The U.S. Coast Guard is undergoing a massive and unprecedented effort to completely restructure itself around Iwo themes: mission execution and mission support. With little fanfare. Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Thad Alien has generated a sea change that strikes at fundamental service traditions, the promotion system, the organizational structure, the operating culture, and the entire way the Coast Guard thinks about itself It is nothing less than transformational in the true meaning of that oft-used, if not abused, term.
Not since 1939. when the Commandant. then-Rear Admiral Russell R. Waesche. reorganized the Coast Guard, has the service seen anything like this. Now. nearly 70 years on. Admiral Alien intends nothing less than a fundamental reordering of the Coast Guard for the 21st century. This is not transformation for transformation's sake, but transformation to:
* Address the strategic problems of nonmilitary, transnational, asymmetric threats in the maritime domain that the United States is likely to face in the future.
* Integrate fully the Coast Guard with the numerous new national strategies published as a result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. and especially the unprecedented 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security that codified into national-level responsibilities many Coast Guard roles, missions, and tasks.1
* Correct inefficient, if not flawed, command and control organizations for operations and loeistics.
The United States has vital national interests in the the maritime domain close to its coastlines as well as overseas. The safety and economic security ol the nation depend substantially on the secure use of the world's oceans-a maritime domain that is increasingly under stress from non-military threats. The threats of the Cold War are long gone, and no major orgunized military threat is on the immediate horizon. But terrorism, illegal immigration, smuggling, and resource exploitation, to name hut a lew, present growing threats to America's maritime borders and sovereign waters. Natural and environmental disasters-hurricane Katrina, for example-are occurring on unprecedented scales along America's shores. These threats and hazards converge in a domain that is critical to our cconoim and filled with complex commercial activity and critical national infrastructure. To get ahead of these sometime ambiguous but always dangerous challenges, and not just react to them, the Coast Guard is thinking, anticipating, and acting anew.
The Coast Guard is an instrument of national security. It must ensure no disconnect between the policies contained in numerous new national strategies and its means to achieve these policies. The Coast Guard does not intend to address the requirements of these strategies and future challenges with yesterday's solutions. Nor does the service intend to wait for a Katrina- or Desert One hostage-like event, or an external change agent such as the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, to initiate transformation. Indeed, as Admiral Allen has stated: "We will not change for change's sake hut purposefully, with strategic intent and always focused on our first priority and duly to the nation: mission execution.
The third reason for transformation is especially a problem for the Coast Guard. The service has never been more relevant or important in the world than it is today. Because of its operational successes after 9/11 and with the response to hurricane Katrina, as well as with its day-to-day operations at home and abroad (i.e., joint maritime interception operations with the U.S. Navy in the Persian Gulf), the Coast Guard has never been more respected or in more demand by the American public. Because of that, however, the public mistakenly believes that the Coast Guard is capable of maintaining this level of operational success and doing more, on a sustained basis, with its current organizational structure. In reality, without radical change the Coast Guard knows it cannot reasonably support such expectations.
The Coast Guard has systemic problems that it has tried to fix. often with incomplete results. At various times the service has tried to change how it operates, both as an operating agency and as a "business" of sorts, in regard to its internal management practices. It has tried to unify its logistical and supply support consistent with the private sector, such as practiced at Wal-Mart or Federal Express. Some very innovative ideas for positive change have been conceived, but unfortunately, often the Coast Guard could not follow through and take full advantage of these ideas.
For example, a 1986 study recommended transferring finance, engineering, and personnel support functions from the multiple districts Admiral Waesche had established in the 1930s to a single new Maintenance and Logistics Command (MLC) to ensure one standardized approach to logistics and support functions. Unfortunately, the Coast Guard diluted the recommendation and opted for two MLCs-one each for the Atlantic and Pacific regions-consequently creating two different "stove-pipe" logistics systems for its aircraft, ships, and shore facilities, in lieu of one centralized support system for all operating forces.
Another study in 1999 concluded that the Coast Guard could he optimally structured if it consolidated the two separate field units at the tactical level overseeing mission execution in the ports and along the coasts and waterways into a single operational command. This same study also recommended that the service establish a Maritime Domain Awareness capability-two years before 9/11. Unfortunately, the Coast Guard repeated the 1986 experience. Despite accurately analyzing the right course of action, it could not follow through. Finally, the events of 9/11 forced it to act. but not until 2006 did the Coast Guard seek to put in place a single consolidated command for all mission execution at the tactical level.
The Coast Guard has decided it is lime in transform itself to ultimately sustain the primary goal of successful mission execution. This includes sustaining a level of performance that the nation has come to expect. The service intends to become more agile, flexible, and responsive. Specifically, the Coast Guard intends to make (I) its organizational structure more responsive to mission execution; (2) its support systems more responsive to its operational units; (3) itself more responsive Io national requirements.
How Will the Coast Guard Transform?
The Coast Guard has developed ten action plans called Commandant Intent Action Orders (ClAOs) to achieve this near-total transformation of the service. With the exception of one that addressed the need for a new service strategy, the remaining nine are eategori/ed as either (1) command and control (C^sup 2^) for how the (Oast Guard plans to executes its missions. or (2) mission support for how the service intends to holster its support and readiness systems to best advantage. Although all orders are distinct, they have not been planned nor are they being executed as independent initiatives. To ensure systematic and integrated implementation, the Coast Guard has established a CIAO Coordination Team directed by a flag officer for thorough planning and execution-especially the intricate internal and external sequencing details-and the development of timelines to reach transformation. In early 2007, planning tor three of the mission-support CIAOS is incomplete and so will not he discussed here. The other seven CIAOs must he addressed first, and their attainment is almost all-consuming tor the service. Once these framework CIAOs are fully implemented, the Coast Guard will turn to completing the final three, knowing the new organizational requirements that these three CIAOs must support.2
Overarching Guidance for Transformation
CIAO for a New Service Strategy. This order directs the development of a comprehensive strategy to provide enterprise-wide strategic intent for the next four to five years. This U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship became effective on 19 January 2007 and guides the crafting of all other CIAOs. It describes how the Coast Guard will work to safeguard the nation against all threats, hazards, and challenges in the maritime domain, today and in the future. It also redefines and discusses the service's enduring roles (safety, security, and stewardship), future challenges and threats, and a systems approach for improving maritime governance. And finally, it sets service priorities for budget, legislative proposals, rule making, and international activities liming Admiral Alien's tenure. From these Inundations, the strategy presents six crosscutting strategic priorities that build on the Coast Guard's strengths and best focuses its capabilities to serve the nation:
* Strengthen regimes for the U.S. maritime domain
* Achieve awareness in the maritime domain
* Enhance unity of effort in maritime planning anil operations
* Integrate Coast Guard capabilities for national defense
* Develop a national capacity for the marine transportation system recovery
* Focus international engagement on improving maritime governance
Of note is the top priorilv of addressing maritime regimes. The Coast Guard sees a future security environment that places increased emphasis on oversight of the ulohal commons. Along with the freedom to use the seas, other "freedoms" to pollute, over-fish. and conduct illegal activity can significantly harm the oceans and the well-being of the international community. The Pew Commission's report. America's Living Oceans: Charting a Course for Sea Change (2003). and the 2004 Commission on Oceans policy report. An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century, both called tor more coordinated and active federal government stewardship of national oceans policy, which will require a governmental entity with the requisite knowledge, experience, and especially interagency coordination experience to lead such an effort.1 The Coast Guard has the policy-making expertise, the inter-agency planning and coordinating experience, the strategic planning foresight, and the hands-on national and international day-to-day experience in the oceans to he a lead federal agency ID formulate, coordinate, implement, and enforce new maritime regimes.
Command and Control (C^sup 2^) Transformation
CIAO for a New Headquarters C^sup 2^ Organization. By the end of Fiscal Year 2008. the Headquarters staff will essentially organi/.e around two broad functions of mission execution and mission support with a three-star flag officer overseeing each function-a Deputy Commandant for Operations and a Deputy Commandant for Mission Support. The Chief of Staff position will be eliminated, and those duties and responsibilities will be assigned to the two new Deputy Commandants or the Vice Commandant, who will essentially serve as the Coast Guard's Chief Operating Officer.
The use of the traditional military numbered staff will promote improved alignment with the Department of Defense. The change to numbered staffs is not new. In fact, the Coast Guard began this portion of its transformation in 2004 with the formal establishment of the Assistant Commandant for Intelligence (CG-2). Ultimately, this organizational construct will be more understandable to both Coast Guard external as well as internal stakeholders.
CIAO for a New Field C^sup 2^ Organization. This order disestablishes the Atlantic and Pacific Area Commands, whose commanders each oversee five subordinate District Commands. In their place, the Coast Guard will employ a completely different C^sup 2^ concept. Instead of two separate Area Commands responsible for all aspects of regional mission execution and mission support, the service will establish a new three-star flag command to oversee mission execution at the operational level lor all ten Districts. In addition, the Coast Guard will commission another three-star Hag command to oversee the current and future mission readiness of all forces assigned to the District Commands-workforce, platforms, and infrastructure. At present, the service plans to designate these new commands as, respectively, the Coast Guard Operations Command and the Coast Guard Force Readiness Command. Both are to be fully operational by the end of FY 10.
By employing this new C^sup 2^ concept, the Coast Guard aligns the field organization with the headquarters staff organization. As discussed previously, at the headquarters level the service has a single staff element responsible for the oversight of all operational mission programs. In turn, the new Coast Guard Operations Command for mission execution provides this headquarters staff element a single point of contact into the Coast Guard's field organization. Other benefits accrue with this new field C structure that standardizes the way the service conducts its operations and maintain its forces-no more "West Coast"/"East Coast" Coast Guards. Moreover, these two new field commands reduce the span of each commander's control to one broad functional area, either mission execution or mission support.
Furthermore, this new organizational framework will facilitate the timely and accurate flow of information and direction among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of mission execution. This results in a C^sup 2^ system that is more agile, adaptive, and responsive to improve mission execution and effectiveness. It will also improve unity of effort within the Department of Homeland security and at all levels of government. It will also result in stronger headquarters and field alignment for increased organizational effectiveness and efficiency.
The Coast Guard refers to its operational force structure as a "strategic trident" because it has three broad categories of multimission operational forces: (1) fixed shore units; (2) mobile afloat units; and (3) deployable specialized units. Fixed shore units include air stations and the new domestic Sector Commands, which are fixed, shore-based units with subordinate components (stations) able to conduct all Coast Guard missions in a specific geographic area usually composed of one or more ports, waterways, and coastal or lake region.
Mobile afloat units are the platforms or major cutters for maritime interdiction, long-range patrol, and presence in the offshore. Economic Exclusion Zones, and high seas throughout the American part of the northern hemisphere and other selected regions of national interest. In the third category are the deployable specialized forces-the National Strike Force (NSF), the Tactical Law Enforcement Teams (TACLET). the Port Security Units (PSU), the Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSST). and the Maritime Security Response Team (MSRT). The Coast Guard is consolidating these deployable units into a single unified "expeditionary" command, the Deployable Operations Group.
The service envisions that the new Coast Guard Force Readiness Command will oversee the mission readiness of all three categories of forces, from equipment and training to doctrine. It will directly oversee the deployable specialized forces when they are consolidated into the single command, and allocate them as requested for operational deployment. The new Coast Guard Operations Command will also he the direct interface for all Defense Department commands.
CIAO for a Deployable Operations Groups. The service has long maintained deployable, special-mission teams, but despite sharing fundamental similarities in mission execution, these teams are tethered to a particular mission-the NSF for nil and hazardous materials spill missions; the TACLETs for general law-enforcement missions; the PSUs for national defense missions; the MSSTs for counter-terrorism missions; and the MSRT for specialized opposed law-enforcement missions. As a result of heing stove-piped into "cylinders of excellence." these teams have a circuitous chain of command and are not sufficiently interoperable among each other. More important, it is extremely difficult to mix and match elements from each team into un integrated, adaptive force package tailored for the specific exigencies of a national security event.
These teams will merge into a new command-the Deployable Operations Group (DOG)-by the end of FY 08. Instead of having multiple operational commanders-areas, districts, and even a headquarters program manager-a single force commander will organize, train, and equip these teams into what eventually will be one force structure. The commander will report to the new Coast Guard Force Readiness Command.
These teams will benefit from consolidating key support functions-administrative, intelligence, logistics, planning, exercise, and financial. Furthermore, they will be available not only to Coast Guard operational commanders, but also to other federal agency operational commanders for missions throughout the United States and overseas high-interest areas.
The DOG will open a single entry point for other agencies requesting support, streamlining coordination and improving efficiency and operational effectiveness. By making these assets better able to integrate with each other, the Coast (iuurd will in turn have forces better able to integrate with its partner agencies. Over the long term, the service expects further benefits as DOG "Community of Interest" takes root in regard to shared skills for training, tactics, techniques, and procedures. The DOG is not a new set of forces or an additional level of bureaucracy, it is simply a better way to organize forces that already exist, simplifying the chain of command.
Mission Support Transformation
CIAO for Logistics Reorganization. The Coast Guard does not have a single integrated logistics organization responsible for supporting all its forces. Mission support needs of the operating forces are scattered across multiple entities, resulting in numerous non-interoperable financial, contract, and information systems. Like the CIAOs directing the reorganization of Headquarters and the major field commands, this CIAO portends another significant change for the Coast Guard.
The command and control concept for this reorganization rests on two key principles: (1) place one person in charge of all requirements for sustainment or logistics support; and (2) apply the centralized logistics model employed for Coast Guard aviation forces to all other force categories-afloat platforms, shore infrastructure, and command, control, communications, and computers information technology (C^sup 4^IT) systems. With the exception of aviation, which is based on the product-line model, logistics support for the remainder of the Coast Guard is a hodge-podge of systems based on geography and functional areas scattered throughout multiple commands.
As the Atlantic and Pacific Area Commands stand down, their subordinate Maintenance and Logistics Command are also disestablished. In their place the Coast Guard plans to commission lour new logistics sub-organizations or centers based on the productline model-one each for aviation forces, afloat platforms, shore infrastructure, and C^sup 4^IT systems. These logistics centers will be designed to provide focused logistical support for in-service assets through asset product lines similar to the way the Coast Guard Aviation Repair and Supply Center in Elizabeth City, North Carolina, is organized today. The centers will significantly streamline the way the service manages and delivers logistics and will eliminate needless hand-oils and coordination among the current complex web of logistics providers.
The four logistics centers will report to a single logistics flag officer, the Chief Sustainment Officer (CG-4) on the headquarters staff under the Deputy Commandant for Mission Support. This Deputy also oversees the Chief Acquisition Officer (CG-9). The Coast Guard believes that this structure will do away with the stove-pipes and oversight issues that have caused it to become somewhat dysfunctional from a management standpoint in instances such as the Deepwater Project after the awarding of large contracts. By the end of FY 10, this product-line organization will also: (1) support operational mission effectiveness at the lowest achievable costs; (2) improve control and accountability: (3) centralize control of depot maintenance and supply chain management: (4) standardize Coast Guard-wide engineering and logistics business processes; (5) reduce the number of financial and information systems: (6) strengthen configuration management processes with associated compliance inspections: and (7) achieve and sustain Chief Financial Officer audit compliance.
CIAO for Consolidation of Acquisition Functions. The Coast Guard is currently managing an unprecedented $25.8 billion in total acquisition programs under 16 major system acquisitions to deliver new or improved air and surface platforms, as well as modern C^sup 4^IT systems to the operating forces. With that amount of business for a relatively small service, the Coast Guard can no longer afford two major and separate acquisition staffs that do not provide mutual support. This CIAO thus directs the merger of lhe Deepwater Program Executive Office (PRO) into the Office of Acquisition by June 2007.
In addition, the order brings together in one place other offices and entities with significant acquisition responsibilities that are presently scattered across the Headquarters stuff-the Office of Procurement Management, the Office of Research. Development, and Technical, the Research and Developmcnt Center, and the Head Contracting Authority. The Coast Guard intends for this acquisition consolidation to become a model for mid-size federal agency acquisition and procurement. The consolidation aligns the Service with its purent Homeland security procurement organization. improves the efficiency of the acquisition workforce, and promises more effective project management and acquisition governance.
CIAO for Financial Management Transformation. In early 2007, Coast Guard financial management processes have come under intense DHS and congressional scrutiny. The department has idcnlilicd numerous poorly functioning financial processes and has yet to give the Coast Guard a clean audit. Furthermore, the service has not provided its operational commanders u ith the proper financial management tools and organizational infrastructure to support mission accomplishment.
This CIAO revamps the Coast Guard's financial management system and will dramatically improve accountability and internal controls hy the end of FY2011, locusing on a series of initiatives for financial management policy, procedures, and systems. The Coast Guard plans to provide improved financial management tools for use by operational units Io ensure accurate data are captured within the financial system. The service is working to consolidate financial processes to maintain proper documentation, review undelivered orders, enter transactions into the system in a timely manner, and alleviate the associated workload in the field.
A Slim and Flat Organization
Taken as a whole, these seven CIAOs-plus the three under development-comprise a service-wide transformation that will slim down the Coast Guard vertically and flatten its horizontal layers to enhance overall effectiveness while maintaining effective oversight of the service's still eon strained resources. Each ClAO represents an integral piece to systematically improve mission support and execution.
The Coast Guard is carrying out this transformation with extreme care, reminding service members that, unlike past re-organizational efforts such as the mid-1990s streamlining projects, this transformation docs nut have a goal of reducing the size of workforce. There are external-service mandates to reduce funding or shrink the size of the service. Rather, this transformation is intended to realign core competencies and skills in the most effective manner possible to prepare the service for the challenges it will face in the next 50 years.
All this will be implemented over several years as the Coast Guard continues to finalize details and work with the administration and Congress. There will he far-reaching changes in the way the service organizes and deploys its forces, manages its resources, and maintains and sustains its systems and platforms. Thus, the Coast Guard will continue to deliver on its promise to remain Semper Paratus for all hazards and all threats.
1. Strategics released after 9/11 include the National Strategy for Homeland security, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets. Other national strategies also govern the Coast Guard: the National security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, the National Military Strategy, and the National Drug Control Strategy.
2. Note: the CIAO's numerical designation is purely random and arbitrary. Since the numerical designation does not indicate priority or sequencing, it is omitted in the title for clarity.
3. The Pew Commission report was an independent report funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts, and the Commission on Oceans Policy report was a government-lunded report. Both commissions brought together experts in the field of ocean policy and governance.
Captain Stubbs is a national security conciliant al Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) in McLean, Virginia. He is a graduate of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy and retired in 2000 after 30 years' service. His article. "Making the 1,000-Ship Navy a Reality." appeared in the January 2007 Proceedings.