I Want You: The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force
Bernard Rostker. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006) 800 pp. $68.50.
Reviewed by Ronald Specter
This book should be required reading for lawmakers, analysts, and policymakers charged with addressing today's complex military manpower issues. Bernard Rostker is a veteran Pentagon analyst and manager. A former under secretary of defense, under secretary of the Army, assistant secretary of the Navy, and senior fellow of the RAND Corporation, he has dealt with manpower issues for more than three decades. This comprehensive history is balanced, insightful, and as clear about the arcane world of budgets, manpower research, and analysis as a book can be made to be. The most important aspect of the book is the accompanying DVD containing hundreds of important official records and analytical studies relating to the volunteer force from its inception through the Clinton and into the Bush years. The documents are not organized topically, chronologically, or by provenance, but are instead linked to individual footnotes in the electronic version of the book, a system that may delight information technology professionals but will have most historians and journalists tearing at their hair.
Rostker is not diffident about his views of the all-volunteer force, which he characterizes as "a resounding success for the American military and the American people." Yet, despite his obvious conviction that he is telling a success story, the author gives ample attention to critics and opponents of the all-volunteer system and includes their beliefs and arguments in the narrative and accompanying documents.
Though Rostker's book is intended to be historical in nature, there is little effort made to place the volunteer force within the broader context of American military history. An eight-page section in the second chapter notes that from the Civil War to World War I and again between the World Wars, the United States maintained a volunteer armed force. Yet there seems to be little recognition of how Americans traditionally regarded career armies. Well into the mid-20th century, Americans believed that armies recruited from the poor, the adventurous, and the desperate were fine for peace but that real wars would be fought and won by citizen soldiers like the Minutemen and Sergeant York, not by career military men.
The real innovation of the inventors of the all-volunteer force was not to convince people that the peacetime draft should be abandoned but that in the future even sizable wars could be fought wholly by career soldiers recruited through the operation of market forces. Economist Milton Friedman and political operative Martin Anderson flatly declared, "no one has any duty to serve the state." Military service, they explained, was actually a form of hidden tax levied on those who served. Such arguments, Rostker demonstrates, provided "the rational, intellectual basis for the All-Volunteer Force."
However persuasive or otherwise the arguments of volunteer advocates, Rostker points out that they would not have been listened to except for several other concurrent developments: first, Army leaders desperate and discouraged by the deterioration of the Army's morale and discipline in Vietnam were ready to try anything; second, the current draft was widely perceived to be unfair; third, the Vietnam War had made any military service appear undesirable; and finally, President Richard Nixon was ready to back the experiment.
Though there was much talk of the inequities of the draft, the actual effect of the introduction of the volunteer force was not to end those inequities but to institutionalize them. Although relatively few members of the comfortable classes served in the military during the Vietnam era and even fewer got to the war zone, the draft was still an annoyance and a source of anxiety and uncertainty to men graduating from Ivy League colleges and similar institutions. It frequently meant service in the National Guard or Reserves, whose training and drills took away precious time from budding professional practices or careers in finance and management. The new form of military service guaranteed that, in the future, those distractions would not complicate the lives of such young men.
While some of the rhetoric connected to the volunteer force stressed equity, most of the actual arguments about the force over the next 15 years concerned not fairness but cost. Reading Rostker's accounts of many of these arcane disputes one is tempted to conclude that they were less about numbers, budgets, and projections than about whose definitions and whose metrics would be accepted in measuring these things. For example, during the Carter years, a General Accounting Office study concluded that the all-volunteer force had cost 80 to 100 percent more than its advocates had originally predicted. The Department of Defense countered that the force had cost just about the same as projected. GAO and DoD then compromised on a figure of 21 percent over projections.
After undergoing a near-death experience during the Ford and Carter years, the volunteer force received advance life-support from the Reagan administration in the form of substantial pay raises, bonuses, and educational assistance. At the same time the shift in the popular image of the Soldier from depraved drug user to action hero made military service more attractive, as did the shrinkage in the number of jobs in the civilian economy open to 18-yearolds without college training. The happy ending to the story, Rostker suggests, came with the superb performance of the volunteer armed forces in the Gulf War and in Operation Iraqi Freedom. But recent developments suggest that the happy ending may not, in fact, be the last chapter.
Dr. Specter is professor of history and international relations at George Washington University and a retired Marine Reserve officer. His most recent book, In the Ruins of Empire: The Surrender of Japan and the Battle for Postwar Asia, is scheduled for publication this summer.
Three Frigates: The South African Navy Comes of Age
Rear Admiral Chris Bennett, South African Navy (Retired). Durban, South Africa: Just Done Publications, 2006. 290 pp. Illus. Maps. Appens. Index. Bib. Notes. $40.32.
Reviewed by Commander A. P. Blake, South African Navy
Three Frigates tells the histories of the three Type 12 ships-President Kruger, President Steyn, and President Pretorius-procured by the South African Navy (SAN) in the late 1960s and is published at a time when the navy is again undergoing modernization with the procurement of the latest-generation MEKO frigates.
The similarities between the environments in which the President- and Valour-class procurements took place are quite uncanny, and readers who joined the South African Navy after the disposal of the "type 12s will easily identify with the trials and tribulations of the navy of that era.
Although quite a long read, the book is carefully divided, allowing the reader to devote more or less time to individual phases in the ships' lives. This is well illustrated, with many interesting photographs of highlights in the illustrious careers of these three ships.
After sketching a portrait of the navy of the time and the reason for the decision to build frigates, the book continues with stories from the building and fitting out to sea trials and workups. Operations and deployments are covered, showing the versatility and capability of the platforms, which at the time were at the forefront of technology. There are a number of amusing anecdotes to illustrate that life in the navy of that time was not too different from today, reminding us all that customs and traditions are the backbone of the naval culture of which all serving and reserve force members form part.
But the book is realistic, too, and deals with the decision to retain only two operational frigates because of budget cuts, the loss of a Wasp helicopter, manning difficulties, and the loss of the President Kruger. Although sad in many respects, it is pleasing that the author has chosen not to shy away from the realities of the time, nor in some cases even to draw these realities through to today's navy.
It is clear from the outset that much research has gone into the chronicling of this important phase of the history of the SAN. This is borne out by the number of footnotes and appendices where historical references are annotated and, in some cases, reproduced in full.
Making use of personal accounts and giving insight from his own appointments, the author has managed to balance an abundance of factual information with the human stories of the time, making Three Frigates a pleasure to read and an absolute must for the bookshelves of anyone who served in these ships and anyone for whom the sea remains a passion.
Commander Blake, who was born in England and emigrated to South Africa in 1971, is a 25-year veteran of service with the South African navy, primarily in mine warfare. He had two at-sea commands.
Our Country, Right or Wrong: The Life of Stephen Decatur, The U.S. Navy's Most Illustrious Commander
Leonard F. Outtridge. New York: Forge Books, 2006. 304 pp. Illus. Notes. Index. $24.95.
Reviewed by William P. Leeman
There has been a revival of interest in the naval heroes of the early American republic as demonstrated by the publication of a number of books in recent years. Stephen Decatur has enjoyed the most attention from historians with four new biographies published since 2004. In Our Country, Right or Wrong, Leonard F. Guttridge provides the reader with a fast-paced narrative of Decatur's life and naval career that at times reads almost like a novel. The book thoroughly immerses the reader in the naval culture of the time, from graphic descriptions of naval combat in the age of sail to the author's strong emphasis on the principles of honor and patriotism that defined the naval officer corps.
The strength of the book is the author's depiction of Decatur's friendship with fellow naval officer James Barron, particularly how conflicting concepts of honor and patriotism ultimately destroyed that friendship and ended Decatur's life. The two men first met on board the frigate United States when Barren (11 years older than Decatur) was a lieutenant and Decatur a midshipman. Barren became a mentor and father figure to Decatur, looking after his professional and personal development. The two officers later served together on board the frigate New York with Barren as the commanding officer and Decatur his second-in-command.
Their close friendship eventually ended for personal and professional reasons. On the personal side, Barron once made an indiscreet comment about Decatur's romantic life in front of fellow naval officers. What exactly Barron said is unknown, but Barron later claimed that Decatur behaved differently toward him after the incident. The breaking point in their friendship occurred in the wake of the Chesapeake-Leopard incident of 1807. The British warship HMS Leopard, patrolling off the Virginia coast in search of Royal Navy deserters, opened fire on the USS Chesapeake, commanded by Barron, after Barron refused to allow the British to board his ship. Because the Chesapeake was unprepared for battle, suffering dozens of casualties and severe damage, the Navy court-martialed Barron. Decatur reluctantly served on the court-martial that sentenced Barron to a five-year suspension from active duty without pay. Decatur later opposed Barren's reinstatement to active duty.
From Decatur's point of view, Barron had demonstrated a lack of honor and patriotism when he failed to return to the United States immediately following the end of his suspension in 1813. Decatur believed that Barron should have seized the opportunity to redeem himself by fighting for his country during the War of 1812 (Barron did not return to America and formally request reinstatement until 1819). Barron viewed Decatur's involvement in his court-martial as a personal betrayal by his former protege. When Decatur publicly questioned Barren's honor and patriotism in the course of opposing the letter's reinstatement to active duty, Barron felt that the only course available to him to salvage his reputation was a duel. Decatur reluctantly accepted Barron's challenge and the two commodores fought the most famous duel in U.S. Navy history near Bladensburg, Maryland, in 1820. During the duel, each man hit his target. Decatur's wound was fatal. Barron lived until 1851, eventually rising to the top of the Navy's seniority list.
The author has written a balanced and well-researched account of Decatur's life, but the book does have a few minor shortcomings. Although the author briefly mentions Decatur's sense of intellectual inferiority and his desire for self-improvement through reading, a deeper discussion of this aspect of Decatur's character would have provided an interesting counterpoint to his high level of professional confidence. Similarly, a more detailed examination of Decatur's professional apprenticeship at sea as a midshipman-the instruction he received, the training he had to undergo, the duties he performed, the hardships he experienced-would have provided some valuable insight into Decatur's later success in battle against Tripoli during the Barbary Wars and against the British in the War of 1812.
Finally, although the author includes a section on sources at the end of the book, the lack of footnotes or a complete bibliography limits the book's usefulness for scholars. Overall, Our Country, Right or Wrong is a well-written biography that firmly establishes Decatur's credentials as a major historical figure in both the early U.S. Navy and the early American republic.
Dr. Leeman teaches American history at Providence College. His doctoral dissertation, which he is currently revising as a book, examined the controversial origins of the U.S. Naval Academy during the early national period.
Roger Ball! The Odyssey of John Monroe "Hawk" Smith, Navy Fighter Pilot
Donald E. Auten. New York: iUniverse, Inc., 2006. 458 pp. Illus. Gloss. Index. Notes. $39.95.
Reviewed by Commander Jan Jacobs, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)
In each of the Navy's aviation communities there are legends, with the fighter community having probably more than its share. John Monroe "Hawk" Smith certainly fits into the legend category. The 1960s and 70s were a pivotal time in Navy fighter development, both in hardware and in tactics-with the formation of the Navy Fighter Weapons School (Topgun) and the introduction of the F-14A Tomcat into the Fleet. Smith entered the Navy in 1963 as an officer candidate at Pensacola and, because of astigmatism, was trained as a naval aviation observer (the forerunner of the naval flight officer) with orders to the F-4 community. While making his first tour in Phantoms, he applied for and was accepted to pilot training. He excelled and was subsequently assigned to fly F-4s. After serving his Fleet tour with VF-103 on the East Coast, he traveled across the country to join VX-4 at Point Mugu.
Among many other projects, he was one of those responsible for the initial Navy testing of the F-14 and its weapon system. The expertise gained at VX-4 earned him a spot in Carrier Air Wing 14 as carrier air group landing signal officer and made the first F-14 cruise, as VF-1 and VF-2 deployed on board the USS Enterprise (CVAN-65) in 1974. A tour as Topgun's executive officer was followed by one as the unit's CO (a move unprecedented at the time). From Topgun, Hawk commanded VF-213 at Miramar and NAS Rota, Spain. After a tour as Commander, Naval Air Force Atlantic chief of staff, Smith retired in 1993 with the rank of captain.
This is an excellent book that works on many levels. It is a story of a man's journey through an eventful naval career with an in-depth look at what it takes to be a fighter pilot. It is a broad history of the Navy's fighter program from being primarily a straight-and-level intercept aircraft in the mid 60s, through developing air combat maneuver training in the late 60s and the introduction of the F-14 Tomcat in the early 70s.
As with any good fighter debrief, a review of Roger Ball needs to be broken down into what went right-the "goods"-and what didn't go so well-the "others."
Under the "good" heading, author Donald E. Auten (a naval aviator himself) does an outstanding job of putting the reader in the cockpit. His descriptions of flying Navy aircraft in both aerial combat and carrier environments are without parallel. His knowledge of the Navy has allowed him to write with an authority usually not seen in a biography of this type. The interaction of a supervisor and his people is brought into sharp focus with quotes from Smith's contemporaries on his leadership style. Run-ins with the commander of Miramar's fighter and airborne early warning wing by then-Lieutenant Commander-and Topgun commanding officer-Smith are chronicled, including a JAG investigation of a Christmas card.
Now, the "others." The book spends more than 400 pages on Hawk's life through his Topgun stint in 1978, and then devotes a paltry four pages for his XO/CO tour at VF-213 and the next 15 years. As with most self-published books of this type, it could have used a good editing for style, consistency, spelling, and factual content. Most of the pre-1962 Navy aircraft designations are mangled (F-9F instead of the proper F9F as one example) as are most of the jet engine designations (there are no hyphens in the designations, i.e., J79, not J-79). Also, most of the ship hull numbers are given their post-1975 designations, when the attack carrier mission melded with the ASW mission (should be CVA-66 instead of CV-66, for example). Air groups became air wings in 1963, although the term for their commanders (CAG) remains today. The book bounces back and forth between the air group/air wing labels with no consistency. The pier at Naval Station Subic Bay was Alava Pier, not "Lava Pier."
Here's the bottom line. If you were at Miramar during the 70s, you need to read this book. If you ever ran across "Hawk" Smith anytime during your career, you need to read this book. If you are interested in naval aviation, especially the fighter community and how it evolved, you need to read this book. If you were ever in the cockpit, you'll find yourself there again-if not, you'll feel like you are there and know what it is to fly air combat maneuvers.
Commander Jacobs, a 1973 Topgun graduate, is managing editor of The Hook. A radar intercept officer, he has 1,400 hours in F-4s and 350 in F-14s.