The Influence of Mahan Upon Sea Power
Power at Sea
Lisle A. Rose. Columbia. MO: University of Missouri Press, 2006. 1,296 pp. in three volumes. Illus. Notes. Bib. $59.85.
From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States
Sadao Asada. Annapolis. MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006. 382 pp. Index. $36.95.
Reviewed by Commander John T. Kuehn, D.S. Navy (Retired)
Recently, naval historian Jon Tetsuro Sumida has written extensively about America's premier theorist of sea power. Alfred Thayer Mahan.1 Sumida has argued for a revised and more nuanced view of Mahan's arguments that has more utility today than perhaps was previously thought. Simply put, Sumida argues that Mahan's work focused on two broad areas-grand strategy and professional strategic education. Chapter one of Mahan's famous The Influence of Sea Power Upon History addresses the grand strategic principles, or "conditions" as Mahan called them, and the remainder of the hook was a narrative history meant to illustrate and educate strategic leaders. More relevant to today's maritime environment, Sumida argues that Mahan's vision of the future was less about one nation (presumably the United States) becoming the "new" maritime hegemon than it was about the formation of a consortium of liberal nations dedicated to enforcing the freedom of the seas for purposes of unimpeded trade.
Sumida is only the latest interpreter of Mahan, although perhaps one of the more perceptive. Several recently published naval histories also have Mahan at center stage. Of these, two of the most interesting are Lisle Rose's three-volume history Power at Sea and Sadao Asada's long-awaited diplomatic and policy history of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) From Mahan to Pearl Harbor. In both works, Mahan dominates the proceedings but perhaps not in the way he would have wanted. That Mahan was influential in the development of naval power is not at issue in either book. What Rose argues covering generally more than a hundred years, and Asada specifically with respect to the IJN, is that Mahan's ideas were viewed through unique nationalist lenses by those who read and interpreted his works. This influence, as H. P. Willmott has baldly stated and is somewhat supported by the arguments of these two offerings, was "pernicious."2 Mahan's ideas, misinterpreted or not, had a decisive influence on the development and application of sea power during the 20th century.
Rose's work is the more extensive of the two and has the broader argument. His chapter titles of the first volume establish the fundamentals of his argument: "The Master: Alfred Thayer Mahan," for chapter one and, "The Architects: Theodore Roosevelt, Alfred von Tirpitz, and John 'Jacky' Fisher" for chapter two. Rose argues that Mahan's writings were avidly read by these three influential individuals and then each interpreted them according to his own vision of how sea power could serve his particular nation-state. Rose might well have added Gombei Yamamoto (no relation to the younger Isoruku Yamamoto) and Heihachiro Togo to his list of architects-however, he instead devotes an entire chapter to the Japanese.
Rose's master narrative is that these architects then proceed to construct modern powerful navies to achieve particular national visions. For the United States this meant expansion of her maritime frontiers and for Great Britain the maintenance of her dominant position and empire. For Japan it meant nothing less than hegemony, a soil of Japanese Monroe Doctrine in Hast Asia. For Germany, the navy's utility was more as an expression of national power and vigor. In doing so, Roosevelt, von Tirpitz, and Fisher established the basis for what Rose calls the "warring states" maritime conflicts of the 20th century. The first two volumes tell this fascinating and tragic story. The final volume focuses on the dominance of the global seas after World War II by the nation that achieved its vision-the United States-and goes by the title A Violent Peace. Rose's work takes the reader full circle, from navalist interpretations of Mahan to the present day and Sumida.
He modestly proposes that his work should serve as a "starting point, a launching pad for more work, more criticism, more consideration...."
Asada's book is focused on just one of Rose's "warring" maritime states-the Empire of Japan. Like Rose, Asada attributes to Mahan a profound influence on the Japanese Navy, especially the doctrine of the "decisive battle." Here is where, perhaps, Mahan's influence is most tragic. Instead of interpreting Mahan's accounts of strategic decision-making in his two-book series on the rise of British sea power as an educational tool, the Japanese instead focused on Mahan's fascination with aggressive offensive actions at sea that littered his narrative. From these they derived, at first, a balanced view of sea power that saw command of the sea as but one component of an overall strategy (much us argued by Sir Julian Corbett who was also writing at the same time as Mahan). However, before long, the Imperial Navy transmuted a flexible sea power doctrine into an inflexible dogma that saw decisive battle between capital ships as the beginning and end of naval strategy.
The book is even more tragic in its message than Rose's. Asada shows how a Mahanian-inspired vision perverted a real effort by moderates in the Japanese Navy such as Admiral Tomosahuro Kato to create a more balanced strategic approach. This approach focused more on what Sumida has proposed-cooperation and security in partnership with the United States.3 Kato's crowning achievement in getting his government to accept a "new world order" after the Washington Naval Conference eventually led to, rather than avoided, conflict with the United States. This was mostly because of increased factionalism within the IJN between the treaty faction centered around the legacy of the moderate Tomosahuro Kato (who died in 1923) and the fleet faction of decisive battle adherents centered around the fiery and anti-American Admiral Kanji Kato.
Although this story has been addressed peripherally in David Evans and Mark Peattie's masterful Kaigun, this is the first comprehensive account of the factionalism and political in-fighting that fully ties in Asada's substantial scholarship regarding the naval treaty system of the interwar period.4 The Imperial Japanese Navy's obsession with decisive battle is not in dispute. Recent books on the battles of Midway and Leyte Gulf provide additional ample evidence of the unhealthy influence of this doctrine on the IJN.5
Both books offer abundant evidence that supports Sumida's interpretation of Mahan. Tomosaburo Kato's vision of maritime collective security in Asada's hook is also echoed in Rose's final volume where he discusses the way ahead for the United States Navy in the 21st century in his final chapter. In particular, Rose emphasizes that force size, technological, and professional advantages, which have kept the U.S. Navy in its position of preeminence, are probably no longer sustainable-which brings this essay full circle.
Mahan influenced the development of sea power in his own day and beyond, perhaps not in the way he intended, although one can probably assume he would have approved of the strategic dominance of the United States at sea after World War II. Mahan's influence continues in our own day and perhaps is best reflected by the Naval War College curriculum if not in the current design of the Fleet.
1 John T. Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), and "Geography, Technology, and British Naval Strategy in the Dreadnought Era," Naval War College Review (Summer 2006), p. 89.
2 H. P. Willmott, The Battle of Leyte Gulf (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), p. 1.
3 Asada, pp. 100-101. Tomosaburo Kato later became head of the Japanese government and proposed a revision of the national defense policy to reflect a policy of war avoidance with the United States.
4 David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institutec Press, 1997).
5 Willmott and Jonathan B. Parshall and Anthony P. Tully, Shattered Sword (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005).
Commander Kuehn teaches military history at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He recently completed a Ph.D. program at Kanvas State University.
The Run-Up to the Punch Bowl: A Memoir of the Korean War, 1951
John Nolan, Xlibris Corporation, 2006, 297 pp. $28.79.
Reviewed by Major General J. D. Lynch, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)
Korea? Why read about an almost totally forgotten war fought more than a half century ago? Good question. A good answer is that the Korean War is the prototype of the three limited wars the United States has since fought or is still fighting-Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Like it or not, there are lessons we have yet to learn. The price has been and continues to be paid in blood.
John Nolan begins the hook by putting Korea and the war in strategic context, a brief but important contribution to understanding the war. He moves briefly to the training of Marine lieutenants, deployment to Korea, and then the heart of the book, combat as rifle platoon commanders. The combat they knew in 1951 was largely offensive, conducted on mountainous, complicated terrain under the harshest of weather conditions in summer and winter, as both sides jockeyed for advantageous positions leading to the impending Korean War truce lalks. Finally, the author closes with the musings of a warrior in his later years and a brief afterword summarizing what happened to those whose combat actions were described.
In sum, John Nolan has produced an eminently readable, highly instructive work of obvious value to lieutenants who lead or will lead rifle platoons. There are also less obvious lessons to he pondered by politicians, national leaders, and senior officers, including generals. On reflection, especially politicians, senior government officials, and generals.
The lieutenant preparing for combat will learn much about troop leading, the value of his non-commissioned and staff non-commissioned officers, and especially the fact that what his platoon seeks in its platoon leader is professional competence above all else. Professional competence-knowing what he is doing tactically, using supporting arms, demonstrating a keen sense of responsibility for men and mission, and "looking after his men" before looking after himself. Nolan provides the examples-the indomitable Charlie Cooper, the indestructible Jim Marsh, and a host of others, including, quietly, himself.
Politicians and senior government officials can and should learn that words mean something, even if they are uttered in Washington and aimed at domestic audiences for political or, less frequently, for honorable reasons. The Korean War error was that of leading the potential enemy to believe that Korea was outside our sphere of interest. That error has been corrected but others have not. An unlearned and major "words mean something" lesson is the price paid by those in harm's way when the words are misunderstood, or serve to provide a wholesale denigration of those risking life and limb, or for some other reason, serve to motivate the enemy.
Then there's the subject of "privileged sanctuaries." That term was used in the Korean War where it applied to areas wherein the enemy could operate without interference. Korea was the first. Despite the complaints at the time, we have learned nothing. We have seen more enemies allowed to operate from more privileged sanctuaries. For example, the Ho Chi Minh Trail of the Vietnam War was the logistic and replacement lifeline for the North Vietnamese Army. Iraq saw the Ho Chi Minh Trail replaced by countless unsecured ammunition dumps-unsecured because there were not enough troops to secure them.
The result? Munitions were available for the taking by insurgent forces. Meanwhile, foreign terrorists were permitted to flow from Iran and Syria because the routes could not be secured. Now we are seeing a resurgent Taliban using safe havens along the Pakistan border to attack Afghanistan. We have yet to learn that the area of combat operations must be isolated and that the isolation cannot he done by air power or any other means except by those who are organized, trained, and equipped to hold ground. This is a problem for generals, and they must move heaven and earth to ensure that civilian leadership understands it long before there is a commitment to conflict.
Nolan's work may he criticized for its absence of maps depicting the tactical actions. This is not a serious deficiency. He presents excellent descriptions of the terrain, certainly enough for the reader in grasp the gist of how a particular action was fought.
The author artfully mixes the emotions of combat from the infantryman's perspective-fear, at times terror, courage, humor, brotherhood, joy at a job well done, and pride. Always pride-in one's Marines, one's unit, and one's self. Now is a good time to go back to Korea and study the prototype. John Nolan's book is a great place to start.
Major General Lynch, a 1956 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, served 35 years as a Marine infantry officer. His combat experience was in Vietnam where he served as the operations officer of the 2d Battalion; 26th Marines, an infantry battalion task organized to conduct amphibious operations.
Maritime Security: A Practical Guide
Steven Jones. London: Nautical Institute, 2006. 262 pp. Illus. Notes. £27.50
By Captain George Galdorisi, U.S. Navy (Retired)
This is a fascinating book that will appeal to the professional mariner, those associated with the wide-ranging maritime community of interest, and the interested lay person. Author Steven Jones provides a contemporary look at maritime security that is both comprehensive and focused.
The book's foreword, by Efthimios Mitropoulos, secretary-general of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), sets the tone for this book. He notes "the emergence of the political terrorist has now added a new dimension to maritime security."
The 11 chapters weave the story of maritime security-and especially the attendant challenges of dealing with that issue in the 21st century-in a manner that makes this both an easy read and a ready reference for both practitioner and researcher.
The selection of Secretary-General Mitropoulos to open the book was not coincidental as the IMO plays a pivotal role in international maritime security. This becomes readily apparent throughout the compact, 262-page book and the reader gains a keen understanding of the role that the IMO plays and how this organization provides stewardship for the world's oceans.
Maritime Security moves briskly through a discussion of the threats to maritime trade in general and to shipping in particular. It discusses roles and responsibilities for maritime security among the key maritime stakeholders and addresses in some detail the IMO's stewardship of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code.
Ensuing chapters deal directly and comprehensively with the subjects of security and seafarers, security planning and practice, basic shipboard security procedures, and security equipment. These sections are arguably the most important in this mariner's companion as they offer straightforward and practical suggestions regarding the way that all parties in the maritime domain can contribute to individual and collective maritime security.
The book's final chapter-Making Security Work-provides both a summation of the hook and an action plan-built around the taxonomy of the acronym ACCEPT-that all can immediately apply to enhance maritime security. ACCEPT breaks down to: Apply risk management. Contemporary security knowledge. Create a security culture, Enhance policies and procedures, Protective measures, and Training commitment. Taken together, these elements, presented in less than two pages, neatly sum up the book's major theme: Maritime security is a team effort and every player on the team has roles and responsibilities that can help to effectively manage the threats posed by those-especially the political terrorist-who would use the world's oceans for illicit and illegal actions.
Three useful annexes are provided: one listing IMO circulars relating to maritime security, another containing maritime security abbreviations, and the last, an ISPS file providing mariners with a checklist of items that should be presented to Port Slate Control Officers when ships are boarded for inspection.
Maritime Security is richly cited and these can take the interested reader on a parallel journey into all areas of maritime security. But make no mistake, while this book is a scholarly work and a sound ready reference, it is above all else a good read on an important and compelling subject.
Captain Galdorisi is a former naval aviator who is now director of the Decision Support Group at Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command Systems Center San Diego.