Crisis of Confidence
(See W. Houley and J. Stark, pp. 26-30, January 2009 Proceedings)
Captain Thomas A. Davis, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Rear Admirals Houley and Stark do a nice job in tackling the problem of the need for a revision in the way the Navy builds ships observations that also extend to other warfare specialties. It is not a new thought that the Navy has let technology dictate strategy rather that world conditions, but the admirals demonstrate the case perfectly. The Navy may have the most sophisticated, capable, and powerful ships, airplanes, and weapon systems in the world, but for what purpose and at what cost? I often think back to the pre-computer age when the Tempo "game" was one of the staff team exercises that tested strategic thinking in the short-, middle-, and long-range arena. An arbitrary budget was allowed and the objective was to maximize the acquisition of weapons and systems to respond to the umpire's random "declaration of war." When "war" was declared each team's choice of how they had spent their budgets for combat implements was measured. If war came too soon and investments were placed in long-range acquisitions, the team lost because there was nothing with which to fight the war. Conversely, if weapons adequate for the immediate future were the choice, the team lost because future enemies had better weapons. One of the key essentials was to evaluate potential enemies and act accordingly with what was necessary and not what was technically possible. The Navy would do well to have its leaders read up on strategy, and gussy up the old Tempo game with a few digital flourishes; then cancel a few of the gee-whiz programs.
Recapitalizing Too Early
(See B. Lindsey, pp. 32-37, January 2009 Proceedings)
Harold N. Boyer—Captain Lindsey is on the mark regarding the premature retirement of naval assets because of age or misleading maintenance requirements. His analogy of the Soviet experience in the 1980s and the current state of the Royal Navy with the potential future of the U.S. Navy is instructive.
Despite the recent mission emphasis on littoral warfare, the Navy has a multitude of missions to accomplish, ranging from humanitarian efforts to traditional blue-water missions. One only has to read about the Chinese Navy's construction of two aircraft carriers to see that the blue-water, sea-control mission has not disappeared. To accomplish these missions the Navy needs enough hulls to maintain not only a world-wide presence, but also sufficient capability to surge assets when needed in two or more areas.
How can this be done when perfectly usable hulls are being retired in the interests of getting the newest in terms of technology? As Captain Lindsey points out, not all missions require the latest platforms. Not every hull needs to have the latest sensor suite, gas-turbine powerplants, or weapon systems. The Coast Guard makes a virtue out of necessity by using hulls that are often 40 and 50 years old. Two examples from the Navy show that it, too, has made longevity a virtue. The USS Vulcan (AR-5) served from 1941 to 1991 and the USS Norton Sound (AV-11) served from 1943 to 1986—50 and 43 years, respectively.
I am not suggesting that we put crews in harm's way using hulls as old as the examples above, yet many hulls have useful service to give but do not because of a mistaken view that sees new as always better. A combination of cheese-parers/bean-counters and techies has wrought more harm than good to the mission-capability of the Navy.
One only has to drive by the Inactive Ships Maintenance Fleet at what is left of the Philadelphia Navy Yard (the oldest federal navy yard and yet another victim of short-sighted, cheese-paring) to see ships ranging in size from a fleet tug to fleet carriers waiting the call of duty that will, in all probability, never come because of the viewpoint that only the newest technology will suffice.
Tell this to the Marines the next time they have to be put ashore without sufficient gunfire support, ammunition, or rations. Better yet, tell this to the merchant ships sailing the Horn of Africa where the U.S. Navy has left the piracy-suppression mission to other navies because of an unwillingness to undertake this task or an inability to undertake it because not enough hulls are in commission.
Inland Sailors
(See J. W. Welle, pp. 20-25, January 2009 Proceedings)
Commander Joseph E. Lyons, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Lieutenant Welle's timely article underscores the career implications of individual augmentee tours valuable to the country and the Navy, but nonetheless time in the wilderness for those serving them. He notes the Center for Naval Analyses' (CNA) study on career impact but provides no selection board statistics to confirm the study.
There is precedent for not taking care of those ripped from their careers for some higher purpose. In-country tours in Vietnam were in the same category. As a JO, I did not learn until later that the Navy considered as neutral time tours in the Mobile Riverine Force (TF-117), River Patrol Force (TF-116), and Coastal Surveillance Force (TF-115).
Officers of my generation and older, more politically astute than I, had already figured this out and avoided Vietnam in-country tours if at all possible. And why not? If the Navy did not value their service there, why should they? It appears from the CNA study that the Navy's view of individual augmentees once again pays lip service to their wilderness tours but speaks differently where it counts in front of selection boards. An IA tour, like all such tours viewed by a selection board, is a tie-breaker and everyone knows it.
Talk is cheap. The only real evidence that the Navy cares about its augmentees lies in SECNAV's instructions to selection boards to protect them. Has this happened? Those being tapped for such assignments should demand answers from their detailers.
Commander Thomas F. Doyle Jr., U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)—An improvement to the IA program would be to have junior-rank (lieutenant, j.g. to lieutenant commander) volunteer naval officers trained and designated as standby infantry officers. When land wars drag on, the Army has problems filling its infantry officer ranks from captain on down with properly motivated leaders. This was certainly the case in Vietnam.
The most important attributes of a good infantry officer are leadership skill, physical fitness, small-unit tactics familiarity, and infantry weapons knowledge. We have an ample supply of enthusiastic, motivated, young officers in our Navy who would be glad to serve their country in direct combat. Many of our hard chargers would prefer an assignment as an infantry leader to one of a support nature, especially if they are going to serve a year in country anyway. This may alleviate some of the problems Lieutenant Welle mentions in his article. Their NROTC, Academy, and Fleet experience arms them with the most important skill: military leadership. Most of them participated in college level sports and are capable of becoming "Army Tough" on short notice. I submit that small-unit tactics and weapons knowledge can be learned on a collateral-duty basis.
These officers would receive an initial Army infantry training program of several months, augmented with short formal refresher courses every two years, continuing correspondence courses, and a recommended personal physical fitness program. Naval infantry leaders would continue in their naval warfare specialty and be on call for a one-time Army augmentation tour of 12 months' duration. As Lieutenant Welle explained, there are manning, readiness, and career-planning challenges in the IA program. However, if young naval officers survive and succeed in an Army infantry assignment, they would be stamped as capable combat leaders. It is difficult to believe that this would be anything other than a worthwhile chapter to a career.
I served in Vietnam as a helicopter gunship pilot for the Seawolves of HAL-3. This assignment involved about six weeks of stateside training, a year in country, and a lot of time spent in support of U.S. Army goals in Vietnam. It should be noted that many of my fellow Seawolf officers eventually rose to high rank. They were not unduly career-damaged by their year away from the blue-water Navy.
Captain Thomas J. Brovarone, U.S. Navy—First, I want to thank Lieutenant Welle for his IA service. I also wish to say that I agree this tour may not make him a better ship driver, but it will make him a better leader. Knowing that some of our future Navy leadership will have served with coalition forces, non-governmental organizations, and foreign governments in this IA environment makes me feel our Navy will be on a solid foundation when officers like Lieutenant Welle take command.
I was an inland Sailor, assigned to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division from June 2007 to May 2008, finishing my assignment as the director of the Reconstruction Sector. I had similar experiences to those described in the article. I found myself trying to answer the career paradox question and made recommendations to improve the IA process through my chain of command.
I agree that the process can be made better. IA awareness training needs to start at boot camp and the officer equivalent, not only because IAs are a role the Navy will fill in the future, but countering future threats will demand it. The promotion statistics for IA is also disappointing. Credit for the efforts IA Sailors expend during tours must be given so there is some parity with their community counterparts.
As a Navy, we also need to challenge the IA demand signal from time to time. Iraq and Afghanistan are important to our national security, yet these are just two missions in which the Navy is involved. Keeping Navy personnel away from their career paths after the need for their skills has passed is taking away from other important missions.
When telling stories of my Baghdad experience, I would say that C-RAM alarms would wake me up at night, but knowing that there is a growing Chinese submarine force out there and several of the Navy's best people are in Iraq restoring electric power, building roads and bridges, etc., instead of building and sailing ships to counter this threat would sometimes prevent me from going back to sleep.
With respect to niche Navy skills, I offer another example. The entire reconstruction mission could not have been accomplished without the Navy's Civil Engineer and Supply Corps and Engineering Duty Officer community. Providing essential services to the citizens of Iraq is one of the elements of fighting insurgents. The men and women assigned to this role are accomplishing that. My experience is from Iraq and I'm sure the same can be said for Afghanistan. There is no doubt in my mind that the senior leadership in the Corps of Engineers would give nothing but a positive endorsement of the Sailors who were assigned to the Gulf region for their IA tours. This can also be seen by the numbers of significant awards these Sailors received at the end of their tours.
The Navy's Tipping Point'
(See R. J. Natter and R. R. Harris, pp. 44-49, January 2009 Proceedings)
Captain James C. Howe, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired)—Even facing a dearth of frigates, Lord Nelson would have been perplexed by a Royal Navy that provided him vessels with such obvious limitations as the Littoral Combat Ship.
The LCS has many innovative qualities. Its maneuverability, stealth, aviation facilities, and roominess are leaps forward. Its network capabilities are cutting edge. Its modularity and open architecture allow recurrent technological refreshment and reduce lifecycle cost. But despite these innovations, other design characteristics will limit the LCS' operational prowess and induce risk to the nation's defense architecture.
A prime concern is the vessel's limited endurance, inferior even to the perpetually thirsty Perry-class frigate. At top speed, the LCS can only steam for less than two days, and even at economical speed will be drinking often from the well. This is a critical factor across the range of missions, from counterdrug operations—where patrol vessels must cover vast expanses of the eastern Pacific with limited resupply opportunities—to full-scale warfare. It is easy to envision a host of circumstances where LCS mission performance will be impacted because of the unavailability of oilers or shore-based support.
This is especially true given that LCS is designed to operate in the environs of the littoral, where its low profile and stealth features will help protect it from enemy radar and weaponry. But since the Navy's oilers must remain outside the danger envelope of shore-based systems and hostile patrols, it means regular trips for the LCS back and forth for fuel, reducing time on station.
And while the speed of both LCS variants is impressive, it leads to another fundamental concern—survivability. Achieving high speed in a small warship requires trade-offs, most notably in weight and structure, which, by definition, means less ability to withstand strikes by missile, gun, or mine.
Adding to the risk is the LCS' small crew size, which will be hard-pressed to respond to any manner of shipboard calamity. There is no doubt that the Stark (FFG-31), Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58), and Cole (DDG-67) were saved by the heroic team efforts of their crews. How a crew one-third the size of an FFG-7's will stem the damage from a missile strike or mine—even with the highest-tech damage control systems installed—remains a troubling question.
Additional questions arise. Will reliance on weapon modules leave LCS unequipped for the right form of warfare in a rapidly changing operational environment? Are the Navy's training and supply systems able to provide support for such a high-tech, minimally manned vessel? Will these high-speed hulls operate effectively in the deep blue, or be constrained to coastal operations?
And, most important—what is the back-up plan if LCS underperforms the Navy's needs?
Circumstances can tip in either direction. The innovative and untested LCS may, indeed, prove a solid performer. But with a plethora of unresolved questions, there is a real possibility that, at the end of the day, the LCS fleet will offer less than needed. Somewhere in the depths of the Pentagon, someone best be working on Plan B.
Checkered Past, Uncertain Future
(See O. Kreisher, pp. 38-43, January 2009 Proceedings)
Remo Salta—After reading Commander Kreisher's article, it would be difficult for anyone to be optimistic about future naval shipbuilding projects. How is the Navy going to learn from the mistakes of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program if nobody is ever going to be held accountable for this financial disaster? Vice Admiral Paul Sullivan states that the Navy "went too fast in pushing LCS into construction before the design was finalized," which resulted in the entire program not going as planned. Navy acquisition executive Allison Stiller also is quoted saying, "We put an unrealistic cost goal, that industry initially signed up to meet, and we have all realized that the actual cost is going to be significantly higher."
The LCS was supposed to be a small, fast, versatile, and (most important) inexpensive (approximately $220 million) warship that was to operate in shallow waters close to shore. After seven years of research and development, we now have a ship that is going to cost well over twice as much as originally planned, may be too large for what it was intended to do, and does not have a finalized design. Making matters worse, we still don't know if the portable mission packages, or modules, that would allow each ship to handle different operational assignments, will work as advertised.
Yet, did anyone lose his or her job over this debacle? Was anyone brought before a House or Senate subcommittee and publicly criticized for their gross mismanagement of a federal project? Was anyone demoted or did anyone lose their pension for wasting millions of dollars? Was any contractor fired and prevented from doing future business with the U.S. government because of their wanton disregard for any budgetary constraints? Of course not, and that is why this same, painful episode will be repeated again and again and again, with the American taxpayer (as usual) picking up the tab.
So long as there is no accountability within the Navy, as well as in the government, for any of these expensive weapon programs; so long as no one is ultimately held responsible for these financial disasters; there will be absolutely no incentive to run any of these programs more efficiently. Senior naval officers involved with the LCS program should have stopped all work on the project as soon as they saw costs spiraling out of control. Defense contractors should have recommended a halt to construction until the Navy had a final design for the ship. Congress should have pulled the financial plug on the LCS when it saw how badly the entire program was being managed.
We should all be sick and tired of government officials telling us about the lessons they learned from failed acquisitions programs. Start putting people's careers and pensions on the line and then we'll see how careful the Pentagon is in spending the taxpayers' money. Start filing criminal fraud charges against any defense contractor not staying strictly within budget. And, if additional funds are needed for a project, put a percentage price cap on the overall cost of the program. Let's see how anxious the Pentagon is in overspending on a project when it knows there is a finite amount of money left to cover cost overruns.
Worried that these rules will discourage defense contractors from bidding on future jobs? Not likely. They're in the business of staying in business and will follow whatever ground rules the government sets. The question is, does this country have the courage to enforce those rules?
Leading Surface Warfare Officers Straight-to-the-Fleet
(See P. H. McDermott, pp. 62-66, January 2009 Proceedings)
Commander John K. Hafner, U.S. Navy Reserve—Lieutenant McDermott's passionate, well-written defense of the status quo regarding surface warfare officer (SWO) training is a disheartening and telling indication of just how far off course the Navy's surface community has drifted. For seagoing officers, professional aptitude and ability—not a degree—should be the prerequisite for leadership and respect. The author's contention that "the standards need not change" is also way off base. We cannot, as an organization, lower our standards, ignore the results, and then expect our newest, most inexperienced officers to somehow figure out how to lead themselves to eventual command of ever more complex warships.
Where do we go from here? Well, there is a deceptively simple solution. We need to set the bar for our SWOs at the same level that the rest of the sea-going world is held to. In addition to Navy-specific warfare training, all SWOs should be trained and certified in accordance with the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping (STCW) for officers in charge of a navigational watch. The STCW code is the International Maritime Organization's standard for seagoing personnel worldwide, including U.S. merchant marine officers. This would not only ensure quality, but would also set an acceptable, internationally recognized, professional standard that would be immune to senior leadership change, budgetary fluctuations, and/or special interests. It would also go a very long way toward restoring the professional pride that our SWOs deserve, as well as the Navy's reputation on the high seas.
Write—with Your Eyes Wide Open
(See W. J. Toti, pp. 16-20, December 2008; B. M. Burawski and C. H. Depew, p. 8, January 2009 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Jay A. Stout, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)—Yes, write while on active duty. As a serving officer offering a critical argument related to your area of expertise, you'll never be more credible. Additionally, you'll stand a greater chance of making a real difference. But be aware that you're likely going to anger someone. Critical articles are, de facto, intended to bring attention to a shortcoming. Well, someone owns that shortcoming and they're probably senior to you. The intellectually weak and morally insecure among them may come after you.
But you can prevail in the long run. In my own case, the commanders who wrecked my career have already been forgotten; the only marks they made went away when they did their laundry. On the other hand, I've created a body of work that will be referenced long after I'm dead.
So stand up and shout. If something needs fixing, explain why. And better yet, explain how. But don't let the small-minded continue to do small-minded things without sounding the alarm. It's your duty.
The Overstated Threat
(See J. Patch, pp. 34-39, December 2008 Proceedings)
Commander Harold H. Sacks, U.S. Navy (Retired)—One cannot agree with Commander Patch that the Navy lacks the resources to accomplish even a fraction of the mission. Agreed, the U.S. Fleet may be overtaxed, however, I would wager that our skippers and crews would look on a 30-day assignment accompanied by authority to "search and destroy" a welcome break in their not always exhilarating at-sea routine. I well recall the excitement on our ship when detached from rescue-destroyer duty to wreak havoc among maritime infiltrators just south of the DMZ in Vietnam. Of course in this case we would earn the world's thanks rather than its opprobrium.