The United Kingdom celebrated its first Armed Forces Day late in June. The Telegraph marked the occasion with an op-ed by Thomas Harding to the effect that "big guns," i.e., conventional high-tech weapons will not win "today's wars." Warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan has badly strained British military finances (as it has our own), and clearly some major programs face cancellation as they do in this country. Harding argued that today's wars are essentially ground struggles involving small units. It follows that fast jets, for example, are a pointless expense. The author admitted that naval forces retained value as a means of projecting ground power, but suggested that the two carriers now on order are far too large (as are the current attack submarines).
The real question, both for Britain and the United States, is what "tomorrow's wars" are likely to be. We know that the war in Iraq has stretched the U.S. Army and Marine Corps thin, and a current effort is under way to expand both. It is unknown if Afghanistan will ever require anything like the numbers engaged in Iraq. Nor, for that matter, is it clear that larger numbers can be supported in Afghanistan, whether or not we want to deploy them. The simple reason is that lines of communication into that country pass through Russia and Pakistan, neither of which can support much more, regardless of whether it wants to or not. It may be that expanding ground forces will not offer much advantage in the one war we are currently fighting. That is entirely aside from the question of whether Afghanistan is the right war to fight now, or whether the wars of the near future are likely to be similar.
It might be relevant to point out here that the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan could not have been carried out without substantial naval involvement, to the extent that Afghanistan was substantially a maritime war. The decisive Marine Corps presence in southern Afghanistan was supported by amphibious ships in the Arabian Sea. The aircraft involved did touch down in Pakistan, but the use of the ships thus avoided unduly offending Pakistani sensitivities. Obviously Pakistan is much more deeply involved now, but in the event that the Pakistani government might become reluctant to support the war in Afghanistan, long-range naval aircraft would probably again be a dominant factor in the war. One advantage gained by the adoption of the MV-22 Osprey is that a future operation of this type might be conducted without using Pakistani territory, at least in its initial phases.
The last administration assumed that Iraq and Afghanistan were part of a larger global war on terrorism, which was also called the Long War. In opposition, the Democrats argued that there was no such single war, that Iraq was a horrible mistake, and that Afghanistan was the important war, because the ruling Taliban had provided the sanctuary in which al Qaeda plotted 9/11 and other attacks. But it is by no means clear that eliminating this sanctuary will dramatically reduce any threat al Qaeda presents. It can (and has) operated from other venues. Punishment of the Taliban may deter others from offering sanctuary, and now it may be argued that unless the Taliban are defeated this deterrent effect will dissipate. That suggests that the war against al Qaeda and its clones may extend to many other places. Given the costs already incurred, it is unlikely that the preferred choice will be to invade to overthrow the existing government, unless some new sanctuary creates the conditions for a new 9/11.
Is the British author right that the era of high-technology war is over? Accounts of recent events in Iran suggest otherwise. It is possible that we are witnessing the beginning of a civil war in that nation that will eventually destroy the current regime. However, it is also possible that we are seeing the start of a horrific purge, similar to those conducted in the 20th century, which will leave a cowed Iranian population following the apocalyptic urgings of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his shadowy ayatollahs.
Naval War in the Gulf?
Historically, Iran has sought dominance of the Persian Gulf region, which happens to supply much of the world's oil. It is not far-fetched to see the states around the Gulf, including Saudi Arabia, as the likely initial targets of Iranian aggression. The United States and its allies fought Saddam Hussein to prevent him from dominating the Gulf and thus the oil spigot. Many opponents of the wars we fought interpreted this interest as a desire simply to seize oil, but it seems fairer to say that our interest is to maintain access to oil.
We would probably find ourselves compelled to defend the Gulf states if Iran sought to control them. That would most certainly be a conventional high-tech operation, and would likely be largely naval. It would include air strikes against a substantial air defense system, and also ballistic-missile defense mounted offshore by missile ships. It would hardly be a small-unit war fought under the benign conditions envisaged by the British newspaper writer.
Iranian hostility toward the current Gulf governments is fueled by the historic conflict between Shi'ite and Sunni. Iran is the only Shi'ite state, and the Iranian government may see the liberation of oppressed Shi'ites around the Gulf (particularly in some oil areas) as a historic mission. The Western powers might, again, feel compelled to defend the Sunni kingdoms of the Gulf and beyond. Any such defense would entail conventional operations mounted against substantial conventional forces. Naval units, including those designed to project power (carriers and amphibious groups) would inevitably be involved. Indeed, without such forces operations would become impossible.
It is also possible to see 9/11 as a symptom of a much deeper convulsion in the Muslim world. In that case the point of 9/11 and other attacks was to demonstrate to Muslims at large that the attackers deserved to lead them. The point may well be the convulsion itself, not the way in which al Qaeda and its equivalents have played to existing anti-Western feelings. In that case, the most important Western military missions of the next few decades will be to deal with the convulsion, i.e., to protect enclaves that resist the general tide (and from which we get our oil), and to protect or evacuate our civilians, often under fire. If the convulsion gains control of modern military forces-as in Iran-these missions will entail substantial conventional operations. They will also usually be naval.
It would be foolish to imagine that the Gulf will be the only area of instability concerning us within the next few decades. Events all over the world affect us because of the way in which our economy is integrated into the larger world economy. For example, Nigeria in West Africa supplies about a fifth of U.S. oil. Late in June an insurgent group announced that it planned to ruin the Nigerian oil industry as a way of pressuring the Nigerian government and, indirectly, us. The price of crude oil promptly rose about $2, and such rises in turn may retard our economic recovery.
Obviously, we are not about to mount a counter-insurgency war to protect the Nigerian oil industry, but we are more, rather than less, likely to want to project or threaten force in hopes of shaping events far from home. We cannot possibly build a chain of garrisons around the world; we have no appetite for world empire. Often it will be impossible to convince local governments to welcome our armies and air forces. Sea-based forces are a very different proposition. They will probably be needed more rather than less. Credibility will require sufficiently high technology to defeat local forces in fact or as a threat.
There are other potential problems. A coup in Honduras recently overthrew President Manuel Zelaya, who favored Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez; Chavez has muttered threats to invade so as to reverse the coup. The U.S. government did not favor the coup as a matter of policy, but what would it do in the event of an invasion and if the Hondurans resisted long enough to ask for help? What about other Latin American governments, such as that of Colombia, which Chavez may threaten? All over Latin America, substantial Indian populations have been submerged by the descendants of the conquering Spanish. The real significance of Mr. Chavez may be that he champions that Indian majority. What would be the effect on the United States of a large-scale race war in Latin America? To what extent would we consider the stream of refugees it created a major national security problem? A larger one than al Qaeda and its friends? Is that another of tomorrow's wars?
Generals (and presumably admirals) are always attacked for their apparent fascination with the lessons of the last war. It seems that the British writer who described "today's wars" may have suffered from the same disease. Iraq and Afghanistan may not be pointers to the future.