Launch the Puma!
ed resources and increasing naval mission requirements, low-cost ultra-light unmanned aerial systems offer enormous capabilities to the surface fleet. The U.S. Navy is anexpeditionary force whose continued success depends on being always engaged, self-reliant, and adaptable.1 As Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert said, the Navy must place warfighting first, operate forward, and be always ready.
The service must fulfill that mandate and dominate wherever it operates. To do that, it must exploit the infosphere smartly, swiftly, effectively, and affordably. The AeroVironment RQ-20A Puma AE (all environment) ultralight unmanned aerial system (UAS) does just that for surface combatants.
Surveillance for the Surface Fleet
Tacticians benefit from monitoring the enemy. The Puma provides much needed information. It offers a ship’s captain an eye-in-the-sky to better assess intent, force composition, and magnitude of incoming surface threats to allow for either engagement or evasion on favorable terms.
To that effect, the USS Benfold (DDG-65) recently tested the UAS. The system demonstrated capabilities addressing the tactical need to better assess the nature of a potential adversary. It also highlighted the notion that not all warfighting readiness enhancements must be expensive, be handicapped by long research-and-development timelines, and be technologically complicated.
Unmanned aerial systems are ubiquitous on the battlefield. In fact, over the nearly 23,000 surveillance missions flown in the first nine months of 2011, UAVs delivered persistent presence in support of ongoing military operations.2 The vehicles’ frequent use is evidence of their effectiveness and utility to ground troops. It is a capability sorely needed on surface combatants at sea.
Naval surveillance requirements exist in both oceanic and littoral environments. They vary from broad-area maritime-surveillance needs addressed by expensive and complex systems such as Global Hawk, to short-range, tactical, quick-response demands better addressed by smaller, simpler, and more economical aircraft like the Puma.
Although high-end systems have proved their worth, smaller unmanned systems must not be overlooked in the face of expanding operational requirements and shrinking budgets. What the surface fleet needs to complement complex and expensive systems is an affordable, rugged, simple, easy-to-repair, easy-to-fly, unmanned aerial system. The Puma fits the bill.
A third-generation UAS made by AeroVironment designed for land and maritime operations, this versatile aircraft offers operators the ability to land on any rugged surface—including water—making it ideal for maritime use.
The hand-launched battery-powered Puma is quiet and difficult to spot at altitude. It can be loaded with electro-optical and infrared cameras and has a 15km range. It can be launched in a matter of minutes, flown to a desired location, loiter over targets of interest, and deliver real-time high-resolution images.
The Benfold tested the Puma against simulated small boat attacks. The system proved superb in providing a clear picture almost instantly. The airborne vantage point provided data to ascertain inbound crafts’ intentions with great effect. The system was also used to monitor a visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) exercise with similar results.
In its ability to be recovered on both land and water, be nearly undetectable, durable, and compatible with the destroyer’s radio frequency, the tested system proved effective in exploring and exploiting the battlespace.
As an added advantage, the Puma is a battle-proven program of record. Special Operations Command employs it and has awarded a $65.5 million firm-fixed-price contract delivery order for new Pumas. It is another buy under an existing $200 million procurement contract.3 The Army and the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command also use this system. The next logical step is for it to deploy on surface combatants.
Adaptability on the Offense
To validate the compatibility of a light UAS at sea, the Benfold conducted seven Puma missions off the Southern California coast. Test flights validated the system as a viable solution for the surface fleet.
As an early variant of the Arleigh Burke–class destroyer, the Benfold has neither organic helicopter support nor associated aerial surveillance capabilities. For her and those like her, the Puma is an affordable game changer.
Nonetheless, the system does have limitations.
With a two-hour endurance and a 15km range, the vehicle’s reach falls short of that of an SH-60 Seahawk. However, the three aircraft included in the basic package can be continually rotated to persistently gather intelligence, provide reconnaissance, and transmit target data to its operator. Even ships with embarked helicopters can deploy the system to obtain short-range, short-order surface surveillance with little risk to aircrews.
In testing, the Puma proved effective against simulated small boat attacks. Operators were able to determine the nature of the threat, the composition of the crew, and the presence of weapons. The information was fed in real time to the ship where it increased situational awareness, decreased decision-making time, and reduced decisional errors. The impact this capability has in high-threat, low-reaction-time littoral environments is enormous.
With the Puma, surface combatants can make more accurate and timely hostile-intent determinations to either avert an unnecessary engagement or consummate one more confidently. It is an informational quantum leap at sea.
The tested system also validated its value during VBSS exercises. The aircraft was launched well ahead of boarding evolutions and enabled the Benfold to relay threat information to the boarding team. Once the VBSS team boarded a training merchant vessel, the Puma persistently monitored the vessel from above where it gathered and transmitted high-definition, close-in views of the tactical situation, and provided 360-degree coverage over the target. It also supplied the boarding team with up-to-the-minute intelligence. Here, too, the benefits to the warfighter are difficult to overstate.
With further investment, the Puma can also be employed for kinetic effect by pairing it with lethal armed drones, like the Switchblade system, or a manned attack aircraft. The system can perform aerial spotting in shore bombardment missions as well. It is a capability whose utility is only limited by the constraints of the imagination.
Affordable Self-Reliance
Although a joint force asset, as a ballistic-missile-defense ship, the Benfold is almost guaranteed independent operations. It must therefore be ready to respond to a wide range of demands with little or no outside assistance. Those demands manifest themselves often in or near the littorals where low-intensity missions such as counterpiracy, maritime-interception operations, oil-platform protection, and humanitarian operations rule.
The improved tactical surveillance capabilities that come with the Puma allow the ship and her operational commanders increased flexibility in support of unconventional or low-intensity missions. The Puma enhances low-end maritime capabilities and allows both the on-scene tactical commander and operational commanders at maritime operations centers greater flexibility and capability to obtain high-value intelligence at low cost.
As an added benefit, the system is simple and easy to use. Just about any sailor can be trained to operate it. The operator training curriculum takes about two weeks, and our sailor picked it up as naturally as he would a typical video game. It was no surprise—the controller was designed to resemble a SONY PlayStation or Microsoft Xbox controller.
Manning should be a consideration as well. Unlike some of the more complex systems, such as Scan Eagle, no additional personnel are necessary on board ship to operate the UAS. Puma has a small footprint, it is easy to use, and affordable. When compared with Northrop Grumman’s $16 million MQ-8 Fire Scout or $180 million RQ-4 Global Hawk, the $350,000 Puma is a smart buy.4
Operational Flexibility
Over the past decade, the Navy has learned—or relearned—that new and evolving threats emerge with little or no warning. Low-end threats such as piracy, terrorism, small-boat attacks, and trafficking continually challenge the freedom of the seas. Operational flexibility is vital to naval operations.
The attention focused on larger and longer-range UAS such as Global Hawk and Fire Scout has eclipsed the potential of much smaller and cheaper vehicles capable of supporting surface combatants as well as amphibious ships and the Marines they support. For them the need to explore and exploit the enemy is vital. The Puma addresses that need.
In this era of expanding threats and shrinking budgets we do need to put warfighting first, operate forward, and be always ready. But we must do so smartly and affordably. It would be tactically and fiscally prudent to acquire simpler and readily available aerial surveillance systems and deploy them at sea. Indeed, the time has come for surface warriors to launch the Puma!
1. Roger W. Barnett, Navy Strategic Culture, Why the Navy Thinks Differently (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009).
2. Noah Schachtman, “Flying Spy Surge: Surveillance Missions Over Afghanistan Quadruple,” Wired, 19 October 2011, www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/10/flying-spy-surge/.
3. “Puma AE: An ‘All Environment’ Mini-UAV,” Defense Industry Daily, 19 June 2012, www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Puma-AE-An-All-Environment-Mini-UAV-04962/.
4. “Analysis of the Fiscal Year 2012 Pentagon Spending Request,” Cost of War, National Priorities Project, 15 February 2011 http://costofwar.com/en/publications/2011/analysis-fiscal-year-2012-pentagon-spending-request.
Rapid Planning for the Maritime Component Commander
When a crisis action team is in the planning stage, developing the rapid-response planning process (R2P2) for the maritime component commander gives the executing forces the maximum time allowable to prepare for the assigned mission. The most persuasive observation of the planning efforts during the 2010 Operation Unified Response to the Haitian earthquake was the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit’s ability to develop, approve, and execute plans in a notably fast and efficient manner compared with those of other task force elements. Even with the short time allowed the 22d MEU (SOC), it was able to provide planning and execution products that were both complete and professional.
To give some context to the time restriction imposed upon the Marines, the 22d MEU (SOC) arrived in the operating area a few days after the earthquake. While the planning behind the humanitarian-assistance effort had enough lead time to be a deliberate planning event, it was also one of the standard tasks covered under the R2P2. This standardized mission had had been practiced and honed to the proverbial 80 percent solution, with associated battle books, smart packs, and other supporting products available. The MEU tailored the off-the-shelf plan for the specific mission requirements of Operation Unified Response.
To create the effects that the R2P2 process produces, it is necessary to understand four main concepts: the standard operating procedures (SOP) for R2P2, the development of a standard crisis action team (CAT) concept, development of predetermined mission type tailorable off-the-shelf planning products, and a dynamic information management/knowledge management program.
Standard Operating Timeline Procedures
The SOP to be followed ensures a methodology to step through the plan to execution. Within the planning staff, the CAT and supporting planning boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups (B2C2WGs) all know their role and where they are involved in the timeline. This understanding facilitates the process and, in particular, when and which products are delivered, and to whom (e.g., the CAT or operators).
The R2P2 methodology allows for focus on the mission to the exclusion of the distractions that affect planning and execution. Because the procedures are practiced routinely, it makes the steps second nature. Figure 1 shows the comparison between the R2P2 method and the standard Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP) or similar process, along with the time frame allotted for each step of R2P2. Followed consistently, the R2P2 process timeline allows for mission execution in a mere six hours. Each step of it has a role to fill as a corollary to the MCPP.
During the first step of the R2P2 process, the CAT will meet to accomplish an abbreviated mission analysis. The primary output of CAT I will be developing the commander’s initial planning guidance. The commander’s personal involvement will prevent major surprises in course of action (COA) development, yet still allow for application of operational art by the planners. As the products developed for a baseline mission are general, there must be substantial effort into validation of planning assumptions and limitations. This effort permits the tailorable plans to be modified for the unique requirement of a given mission.
The second step is course of action development. During this phase, a COA will be designed to generate options for follow-on comparison that satisfy the mission, intent, and guidance of the commander. This step does not produce a significant written description, but relies on a visual depiction. Therefore, identification of personnel, who can quickly and efficiently use tools such as PowerPoint or Command and Control Personal Computer, will be critical to show the planner’s vision in the time allotted.
The third step is the second convening of the CAT (CAT II). Now wargaming and the comparison and decision steps are combined into one. CAT II relies heavily on the commander, the CAT, and other subject-matter experts, to ensure that the course of action is supportable and able to accomplish the mission. Refinement of limitations and assumptions will assist in the risk management for a given mission and its subsequent mitigation. Standing plans are made with a built-in list of planning factors that will only serve to decrease risk for the commander’s decision. At the end of CAT II the commander will select or modify a course of action. Once it is chosen, additional specific guidance will be provided as the staff moves to the detailed planning.
The fourth step, and the longest, is that planning. Significant effort and input from the staff is required to create the final product of this phase with the output being the confirmation brief. It also allows the commander to have a long period of time to fulfill other responsibilities.
The final step is delivering the confirmation brief. This has a standardized procedure requiring all players to understand their individual role during it. The brief gathers both the planners and key personnel who execute the mission in one room, although this may require leveraging technology solutions (e.g., the use of Defense Connect Online, or video teleconferencing) because of dispersal of the forces involved. The purpose is to ensure that the entire plan has been coordinated and synchronized, including the completion of all the staff’s concurrent and parallel planning. This allows the commander to understand unique mission differences, as opposed to the approved baseline. The brief also obviates having to read an operations order, as the brief doubles as this task. Because all of the key stakeholders are participating in the confirmation brief, the order is a formality.
Crisis Action Team
The R2P2 CAT relies heavily on the senior leadership of the staff, as well as the senior leaders of subordinate elements. This is a forcing function for senior involvement but, because of the R2P2 timeline, this appears to be an efficient use of their time. Naval staffs certainly have crisis-action teams. However, the R2P2 CAT is more formalized as it is process-driven rather than ad hoc. Within the R2P2 process there is a methodology to the supporting B2C2WGs’ help in the planning effort. Following the process by the maritime component commander’s CAT can become more than simply focusing on quick decisions, but be a value-added part of the planning process.
The a priori involvement of the crisis action team in creating the products to be used in a contingency is where the team can have an early impact. The R2P2 process works in a time-compressed environment in contingencies because time and effort have been spent in creating planning products. Products vetted through the CAT ensure completeness, and it acts as a situational awareness builder, enhancing the team’s practical application. The list of what missions are to be planned for the process is outlined in Marine Corps Order (MCO) 3120.9C. The packages that are created include everything that a planner and an operator would need, and many of these baseline products could be developed by subordinate task forces.
The information-management and knowledge-management (IM/KM) hurdles for the process are steep. Although this cannot be examined here, IM/KM is truly owned by the entire command, not just the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Communication Network (N6). Identification of the management rules during R2P2 must meet the rigors of this environment, because the speed of the process relies upon the successful resolution of these issues.
R2P2 at the Maritime Component Commander
As with the harmony between the Marine Corps Planning Process and R2P2, the creation of a maritime component commander (MCC) R2P2 process will not circumvent the Naval Planning Process, but rather complement it. This will allow movement from an informal system of rapid planning to a well-ordered and disciplined approach.
Each subordinate task force has core competencies, which could be matched with a given Naval Mission Essential Task that could be identified as an MCC R2P2 mission. A short list that may serve as a point of departure includes short-fuse maritime interception operations, immediate piracy response, salvage operations in a hostile environment, humanitarian assistance, noncombatant evacuation operations, embassy reinforcement, search and rescue, mine strike, immediate reconnaissance, and environmental-disaster mitigation.
The adoption of R2P2 ensures that the commander has been exposed to the basic mission products, and the subordinate forces have trained to the missions. The process will also serve to flex the staff processes. It allows for standardization of not only how the CAT approaches a problem that the commander must decide upon, but also how the greater staff supports the commander. At the operational level of war, R2P2 can increase the MCC’s ability to deal with the eventuality of a major contingency.
Command and Control: The Warfighter’s Glue
By Admiral Richard C. Macke, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Command and control (C2) is the glue that ensures all the facets of an operation, be it warfighting or humanitarian, adhere to each other. It is the means by which all military endeavors are coordinated and focused on the objective. C2 is not only practiced during specific operations; it is a continuous activity employed by commanders at all levels.
All five warfare domains have a C2 component. Be it air, land, sea, space, or cyberspace, the ability to understand the environment and objectives, assign forces, put them in the right place, and amend plans when the situation demands is critical to success. In the joint arena, the C2 of all five domains through one C2 structure is required to yield a cohesive effort.
In simple terms, command and control is a decision loop. Detection provides a wealth of data about the normal operational environment and any evolving crisis. Analysis fuses that data into information, which will be of use to the commander. Decision transforms information into actionable knowledge on which alternative courses of action can be evaluated. For the first three steps of the C2 decision loop, data has been transformed into information and then into actionable knowledge. Once the decision is made, execution gets the orders out to the forces to begin the operation. Then, the commander monitors the operation and makes any changes necessary to counter an unanticipated enemy reaction or unforecast change in the humanitarian situation.
What is described is the decision cycle often referred to in the context of The Art of War, by Sun Tzu. “If you can operate inside your enemy’s decision cycle you will ensure victory.” Equally important in applying the decision cycle is Carl von Clausewitz’s “apply your strength against your enemy’s weakness.” The decision cycle discovers the weak points of the enemy and provides the means to apply friendly strength at those points.
Some form of command and control is as old as warfare itself. But C2 is vastly different today. The single biggest change is the result of the explosion in information technology. Technology has provided the means to acquire and store multiple terabytes of data, dissect that data, and turn it into useful information. Technology creates a single universe where distance is not a factor. Cyber has created a new paradigm in command and control, some good and some bad. The warrior must understand and embrace this to be successful in today’s technology driven C2 environment.
One other aspect of the information explosion that has a tremendous impact on our warfighting and humanitarian operations is the omnipresence of new and social media. What were once isolated and controlled military activities are now exposed and broadcast instantaneously around the world. Social media and the plethora of small, very sophisticated computers allow information to reach the far corners of the earth at the speed of light. Knowledge of what is happening in military events is no longer the sole purview of the military. These factors complicate the application of friendly command and control, increase an enemy’s knowledge of events, and enable them to execute more effective actions and reactions.
Breaking down the nodes of the command and control loop may provide a better understanding of what is involved in this complex cycle.
Detect
A plethora of data is collected from diverse sources on a minute-to-minute basis. Sensors from the bottom of the oceans to the outer limits of space provide continuous data. Weapon platforms such as radars and cyber sensors input data at rates beyond the human ability to absorb. All this data is not applicable to a specific operation and much of it is pure data that means nothing in and of itself. But all must be collected and sent on its path in the command and control loop.
Analyze
To give meaning to the data, it must be analyzed, correlated, and fused, and much of it needs to be discarded as not pertinent. Some data is relatively easy to analyze; a radar target coincident with an electronic surveillance hit, a satellite photograph correlated to a human input. Much of the analysis needs to be based on historic knowledge of the enemy or natural disaster. The analysis rejects the extraneous data and transforms the pertinent data into information of use to the operational commander. Much of that analysis is currently performed by people, which takes too long. Improved computer-based analytic tools will speed the process—though the human element must remain to ensure what the machine relates makes logical sense. The analysis must also account for friendly and neutral forces.
Decide
An event has been detected or the possibility that an event will occur is known. Now, the question is what to do. Some experienced commanders know what action to take for certain events. They may even know what forces they want to employ if they have real-time status on readiness and location of those forces. However, in most cases there will be alternative courses of action that need to be considered and usually simulated to determine probable outcomes. Some variations possible during execution may need to be inserted into the simulation to determine how a specific course of action will hold up under changing circumstances.
Forces available need to be evaluated in terms of readiness, capabilities applicable to the specific event, proximity to the event, air or sealift availability, etc. Simulation results need to be studied and a final course of action decided. Possibly some preplanned modifications need to be included in the decision based on possible or probable changes during execution. This must be accomplished rapidly to stay inside the enemy’s decision loop, especially in the case of combat.
Execute
Delivering execution orders to forces takes time if the deployment orders need to be written, reviewed by several layers of the commander’s staff, and then transmitted in final form. Automated development of the operations and deployment orders can speed this process. Once the forces and actions have been determined it would be fairly simple to have the C2 system write the orders for simultaneous review by those who need to do so and transmit them. Time, which is critical, would be saved. Most operations orders follow a general format, which would ease the ability of the “system” to write them.
Monitor
“The first plan never succeeds.” There is truth in this statement, since in many instances the first plan did not account for all the information and alternatives available. Even if it were all accurate and accounted for, the enemy—man or natural—might not act in the predicted manner. Sometimes that reaction will be stupid and ease the problem; sometimes it will be profound, requiring a whole new evaluation of courses of action to be taken. In most cases there will be minor modifications required that are relatively easy to execute.
This last node of the command-and-control loop is really the start of another trip around the loop. The monitoring becomes the detection for the next set of data to analyze so that a different decision can be made and executed responding to fluid situations.
The transport that connects these nodes is critical to the effectiveness of our C2. It is also a vulnerability that must be understood and accounted for.
An increasingly significant threat to effective command and control is cyber warfare. The use of cyber to disrupt the C2 loop, confuse orders transmitted, and inject false information into the data-gathering process will result in bad decisions that will favor the enemy. Cyber attacks can interrupt the connectivity between nodes and cause a total failure of the C2 decision cycle. The security and resilience of friendly C2 is paramount but very difficult to assure in today’s cyber-dominated world. Many hackers, independent or state sponsored, are working continuously to penetrate networks, both secure and unclassified, to gain information, disrupt transport, or plant malware that can be activated during a crisis.
While cyberspace is a global warfare domain, the local/geographic commander must have a total understanding of what is happening in cyberspace relative to their area of interest and must have the ability to influence cyberspace activities to ensure the C2 loop remains whole. In the event of a successful cyber attack, that commander must have the ability to take actions necessary for fighting through the attack, to include setting the priorities for recovery of C2 wholeness. The operational commander/on-scene commander must have the ability to exercise the appropriate level of command and control over all warfare domains in his operating area; land, sea, air, space, and especially cyberspace. Doctrine must be developed that clearly recognizes and enables the local/geographic commander’s equities in cyberspace.
No operation in war or peace can be effectively conducted without clear and consistent command and control of forces assigned. At all levels of the command structure, C2 is used to employ forces. Commanders must understand all its complexities and understand their entire command-and-control system to ensure victory. Effective C2, more effective than the enemy’s, is essential to victory. It is the glue that provides cohesion to the warrior’s plans.
Admiral Macke is a retired naval aviator who has commanded from the squadron to the combatant commander level. He retired as the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Command.