The 2006 Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24) states that the key to a successful counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy lies in protecting the populace. In its introduction, Army Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl notes that the field manual directs U.S. forces to make “securing the civilians, rather than destroying the enemy, their top priority.” One might think this principle should remain the same whether the setting is urban or rural. However, when a counterinsurgency is fought in a predominantly rural environment in a country whose cities are pre-industrial, the singular focus on dense population centers is erroneously identified as the key to victory. The rural populace should be the focus in Afghanistan.
While the military and academic cases for population-centric counterinsurgency were validated in Iraq, they lack a broader perspective. Based on historical standards, the U.S. military was right to focus on the population—and therefore the cities—when fighting in Iraq. As Small Wars Manual: United States Marine Corps 1940 states, “One of the dominating factors in the establishment of the mission . . . has been in the past, and will continue to be in the future, the civil contact of the entire command.” The manual adds that local populations are primarily concerned with the security of their lives and property. There is no better way to make broad civil contact or address civilian security needs than to operate within the city limits.
When the populations of Fallujah, Ramadi, Haditha, and Al Qa’im were secured in Iraq, huge gains were made in the larger al Anbar province counterinsurgency fight. To apply the valuable lessons learned in that province, the population centers have remained the focus of the war in Afghanistan, yet the notion that similar gains will be made if the populations of Kandahar, Marjah, Lashkar Gah, or Mazar-i-Sharif are secured is flawed. It fails to take into account two important factors: the nature of Afghan cities and the role of the surrounding rural areas, both of which dramatically reduce the importance of the more densely populated areas.
Securing the Vast OpBox
One such rural environment in southern Afghanistan, dubbed by military planners as Operational Box Tripoli (OpBox Tripoli for short), has no significant population center and yet is vital to the overall war. OpBox Tripoli covers nearly 9,800 square miles (approximately the size of Vermont) and has a population that could be considered, in the context of FM 3-24 and when compared with the millions who live in Kabul or Kandahar or the rest of the country, as generally irrelevant. It could be argued the small population occupying isolated hamlets strewn across an open countryside is not worth the time, effort, or money when waging a large-scale counterinsurgency. Remote villages are difficult to secure and influence, and the gains are thought to be hard-fought and few. This conventional wisdom, however, ignores some important aspects of the COIN fight in this environment.
On closer examination, Afghanistan’s rural areas afford guerrilla forces certain significant advantages, including freedom of movement, innumerable safe havens, an easily accessible recruiting pool, a well-developed logistics network, and sources of financial support in the form of unchecked taxation, tolls, and opium production, as well as widespread banditry and bribery. In a rural environment counter-state or “shadow government” operatives fill gaps in governance that the host-nation government is unable or unwilling to address. This ease in providing leadership where the official government does not strengthens the control insurgents have over an essential operating area.
FM 3-24 also states: “In a rural-based insurgency, guerrillas normally operate from a relatively secure base area in insurgent-controlled territory, [whereas] in an urban-based insurgency guerrillas operate clandestinely, using cellular organizations.” In a rural environment insurgents not only have more advantages, they also have it easier than their counterparts fighting in cities. Guerrillas can operate more openly and without the constant threat of being discovered, captured, or killed. FM 3-24 continues, “Historically, [insurgent] activities have not generated much success without wider rural support”—again emphasizing the importance of areas such as OpBox Tripoli.
The Afghan “City”
It is the combination of a dominant rural environment and marginalized cities that make the situation in Afghanistan different. In Iraq, a counterinsurgency might be fought in a rural area, but the cities might still be economic and logistical hubs for enemy activity, as was the case throughout much of al Anbar province. In Afghanistan, on the other hand, the cities exist strictly as derivatives of the surrounding farmland and act primarily as marketplaces. Afghan cities do not drive capital into the rural areas as cities do in post-industrial countries in the developed world. Instead, they draw their wealth from the countryside, and as the rural areas are the economic engines. The cities do not create jobs, since they lack any sort of industry or infrastructure. And they are largely devoid of a state apparatus or national-level governmental influence, which makes them even less significant.
Thus, Afghan cities are little more than densely populated areas to which FM 3-24, after a cursory reading, would still direct all attention be paid. This is a flawed application of the field manual. It fails to take into account the relevance of a given population. To apply the doctrinal paradigm to the war in Afghanistan, the rural environment itself would be defined as the insurgent “center of gravity,” and if FM 3-24’s premise is correct and the population should be the focus, then the enemy’s “critical vulnerability” is therefore the rural populace. An historical example of the how a rural environment acted as a “center of gravity” for a paramilitary force is seen in the American Revolution when the British were defeated by militiamen basing their operations in and attacking from a rural area.
In a Wall Street Journal article titled “Petraeus’s Opportunity,” dated 25 June 2010, author Mark Moyar objected to the COIN strategy being used in Afghanistan, stating “the operation in Marjah . . . failed to quash the insurgency because of the decision to focus on the population and not the enemy. Consequently, many insurgents were allowed to flee unmolested as the Marines prepared to move in.” The more accurate reason for the unsuccessful assault on Marjah was that U.S. forces failed to focus on the more relevant population surrounding the district both before and during the operation, not because they failed to focus on the enemy, as Moyar states. Once the attack commenced, the insurgents fled to the rural areas where, had its indigenous population not been wholly ignored, the Marines could have created conditions resulting in the enemy running right into the arms of Coalition forces.
Crafting a Hybrid Strategy
While adhering to the guidelines on population outlined in FM 3-24, elements of two historic war strategies could be merged and prove effective in Afghanistan. The “Anaconda Plan,” used in the U.S. Civil War to blockade the South, combined with the idea of bypassed strong-points used in the island-hopping campaign by Marines in the Pacific during World War II, could allow U.S. forces to skip heavily populated areas in Afghanistan and focus instead on surrounding farmlands and their more crucial inhabitants. This strategy would concentrate on shutting off the enemy’s flow of funds, recruits, and logistics—especially weapons and ammunition—to the cities; prevent their freedom of movement; and prohibit them from having a reliable base of operations in the rural areas on which they have come to depend. This is precisely what was done in OpBox Tripoli since the 2d Battalion 7th Marines arrived in 2007 and what 3/7 continues to do today. The most significant challenge in implementing this new strategy is the Soldier-to-civilian ratio required to execute it. COIN demands a Soldier-to-civilian ratio anywhere from 1:250 to 1:50, and since a rural COIN fight would heavily rely on distributed operations, it would place a huge strain on the current manpower limitations and require a ratio closer to 1:50, or 20 Soldiers per every 1,000 civilians.
Regardless of manpower restrictions, when seeking to influence civilian populations the use of a combined action platoon (CAP) is one of the most effective methods. CAPs were widely used in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War and earlier, in Central and South American countries such as Haiti and Nicaragua, during the so-called “Banana Wars.” CAPs are small, specialized platoons that live among the local population in an attempt to gain its trust and confidence in a dangerous combat environment.
A similar concept was successfully employed in Iraq in supporting the Iraqi Security Forces. Military Transition Teams, however, focused more on training and equipping the local forces than on interacting with the local population. If CAPs were deployed to the rural areas of Afghanistan, they could—as they did in Vietnam—focus on neutralizing the insurgent threat in Afghan villages and provide security for local leaders. They could collect intelligence and provide military training and conduct combined operations with local army or police forces. Perhaps most important, by living among the local populations and interacting with them in positive and meaningful ways, Marine CAPs could participate in and support civic action and social and economic development programs.
Harsh Terrain, Flinty Character
Understanding the way the Afghan people’s environment affects their culture and character is particularly germane to conducting a successful rural counterinsurgency. These areas are occupied in a predictably linear fashion, based on terrain features such as rivers and mountain ranges. Villages often lack connection with other villages and are forced to be self-sufficient despite extreme conditions. Rural Afghans typically have a strong work ethic, value their autonomy, and are concerned with survival. In market areas, on the other hand, while the population is more densely housed, people also are more factious and demanding and less self-reliant. It is difficult to earn their trust or appease them. While the independence of Afghans in remote areas makes them vulnerable to enemy control, they are also more likely to be turned by Coalition forces living among them. Here again, the CAP would be an effective method for striking at the Taliban’s critical vulnerability.
The U.S. military could hypothetically secure the population of any city in Afghanistan, but the insurgency would grow no weaker, and the war effort would not be advanced. Although fewer people live in the countryside, these populations are more relevant to the Taliban’s strength and to our efforts to defeat them. Securing a rural population and garnering their support is more valuable than comparable efforts in places such as Marjah or Lashkar Gah. When 3d Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment cleared the enemy from the Now Zad district center in northern OpBox Tripoli, the success lasted because Marines controlled and secured Kenjak-e Soflá, Khwaja Jamal, Dehanna, and Nomad Village, the rural areas surrounding the district center in the Now Zad Valley.
A lack of appreciation for the role rural areas play in pre-industrial societies prevails among higher echelons throughout the military, where the focus remains on the cities simply because they are the population centers. This is narrow-minded thinking. The COIN lessons of Iraq must be revisited in the context of Afghanistan, and they must be more carefully applied. Even if Kandahar is secured and Marjah prevented from acting as an enemy safe haven, ultimately little will be gained in the overall war effort.
The reason Afghan cities are being targeted by military planners is that time is of the essence. Focusing on the rural populace while implementing “blockades” on cities or “island hopping” around major urban areas is a slower prospect and is therefore rejected by politicians and military planners. Strict timelines and glaring deadlines make the war tempo critical. Focusing on more densely populated areas, it’s hoped, will push the strategy forward more quickly. It is a futile effort, however. OpBox Tripoli and rural areas like it are vitally important to the larger Afghan counterinsurgency, and only when they are controlled will the United States defeat the Taliban and secure a lasting victory.