The Missing Element: Strategic Communication
(See M. K. Eder, pp. 28-33, February 2009 Proceedings)
Commander Hans Liske, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Major General Eder's arguments in favor of a centralized voice for strategic communications were unpersuasive on several counts. First, the author only scratches the surface of culture, and bases her arguments on its most superficial aspects. Second, she minimizes the many differing viewpoints in American democracy. And finally, she mischaracterizes the conflict about which she writes as a "war of ideas."
Geert Hofstede offers a model of culture that resembles an onion. The outer layer is composed of words, symbols, and the like and is the most visible source of conflict. It is the most superficial layer. Though the misunderstandings produced at this level can cause real problems if not appropriately managed, this outer layer is far from the driving or defining part of a culture. Jerry Springer and the TV show Dallas are in this layer. Springer's guests represent a tiny fraction of one percent of Americans. They volunteer for the show, and often make up or embellish their stories, simply to get on TV for their 15 minutes of fame. The audience understands this, and watches for the amusement of seeing someone make a fool of themselves. The fact that a student's question at the Swedish International Training Command involved a silly entertainment program hardly stands as an indictment of U.S. culture or a compelling reason to reprioritize scarce resources.
More disturbing is the notion that we should create a bureaucracy to push an "image" of the United States. One is left to ponder the question: whose image? Oliver Stone's? Michael Moore's? Rush Limbaugh's? Mine? The question isn't trivial. There are serious policy differences between reasonable people. It is the President's job to bridge these differences, or to decide between the different options, and communicate America's policies. We already have centralized in one man the ability to do what the author desires. Creating another entrenched bureaucracy, especially if it represents legislative intrusion into executive turf, isn't a very wise use of limited resources, and may result in the very mixed messages General Eder fears.
The notion that we are engaged in a "war of ideas" is simply wrong. What we are witnessing is a clash of values—the deeply held moral values at the core of Hofstede's model. By way of example, consider two American values—the right to life and the freedom to make one's own decisions. Both are strongly held values, but when a question arises that pits them in opposition, one must be given priority over the other. Abortion does just that. Some choose life, others opt for choice. Rarely, do facts and arguments persuade someone to change his mind, because this isn't about ideas, it is about which of two strongly held values gets priority. In the war on terrorism, American policy is creating this kind of conflict within Arab minds. They value freedom, democracy, and modernization, but those values conflict with other deeply held traditional values. The proposed strategic communications program completely misses that point.
Operations Analysis Guides LCS Employment
(See B. Abbott, pp. 82-83, February 2009 Proceedings)
Remo Salta—Lieutenant Abbott makes two points about the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) that are absolutely stunning. First, when dealing with possible threat scenarios facing the LCS he states that, "Five LCSs configured for the primary threat and two for the secondary threat serves as a compositional rule of thumb." We should all certainly hope that seven frigate-sized warships armed with a total of 14 SH-60 Seahawk helicopters (two per ship) should be able to defeat just about anything. Both versions of the LCS—the USS Freedom (LCS-1) at approximately 378 feet long and the Independence (LCS-2) at 418.6 feet long—are frigate-sized warships that should be able to handle frigate-sized missions. But because of their small crew sizes (less than 40 people), large fuel consumption (at top speed, the LCS only has enough fuel for less than two days at sea), and questionable offensive firepower (we're still not certain these portable mission packages, or modules, will adequately defend this ship). We still don't know if the LCS is even as capable as a Perry-class frigate.
What is even more troubling is that unlike fixed-mission warships that go into battle as is (such as frigates or minesweepers), we don't know if there will be enough time to convert the mission modules for each LCS so that she can rapidly adapt to a changing combat environment. And where will these conversions take place, at some far-away friendly port, or possibly at a supply ship that can double as an LCS tender?
Second, Lieutenant Abbot stated that, "Due to the inherent risks entailed by littoral combat, the Navy should effect a paradigm shift so that casualties of both ships and personnel are expected and accepted." Aside from the sheer coldness of that statement, what is an "acceptable" loss-ratio for an expensive frigate-sized warship like the LCS? And how many of these ships are we willing to lose to asymmetrical threats, such as to suicide speedboats loaded with explosives that the Iranians are so fond of or to small diesel submarines that specialize in operating in shallow coastal waters? At nearly $500 million per unit we may be approaching a point where the LCS is too big and expensive to be used close to shore (which is what it was designed for), but is also incapable of adequately performing blue-water tasks normally assigned to traditional frigates.
Brute
(See R. Coram, p. 14, February 2009 Proceedings)
Hugh Whitfield Davis—This a great article about General Krulak. However there is an error in this quotation: "[H]e was General Lemuel Shepherd's operations officer for the invasion of Okinawa. For his role in training the 6th Marine Regiment . . ." General Shepherd commanded the 6th Marine Division, not the 6th Marine Regiment.
The Navy's 'Tipping Point'
(See R. J. Natter and R. R. Harris, pp. 44-49, January 2009; J. C. Howe, pp. 85-86, February 2009 Proceedings)
Captain Anthony Cowden, U.S. Navy—Admiral Natter and Captain Harris compared the cost of the FFG-7 to the LCS and discussed size, accessibility, and speed comparisons between the two ships. Left under-addressed was the combat capability that comes with the roughly equivalent cost of an FFG-7 compared to an LCS: a coherent receiver-transmitter FFG-7 had a 76-mm gun, hull and towed-array sonar, CIWS, and the ability to employ SM-1, Harpoon, and SVTT-launched MK 46 torpedoes. An LCS comes with a 57-mm gun and Rolling Airframe Missile. Without its mission package, the LCS has virtually no combat capability—and with its mission package it has combat capability in only a single mission area. Hopefully future Proceedings articles will continue to analyze the functional utility and capabilities of LCS mission packages.
On the Care and Feeding of Young SWOs
(See K. S. J. Eyer, pp. 50-54, January 2009 Proceedings)
Hayden Leon—Captain Eyer observes "the level of knowledge in today's new SWOs to be both shallow and brittle." The need for a five-CD "SWOS at Sea" program, resumption of SWOS-DOC, or even a single month of "just-in-time" training in standard commands, navigation, maneuvering board usage, radar manipulation, and radio telephone use on graduation and commissioning speaks loudly of the poor job the four years of education in the Naval Academy or NROTC is doing. When I graduated, admittedly 50 years ago, I immediately became first lieutenant on a Gearing-class destroyer. The sea-going skills and leadership training I learned in four years at the Naval Academy served me well. There was no schooling after graduation. Two other ensigns, both NROTC, took over divisions in operations and engineering. Within six months we were all qualified officers of the deck. Admittedly the Gearing-class destroyer is not as complex as an Aegis cruiser, but the core skills are exactly the same. Before I left the ship I became weapons division officer, responsible for the 3-inch and 5-inch guns, the director, the torpedo tubes and director, the Hedgehogs, the depth charges, and the sonar. Although formation maneuvering and gunnery skills were not directly applicable when I went into submarines, the core sea-going skills remained and they were helpful in understanding targets.
If the four-year schooling isn't enough to provide the necessary education, it should be fixed so that an officer is ready to assume the responsibilities of a surface warfare officer upon reporting.
Ensign Douglas Cummings, U.S. Navy—I was moved by how well the author described the obstacles I and other junior officers face when we report to our ships. The challenge of having to qualify as a SWO on board a ship while simultaneously leading a division takes away from your efforts at both.
If you focus on qualifying for your pin, the care you put into maintaining your division suffers; if you focus on the job the Navy pays you for, you fall behind on your quals. If you split time between the two, you rarely feel that you're making progress on either. The most frustrating thing is when you ask a department head for the reference, to learn the answer the right way, and are told to figure that out yourself like the protagonist in Message to Garcia. It's little surprise that so many junior officers leave after their initial commitment, and that the Navy needs to pay $75,000 to convince each of the rest to stay.
Consider how much better prepared new officers would be if they were given some in-depth training in subject matters they need to know as a division officer before they arrived. Learning about fire-fighting, basic engineering, and combat systems would prepare them to be better all-around officers. It also would help alleviate the shortage of department-head candidates.
A Rude Awakening
(See M. McGuffie, pp. 56-61, January 2009 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Stephen F. Shedd, U.S. Navy—I thank Lieutenant McGuffie for a very good contribution to Proceedings and the discussion it has stimulated. I met Mitch at the Surface Navy Association National Symposium in January and we discussed his article in great detail. During our discussion, he asked me two questions: Was it a burden for me as a department head to train young ensigns under our current system
and, Did I think we could do better?My answer to the first was simple, but merits discussion. First and foremost, I never felt burdened training ensigns. Despite times when I was annoyed by some individuals who didn't have the fire to learn, I thoroughly enjoyed teaching them. In hindsight, however, I probably spent a disproportionate amount of time as a department head training young ensigns in basic mariner skills such as seamanship, engineering, and navigation as compared to mentoring and training them in more advanced skills such as material readiness, leadership, management, and tactics. I ended up spending far less time training and mentoring first-tour division officers in these "advanced" topics compared to what I received as an ensign.
The answer to the second question was a resounding "YES." I absolutely think we can do better in training ensigns prior to arrival at their first commands. I think the old six-month SWOS Division Officer Course was two-months of good training stretched into a six-month period and needed to be revised. Further, the computer-based training—SWOS-in-a-Box—simply doesn't work, and I'm glad to see the surface community moving away from this model. As I discussed with Lieutenant McGuffie at the symposium, his proposed training plan for SWO accessions is a non-starter from a fiscal standpoint. He is, however, spot-on that a more rigorous training program needs to be implemented for ensigns prior to arrival to their first ship, and the program should be geared toward or in line with commercial licensing practices.
I think the one-month SWOS introduction course is a great start in bringing the pendulum back to a reasonable solution. I would like to see a hard-hitting, intense, two-month course incorporating seamanship, navigation, damage control, material maintenance, basic engineering, and force protection. These are the core competencies, true for any mariner (even force protection nowadays), and should be hammered into each ensign prior to reporting to their ship to reduce the steepness of their learning curve and ultimately enable them to contribute to their ship faster from the moment they hit the deck plates.
Advice for the SecDef
(See H. M. Sapolsky, pp. 16-19, January 2009 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral Robert F. Dunn, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Dr. Sapolsky has written and the Naval Institute has published one of the best and most timely articles to appear in Proceedings for some time. What a breath of fresh air were the defense hierarchy to read and heed what he has written. The section entitled, "No More Management Fads," is particularly pertinent.
In my 38 years of active service I encountered numerous fads, and none, repeat none, ever made my unit or me more combat ready or my office or command more efficient in the use of taxpayer-supplied resources. Over the years we weathered MBO, TQM/TQL, Matrix Management, Process Re-engineering, Team-Based Management, Zero Defects, ISO 9000 and, now, Lean Six Sigma. Each time the fad-of-the-day required dedicated trainers, time devoted to being trained, a report structure that clogged the paperwork flow, and more. Those of us in charge at the times these fads came along put up with them because it was suggested that if we didn't, careers would be limited. Thus arose gundecking, dissimulation, lip service, and snickers in the wardrooms and ready rooms. The American Sailor, too, could readily see that and secondary effects were everywhere, except for growth in efficiency.
Many of these techniques were developed to be used in manufacturing environments but the gurus decided they would work in leadership environments as well. They didn't and they don't. The services, especially the Navy, have a long tradition of leadership, with lessons learned through trial and error over centuries. Why is it we must depart from those historical and traditional lessons learned in order to conform to the latest fad? The answer is, we don't.
What we should do is hark back to the words in every officers' commission—"Placing special trust and confidence"—and then apply it to every officer, every petty officer, and senior Navy civilians as well. That won't be hard because, in the end, everyone wants to do a good job and responds well to trust. Then apply a leadership formula, which has worked time and again over the years:
Ensure that the people in your organization know clearly what's expected of them.
Ensure they have the right training.
Provide them the right tools.
Then cheer them on.
Do that, and dollars will be saved and the next management fad will be even more irrelevant and better ignored. That would be good for the Navy and all who serve in it.
Inland Sailors
(See J. W. Welle, pp. 20-25, January 2009; J. E. Lyons, T. F. Doyle Jr., T. J. Brovarone, pp. 7, 84-85, February 2009 Proceedings)
Senior Chief Aviation Ordnanceman John Cataldi, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Lieutenant Welle points out how many Sailors detailed to Individual Augmentee (IA) duty are often assigned to war zone tasks that have nothing to do with their ratings or warfare specialties. He further states that this duty dulls perishable naval skills and comes at a cost to Fleet readiness.
I submit that there is a pool of untapped naval personnel that could help to fill these "outside the sea-lane" IA assignments at no cost to warfare skills or Fleet readiness—Navy retirees. To my knowledge, few, if any, Navy retirees have even been asked if they would accept a recall for an IA assignment. Many of us retired from the Navy in our late 30s to early 40s and have entered new career fields that could be valuable to these IA assignments.
Many military reservists serving in Iraq or Afghanistan are as old or even older than many retirees. Likewise, many of the older reservists have chronic but controllable medical conditions and yet, they are still sent to the war zones, some of them more than once.
Since my retirement from the Navy in the early 1990s, I have been a municipal police officer for the past 13 years. I have a current State of Texas law-enforcement instructor's license and am certified in crisis negotiations. Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, I have twice sent requests to BUPERS volunteering for recall to IA duty. The requests have included my law enforcement experience and certifications. To date, I have never even received the courtesy of a reply. Imagine my dismay when I read articles in Proceedings and the Navy Times about surface warfare officers and aviation machinist mates pulled from the fleet for IA duty to train the Afghan police.
I certainly cannot be the only retiree with skills acquired after a Navy career that are of value to IA assignments. If the Navy leadership would publish a general list of skills for which IA billets exist, and then ask if there are any retirees willing to be recalled to fill them, they might be surprised at how many of us are willing to step up and serve again.