The new maritime strategy has a vital task: communicate the Navy's continued relevance to the nation.
As part of its role in supporting the National Security Strategy, the U.S. Navy must continue to promote global security and free trade to ensure the continued well-being of American society as well as worldwide security and economic prosperity.
In formulating a new strategy, the Navy should build constructive arguments around how: (1) multilateralism can have a positive effect on our vital interests, (2) a new strategy will actually make the services more joint and combined. (3) the strategy will change rather than decrease procurement, making the system more efficient and relevant, (4) strategic flexibility will be enhanced, and (5) the Navy will provide mutual support for security issues around the world through cooperation rather than domination.
A Bimodal Force
When Admiral Elmo Zumwalt became Chief of Naval Operations in 1970. he set about creating what he termed the "High-Low" concept.1 His goal was to meet the threat of the post-Vietnam Soviet challenge by focusing on strike and sea control while keeping overall costs down. His task was made simpler by the Nixon Doctrine, which allowed the Navy to ignore the brown and most of the green waters of the world.
Today the Navy faces similar fiscal challenges and the need for a modern version of the "High-Low" concept. The shape of this new force must be based on two distinct goals: engaging in all facets of the war on terrorism, and being prepared to meet the next peer competitor. Captain Way ne Hughes Jr. refers to this construct as the "bimodal force."- To envision this fleet's capabilities, the planner must view the traditional expanse of conflict somewhat differently. On one end is the war on terrorism and on the other, the peer competitor. Forces must he created to meet both needs while retaining the capability for all remaining missions.
The Navy is already moving in a direction complementary to this vision. The creation of a dedicated foreign area officer program, the publication of the 2005 CNO Strategic Guidance, the formation of the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command and its associated riverine squadrons, the retention of the Cyclone-class patrol coastals following Operation Iraqi Freedom, the amiressive movement toward the design and construction of the littoral combat ship (LCS), and the concept of the 1,000-ship navy all signal that the U.S. Navy is moving into the littorals to stay.
By offering the right naval forces at the right time, we can create a synthesis of effects to successfully oppose terrorism. Meeting this challenge requires a well-trained and vastly diversified Fleet capahle of integrating with the forces of other nations. The result will he enhanced longterm relations with a host nation's future naval leaders and governmental decision-makers.
The core missions required to meet the challenge of the war on terrorism are substantial and their operations both extensive and far ranging. These new littoral assets will face significant force-protection issues, wartime operations in support of the war on terrorism (including the likelihood of use against a regional power), and integration into the force structure used against a peer competitor.
To meet the challenge of a peer competitor, more sophisticated units will also he needed. However, additional high-end capability for its own sake is not required. For the near- to mid-term, the Navy will need to maintain a robust force to conduct combined operations against any renegade modern state whose actions violate worldwide security.
Congress recently asked both the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments to look at the Navy's shipbuilding programs.3 In the simplest sense. Congress believes the Navy is underestimating its procurement budget; both reports bear this out. The CBO report states that the Navy is 23 percent over budget in ship production toward the CNO's future Fleet model of 313 ships. Notably, neither report takes into account additional spending for the new riverine capabilities as well as spending made necessary by the need to equip the Navy for service in the war on terrorism.
The LCS will reportedly cost $300 million per hull, and another $150 million for two mission modules, technology the development and cost of which is currently spiraling. Thus, the cost of one LCS is estimated at just under half that of an Arleigh Burke-class Flight II multimission destroyer. While it is true that the LCS boasts significantly lower manpower costs and offers increased speed and less draft, it is also true that substantially less protection and firepower accompany that very large price tag.
Streetfighter Redux?
A better course of action may he for the Navy to reevaluate the number of littoral combat ships to be built and reconsider the original "Streetfighter" concept proposed by the late Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski. These ships, operating in networked packs, cost significantly less (originally estimated at $70 million per hull) and require a smaller crew than the LCS. The general operational concept has found its way into the framework of transformation and the information revolution in military affairs, hut the small ship of the original construct has become the larger LCS. Streetfighters can be operated in large or small groups, or individually, to meet a variety of engagement and persistent low-threat environment needs.
They can also serve as a transition force between blue-and brown-water navies, as do the current patrol coastals, but with much more integration. They could act as technology demonstrators for the new weapons, unmanned systems, and propulsion equipment that may well prove useful in larger, more complex ships in the future. They would also have the capability of operating as either a blockade force or as force protection preceding or accompanying the main force in a high-threat littoral environment. Since the development of the original concept, the Navy has experimented with a variety of hull designs that could serve as the basis for a small, potent, and flexible Streetfighter.4
Streetfighter could be adapted to foreign naval uses and would be more attractive to many foreign buyers than larger capital ships. Additionally, the design could easily accommodate sensor, command and control, and weapon packages that would be relatively simple to tailor for the needs of the buyer and to the security needs of the U.S. government. Cost savings and aid packages would make the platforms even more affordable and maintainable as the Navy's maritime network expands. These efficiencies allow for easy export, training, and integration for foreign countries that will be working with the United States.
Similar production advantages can apply to both the high- and low-end capabilities of the bimodal Fleet, and collaboration with foreign militaries for production is not a new concept. The most modern and relevant examples are the Joint Strike Fighter and the Aegis weapon suite, which key allies are very interested in developing and buying in partnership with the United States. However, collaboration is not a panacea. Platforms such us the Pegasus-class hydrofoils and, more recently, the Osprey-class mine hunters, were less than stellar international ventures because they were not viewed as critical war-fighting assets by any of the parties involved. Currently, the situation may be changing because of rising costs, budgetary constraints and the changing nature of modern warfare. As an example, Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter recently indicated that the Navy will seek a wider range of suppliers from around the world, provided that the vendor under consideration is "an assured source of supply."5
Additionally, a new Fleet model based on an engagement strategy may obviate the need to multi-crew ships. This will save the Navy additional manpower costs and will allow the crew to "own" the ship rather than being "custodians." This seems a nuance in terms of terminology, but ownership is an important part of keeping ship and crew ready to fight. Moreover, if the hulls are not multi-crewed, less money will need to be spent on building and maintaining the shore infrastructure to sustain the additional crews ashore, including training facilities.
As alternatives to multi-crewing are weighed, the Navy also must consider that an aggressive engagement policy will require our Sailors to be culturally savvy and possibly embedded within a culture for extended or repeated missions to support host nation needs. The rapport and trust built up over multiple or sustained visits would be eroded by moving crews in and out of theater. The simple answer to this problem is that the Navy should increase the number of assets (including families) overseas.
Procurement Challenges
To meet the challenging funding needs of the near term force and continued transformation, the Navy will also need to either delay production or procure fewer capital ships and major weapon systems. Although technological change has not obviated the usefulness of the carrier and large combatants, the Navy does need to recognize that it (and the rest of the military) already possess significantly more striking power than any other navy (or nation) in the world. Our superiority will continue far into the future without adding newer systems and airframes in the near-term. In fact. U.S. capabilities will continue to expand simply because of the development of effects-based operations, increased networking, and more efficient weapons.
In contrast, a higher priority should he placed on Navy-Marine Corps re-integration, proper fire support, and especially on lift capability from an appropriate sea base. This construct should also be aggressively fostered as a joint and Coalition-operating concept. Executed correctly, the ability to sustain and maintain ground forces from the sea provides the assured access required by even a brigade-size unit when an allied or other suitable land-based location is not available. Operations of this sort require the design and building of sup ply ships capable of reorganizing cargo at sea, the procurement of small and large fast connector surface and aircraft (to access both large and small debarkation points), and advanced gun systems (on the DDG-1000 class, LPD-17 variant, or an even less expensive platform).
A recent Naval War College study found that "the ability to disperse, maneuver, and remain connected form the foundation of a future fleet architecture."6 Knowledge, and more specifically the integration of knowledge across the battle force, creates the most efficient, safe, and effective use of military capabilities. However, the current methods of joint experimentation and exercises that test these concepts appear to focus on the operational level and are not aggressively targeted at coordinating in real time across the joint arena. As more green- and brown-water naval forces enter the battlespace. the need for both operational and tactical integration within and between the services will increase in both importance and complexity. All of the services must quickly move beyond their slovepiped architectures and the operational constructs thai set those boundaries. The transformation process must adapt for this baltlespace change. Networking and collaboration must be accelerated to create a truly joint force: the Navy needs to lead the way to the next level of joint integration.
If the services were able to fully align and synchronize their acquisition processes, the Department of Defense could procure more equipment in a shorter timeline, with fewer wasted resources, and provide an easier path to hecoming a truly joint military. Today, with few exceptions, each service is responsible for its own system, platform, and material purchases. In a nutshell, the service chiefs and their stalls control the money. The Joint Staff is responsible to the Chairman for ensuring thai the concepts, experimentation, and purchases are joint in nature. The result is a slow selection process that wastes money because of competing service ideas, redundant testing, and the purchase of a variety of systems that then cost even more money to integrate with both joint and Coalition services.
The Navy should advocate the adoption of modern Goldwater-Nichols legislation. The core of such a bill would place both fiscal responsibility and accountability in the hands of the Chairman and his staff. The process would be transformational for the U.S. military but is already common in many other nations around the world, where substantial efficiencies in procurement have long been sought due to significant government restraints in military spending. Such a bill would also reduce individual service staff size and increase the size of the JCS at a greater than one-to-one tradeoff by eliminating redundancies. The process would have immediate effects on the inleuration and networking of a future force.
Forming and implementing a new naval strategy requires proper salesmanship and public relations-not an unfamiliar legacy tor the service which launched the Mahanian revolution in eight years, fought tor carrier aviation alter World War II, and revolutionized sea-based warfare after Vietnam. If the Navy makes the effort to bring key civic. inilitan. international, and industrial leaders on board, criticism of a new strategy will become praise.
A coherent naval strategy will communicate the Navy's importance to both the domestic and international audienee. It will bind together subordinate visions, guidance, and direction by setting the tone and tenor of the service's global engagement. It will describe the critical missions and the tools needed to accomplish them. Such a strategy is necessary if the Navy is to maintain its relevance in a changing world. Most important, it is achievable.
1. Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., On Watch. (Quadrangle, New York: 1976), p. 72.
2. Wayne P. Hushes Jr., "A Bimodal Force for lhe National Maritime Strategy," Naval War College Review: Spring 2(107. Vol. W), No. 2.
3. Robert O. Work. Winning the Race: A Naval Heel Architecture for Enduring Maritime Supremacy (CSBA: 2005) and Options for the Navy's Future Fleet (CBO: 2006).
4. For a brief synopsis of the concept and experimentation pros/cons refer to Greg Jaffe. "Risk Assessment: Plans for a Small Ship Pose Big Questions For the U.S. Navy-The Streetfighter Would Add Punch in Close Combat; Are Deaths Acceptable?- 'Nagging Sore' for the Enemy," Wall Street Journal (Laslern edition). 11 July 2001, p. A1.
5. David Ahearn, Defense Daily, 3 August 2006, "Navy secretary Winter Strongly Backs LC-S Buy."
6. Bradd C. Hayes, Analysis of Workshop Two Discussions for the Congressionally Mandated Report on Fleet Platform Architectures for the Navy, (Office of Force Transformation. U.S. Dept. of Defense: Washington, 2004), p. 11.
Lieutenant Commander Butler is a surface warfare officer currently studying national security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. His previous assignment was commanding officer of Patrol Coastal Crew E, which included two tours as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom.