In the Korean War, when the successful outcome of the conflict depended on the available air power that could be brought to bear against the juggernaut of the Chinese army, the U.S. Navy was able to triple the size of its carrier fleet by bringing World War II-era Essex-class ships and carrier aircraft out of mothballs and manning them with World War II veterans from the Naval Reserve. Today there are no carriers in mothballs available for mobilization. It would take five years to construct a large-deck carrier, even with the highest priorities. Therefore the current carrier force, and its sustaining shipbuilding program, must be capable of supporting U.S. foreign policy in the most critical areas.
A particular area of concern in this regard is the question of China. For decades the United States has supported the self-determination of Taiwan, and has been quick to react when Taiwan has been threatened. In October 1958, the U.S. Seventh Fleet was reinforced to seven carriers, which were deployed to the Taiwan Strait to deter the mainland Chinese from their threat to occupy the Taiwan-affiliated islands of Quemoy and Matsu. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) backed down when faced with U.S Navy carriers conducting air operations in the international waters off its coast, quickly ceasing all threatening gestures toward the islands.
The Shifting Pacific Balance
However, the situation that existed in the 1950s no longer prevails. The balance of power in the Western Pacific is shifting. Intelligence analyses from multiple sources agree that China is building a modern navy of nuclear-powered submarines, missile ships, and supersonic maritime strike aircraft on an accelerated basis. Considering China’s extensive land borders with Russia and India, and Japan’s lack of a potent navy—it has only a maritime self-defense force—the PRC’s naval buildup can only be for the purpose of countering the U.S. Navy’s maritime dominance in the Western Pacific.
In any Sino-U.S. confrontation on the Pacific Rim, carrier strike groups would be the main source of U.S. military power. Its expeditionary strike forces could not survive in the Western Pacific against China’s land-based air power without the cover of carrier-based strike fighters to establish local zones of air and maritime superiority in which to employ available expeditionary forces in an amphibious operation. Basing U.S. Air Force aircraft on airfields on Taiwan is not a realistic option, for they would be within range of tactical missiles launched from China.
Such a conflict with the PRC should never occur. To prevent such hostilities, the United States must be able to dissuade the Chinese from encroaching on vital U.S. interests in the Western Pacific. That requires a convincing U.S. capability to immediately respond militarily to defend its interests on the Pacific Rim in response to an intrusion by the PRC, a surrogate, or anyone else. And that capability resides solely in the carrier strike groups of the U.S. Navy. They have the ability to remain in an objective area indefinitely, and in a range of postures—from unobtrusive to threatening. It is not in America’s interest to even threaten the use of nuclear weapons. The potential for a miscalculation on the part of China or the United States could lead to a preemptive attack and a nuclear exchange. That would result in unthinkable carnage and destruction.
Naval Air Superiority = Deterrent
Protecting the independence of Taiwan and other U.S. interests in the Western Pacific—allies and trading partners—can best be achieved by deterring a PRC invasion or other conflict. And the best deterrent is the threat of intervention from a force of large-deck U.S. aircraft carriers in sufficient numbers to achieve in-theater maritime air superiority with squadrons of the most advanced fighter-attack aircraft.
America’s experience in the Cold War—resolved in the West’s favor in part because of a strategy of forward-deployed Navy carrier battle groups and amphibious forces—would indicate that 11 or 12 large-deck nuclear-powered carriers should be the absolute minimum for the proper execution of a “From the Sea” strategy. Recent studies at the Center for Naval Analyses have concluded that carriers smaller than the Nimitz-class ships do not have the capability of fulfilling the requirement to provide tactical air cover over an objective area 24 hours a day. Only a Nimitz-size carrier has the deck area and the support facilities to singly operate sufficient combat aircraft to maintain around-the-clock coverage over a target indefinitely.1
A continued presence of U.S. Navy carriers in the international waters of the Western Pacific should not be considered in any way a provocative threat to the basic security concerns of China. The United States has, for the past 60 years, maintained an uninterrupted prepositioning of three carrier task forces in the Pacific Rim and the Indian Ocean.
That strategic posture has proved to be a prudent policy. As noted, it was the highly visible presence of American carriers that deterred the PRC from seizing Matsu and Quemoy in 1958. Additionally it should be remembered that prepositioned carriers became the first responders in both the Korean and the Vietnam wars, while providing crucial main battle forces for the duration of those conflicts.
China’s Security Concerns
The PRC has been, and remains, a continental land military power. It has no significant sovereign territory or allies overseas. Its lines of communication to all its territories are overland and contiguous. That geographic situation is quite unlike that of the United States, which has two states and all but two of its allies—Canada and Mexico—lying overseas. The security of America’s sea lines of communication is vital to its survival.
China’s continental aspect means its most vital security concern—its survival—resides not in any threat to its sea lines, but in the threat of an invasion of its sovereign territory. That threat is most probable, or even only possible, from across China’s lengthy and vulnerable land borders with India and Russia. An effective invasion of China through a military amphibious operation, or even an air bombardment campaign against mainland targets, cannot be considered feasible because of the enormous area involved.
Consequently, the presence of American carriers in international waters of the Western Pacific, even in the most reinforced numbers, cannot and should not be viewed as a provocative threat to China. The United States is simply prepositioning appropriate forces, capable of responding to aggressive actions—from any country—against its allies and essential trading partners, and insuring the continued free use of the world’s oceans in accordance with the internationally agreed upon Laws of the Sea.
In the final analysis, however, that function of deterrence, to be effective in its purpose, is critically dependent on the credibility of the United States: Are the U.S. naval forces deployed for that purpose adequate to defeat a hostile operation?
Beijing’s Maritime Challenge
China understands America’s dependence on the sea lines of communication for both its economy and security, and recognizes that the United States has clearly established, through its Navy and its national military strategy, a position of global maritime supremacy. In its inexorable drive toward superpower status, China must be able to challenge America’s dominance of the sea.
To do so, the Chinese are expanding their naval capabilities, but not along the lines of the U.S. Navy. Their limitations in technology and industrial capacity make it impractical for them to attempt to mirror the U.S. Fleet structure within an acceptable time frame. Instead, China is emphasizing naval capabilities of long-range supersonic maritime attack aircraft and nuclear-powered submarines to neutralize the U.S. Fleet’s carrier and expeditionary strike groups. But the defensive capabilities of U.S. carrier striking forces against current state-of-the art antiship weaponry can be formidably effective. Consequently the Chinese are seeking the ultimate naval weapon: the antiship ballistic missile (ASBM).
Theoretically the ASBM represents the epitome in antiship weaponry. Although frequently referred to as the “carrier killer,” it would be a lethal threat to all sea-based military forces. Fortunately, the weapon system does not yet exist—and there is no legitimate forecast as to when such a weapon might become operational and to what degree of reliability. China has let it be known that the development of such a weapon is a high priority for its military R&D program, but it is not there yet.
As recently as 2009, operational analysts specializing in China’s military concluded in an article published in the Naval War College Review that China did not yet have an operational ASBM.2 The Chinese lack some of the key hardware and software to constitute the “system of systems” required to achieve the kill-chain of detection, tracking, guidance, and pinpoint accuracy necessary to hit a target.
The most important requirement—and also most difficult—for an ASBM is that it must have the accuracy to make a direct hit on a moving target at a prescribed angle of impact to penetrate a carrier’s armor. That precise angle of impact is essential for the effectiveness of the ASBM warhead.
To illustrate that aspect, it should be noted that in the accidental fire on board the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) in 1969, nine major-caliber bombs (750 to 1,000 pounds) exploded on her flight deck, yet the carrier’s armored decking was not penetrated. Had it been necessary, the Enterprise could have resumed air operations in four hours—as soon as the debris was cleared from the after-end of the flight deck. Three of the multiple installations of aircraft arresting gear and two of the four catapults remained operational. Additionally, damage-control parties quickly covered affected areas of the flight deck with sheet steel.
We Must Remain Vigilant, Ready
It is the view of Western observers that an ASBM capable of reliably and consistently scoring a direct, steep-angle hit on a moving warship is not something that will be developed anytime soon. It has been suggested, however, that an ASBM with a nuclear warhead would solve the accuracy problem. A nuclear weapon would not require a direct hit to put a ship out of action. A near miss within 30 yards would destroy a modern warship’s combat potential. But that creates an entirely different scenario: Any nuclear attack on sovereign U.S. territory—which a U.S. naval vessel represents—would result in a nuclear response, and thus, a nuclear war. It is not conceivable that the Chinese would initiate a general nuclear war with the United States just to sink a carrier.
The U.S. Navy today has the warfighting capacity to implement a strategy of deterrence in the Far East with its current inventory of aircraft carrier striking forces, but any reduction in those forces cannot be absorbed without surrendering America’s access to the Western Pacific for trade or to support its allies.
So the essence of the China question is this: Will the United States opt to react with an appropriate level of response to aggression by the Chinese?
1. Christine H. Fox, “Carrier Operations: Looking Toward the Future—Learning from the Past” Center for Naval Analyses, Report D0020669.A1/ Final, 27 May 2009, p. 24.
2. Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin, “China’s Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 62, No. 4 (Autumn 2009).