The Bitter Cost of Business
(See K. S. J. Eyer, pp. 44-49, July 2008 Proceedings)
Captain James T. Rooney, U.S. Navy Reserve—This article points out that 439 funded O-6 billets are empty for several reasons, but primarily because of a decreasing O-6 inventory. Any solutions to increase the O-6 inventory are years away, regardless of the decided course of action. I don't know the importance of these 439 vacant billets to conclude whether they should be filled or not. But this just might be a good time to push active-Reserve integration.
If these billets should be filled by a military member, and we know that the fix is years away, why not advertise for Reserve officers to fill them? (The article did say the billets were funded, so figure out how to get the money into the correct bucket.) I read many billet advertisement e-mails for everyone but O-6s. Navy Reserve officers have been mobilized and/or recalled to active duty in large numbers during the past five years, and as we shift to an operational reserve, members should now expect to be recalled every five or six years. It seems like a no-brainer to at least try to fill these billets with Reserve officers.
Winning Battles, Losing Wars
(See H. Ullman, p. 12, July 2008 Proceedings)
Douglas Cox—I disagree with Mr. Ullman's assertion that "The Korean War was, at best, a draw." He defines losing as a failure to gain a war's objectives in the peace that follows the end of hostilities. But the objective of the United Nations forces in Korea was the preservation of an independent, non-communist South Korea. This objective was achieved both during the war and the peace that followed.
After the Chinese Fourth Phase offensive in 1951, it was clear that UN forces could not be pushed off the peninsula. It was also clear that unification of Korea was unlikely. A stalemate ensued until an end to hostilities could be brought about politically. Though the armistice remains uneasy after 55 years, South Korea has prospered and maintained its independence.
I would argue that Korea was at worst a draw, and at best a limited victory. But a limited victory does not have the same appeal as the sweeping victory of World War II. Compared to the victories over Germany and Japan, it is not surprising that other victories, before and after, are viewed with disappointment. But military campaigns gaining limited objectives are still victories.
Mr. Ullman quite rightly points out that the failure to win the peace following World War I led to another war 20 years later. Similarly, one could argue that a failure to win the peace after the First Gulf War led to another war with Iraq. In the intervening 12 years the United States resorted to the use of military force against Iraq on several occasions.
In contrast, whatever failures there may have been in winning the peace after the armistice, there has not been a second Korean war, nor has the United States had occasion to resort to the use of military force against North Korea. Though tensions remain, the record of the last 55 years with regard to the Korean peninsula appears much brighter than Mr. Ullman suggested in his column.
Sprinting Through the Tape
(See T. L. Wilkerson, pp. 28-31, July 2008 Proceedings)
SOUTHCOM Turns to Soft Power
(See P. Paterson, pp. 56-60, July 2008 Proceedings)
Colonel John C. McKay, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)—Whether intentional or merely incidental, the juxtaposition of articles by Major General Wilkerson and Lieutenant Commander Paterson in the July issue is fortuitous and timely. Defense Secretary Robert Gates' short 18-month tenure has brought a sense of "righting the vessel" of the Department of Defense after a period of dangerous listing.
Though the Secretary has made quite clear his intent to identify the shortcomings that afflict the Department and correct them, it is the on-site combatant commanders who must ultimately implement the Secretary's guidance in accord with their own judgment and the situation in their respective areas of responsibility. Lieutenant Commander Paterson's article fittingly details the USSOUTHCOM commander's original and energetic efforts, within a relatively unique area of responsibility, to tailor his command for mission accomplishment—an uncertain strategic environment and significant budget constraints notwithstanding. More important, as implied in the article, he is doing so in accordance with Defense Secretary Gates' strategic intent and guidance clearly in mind.
Both articles reflect, albeit at different levels, how the critical elements of proper leadership, foresight, and creative thinking are the keys to success in the execution of the national security strategy. As an aside, Admiral Stavridis contributes admirably to creative thinking with his emphasis on the need for civilian and military professionals to write and publish their thoughts and experiences. Written intellectual expression and debate further operational effectiveness. The two articles, taken together, provide a textbook illustration on how the national military strategy, in conjunction with the National Security Strategy, must be implemented in a world much at variance, if not diametrically opposed, to that of the Cold War.
In four months the country will elect a new President. What this augurs for the DOD leadership is unknown. But as depicted in these two articles the professional leadership, both civilian and military, is certainly extant. Whether the next President retains the current Defense Secretary—certainly worth serious consideration by whoever wins—is not known. Admiral Stavridis will certainly move on and possibly up. The point borne out by these two articles is that the character of the individual in charge does make the difference. An excellent commander such as Admiral Stavridis—and there are certainly many other equally qualified individuals—can anticipate and implement the intent and guidance of a Defense Secretary, such as Robert Gates, who understands that the country is at war, who demands accountability, does not abide complacency, and exercises the basic tenets of leadership required of the position in which he competently serves our nation.
Lieutenant Commander Paterson does not address the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (1967), certainly a key strategic concern in an era when nuclear proliferation is of the utmost importance. This is particularly cogent since Venezuela's Hugo Chávez feels compelled to cozy up with another self-styled populist, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran.
DOD on a Glide Path to Bankruptcy
(See J. D. Christie, pp. 22-25, June 2008; P. J. Madden, E. P. Podrazik, pp. 9-10, July 2008 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Rowland G. Freeman III, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Dr. Christie's article was right on, but there were a couple of things he left out. First, he was saying the same thing when he was in Systems Analysis in OSD and I was Deputy Chief of Procurement and Production in the Naval Material Command in the 1970s. Whether it was shipbuilding, aircraft, or electronics, estimates were way off (low) as were schedules (late). The recommendations of the investigative commissions were ignored, and the only corrective action seemed to be more bureaucracy, more reviews, and more "passing of the buck." Thus almost 40 years have gone by without much improvement, except now we seem to be developing things unrelated to the wars we fight, as shown with our performance in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Second, it would appear that Dr. Christie has mellowed. He was much more blunt in Systems Analysis in pointing out that many of the mistakes were the result of pure incompetence on the part of several players in the system. While outlining in the article three issues (requirements, technology, and cost estimates), he left out the biggest problem/issue: people. While Dr. Christie dealt with the civil service and political side, most of the mistakes are made below that level and involve program management and the staff supporting them. The most recent action of cutting the length of courses at the Defense Systems Management College is a prime example of what not to do. Good old business training is still not supported in the procurement area, particularly on the military side, and most program managers learn on the job.
Study after study by well-staffed commissions have made very concrete recommendations, but few of these have been implemented, particularly in the people area. Unless the bottom of the system is fixed, no matter how well-qualified the top, the system will fail. I am reminded of a quote from British Admiral Sir John Jellico at the battle of Jutland during World War I: "The prelude to battle is the work of the engine room."
We need more articles like Dr. Christie's that address his last two sentences: "To avoid failure leaders need to focus on fixing basic problem causes, not treating the symptoms. The problem has been self-inflicted; the solutions can be as well."
One Size Does Not Fit All
(See E. Wiser, pp. 26-31, June 2008 Proceedings)
Captain Evin Thompson, U.S. Navy, Commander, Naval Special Warfare Group Four—Mr. Wiser's article provides a thought-provoking commentary on our nation's maritime challenges in the littoral and riverine environments. His view that our nation needs a family of craft to meet the challenges of the green- and brown-water environments is on target. The U.S. Navy of today has a family of capital ships, but the other craft required to conduct full spectrum maritime operations are sorely lacking.
Post-Vietnam, our conventional naval force had a gap in the green- and brown-water environments. Naval Special Warfare kept the pilot light burning with the preservation of the capability, innovation, and combat development that provided our only impact in these theaters until the recent creation of the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command. The Navy continues to show a token interest in the green- and brown-water domains.
Our Navy is sacrificing critical capability and development of a green- and brown-water fleet that could engage with our allies in the indirect fight today and then fight directly against future enemies. The Navy does this in favor of high-end surface combatants that will carry the day in a blue-water conflict that may never come again. The fight in the littorals and rivers is relevant today and will remain so for the foreseeable future. The Littoral Combat Ship will be challenged to truly fight a littoral battle. It is big, cumbersome, and at its high cost and crew size, will never enter into the littorals.
The author unfortunately diminishes some of the capabilities of our allies. The Colombian Navy has developed the most potent riverine craft in the world in the form of the Nodriza-class Riverine Support Vessel (RSV). This world-class fire support, transport, and command-and-control ship continues to make a difference in the war on terrorism as the Colombian military forces aggressively use it to fight in the riverine environment. Our nation would be well served to take advantage of the offer by the Colombians to lease a RSV to build our own expertise over the coming years.
Another point that the author misses is the requirement for armor as a tradeoff for speed and acceleration in the riverine environment. The base line requirement for any vessel that operates in this arena is weaponry, and not just organic but the ability to apply the combined-arms team. The second base line requirement is the ability to go at least two knots faster than the current. Speed and acceleration can be mitigated by armor. A vessel like the RSV is slow. It is well-armored and armed and can stay and fight on the river.
Unlike any other maneuver element in the air, land, or sea, a boat on the river can only do two things: it can go up or downriver. The decision on speed versus armor depends on the mission task. A fast boat will never be a well-armored boat, the iron triangle (speed, range, payload) of boat design does not permit such a luxury. But, a fast boat is necessary to conduct the precision, time-sensitive raids required of special operations. To state that the special operations craft-riverine is not the finest riverine strike craft in the world is false. What our Navy is lacking is a riverine craft that can provide persistent presence on the rivers and that requires a well-armored and armed boat.
'I'm Still a Navy Man at Heart'
(See B. Feller, pp. 14-15, June 2008 Proceedings)
Jan P. Fladeboe—Bob Feller's story in the inaugural "Answering the Call" is a testament to his patriotism and courage. I had the opportunity several years ago to meet Mr. Feller and he voiced the same sentiments noted in the article. I commented that he certainly would have reached 300 wins (he won 266 games in his major league career) had it not been for the war. He replied that was all right, that "we had won the Big One" and that was all that mattered.
Knowing that he has served on a battleship in the Pacific, I asked him about his toughest moments. I expected him to respond by naming a battle in the Philippines or the Marshalls, but he didn't. He said his worst moments on board the USS Alabama (BB-60) were in the Chesapeake Bay, of all places. The ship had run aground on an uncharted sandbar and was stuck fast. Feller recalled that the crew was very anxious about their plight because of the threat of German U-boats that had been ravaging the East Coast. He recalled that the entire crew ran back and forth on deck, from port to starboard, as the ship alternated reversing its screws. Finally, after several agonizing minutes, the ship broke free.
The Polaris Partnership
(See D. Taweel, pp. 48-51, June 2008 Proceedings)
Ambassador Linton F. Brooks, former Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration—Ensign Taweel provides an important reminder of the origins of the close nuclear and strategic cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom. For 50 years, an important factor in the development of this cooperation has been the U.S.-UK Mutual Defense Agreement (formally the Agreement for Cooperation on the uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes), signed on 3 July 1958, within days after changes to the Atomic Energy Act made such an agreement legal.
The extent of cooperation under this agreement has been remarkable. The two countries have shared complete technical and design details of their most advanced nuclear warheads. Of particular interest to the Navy, the United States helped Britain develop their submarine nuclear propulsion by transferring information, technology, and a complete submarine power plant to the United Kingdom. For years British nuclear weapons tests were conducted at the Nevada Test Site. More recently, the two countries have exchanged technical information in the fight against nuclear terrorism. There is probably no better example in human history of military cooperation as detailed and enduring on such a sensitive topic.
Equally remarkable has been the degree to which nuclear cooperation—like defense cooperation in general—has been immune from the periodic tensions that mar relations between even the closest of allies. In the four and a half years I served as administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (and thus as the senior U.S. official responsible for cooperation under the 1958 agreement) I can recall no instance in which it was necessary for either side to raise any issues at senior levels about the details of the cooperation. As the two countries note the 50th anniversary of cooperation in July, it is worth looking back on this remarkable partnership, one that seems certain to continue in the coming decades.