths through the Suez or Panama canals. The route from Shanghai to Hamburg, for example, is 3,231 miles shorter through the Arctic than the Suez Canal. This has potentially significant cost savings for shipping companies, with up to three or four weeks saved on any particular Asia-Europe journey.
It is not just maritime transport that is set to benefit from the opening of the Arctic. The exploitation of the Arctic Ocean’s riches will also bring other economic benefits to the littoral countries and international fishing companies. A March 2012 U.S. Geological Survey report suggested the Arctic Ocean could hold 66 billion barrels of oil and 237,000 billion cubic feet of gas.4 The proportion of fish catches to the global total is currently low (at about 5 percent), but as sea ice increasingly retreats, warmer seas attract migrating stocks, and fishermen are able to operate for longer periods farther north, this resource is likely to become more plentiful as well.
Pole Positioning
All this potential commercial gain and the largely unregulated environment in the High North have led to a media narrative emphasizing state-based competition, with newspapers eager to emphasize the seemingly zero-sum calculations of nations striving to secure resources.5 The reality is somewhat more complex. While such a narrative has been supported by occasionally belligerent rhetoric and an increase in military deployments, messages sent by politicians and cooperative exercises are conflicting.
On one hand, the changes in the Arctic appear to be encouraging a rivalry for maritime rights. Most infamously, in August 2007 a Russian research expedition planted a titanium flag on the seabed at the North Pole. Although not an official government act, this propagandistic deed suggested a competitive mentality akin to imperial-era territorial grabs. A number of territorial disputes in the Arctic exist, some of them dormant, such as the Canadian-Danish Hans Island disagreement, and some largely benign, such as the U.S.-Canadian Beaufort Sea dispute. But the flag-planting episode was related to the most contentious of the disputes: a trilateral disagreement between Canada, Denmark, and Russia over their extended continental shelves, particularly the Lomonosov Ridge.
Accompanying such events and disputes has been a steady increase in Arctic deployments and operations. Russia, long the primary military force in the High North, has led the five Arctic littoral states in terms of military developments. The region was used regularly by the Soviet Union for submarine deployment under the ice in the Cold War. Russian submarine activity here was a concern not only for the United States during the Cold War, but also Scandinavian countries that on occasion saw Russian submarines approach major population centers. In 1981, for example, a Soviet Whiskey-class submarine ran aground in Gåsefjärden, Sweden, and the 1982 Håsfjärden incident involved an intense sub hunt in the Stockholm archipelago for what was believed to be a Soviet submarine.6
The Northern Fleet, based in Severomorsk and along the Kola peninsula and White Sea, has been the most substantial of Russia’s five naval organizations and home to just under two thirds of the country’s submarine fleet, including three fourths of the currently operational ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) fleet.7 While it has seen sizeable reductions in its capacity since the Cold War, there is now a concerted effort to rebuild or at least rejuvenate their presence in the north. The first new SSBN in more than 20 years, the Yury Dolgoruky, entered the Northern Fleet in January, with more to follow in the Borei class. The 200th Motor Rifle Brigade in Pechenga will form the base of a new Artic unit that will be established within the Northern Fleet by 2015. Airfields that have been abandoned since the fall of the Soviet Union may be brought back into operation, while a squadron of MiG-31s will be deployed to Rogachevo on the island of Novaya Zamlya in Archangelsk Oblast by the end of this year.8
Russian activity in the Arctic has already increased. In August 2007, Moscow renewed long-range aviation patrols to the Atlantic, Pacific, and over the Arctic Oceans. Strategic bomber flights along the Norwegian coast increased from just 14 in 2006 to 97 in 2008; although this declined in subsequent years, it returned to over 55 flights in 2012.9 In March 2013, two Tu-22M3 Backfire bombers and four Su-27 multirole aircraft flew within 20 miles of Sweden’s borders; the failure of the Swedish air force to scramble in response to the night-time exercises led to searing media criticism.10
Russia is hardly alone in pursuing military development in the north. In Scandinavia, Norway has been the most active country modernizing its military, as its resource-driven economy and concomitant defense expenditure has not suffered the same restrictions as elsewhere in Europe. Norway’s five Fridtjof Nansen–class frigates—the last being commissioned in 2011—have introduced a substantially more capable surface combatant to the navy, supported by six fast and stealthy Skjold–class patrol craft. Together, these two classes have greatly improved Norway’s ability to defend its coastline. The importance of the High North to Oslo was also reflected in its decision to relocate the National Joint Headquarters from Jåttå in southern Norway to Bodø in the north in August 2009.
Denmark, too, has embarked on its largest procurement program to date with its three Iver Huitfeldt–class frigates. Copenhagen’s focus on the High North was exemplified by the formation of a joint Arctic Command in October 2012 based in Nuuk, Greenland.
Neighborly Relations
The various platforms procured by these Arctic littoral states suggest a strategic focus on state-on-state warfare, and hence a militarization of the region, rather than an investment in the maritime-security capabilities that would benefit the growing commercial interests in the High North. This sentiment was shared by Russian President Vladimir Putin in February when he noted, “The danger of the militarization of the Arctic also persists.”11
In particular, Russia’s revitalization of its Arctic presence and Norway’s concern over its larger neighbor most resemble a form of competitive military procurement. The purchase of new SSBNs, nuclear-powered attack submarines, and Mistral-class amphibious-assault vessels does not suggest a primary concern with maritime safety and security, but rather a desire to project power into and beyond the Arctic Ocean. In the same sense, the development of missile-laden surface combatants in Norway and Denmark do not suggest a maritime-security role for the forces being developed in the Arctic.
There are, however, indications that these procurements do not necessarily indicate a destabilizing competition in the region. The slow procurement pace by most Arctic states suggests that purchases are unlikely to develop into a naval arms race. Denmark is not expected to witness any nominal growth in its defense budget until 2015. Swedish defense spending has declined from 2.5 per cent of GDP in 1998 to 1.2 per cent in 2012, and Finland’s defense expenditure to GDP has remained largely constant for the past decade.12 The United States has equally shown little appetite to invest in any particular Arctic-focused facilities or equipment, despite the issue garnering political attention. Its ice-breaking capabilities remain limited to one heavy icebreaker, the USCGC Polar Star (WAGB-10) and one medium, the USCGC Healy (WAGB-20).
Further, the recapitalization of the Russian Northern Fleet may be a concern to neighboring states, but it could equally be argued that it is largely designed to update clearly decrepit equipment, rather than build a more muscular Arctic presence to coerce neighbors. Russia has witnessed rapid increases in its defense budget and is undertaking a substantial revitalization of its fleet. However, this should be viewed in context: Russia’s navy has suffered from 20 years of stagnation since the end of the Cold War. Since 1994, only five new major surface vessels have entered service, and overall, much of Russia’s navy, particularly its submarine fleet, is in dire need of modernization. Russia’s newest naval shipbuilding program has deprioritized the more ambitious and less necessary ships, such as the aircraft carrier and cruiser program, in favor of platforms that will enable Moscow to monitor and govern its waters, such as frigates and corvettes.
There does, however, seem to be a contradiction in rhetoric, diplomacy, and arms procurement among Arctic states. Russia’s perceived naval modernization sits uneasily with its otherwise relatively accommodating Arctic strategy. The potential riches to be gained from the opening of the region are encouraging Moscow to seek collaborative solutions to problems, for example, the 2010 Barents Sea agreement between Russia and Norway was the result of 40 years of negotiation over maritime delimitation of potentially hydrocarbon-rich waters. Speaking in 2010, Putin suggested the Arctic should be a “zone of peace and cooperation,” and that “all the problems existing in the Arctic, including problems over the continental shelf, can be resolved through an atmosphere of partnership.”13
Norway, too, exhibits such behavior, as Oslo has pursued its naval modernization program in conjunction with a somewhat schizophrenic Arctic strategy. While the country urges closer cooperation with Russia, it also encourages greater NATO presence there through the Cold Response invitational exercises it has hosted since 2006. Since 2010, Norway has held joint exercises with Russia, through the bilateral Pomor series, reflecting Oslo’s desire to build a more collaborative military-military relationship with Moscow even as it purchases high-end platforms and weapons.
Canada is perhaps the exemplar of this confusion between the rhetoric surrounding seemingly competitive arms procurement and the reality of limited military capabilities in the High North. On one hand, Ottawa appears to be pursuing a competitive militarization in the region. Both Canada and Norway are expected to be major customers for the F-35 multirole aircraft program, with Oslo expected to buy 52 and Ottawa up to 65 aircraft, yet such aircraft do not appear to fulfill a significant maritime safety and security role. In an unusually bellicose statement, in 2007 Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper asserted that “Canada has a choice when it comes to defending our sovereignty in the Arctic: We either use it or lose it. And make no mistake this government intends to use it.”14
At the same time, the Canadian military has attempted to build a more regular presence in the Arctic. A 500-strong army response unit for the Arctic is likely to be formed, and the military expects to construct both a seasonally available deepwater docking/refueling facility at Nanisivik and a training center in Resolute Bay, where the airfield may also be upgraded. The armed forces have also held three recurring exercises in the far north since 2007: Operations Nanook, Nunalivut, and Nunakput are designed to assert Canadian sovereignty as well as increase Arctic readiness.
Nevertheless, Ottawa’s security force’s presence is still relatively modest, comprising Canadian Rangers, a small army reserve unit under Joint Taskforce North (JTFN), signals-intelligence facilities at Canadian Forces Station Alert, and a chain of radars that provides an early-warning system in the north. Part of the expansion of the security force presence in the High North is to add 300 rangers within JTFN to bring the total to approximately 1,900. Perhaps the most significant Canadian military development has been its plan to procure between six and eight ice-strengthened Arctic offshore patrol ships, to be launched in 2015 at a current cost of $3.1 billion. These vessels won’t boast offensive weapon systems; instead they will be humbly armed offshore patrol vessels intended to bolster Ottawa’s ability to secure its territorial sovereignty.
Examining rhetoric and action highlights a key aspect of the question over whether recent military developments represent a militarization or a securitization of the region: the importance of intent rather than capability. If the Canadian deployments are intended to deliver greater security for the growing number of commercial Arctic users and deliberately designed to avoid confrontation with other states, then it matters little whether there is an increase in military presence. Indeed, it is arguable that some of the recent procurement and deployments are perceived not only as symbolic assertions of sovereignty but also as necessary deployments of security forces to prevent the emergence of a large, ungoverned space. The increased military attention in the High North may therefore at least in part be a securitization of the region rather than a militarization.
Northern Cooperation
Where does this leave the debate over the militarization or securitization of the Arctic? In short, the answer is somewhat confused.
To a large extent, the growth in military capabilities is relatively restrained and driven more by the knowledge that the retreat of sea ice in the Arctic will create vast areas of water that will require governance as increased traffic will demand security and safety. This need not be a competitive procurement process; Russia’s desire to use the Arctic for commercial purposes means that Moscow is more likely to perceive collaboration as in its interests. Monitoring of traffic through different exclusive economic zones along the Northern Sea Route, for example, would necessitate coordination among constabulary agencies and information-sharing.
Recent diplomatic and military-military developments indicate that the Arctic states are aware of the need for greater interaction on military and security issues. The only two binding agreements the Arctic Council has reached have been designed to encourage cross-border cooperation on maritime safety and security issues: search-and-rescue and marine oil pollution. From the second chiefs of defense meeting in Denmark in June to the American-sponsored Arctic Security Forces roundtables, such military-military ties act as a form of confidence- building in a region with little security architecture.
In reality, the Arctic is an excellent opportunity to build closer ties among the littoral states, and thus between Russia, NATO states, and historical rivals. As Yevgeny Lukyanov, a deputy secretary of the Russian Security Council, noted in January, “Russia needs to cooperate with other Arctic states in strengthening and defending its Arctic borders and in monitoring transportation routes.”15
At the same time, it is also undeniable that some of the platforms being purchased owe more to traditional occupations of state rivalry than the principles of maritime security. There is therefore some level of military competition within the region, but it is restricted by austere budgets and a narrative that currently favors cooperation. The question is whether this will continue to be the defining plot of the Arctic.
1. “Arctic sea ice extent settles at record seasonal minimum,” National Snow and Ice Data Center, 19 September 2012, http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/2012/09/arctic-sea-ice-extent-settles-at-record-seasonal-minimum/.
2. Clifford Krauss, “Gas tanker completes Arctic sea journey,” The New York Times, 6 December 2012, http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/06/gas-tanker-completes-arctic-sea-journey/.
3. Trude Pettersen, “46 vessels through Northern Sea Route,” The Barents Observer, 23 November 2012.
4. “An Estimate of Undiscovered Conventional Oil and Gas Resources of the World, 2012,” U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet 2012–3802.
5. For examples of such headlines see, Gerd Braune, “Cold War in the Arctic? Countries Seek Piece of Pie,” Der Spiegel, 23 March 2009, and Steve Connor, “Arctic Ice Melt Will Bring Frosty Relations As Nations Navigate Across North Pole,” The Independent, 4 March 2013.
6. See Carl Bildt, “Sweden and the Soviet submarines,” Survival, July/August 1983, 165–169, for an overview of these incidents.
7. The Military Balance 2013 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies/Routledge, 2013), 231–234.
8. Märta Carlsson and Niklas Granholm, Russia and the Arctic: Analysis and Discussion of Russian Strategies, Swedish Defense Research Agency, March 2013, 26–28.
9. Katarzyna Zysk, “Military Aspects of Russia’s Arctic Policy: Hard Power and Natural Resources,” in James Kraska, ed., Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 86–87.
10. “Ryskt flyg övade anfall mot Sverige,” Svenska Dagbladet, 22 April 2013.
11. “Putin sees strategic balance threatened,” United Press International, 27 February 2013.
12. Gerard O’Dwyer, “Sweden’s Military Spending to Rise?” Defense News, 1 February 2013.
13. James Brooke, “Putin Stresses Cooperation in Arctic Resources Disputes,” Voice of America, 22 September 2010.
14. “Canada to strengthen Arctic claim,” BBC News, 10 August 2007.
15. “Russia calls for Tougher Arctic Security,” RIA Novosti, 21 January 2013.