Perilous Fight: America’s Intrepid War with Britain on the High Seas, 1812-1815
Stephen Budiansky. New York: Knopf, 2011. 422 pp. Illus. Maps. Notes. Bibliog. Index. $35.00.
Reviewed by David Curtis Skaggs
As we enter the bicentennial year of this “second war for American independence,” the interaction between the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy before and during the War of 1812 continues to attract historians and popular-history authors. Versions of the story have included, over the years, those by James Fenimore Cooper, Theodore Roosevelt, and C. S. Forester, all of whom emphasized U.S. ship-to-ship victories while neglecting British tactical successes and the importance of the blockade to Britain’s strategy. Others, including Alfred Thayer Mahan, have focused on the advent of high-seas U.S. fleet operations to justify the Navy’s expansion in the late 19th century.
Into the melee of more contemporary views, Stephen Budiansky’s Perilous Fight provides a survey of tactical engagements while concentrating on the strategic activities of both governments. Primarily an author of studies concerned with science, espionage, and national-intelligence issues, the author turned to historical topics recently. In Perilous Fight he undertakes a thorough review of secondary literature and offers new insights from an investigation of primary sources that others have neglected. Whenever there is a good personal story to tell, Budiansky is sure to include it, even if it has little relevance to the subject at hand.
At the core of his analysis is the role of William Jones, secretary of the Navy 1813–14. The papers at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania provide an interesting source for this U.S. official’s personal attitudes that are missing in governmental papers. A Revolutionary War privateer and international maritime merchant, Jones brought administrative and commercial sailing experience beyond that of most of his captains. Central to his strategy was an aversion to single-ship combat and an emphasis on the destruction of British commercial shipping from the English Channel to the central Pacific. Unfortunately several of his captains, more concerned with glory than strategy, engaged in battles that ended in disaster for their ships, their crews, and themselves.
Going against Mahan’s interpretation, Budiansky argues that John Rodgers and Stephen Decatur understood and appreciated the secretary’s hit-and-run strategy, with its diversion of force, and were not advocates of a blue-water fleet structured to fight the Royal Navy. They comprehended that in a naval war where the enemy had twice as many ships as the U.S. Navy had guns, a David-versus-Goliath approach would have significant impact on the opponent’s merchants and politicians.
To implement this policy, Jones stressed the construction of sloops-of-war. These were cheaply and quickly built, required fewer sailors, and more easily escaped the ever-tightening blockade than did the ships-of-the-line and frigates sought by senior naval officers and congressmen. Some of the best writing in this book concerns the cruises of the Wasp, Essex, and Peacock.
A supplement to the policy was Jones’ encouragement of privateering, which inflicted more damage on the British merchant marine than did the U.S. Navy. Budiansky provides all-too-brief descriptions of some of these cruises. Privateering as a strategic policy deserves more detailed treatment.
As for British strategy, Budiansky focuses on the activities of John W. Croker, secretary to the Admiralty Board, 1809–30. Croker’s critical and often sarcastic letters to the admirals posted to the North Atlantic blockading squadron are one of the highlights of this book. Finally the Admiralty Board relieved Vice Admiral Sir John B. Warren, installing as more aggressive commanders Vice Admiral Alexander F. I. Cochrane and Rear Admiral George Cockburn. The latter’s Chesapeake Bay raiding policy involved outrageous British troop behavior at Hampton, Virginia; repulses at Craney Island outside Norfolk and at Baltimore; and successful incursions at Washington, D.C., and Havre de Grace, Maryland. These raids outraged Americans, who became more determined to carry on the war—the opposite effect from that expected by His Majesty’s government. Budiansky never questions whether the diversion of naval and military resources had a negative impact on more critical British operations on the Lake Ontario and Lake Champlain theaters.
This brings us to the one great disappointment of this study: the absence of any serious discussion of the war on the North American lakes. Only there did the Americans have a chance to match British naval capabilities. Despite notable U.S. triumphs on Lakes Erie and Champlain, the failure to dominate Lake Ontario contributed significantly to the military stalemate along the Canadian border. To what degree were Secretary Jones and Commodore Isaac Chauncey responsible for this situation? We do know that President James Madison’s overruling of Jones’ limits on ship construction on Lake Champlain conduced decisively to Thomas Macdonough’s victory on that lake.
This shortcoming notwithstanding, overall Perilous Fight constitutes a solid beginning to an effective strategic investigation of this conflict, especially in its use of long-neglected primary sources. However, much more research and analysis are needed before the final word appears.
Arctic Mission: 90 North by Airship and Submarine
William F. Althoff. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011. 264 pp. Illus. Maps. Notes. Bibliog. Index. $39.95.
Reviewed by Stephen Stein
This book interweaves the stories of three 1958 U.S. Navy missions to the Arctic: the transit of the nuclear submarine Nautilus (SSN-571) from the Pacific to the Atlantic via the North Pole, the establishment of a science station on drifting ice island T-3, and the voyage of the Navy airship nicknamed the “Snow Goose” (ZPG-2 BUNO 126719) to that base to test the feasibility of operating airships in Arctic conditions. The events of the Nautilus’ record-making voyage have been chronicled before, though Althoff offers a nice firsthand account of them benefiting from several interviews with crew members. The book shines when the author shifts his focus to the establishment of a scientific outpost on T-3 for the 1957–58 International Geophysical Year and the flight of the Snow Goose to that island.
Althoff is the author of several books on airships, and his descriptions of operations and the Snow Goose’s Arctic voyage are particularly vivid, again enriched by interviews with many of the participants. One of the last major missions conducted by a Navy airship, it provides a fitting coda to an often-overlooked branch of the Navy. Its story is well told in this book, enhanced by numerous photos from the mission.
Navy airships played an important role in World War II against German submarines, and the U.S. Navy continued to fund their development after the war. The ZPG-2 was among the postwar airships, a particularly large Goodyear design with a 45-knot cruising speed and 55 hours’ endurance that could be extended considerably with additional fuel tanks. One ZPG-2 spent 11 days aloft in a flight to Europe and back.
By the mid-1950s, lighter-than-air aviation faced severe budget cuts and possible cancellation. As the fiscal axe loomed, airship advocates emphasized the Arctic as the place to prove the continuing relevance of blimps. Cold War tensions also focused attention on the Arctic, the likely route of any nuclear attack on North America. Canada and the United States established military outposts in the region, among them the Distant Early Warning Line. Whether scientific or military, supplying Arctic bases by air proved difficult, as freezing weather hindered flight and constantly shifting ice made permanent airfields an impossibility. Perhaps airships could fill this role?
The Snow Goose crossed the Arctic Circle about a week after the Nautilus reached the North Pole. It was the first Arctic airship voyage since 1931, when the Graf Zeppelin reached 81° 50’ North. Guided by experienced Arctic navigator Wing Commander Keith R. Greenaway (Royal Canadian Air Force), one of two Canadians in the crew, the Snow Goose successfully reached T-3, resupplied it, and took various scientific readings along the way. The blimp’s two-deck control car offered an amazing view, and AP reporter Hugh A. Mulligan, who accompanied the mission, wrote glowing reports of Arctic vistas and mission progress.
Unfortunately, the Snow Goose turned for home before reaching the North Pole due to poor weather. It reached only 79° 10’ North, about 500 miles short of the pole. All told, it logged 6,200 statute miles on the mission, and everyone involved reported favorably on the ability of airships to operate in the Arctic. The same characteristics that made them superb antisubmarine platforms—an unobstructed view of the horizon and the ability to loiter for long periods—would make airships valuable to Arctic research. And their large lift capacities meant they were more economical than airplanes for supply missions.
The concurrent voyage of the Nautilus eclipsed the Snow Goose’s success. Reports on its journey and recommendations for future airship missions to the Arctic received no reply. Instead the Navy continued decommissioning airships. By 1960, only ten remained in service. The following year they too were ordered decommissioned, a process completed in 1962. As the author notes, airships never found a place in the Navy. Even before World War II, they received little funding. In the jet age they simply appeared quaint and obsolete.
This book presents an interesting juxtaposition of two technological systems, and the author might have said more about this. New to the Fleet, nuclear submarines were destined to occupy a central place in the U.S. Navy. Airships, an old technology, neared the end of their naval service despite the hopes of their adherents. Althoff argues that they could have provided useful service, but the inability of the Snow Goose to proceed farther north leaves this open to question. Nonetheless, this story of one of the last Navy airship missions is a great read.
Marshall and His Generals: U.S. Army Commanders in World War II
Stephen R. Taaffe. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011. 438 pp. Maps. Notes. Bibliog. Index. $37.50.
Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Walter E. Kretchik, U.S. Army (Retired)
Rarely does an academic historian offer insight into the past and a tutorial on the art of senior-level command. Stephen R. Taaffe accomplishes both in Marshall and His Generals: U.S. Army Commanders in World War II. A professor of history at Stephen F. Austin State University and two-time Army Historical Foundation Distinguished Book Award winner, Taaffe has produced a valuable work for academics, general readers, and practitioners. Unlike others who have focused on command in Europe or the Pacific, this author offers a global examination of the Army senior-command selection process and its outcomes. His expert use of archives and secondary literature underwrites a readable historical narrative that objectively scrutinizes general officers both famous and unassuming.
Taaffe focuses on Army Chief of Staff General George Catlin Marshall and his selection of the 38 senior-level officers who led the service’s three army groups, eight field armies, and twenty corps in Europe, North Africa, and the Pacific. Delving into Marshall’s logic and the outcomes of his decisions, Taaffe describes the general as gifted with an astonishing organizational ability that not only enabled Allied victory in World War II, but also made or broke officers’ careers.
Regardless of their prior accomplishments or perception of self-worth, it was ultimately Marshall who afforded or denied individuals the opportunity for advancement and senior command. As the institution’s gatekeeper, he viewed character as essential but rarely selected officers who lacked a Command and General Staff School and Army War College education. Moreover, age mattered, because combat leadership demands energy, stamina, and vigor. Marshall sought experienced and proven men who were primarily in their 40s and 50s, most of whom he knew. In making personnel decisions, he initially solicited respected colleagues for their input, namely Generals Henry H. (Hap) Arnold, Brehon B. Somervell, and Lesley J. McNair. Later, field commanders were involved in the appointment, advancement, or removal of senior officers.
In the book’s introduction Taaffe highlights Marshall’s formative years, including his small-town upbringing and the subsequent career experiences that framed his views of senior officership. His keen mind with its attention to detail is apparent, as is an ability to recall the triumphs or failures of others. Although Marshall considered officers in a favorable light more often than not, he was committed to choosing only the best qualified to lead the nation in war. Yet he seldom relieved someone for failure; instead it was for illness or promotion. That most appointees succeeded speaks of his ability to correctly assess leadership capabilities right from the beginning.
In nine chapters, Taaffe shows how Marshall’s selection process played out through the wartime careers of an elite group of officers. Omar Bradley, Mark Clark, J. Lawton Collins, Robert Eichelberger, Dwight Eisenhower, Courtney Hodges, Walter Krueger, Douglas Mac-Arthur, Troy Middleton, George Patton, Matthew Ridgeway, Walter Bedell Smith, James Van Fleet, Walton Walker, and 24 others receive their due in an unvarnished and well-documented manner.
Beginning with efforts to stop the Japanese offensive and then shifting to chapters that cover North Africa, Italy, Europe, and the final days of Germany and Japan, the narrative traces the war through the domain of upper-level leadership, a world rife with cautious decision-making, complex egos, and high-stakes mission execution. It is here that the book makes its major contribution—showing how people thought and why—not only in dealings between Marshall and his subordinates, but also among them and their Allied counterparts. Taaffe’s analysis of Marshall’s interaction with Eisenhower and MacArthur is particularly noteworthy, but it is the author’s articulation of why Marshall valued accomplishment over quirky personality maladies that is especially useful for fathoming senior-level military bureaucracy, then and now. Taa-ffe concludes that Marshall’s most successful selectees were more competent than brilliant men who used what was available effectively, while withstanding the pressures of their positions.
The book provides important historical perspective on how Marshall viewed competency in choosing an exclusive group of generals to lead the nation’s army in war. It is worthwhile for that reason alone. More important, for those who seek insight into the why and how of senior-level command, it is essential reading.