Pakistan, in particular that nation's Makran Coast, will be key to future activities on and around the North Arabian Sea. Change is under way that will have a significant impact on international relations in the region.
Challenges in the North Arabian seas may endanger stability and undercut strategic interests of major stakeholders in the region. As the United States continues to collaborate with India in actions ranging from nuclear accord to all-inclusive naval exercises and antiterrorism operations, it inadvertently promotes what it has intensely fought since those tragic moments when Mohammud Alta and his henchmen flew their planes into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and Shanksville, Pennsylvania.
Five years after it agreed to join the U.S.-led war on terrorism, Pakistan remains in the eye of the storm. A majority of those in British custody following the 10 August 2006 attempt to hijack and destroy U.S.-bound airliners are either Pakistanis or of Pakistani descent. The central figure in the foiled plot is a Pakistani-born Briton. Rashid Rauf. Despite being a key U.S. ally that provided vital support during Operation Enduring Freedom and reversed its policy toward the Tulibun, Pakistan is still perceived to be home to many of America's foes in the war on terrorism. Consider a closer look at Pakistan and its navy.
The Vulnerability
During a talk at the Pakistan Navy War College in April 2006. renowned British maritime historian Geoffrey Till grossly underestimated al Qaeda's maritime ability to disrupt the global economy by attacking sea arteries. Professor Till held that there is no terror threat to global maritime trade. Quite to the contrary, al Qaeda has a declared commitment to maritime acts of terror.
A hypothetical situation highlighted during a Homeland Port security Conference sponsored by the U.S. Naval Institute two months later may not be too far-fetched. Indeed, ocean-borne terror threats involve an enemy that is "transient, invisible, and hiding in plain sight."' This is an enduring danger to ports worldwide as well as to the global sea trade and sailors on the ocean highways.
Shipping accounts for more than KO percent of global trade through more than 2.800 ports including 361 in the United Stales. In 2004. merchant ships carried 90 percent of the world trade, worth $8.3 trillion.2 With more than 120,000 commercial ships and 1.2 million mariners plying the oceans' highways, concerted international efforts have made those routes far safer today than they were it few years ago. Given the ingenuity of terror groups, however, maritime trade remains vulnerable. A concealed explosive smuggled on board a tanker carrying a volatile cargo such as liquefied natural or petroleum gas (LNG/ LPG), if detonated, could cause extensive damage for minimal expense. Not all potentially dangerous cargo terminals are outside population centers nor are those vessels safe in transit. LNG or similar cargo carriers can he destroyed at critical choke points with dreadful consequences.
In his 2006 State of the Union address. President George W. Bush acknowledged only the obvious when he said. "America is addicted to oil. which is often imported from unstable pails of the world." Breaking its dependence on the Middle East for its addiction through fresh research for alternative energy sources may not come soon or easily. As vital as the Persian Gull is now, its strategic importance is likely to grow exponentially in the next 20 years. Nearly one-third of the world's oil reserves lie under just two countries: Saudi Arabia with 259 billion barrels and Iraq with 112 billion.3
The Strait of Hormuz connecting the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea is only 1.5 miles wide at its narrowest point. Roughly 15 million barrels of oil are shipped through it daily. A major transshipment and commercial seaport on the western fringes of Pakistan's 600-mile-long coastal belt of Makran is Hearing completion. Built at a cost of $250 million-with China contributing S200 million-the port of dwadar is in Pakistan's largest, but vastly impoverished, Balochistan province, dwadar. 390 nautical miles from the Strait of Hormuz, is strategically located to monitor its approaches.1 Once completed, the port is expected to expand commercial trade and reduce reliance on Pakistan's only other port at Karachi, some 250 miles to the east.
Makran Coast-Balochistan-Past and Present
The strategic significance of Pakistan's Makran coast has been long recognized. Among classified documents related to Indian partition and attributed to Lord Louis Mountbatten, the last British Viceroy, is a memo dated 19 May 1948: "If the British Commonwealth and United States are to be in a position to defend their vital interests in the Middle East, then the best and most stable area from which to conduct this defense is from Pakistan territory. Pakistan [is] the keystone of the strategic arch of the wide and vulnerable waters of the Indian Ocean."
Sir OIuf CUIOC. the then-governor of the North West Frontier Province bordering Afghanistan and former British foreign secretary, supported this contention during a 1447 lecture in the United States. "Karachi port and the coastline of Bulochistun (Makran) standing at the mouth of the Persian Gulf were vital to its (British) reckoning. The British base in India |now Pakistani had maintained stability in the Middle East since 1801. when Tsar Paul's ambitions first blew the whistle."
History often takes perplexing twists. In September 1973 when Pakistan's Prime Minister Zultlquur Bhutto met President Richard Nixon at the White House, he sought U.S. aid to construct the port at Gwadar and offered its use to the U.S. Navy. Although the President stated he would have the proposal examined, a National security Council briefing paper indicated no great interest in having a naval facility in Balochistan. which would stir up the Soviets. Indians, and Afghans without greatly contributing to U.S. interests. The administration took no action on the proposal, which Chinese Premier /hou Knlai strongly endorsed when secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited China in November IW.
Today, despite denials by China that its contribution Io Ciwadar has no military dimension, both the United States and India remain skeptical. "Acquiring a hase facility in Pakistan would merely require two signatures on a piece of paper if their common interests so dictated." writes Indian Admiral Vijai Singh Shekhawat." The port has boosted Balochistan's significance because the projected 27 berths-enough for a major Pakistani naval base-could be used by Beijing. Put plainly, long alter the COkI War is over and security imperatives stand redefined in the wake of 9/1 I. the strategic value of Gwadar and Pakistan's coastal belt remains intact and fearsome.
Seeds of Maritime Terrorism
Baluchistan is in the grip of a bloody insurgency. Over the past two years, nearly six Pakistani army brigades, backed by several thousand paramilitary forces, have battled an ethnic Buloch nationalist group. The group, formerly led by a veteran politician cum tribal leader Nawab Akbar Bugti, demands provincial autonomy under the 1973 constitution and an end to economic inequity as well as its right to use provincial natural resources. Balochistan has the country's richest mineral resources including natural gas, copper, iron, and more than 50 minerals. While the government claims that India is aiding the insurgents. Baloch leaders maintain that wealthy supporters in the Persian Gull region are providing money to buy weapons.
On 26 August 2006, in the rugged mountains of Balochistan. the Pakistan military, using a satellite tracking system, found Bugti. In the ensuing battle, he and several of his tribesmen were killed. The question that remains unanswered is whether or not Bugti's death will provoke more violenee from separatists. For now. the impoverished yet energy-rich province is in an uproar after an ill-explained military operation. The consequences of Bugti's assassination are likely to he monumental.
With Balochistan ablaze. the province is likely to hecome a haven for al Qaeda and the Taliban. Pouring in from neighboring Afghanistan, these terrorists may exploit and provoke sentiments of the large, destitute population living along the coast whose meager living is inextricably linked to sea.
After 9/11, the nexus between drug cartels, sea pirates, and terror groups was largely broken. The violent suppression of insurgency in Balochistan and killing of a popular tribal leader has the seeds of producing a new breed of maritime terrorists along Pakistan's Makrun coast who may eventually threaten dwadar and parts of the North Arabian Sea.
Military Sales and Pakistan Navy
American military and economic assistance to Pakistan, both during and after the Cold War has followed a pattern of least during a military regime and famine once civilians govern. Statistics provided hy the U.S. Agency for International Development, indicate that between 1954 and 2002. the United States provided $12.6 billion in economic and military aid to Pakistan. Of this. $9.2 billion was given during 24 years of military rule while only $3.4 billion was provided to civilian-ruled Ut)N1CnImCnIs spanning 19 years, an annual average of $3X2.9 and S178.9 million respectively.1' With the Pakistani Army being the dominant power, the nation's other services, particularly the navy, had to struggle for their survival for the better part of the nation's history.
In the mid-1980s. India had superiority over Pakistan in terms of manpower (2:1), divisions (2:1). main battle tanks (2:1 ). surface ships (4:1), and combat aircraft (3:1 ).7 Despite liberal U.S. military aid during the Afghan war, Islamabad could neither maintain nor upgrade the navy's weapons. Beeause of its low priority, the service could not benefit from the initial aid package. Three P-3C Orion aircraft procured in the second package remained nonoperational initially, because of, first, their poor condition, and later, the arms embargo. Eight U.S. frigates of the Rrookv and Garcia classes were obtained on lease but were called back in 1991. leaving the navy with a gap to be filled.
Between then and 1996. the Pakistan Navy purchased several types of weapon systems that barely enhanced service capability let alone constituted a significant threat to the Indian Navy's growing blue-water potential. These included old Leanders and Type 21 frigates from Great Britain and an auxiliary from China. The French embargo of 1999, which temporarily stopped the transfer of Agosta 90-B submarines, exposed the Pakistan Navy's vulnerability in maintaining even a credible defensive posture. To bolster its fleet, the navy recently contracted IOr four Chinese Jiuii^wci-ll (Type 053H3) frigates. Three of these will be built in China and one in Pakistan. The purchase of four second-hand Greek frigates was cancelled by the Greeks under pressure from NATO. The new Chinese ships-dubbed F-22P-are set for delivery from 2009 to 2012. In addition, the navy has commissioned two domestically constructed fast-attack craft fitted with the Chinese C-802 antiship missile.
Looking Over Its Shoulder
The Pakistan Navy played a vital role and rendered critical logistic support to the Coalition forces during Operation Enduring Freedom. Today the navy is a key partner in the US.-led Coalition Maritime Campaign Plan. But small deliveries of P-3Cs and Phalanx close-in weapons systems have not added to its teeth ami the service remains weapons deficient. While navy professionals persevere against the odds, the technological and numerical gap between the Pakistani and Indian navies continues to increase.
Eric S. Margolis. an international columnist and a commentator on foreign affairs concluded in a March 2005 Proceedings article that:
The principle mission of the Indian Navy is to face up to the Pakistan Navy. In any new conflict, India's overwhelming naval power could quickly eliminate Pakistan's eight outdated destroyers and frigates and hunt down its seven conventional submarines and blockade Karachi and Gwudur, Pakisum's two ports, cutting off imports of fuel, munitions, spare parts and strategic goods.
Large-scale joint exercises such as Malabar between the United States and India, raise not only concerns within the Pakistan Navy but also those in regional waters. Attempts to counterbalance this through the ongoing Inspired Union exercises-joint U.S.-Pakistan naval exercises to check terrorism, human, and drug smuggling-do little to allay the deep-seated distrust of India. It is not a complex interpolation to see that if the Pakistan Navy conducts major exercises with China's Peoples' Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN), or if Islamabad seals a strategic alliance with China that opens mutual bases at Gwadar and Myanmar for military purposes, the Indian Ocean will become a hotbed of instability. Neither Washington nor New Delhi would he happy to see PLAN warships berthed at Gwadar.
The Way Out
Over the years, the theme of the U.S. Naval War College's annual international seapower symposium has remained basically unchanged: Building Capacity Through Cooperation. At the 2005 symposium. Ambassador Rose M. Likins stated, "The core mission of the U.S State Department is to create a more secure, democratic and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the international community."8 It seems, however, that in this part of the world, the United States is doing none of those things.
"Our enemy is not terrorism. Our enemy is violent, Islamic fundamentalism." asserted former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman in a May 2004 Proceedings article. Little do we recognize that religious seminaries preaching jihad are just one part of the problem. The brutal eruption of Islamic fundamentalism has roots in Muslim states where religion and politics are merged and the state security apparatus represses dissent. This is recognized within Pakistan. In a 11 August 2006 op-ed piece in the Pakistani daily. The Nation, Lieutenant General Asad Durrani, former director general of Pakistan's top spy agency, wrote that:
All terrorist movements started with a domestic agenda (even al Qaeda had initially pleaded tor in-house reforms). Unable to contain their disaffection, some of the stales chased them across their frontiers-once even sent them to Afghanistan in the hope that they would embrace martyrdom-and bandwagon with the others of their ilk. The terrorists reacted predictably; they networked. Globalization of terrorism was thus state sponsored.
The United States may find the $58 billion planned for homeland security in the coming fiscal year to be too little, too late if the radical ideology and following of al Qaeda continues to expand in the Muslim world.
In recent years, the chief of the Indian Navy indicated readiness to conduct joint exercises with the Pakistan Navy. This was a momentous signal and barkened back to the 1950s when both navies participated in exercises known as JET (Joint Exercises at Trincomalee). The United States can play a vital role in the settlement of long-festering maritime disputes in the North Arabian Sea including the Sir Creek and maritime boundary issues at the PakistanIndia border. This will pave the way for reviving bonds that previously linked the two nations and will lead to gradual lessening of mistrust and increased cooperation. After the resolution of these discordant maritime issues, the United States should engage both navies to initiate cooperative policing in the region.
Stability in the Indian Ocean must not remain hostage to the containment of emerging centers of power or resolution of core issues. These are neither in the interest of littorals nor other stakeholders but may serve al Qaeda and its breed well.
1. "Terror Threats at Water's Edge" by Erie Mills, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 2006, p. 30.
2. "The Challenge of Maritime Terrorism: Threat Identification WMD and Regime Response" by Donna J. Nincic, The Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 28, No. 4, August 2005, p. 622, and "Maritime Challenges" by Admiral Arun Prakash, Indian Defense Review, January-March 2006 Vol. 21 (1), p. 51.
3. "India's Energy Security of Supply and the Gulf" by Dr. Akhilesh Chandra Prabhakar, India Quarterly Vol. LX, No.3, September 2004, p. 126.
4. "Terrorism Goes to Sea," Foreign Affairs Vol. 83. No. 6, November/December 2004, pp. 65-66, and "New Naval Bastions" by Dr. Vijay Sakhuja, Indian Defense Review, April-June, Vol. 20(2), 2005, p. 58.
5. ibid., "New Naval Bastions," and "Maritime Power" by Admiral V. S. Shekhawat, Indian Defense Review Vol. 21 (2) April-June 2006, p. 61.
6. Pakistan between Masque and Military by Hussain Haqqani. Lahore:Vanguard Books, 2005. p. 324.
7. Pakistan's Security under Zia in Robert G. Wirsing. London: Macmillan, 1991, p. 89.
8. "Luncheon Address" by Ambassador Rose M. Likins. 17th International Seapower Symposium, 21 September 2005, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI.
Commander Khan, commissioned in the operations branch of the Pakistan Navy in 1976, retired in 1998. A graduate of Pakistan's National Defence College, he specialized in communications and held staff and command appointments including executive officer on hoard two destroyers. His career includes 13 years of sea service and active sea duty with the UAE Navy during the Iran-Iraq war.