Too Busy to Learn
(See R. H. Scales, pp. 30
35, February 2010; and S. M. Pavelec, p. 6; D. G. Bolgiano, p. 6; and T. Fredricks, pp. 6 7, March 2010 Proceedings)There's No Place Like Newport
(See M. Vego, pp. 36
41, February 2010 Proceedings)William J. Davis Jr., Ph.D., Associate Professor, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College—General Scales has a valid point in that there is a culture of anti-intellectualism and a resultant intellectual deficit in the military, however, his remedies are wanting. For example, he suggests making the faculty in professional military education (PME) primarily uniformed service members. I agree that this would definitely increase the intellectual capital within the military, but it would also result in a faculty of neophytes at PME; military members would rotate out of faculty positions after two or three years. A more balanced faculty, wherein military members are mentored by the civilians, would be more appropriate.
The general's argument that the majority of faculty should be uniformed exposes a considerable weakness throughout most of PME. It is, for the most part, administered and overseen by non-educators. How many staff and war colleges have people who hold the title and authority of dean, president, commandant, director of curriculum, and the like without having the requisite experience or education
In my 12 years of PME experience, I have seen many uniformed individuals think that because they could well perform military duties they could also be exceptional educators, when that is not necessarily true.
I offer the Naval Postgraduate School and the Naval War College, both of which have arguably the best academic programs and reputation in the PME community, as examples. They have these because the Navy has left education primarily up to education professionals. Another solution offered was to ensure that every officer has foreign-language competency. While being proficient in a foreign language will never be a negative, it is completely unnecessary for a myriad of specialties. This programmatic solution is indicative of a key problem with PME
everyone wants to develop a curriculum that will solve all problems. PME should be an electives-based program, allowing officers to focus on those areas they see as best suiting the needs of their particular careers.General Scales also spoke of writing confidential reports on an officer's ability to think critically. The idea of such reports is antithetical to the very core values that our military upholds
moral courage, integrity, and leadership. Also, who would determine whether the rater's ability to critically think is beyond that of the rated officerI would also like to take umbrage with the idea that exceptional performers can be identified as early as commissioning. Identifying those with "intellectual" gifts at commissioning is an arbitrary metric at best. I have been under the command of many "C" students who were outstanding professionals and thinkers, and also under the command of "geniuses" who "couldn't lead a Sailor to a cold can of beer" (cultural idiom courtesy of Master Chief Moyer).
I am glad that General Scales has started a conversation that needs to be held.
Richard L. DiNardo, Ph.D., U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College
General Scales painted a grim picture of a military that had turned its back on learning, primarily because it was "too busy to learn." Because the issue is so critical, the author deserves a response.His comments about the personnel system and its failings, although accurate in many respects, lie beyond the scope of this piece. I will deal with his comments as they pertain to PME.
The basic problem with the article is that it paints with too broad a brush. Many problems the general identifies seem to be more of an issue for the Army rather than the services in general. He is understandably concerned that officers attend top-level schools too late in their careers. This seems to apply, however, only to the Army. I cannot speak for the Air Force or the Navy, but generally the Marine students who are selected for those schools are lieutenant colonels and colonel selects.
The solutions proposed by the author strike me as unrealistic and uninformed. Consider, for example, demanding that every officer graduate from a graduate institution, presumably including intermediate-level schools (i.e. staff colleges) and war colleges, with demonstrated foreign language skills. Foreign language proficiency was a graduation requirement at the German Kriegsakadamie. Most attendees, however, chose French or English, both widely taught in the German school system. Thus, Kriegsakadamie students already had over a decade of instruction in that language. That is a very different proposition from teaching a major Arabic or Chinese from a baseline of zero.
His suggestions for the composition of faculty at PME institutions are also faulty. The notion that all faculty be uniformed officers is simply unworkable, given current force structure. Also, losing a large number of faculty every year through the normal assignment process would mean a serious absence of continuity at these places, negatively impacting the curriculum.
The author's comments on the presence of civilian contractors on faculties are incorrect in regard to non-Army intermediate- and top-level institutions. At Marine Corps University, for example, civilian faculty members are government employees hired under Title X, U.S. Code. Many left tenured positions in academia to work there. Also, the first Skelton Report recommended bringing such academic expertise into the PME system. The general's ideal faculty might be composed of active-duty officers, backed by a smattering of civilians, also retired officers. I can't imagine a better way of creating an intellectually destructive group-think atmosphere.
Finally, the governing document for PME institutions is the Officer Professional Military Education Policy. It is created by the Joint Staff J-7. Revisions to it are often done with input from the institutions it covers.
To conclude, General Scales raises important issues. In some respects, he would do better to raise these with the Army's Chief of Staff, General George W. Casey Jr. Also, the solutions he suggests would be worse than the problems they are designed to solve.
Colonel Neal H. Bralley, U.S. Army (Retired)
My comments specifically address the Army Intermediate Level Education (ILE) system, not the Army's other service schools or its senior service college (Army War College) attendance figures.A number of years ago the Army's strategic leaders made a decision to educate all of its majors through a resident, or resident-like experience, as found at Fort Leavenworth's Command and General Staff College's Command and General Staff School (CGSS). The Army, since 2001, increased
not decreased enrollment of its active-duty majors within the ILE program at Fort Leavenworth despite over 8 years of on-going combat operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Staff school enrollment at Fort Leavenworth in 2001 was 1,054 students (of which 836 were Army officers of all components Regular Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard). In 2010, enrollment is now 1,451 students (1,144 from all Army components). That 37 percent increase is but part of the story.The CGSS operates four state-of-the-art satellite campuses at Fort Belvoir and Fort Lee in Virginia; Fort Gordon, Georgia; and Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. The staff school provides the faculty for these campuses, which educate up to 1,032 additional officers per year in the identical core courses found at Fort Leavenworth. This is not a lip-service relationship. As of 1 January 2010, satellite campus graduates totaled 3,439 officers. Additionally, the Command and General Staff School teaches ILE courses to 1,400 Army Reserve and National Guard officers through the Army School System, and teaches another 3,100 officers, mainly Army Reserve and National Guard, through the Advanced Distributed Learning system. The Army is certainly increasing its output of officers through the Intermediate Level Education program. It is producing many more intermediate staff college graduate officers today, not fewer.
So how does this work
Fort Leavenworth primarily educates operations career field officers through two major components: an ILE core course of about four-months duration, and a six-month long credentialing program, the Advanced Operations Course.Officers attending the satellite campuses are mainly in other-than-operations career fields. The satellite courses present the identical four-month core course with its graduates attending a mandatory credentialing course designed and managed by the career management leaders of their specialties. These credentialing courses may last from several weeks to many months. Credentialing courses may be in either military operated or in civilian educational institutions.
I would strongly encourage Major General Scales to visit Fort Leavenworth's Command and General Staff College.
Captain John P. Cordle, U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS San Jacinto (CG-56)
As a surface warfare officer in major command, I read these articles with great interest. My perspective is different, having completed the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) via correspondence during my executive officer tour and then attending the Naval War College.With all due respect to the ACSC correspondence course, it was truly a "check in the block" to maintain upward mobility at that stage of my career. The Naval War College was a fantastic experience from both a personal and professional standpoint, with the high point being the exposure to experienced instructors and the opportunity to mix with peers from other services and the State Department. On a scale of both level of effort and relevance, I would give the ACSC a "2 out of 10" and the NWC an "8 out of 10." But they both check the same JPME I block for career purposes. I do fear that my NWC experience will become more of a rarity for "due-course" officers, especially in the surface-line community.
Under the new SWO CO/XO Fleet-Up screening process, JPME I completion is now mandatory prior to screening for command at sea. With the screening points moved up, most surface warfare officers must complete a JPME I correspondence course while on sea duty (as a second tour department head or principal assistant) before they are senior enough to attend a resident war college. Most choose the ACSC course since they must complete it in their free time during the most challenging sea tour of their career. It remains to be seen if the increased time between department head and XO/CO will allow officers who already have JPME I and a master's degree to attend a war college as well and whether they will be sent there, having already met the JPME requirement. If not, the Naval War College stands to see fewer and fewer due-course officers as they pursue more visible and career enhancing jobs in the joint and SWO community.
The second point, of sending due-course senior officers to instruct at the Naval War College, while an admirable goal, seems a bit optimistic. I had some extraordinary O-6 instructors at the NWC, but none was a future flag officer. Now, as a 26-year SWO in major command, I watch as peers who are on track for promotion depart for one of two places: either a front-office or a heavy-lifting SWO job in Washington, D.C., to put them over the top for flag. Perhaps the day will come when "Go to the Navy War College as an instructor" will be added to that list. But without some of the other changes put forward by Dr. Vego and General Scales, I would be very surprised to see it.
Old Ideas Needed for a New War
(See J. Lacey, pp. 54
57, February 2010 Proceedings)Sean L. Wenstrup, Graduate Assistant, Salisbury University—As a professional military historian, I believe I should speak up for those in my profession regarding this article. I agree that the military situation in both Iraq and Afghanistan requires a new perspective. However, I think Dr. Lacey is asking too much from the historical profession in general, regardless of the military subset. Professional historians, for the most part, have tried to keep their opinions out of the popular atmosphere of current events and generally feel that stage belongs to political scientists and popular historians.
I do agree, though, that as professionals, military historians could provide a great deal to the policies of the various government departments and agencies, as any seminar or convention will illustrate.
More specifically, however, the author's assertion regarding the lack of "teams of military historians" looking "at today's problems in search of potential solutions from the past" seems to be antithetical to the way historians conduct themselves. Professionally speaking, that level of brainstorming is something akin to water-cooler or bar talk, as it is usually entirely subjective and borders on the counterfactual, two qualities that are not highly regarded.
The author raises an interesting point when he suggests specific types of comparative studies, such as the effect of multigenerational campaigns and/or wars on a population, or comparative counter-insurgency analysis. Both of these types of scholarship are valid and would more than likely lead to even more in-depth analysis about different types of insurgency, or renew interest in previous military thinkers, such as Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, or Caesar.
While comparative studies have been around in the history profession for a long time, military historians have only started to employ cross-era comparative military analysis (i.e., comparing the U.S. Army to its ancient Roman counterpart). In fact, only a handful of academic programs, doctoral or otherwise, in the United States actively advertise comparative military studies.
The author is right to demand that historians offer more comparative studies of different facets of military campaigns. These studies, however they are conducted, must remain open-ended and free of the politics of policymaking. One of the great fallacies of historical writing is to formulate a conclusion before undertaking research.
Giving a room full of historians the mandate that they seek lessons from history to inform current decision-making will ultimately result in conjecture, not scholarship. Historians will write about these current issues, and as comparative military studies grows, the breadth of this knowledge will become more voluminous. Until then, it is up to the reader and/or leader to peruse the nearly infinite number of histories on varying topics and formulate his own opinion.
Training with Greek Warriors
(See C. R. Davis, pp. 78
9, January 2010 Proceedings)Lieutenant Commander Clayton A. Robinson, U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer, Maritime Civil Affairs Squadron One—I wholeheartedly agree with Captain Davis' recent assessment regarding the Hellenic Navy's NATO Maritime Interdiction Operations Training Center when he states, "Our maritime services need to make a critical assessment of the center's capabilities and potential."
While assigned to the U.S. Navy's Center for Security Forces, I led an August 2007 assessment of the training center's curriculum and facilities at the request of the Hellenic Navy. As the Navy's Learning Center responsible for delivery of individual and team training solutions for Non-Compliant Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS) teams, the Center for Security Forces was able to focus this assessment on comparison of curriculum content, consistency of tactics, adequate risk management, equivalent safety practices, and effectiveness of training facilities. My assessment team determined that the training center was clearly a first-rate facility with curriculum and standards on par with that being used at the Center for Security Forces at the time.
It was also noteworthy that the training center was preparing to provide what is essentially both individual- and unit-level training, tailored for a wide variety of multi-national partner nations within NATO and the Partnership for Peace. The flexibility that this requires is significant, as the knowledge, skills, and abilities of these potential trainees runs the gamut.
Captain Davis has put forth several recommendations for further U.S. engagement with the training center with which I concur and would elaborate by adding some specifics in two areas. First, personnel exchange program tours provide an important opportunity for Navy personnel to serve on the staffs of our partner nations, and placement of a former VBSS boarding officer on the training center's staff would be quite similar to the variety of other exchange program assignments available today. Second, the center could be used for mid-deployment VBSS sustainment training and subject matter expertise exchange for ships deploying to or through the Mediterranean. Because the center is located in Souda Bay, Crete, it is not only centrally located within the Mediterranean Sea, but is already a frequent port of call for U.S. warships operating there or transiting en route through the Suez Canal.
Our maritime forces should embrace the opportunity to partner with the training center in its mission to conduct the combined training necessary for NATO forces to better educate surface, sub-surface, aerial surveillance, and special operations activities in support of maritime interdiction operations.
Finding Our Balance at Sea
(See M. Vego, pp. 22
26, January 2010 Proceedings)Scott C. Truver, Gryphon Technologies LLC—Dr. Vego's statement, "But the main purpose of building and maintaining the Fleet is to support friendly ground forces in the nation's wars," misses the mark. Fighting and winning wars is a bedrock principle, to be sure. But as I recall, the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower also emphasizes preventing wars. This has fostered a sharpened focus on prolific irregular challenges that threaten to undermine regional stability and peace and stymie vital U.S. interests
witness the Navy's new Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges.The challenges we face and the threats we must defeat in the maritime domain are best addressed by general-purpose naval
Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard forces. At the higher end of operational capabilities, a guided-missile cruiser or destroyer armed with antiballistic-missile defense systems is fully capable of capturing pirates one day and rescuing migrants the other, all the while ready to protect the homeland, allies, and friends from missile attack.Agility, flexibility, and adaptability were the hallmarks of the flotilla that quickly came together in response to the Haiti earthquake in January. When the carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) was commissioned in 1982 during the waning days of the Cold War, few imagined this warship ever operating as a sea base for helicopters flying critical medical evacuation and resupply missions in the Caribbean.
The inherent agility, flexibility, and adaptability of combat-efficient and combat-effective warships originally bought for high-end combat missions thus qualify them to respond effectively to a whole host of missions across the range of America's engagement in the world.
But numbers count, and the Navy is looking to smaller, less costly (but, admittedly, still-expensive) ships to provide quantity as well as quality at the lower end of the force. The jury is still out (and will be for some time), but the 55-ship LCS program focused from the outset on the littoral
where most of the action is, in peacetime, crisis, or war.More important, the Navy is also emphasizing the need to organize, train, and equip for irregular challenges through balanced investments in technologies, systems, and platforms.
Thus, these are influenced by the main purpose of the Fleet to operate within and from the maritime domain to enhance regional security and stability; to "dissuade, deter, and defeat" irregular threats and challenges in the world's "fragile neighborhoods"; and to be ready to "support friendly ground forces in the nation's wars."