Western Pacific SONG Cooperation
By Lieutenant Commander Shusuke Kitaguchi, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
The Western Pacific Naval Symposium is committed to enhancing mutual understanding between nations of the region.1 To this end, in October 2008 the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) Staff College hosted a Seminar for Officers of the Next Generation (SONG), the eighth of its kind. This latest SONG was held in Tokyo, attended by lieutenants and lieutenant commanders from Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, France, India, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Singapore, Thailand, Tonga, and the United States. (Bangladesh, Canada, Chile, and India are observers in the Symposium.) Representatives were students in their native naval staff colleges or the equivalent levels.
The SONG lasted for five days, which included a trip to the JMSDF naval base in Yokosuka, a two-day discussion, and a cultural trip to the Tokyo area. The seminar serves as a platform for promoting free exchange of information among young officers about the current maritime domain. The focus is on leadership and maritime security.
Aside from mutual understanding, the SONG aims to forge personal relationships, so that bonds of friendship further unite a region where international naval cooperation has been emphasized in recent years. Additionally, participants have the opportunity to see and experience Japan, which fosters understanding of our culture as well as of the JMSDF. This will be helpful for coordinating efforts during possible future military operations.
Because many participants are in Japan for the first time, JMSDF Staff College students are assigned as hosts to facilitate the visit.
Structured Activities
The SONG commenced with an orientation to reconfirm its aims. Participants then toured the naval base and were briefed at the Self-Defense Fleet about current operations, which included those of ongoing replenishment support in the Indian Ocean. The tour also featured a brief visit to one of the JMSDF's latest destroyers and the battleship Mikasa, today a memorial that was the flagship of Admiral Togo Heihachiro at the Battle of Tsushima during Russo-Japanese War.
The first day of discussion centered on leadership. Representatives shared definitions and recommendations on how to improve naval leadership, stressing that this trait is critical in a navy and has great impact on mission accomplishment. Talks also emphasized the importance of keeping personnel engaged in their duties willingly, thereby enhancing their abilities. There was agreement that leadership is a dynamic art requiring constant practice and study to motivate subordinates to do their best.
Day two of discussion focused on maritime security. Participants gave presentations on their current issues and exchanged perspectives unique to each country. Covering this topic renewed understanding of the maritime domain in the Western Pacific, vital not only to the Asia-Pacific region but to the entire world because of its importance in maritime trade. Current regional concerns include piracy, armed robbery, smuggling, illegal fishing, and terrorism. All of these greatly impact the maritime policies of littoral countries.
The seminar concluded with a fun-filled trip to the Tokyo area. This trip greatly contributed to understanding the local culture. The tour included the Imperial Palace, Tokyo-Edo Museum, and the Tokyo Tower.
Opening Mental Borders
The five-day SONG resulted in personal friendships, thus achieving one of our goals. Especially useful in promoting mutual understanding were the discussions about maritime security. Each country's view was shared, providing a valuable opportunity not only for the international participants, but also for the students of JMSDF Staff College. All came away with a deeper understanding of the issues and each nation's measures to address them.
In recent years, the JMSDF has been expanding its role in the international community. It has participated in proliferation security initiatives, replenishment support in the Indian Ocean to help combat terrorism, and various international disaster relief operations, such as in the aftermath of the 2004 earthquake and tsunami in Indonesia and neighboring countries.2
The SONG, a small but certain step, helps to lay a foundation for the future naval cooperation that is essential to maintain the region's stability.
1. For details of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, see http://www1.apan-info.net/wpns.
2. For details of JMSDF overseas operation, see http://www.mod.go.jp/e/index.html.
The Return of Naval War Gaming: Global 2008
By Jose Carreno; Captain George Galdorisi, U.S. Navy (Retired); and Antonio Siordia
From 4 to 8 August, the War Gaming Department at the Naval War College hosted Global 2008 on behalf of the Chief of Naval Operations. The goal was to examine the challenges, issues, and implications of implementing the new U.S. maritime strategy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.1 Reflecting the cooperative theme that underscores the maritime strategy, among the roughly 200 participants were representatives from 19 foreign navies, as well as members from other branches of the U.S. military, several U.S. government agencies, international and nongovernmental organizations, and participants from the defense and shipping industries.2 The success of this exercise underscores the importance of international and multi-agency cooperation in helping to meet the challenges of the future security environment.
In 1979, the U.S. Navy initiated the annual Title X Global War Game as part of its Cold War strategy development process. The effort included analysis of future force structures, consistent with the Navy's Title X authority to man, train, and equip naval forces. Hosted by the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, these Global War Games were held in abeyance after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. Dr. Robert Rubel, dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the college, said the reason for this was partly a lack of "compelling geopolitical reasons."3
However, in response to increased interest by senior Navy and Marine Corps leaders, and with the recent release of the new maritime strategy, the Title X Global War Game was reinstated last summer and now serves to inform the Navy Strategic Planning Process.4
Recent high-level strategic guidance, such as the 2008 National Defense Strategy, underscores many of the themes in the maritime strategy. These themes were mirrored in Global 2008. Significantly, these macro-trends portend a future that will require "whole of government" approaches; partnerships with allies and friendly nations in a variety of scenarios, both traditional and non-traditional; and enhanced collaboration with nongovernmental entities. At the same time, we will have to maintain credible combat power and assure a persistent global presence.
In a recent Foreign Affairs article titled "A Balanced Strategy," Secretary of Defense Robert Gates clearly describes what he sees as a critical shift needed in U.S. security arrangement to realize these capabilities. He notes: "The United States needs a military whose ability to kick down the door is matched by its ability to clean up the mess and even rebuild the house afterward."5 This builds on the secretary's call for a set of first-ever campaign plans that will describe how combatant commanders will "do business during peacetime, in wartime, and every time in between."6
Why the Games Are Important
While they cannot validate assumptions, war games such as Global 2008 can highlight relationships and issues that may warrant further analysis. "Games have a significant educational component. The players themselves have an educational experience playing the game."7
As the Naval War College's Dr. Rubel explains, "war gaming is still more a craft than a discipline, and it is quite possible for rank amateurs, dilettantes, and con artists to produce apparently successful but worthless or misleading games."8
Peter Perla at the Center for Naval Analyses defines war gaming as "any type of warfare model or simulation, not involving actual military forces, in which the flow of events is affected by and, in turn, affects decisions made during the course of those events by 9 According to Perla, this can range from small table-top games to more complex scenarios such as the Global War Game series.
players' representing the opposing sides."Equally important is the necessity to understand that war gaming is not rigorous, quantitative analysis, nor is it "duplicable." Because war games are inherently about human interaction, "the interplay of human decisions and the outcomes of those decisions make it impossible for two games to be the same."10
Understanding the distinction between what the games can and cannot provide is critical in evaluating their impact. When the Navy decides to make investments in an endeavor like Global, this is only one part of the toolbox that collectively helps senior leadership to establish the context for answering questions such as what kind of Navy we need.
As Dr. Rubel describes it, war gaming "is inherently a research tool" by which knowledge is gained primarily through "visualization," or players' ability to see relationships in complex environments.11 In the same vein, as Perla notes, "If physical or technical parameters are of greater interest and importance than human decisions, then war gaming is less relevant than other forms of research."12
Additionally, war gaming can be used to socialize concepts and achieve "buy in" from a wide range of stakeholders. As Dr. Rubel explains, Title X war games such as Global 2008 "frequently have this as at least a tacit purpose."13
Accomplishments of the 2008 Games
Global 2008 explored how the execution of the maritime strategy might look under any of four alternative futures. The Navy strategic planning process developed these scenarios from regional and global perspectives, delving into the methods and means required for their implementation.
These possible futures aligned along two distinct axes: one ranged from a high to low level of cooperation in the sharing of resources; the other from high to low in the empowerment of extremist elements. During the course of the week, players developed ideas about how their particular future would look in their specific region, through the lens of political, military, economic, sociological, informational, and infrastructural concerns. They then identified maritime tasks and capabilities that would be required for success.
International participants brought a wide range of expertise and perspectives. They were divided into seven player cells: six regional cells that mirrored the current geographic combatant command areas of responsibility, and one global cell tasked to look at their futures from a global perspective. Global 2008 was carried out at the unclassified level, which provided for a much richer and diverse set of participants. However, it also limited the level of detail in which certain topics could be discussed.
Several overarching themes emerged that were ultimately confirmed by the Global 2008 out-briefs. Foremost among these, the necessity for interagency and international collaboration loomed large as a key requirement of successful implementation of the maritime strategy. To this end, there was an emphasis on practices and technology that facilitate cooperation and coalition building. Moreover, nontraditional and soft-power activities were common to three of the four alternative futures, with a clear emphasis on activities aligned with the prevention of war.
Some obvious themes also emerged at varying levels, including the continuing imperative of building partnerships as a cost-effective means of accomplishing shared goals, while at the same time creating opportunities for developing relationships and building trust. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, in particular the cooperative training that accompanies these missions, likewise reinforced the theme of working with our allies and partners.
The maritime services and our partners will continue to explore the implications and challenges of implementing the new U.S. maritime strategy. The insights gained from the Global series will be critical to ensuring that the strategy matches its environment. Building on Global 2008, future Navy Title X War Games will further develop the application of the new strategy. The resulting analysis will inform capabilities analysis, force design, and future concept development.
1. For a thorough background on war gaming, see Robert Rubel, "The Epistemology of War Gaming," Naval War College Review, Spring 2006.
2. Department of the Navy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, October 2007, p. 11. Available at www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf. As the strategy points out, while maritime forces can surge in response to crises, "trust and cooperation cannot be surged." By broadening participation in events like Global, not only is the efficacy of outcome increased, but so is the understanding that this new focus on cooperation is not simply words printed on paper. Instead, it is truly a pillar of the maritime strategy. See also John Lehman, "A Bravura Performance," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings magazine, November 2007, pp. 22?25, and other articles on the topic in the same issue.
3. Rebekah Gordon, "Global War Game Revival Explored Maritime Strategy Execution, A First: 19 Worldwide Navies," Inside the Navy, 18 August 2008.
4. Mathew Breen, "Naval War College, Hosts ?Global 08' War Game," Naval War College Public Affairs, 2008, accessed at: http://www.nwc.navy.mil/pao/news/global08.aspx.
5. Robert Gates, "A Balanced Strategy," Foreign Affairs, January?February 2009.
6. Sebastian Sprenger, "Campaign Plans," InsideDefense.com, 24 September 2008.
7. Breen, "Naval War College, Hosts ?Global 08' War Game."
8. Robert Rubel, "Epistemology of War Gaming," Naval War College Review, Spring 2006.
9. Peter P. Perla and LCDR Raymond T. Barrett, "An Introduction to Wargaming and its Issues," Center for Naval Analyses, November 1985. See also Peter Perla's book The Art of Wargaming (1992) for a thorough examination of the war gaming. The Center for Naval Analyses also has a number of his papers available online which discuss wargaming, particularly from a naval perspective (www.cna.org).
10. Perla and Barrett, "An Introduction to Wargaming and its Issues."
11. Rubel, "Epistemology of War Gaming."
12. Perla and Barrett, "An Introduction to Wargaming and its Issues."
13. Rubel, "Epistemology of War Gaming."
Four Key Principles for Fleet Training Officers
By Lieutenant Commander Chris Wells, U.S. Navy
The word training may bring to mind wasted time and boredom. The term has been maligned by poor practice because the art of training is not well studied, and little guidance is often provided to those charged with developing and leading their organization's training efforts. Unintentionally compounding this problem is a move to standardize training, which often results in completely sterile, nonspecific presentations that reinforce the association with boredom. We need a mission-focused training program with dynamic interactions, productivity, and a little fun, too.
Four key training principles, if applied correctly, will increase the probability of mission accomplishment.
- Keep it real
- Keep it objective
- Keep it simple
- Keep them engaged
We can remember these using the acronym ROSE. Just as a compass must go through a periodic swing-check to verify that it provides accurate navigation data, so too must each command's training program be checked for alignment using these principles.
The goal of each organization is to achieve its mission. Training is intended to increase the probability of success. Programs must be tailored to meet this goal, and it is largely up to individual officers and other key members in staff- and unit-level training organizations to ensure that the programs are realistic, that they address the objectives, and that they are simple enough to be understood easily while also keeping the audience engaged and productive.
Keep It Real
This concept has been stated in varying terms, including "Train how you will fight." "Keep it real" means training for what actually occurs or could reasonably be expected to occur. Some opponents of the implied specificity argue that this artificially limits the range of skills that can be evaluated. However, keeping it real combines the use of several skills for a specific, relevant scenario that provides an understanding of expectations and desired results.
By adding context and realism to training, it is possible to educate personnel—typically the operators and war fighters—to achieve results during actual missions, even when faced with equipment failures, breakdown of command and control, and other complications. Adding realism to the training is necessary to provide the tools for adapting to and overcoming unforeseen obstacles and unplanned circumstances.
The actual operators and system experts should be involved in creating and developing the training. This will help to ensure that the training is well thought out at a practical and appropriate level, and that it mimics situations that can reasonably be expected to arise. Involving operators and experts as stakeholders in the program also reinforces the fourth principle: Keep them engaged (more on that later).
A wide net should be cast, thus involving as many organizations as possible that can contribute to the command's goals. If they are involved as stakeholders early in the process, a larger and more realistic planning and training effort will be possible. Too often, organizations do not effectively manage resources when actual crises occur because of large gaps and operational seams that have not been discovered. The reason for this is that much of the training for component mission areas occurs in stovepipes. Unidentified and unmitigated interservice and organizational differences lead to unpreparedness for the actual fight.
The key to keeping it real is to minimize assumptions and simulations across the board. If required, simulations should be as accurate as possible. We should use the actual command and control, data architecture, and circuits that are planned for use in real situations. This includes the actual boards and cells, watchstanders, and support organizations across all tiers. The goal is to stress-test the actual system to determine its capabilities and limitations.
Keep It Objective
Training cannot be done for its own sake. It must make use of goals, or objectives, to ensure that it increases the probability of mission success. Clear, well-defined objectives are necessary to direct and gauge the success of the training effort. A link from strategic requirements to operational and tactical objectives must be made. This can be done through creating mission-essential tasks.
Each objective or task should be measurable and contribute to achieving the desired results. The measure of success for many higher-level objectives may, in fact, be directly assessed by the completion of supporting tasks and related subtasks. Again, this element requires input and validation spanning many organizations and drilling down from top-level strategic tiers to tactical-level "trigger-pullers" or "button-mashers."
Keep It Simple
Many of the mission areas for which we train are complicated and involve multiple organizations, rules, technical systems, concepts of operations, and so on. This means that many among our audience may be overwhelmed and uninterested in conducting training in this type of environment. For the trainer, the key to training the audience is to show how to "eat the elephant one bite at a time."
A trainer must know how to break down complicated mission areas into their core tasks, and how to work from the appropriate level incrementally, adding steps or concepts as needed. This S principle, reinforced by R, O, and E, must be tailored to create a crawl-walk-run approach, especially when dealing with complex mission areas.
Keep Them Engaged
Central to the E principle, as mentioned previously under R, is to use the system operators and experts throughout the process. Using their expertise turns members of the audience into active, participating stakeholders. This fosters a team-building environment, when combined with an atmosphere that encourages sharing ideas through continuous input and feedback.
Other critical elements in keeping the audience engaged are after-action reports and post-training meetings and briefs. It is important to make use of honest and open feedback in these processes. This leads to continuous improvement in the training program, as vital lessons learned are gathered and applied in future sessions and scenarios.
Finally, we need to ensure that our training scenarios are tailored to challenge all levels of participating organizations and make effective use of the time that they dedicate to the training. Dead time will lead to disinterest and loss of the audience's attention, thereby reinforcing negative perceptions of the training program as a whole.
Inevitably, certain circumstances may lead to delays or necessitate accelerations in the timeline. If we plan for these types of contingencies, we will be ready to inject additional steps as necessary to facilitate continuous training. Identifying and engaging necessary stakeholders throughout the process will increase the likelihood that training remains relevant and interesting (maybe even exciting) for the desired audience.
As we have seen, the ROSE principles reinforce each other through their interrelated elements: the use of stakeholders, metrics to gauge the organization's ability to accomplish required tasks, and tools at all levels to facilitate an adaptive, continuously evolving program. ROSE can help training officers to accomplish their difficult yet critical responsibility.