"A Civil War in the Military"
(See M. Cancian, pp. 48-52, September 2006 Proceedings)
Commander Jeffrey B, Barta, U.S. Navy-Colonel Cancian wrote an excellent overview of the issues facing today's military. He poses some critical questions and I think, based on our Iraq experience, the answers lie in the middle ground between the three schools of thought.
Technology and capital intensive services such as the Navy and Air Force can help win initial control of the battlefield, but more troops, in particular those specializing in civic affairs, construction, and special operations must be carefully employed to win the hearts and minds of those occupied in the latter phases of conflict.
We must also look at a new definition of "joint," not just in terms of the military, but to include the interagency as well. Without civilian input on the planning process (especially for Phase IV efforts), we are doomed to repeat the mistakes of Iraq.
Civilian control of the military is a bedrock of our governance and when an order is given, it must be followed. But that doesn't mean the military must submit to civilian domination of planning processes and combat operations. Unless our senior leaders are willing to speak frankly in private (and conversely, our civilian leaders must be willing to listen) and be willing to resign publicly while a controversy brews, no one will be held accountable for operations gone bad, to the detriment of all.
"Transformation Ballyhoo"
(See B. Hanley, pp. 64-68, September 2006 Proceedings)
Dr. Thomas C. Hone, Office of Force Transformation-In his criticism of the work of the Office of Force Transformation, Lieutenant Colonel Hanley forgot the "Patton Test." That is, what if you had asked General George S. Patton Jr., Third Army commander at the breakout from the Normandy beachhead in 1944, if he would accept the following innovations in his force: a logistics system that would guarantee his tanks never ran out of fuel or ammunition, night-vision devices that gave his troops the ability to fight effectively in the dark, round-the-clock air cover and pinpoint air support in all weather, secure communications, real-time intelligence on the composition and movement of enemy forces, replacement battalions that could move quickly into the line as needed and immediately take up the fight, and an electronic picture of the battlefield that could be shared among all his commanders and that was relevant to the combat situation each commander faced?
What if you could have offered him all that in June 1944? He would have grabbed it instantly, used it, and then he and his fellow Allied commanders would have defeated Germany in the fall of 1944 instead of the spring of 1945. That's transformation. If you want to know whether transformation is worth doing, just ask the fighting forces if they want to take a pass on new and more effective ways of doing their missions.
Forget the articles, pamphlets, and books on transformation. Forget the words and the battle over terms. Focus instead on what the services have been and are doing to make themselves the masters of combat. It's an impressive record so far, and it will continue to be impressive if it's supported by the leaders of the nation's armed forces.
"Where Have All the Shiphandlers Gone?"
(See S. Landersman, pp. 54-58, August 2006; J. Hafner, T. Beall, p. 6, September 2006 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander A. Thomas Herbert, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)-In the 40 years since I was on active duty, nothing seems to have changed with regard to the Navy's attitude toward proper seamanship and good shiphandling skills. The Navy's concern is to launch and fly airplanes, not to operate ships. Ships are just platforms to carry the airplanes.
Consider the operation of an aircraft carrier. At 90,000 tons and carrying a complement of more than 6,000 personnel, it is commanded by an aviator who has spent his career flying planes, except for a short tour with a deep-draft command. Imagine taking a cruise on a luxury liner with 5,000 passengers commanded by an airline pilot who had spent one year on a freighter before taking command.
When I was on active duty, my ship was commanded by an aviator who was doing his deep-draft tour prior to getting command of an aircraft carrier. There were at least two instances that I can remember when he put the ship in danger. When we came into port and had to wait for the pilot, he almost ran the ship aground because he did not know what to do. In another instance he did not know how to properly handle the ship when cargo broke loose during heavy seas. During my last year on board, we received a commanding officer who was a true ship driver. What a difference it made! I can remember an instance overseas where he maneuvered the ship alongside a pier when help was not available. He knew what he was doing.
Since aircraft carriers and most amphibious ships are commanded by aviators, seamanship and good shiphandling skills will not be a priority in the Navy. At least auxiliaries are now commanded by ship drivers since they are in the transport service, unlike my days when they too were commanded by aviators. It is time to change the practice of ships being commanded by non-ship drivers. We need a truly capable Navy with ships commanded by real ship operators.
Commander Jeffrey S. Nilsson, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)-I recall some years ago that we had about twice as many ships in active service than we have now, and our service force ships were all U.S. Navy and delivered the goods to their customers via underway replenishment-no helicopters, thank you. You had to know your seamanship to do what we did, sending pallets from one ship to another by one of a variety of rigs, be it high line, housefall, or Burton. When we were resupplying everything from submarines to aircraft carriers the skipper had to know what he was doing.
Granted, it is not the same Navy it was while I was on active duty, but going to sea still means taking a ship out of port and getting her to a particular place. I have always held that one of the main criteria of being able to say that you would go to sea with a particular skipper was his shiphandling expertise and the confidence his crew had in him as a shiphandler. I hope that we do not see this basic tenet of being a ship driving officer in the U.S. Navy disappear. I strongly recommend that seamanship be a significant part, if applicable, of an officer's Fitness Report and certainly a critical factor in screening him for command at sea. It is appalling that it was even necessary to write and publish such an article. Captain Landersman saw a need and I applaud him.
"Misnaming Aircraft Carriers"
(See N. Polmar, pp. 30-31, September 2006 Proceedings)
Bruce A. Brightwell-I found the sidebar on misnaming aircraft carriers in the September issue enlightening. However, I fail to understand why the author did not take the powers-that-be to task for the two (at least to me) glaringly misnamed carriers on his list-the USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) and the USS John C. Stennis (CVN-74). At least the other carriers were named for some of our most outstanding presidents. But I know when I first heard the names of the John C. Stennis and Carl Vinson, my reaction was "Who the heck is that?"
While it may be politically expedient to tack the names of politicians on toll roads and federal office buildings, to apply those names to our nation's biggest, most expensive ships of war is a disgrace. Part of the mission of these ships is to project the power and prestige of the United States to foreign countries. A ship with the name George Washington does that. A ship named after a person that even I, as a fairly knowledgeable student of naval, history, and political affairs, had to look up to know exactly who they are and what they had done, does not. Certainly, our Navy has plenty of other ships that could have been named for these individuals, without diluting the singular honor that should be reserved for our most significant naval assets.
Of course, if, as Mr. Polmar pointed out, we had not gotten away from naming our most powerful warships after our most historic and heroic naval battles and ships, this would have never been an issue. Would it have been so terrible to have had the pride of the Fleet carry names such as Tripoli, Arizona, Midway, Coral Sea, Intrepid, and Hornet? I certainly don't think so.
Lieutenant Commander Rolland G. Fitch II, U.S. Navy (Retired)-Mr. Polmar is absolutely correct in his assertion that the Navy has gotten far away from the convention of naming ships, especially aircraft carriers. Carriers represent the top of the line in today's Navy. They are the most publicly visible ships and as such, have become a political prize to be awarded in return for favors or Congressional support. Two examples of such favoritism are Carl Vinson and John C. Stennis. Both of these men, as members of Congress, were big supporters of the Navy. The fact that John Stennis represented a state where two classes of destroyers and one class of cruisers were built shows that the senator was rewarded twice for his support.
However, I do feel that a case can be made for naming a carrier for Gerald Ford. The case would be stronger than the one for Harry S. Truman and at least as good as the case for George H. W. Bush.
Mr. Ford served his country in World War II as a gunnery officer on an aircraft carrier. When the war ended, lieutenant Commander Ford returned home and subsequently served the people of Grand Rapids, Michigan, in the House of Representatives. Mr. Ford had no grand ambitions beyond becoming Speaker of the House if the Republicans ever became the majority during his service. However, as the result of two political scandals he was thrust into the presidency in August 1974.
President Ford took office at a time of great upheaval in our nation's history. The people had been betrayed by their government, the economy was in terrible shape, and Mr. Ford was facing a hostile Congress. It was under these conditions that Mr. Ford exhibited integrity and courage. He made the unpopular decision to pardon former President Richard M. Nixon so that the government and the country could turn its attention to pressing issues. He made a decision that he knew would, and eventually did, cost him a chance at his own term as president.
Gerald R. Ford may not have had the impact on the Navy that Franklin D. Roosevelt, Carl Vinson, or John Stennis did. He may have only been a "caretaker" president that had no lasting impact on defense matters. However, in his short time in office (August 1974-January 1977) he made some hard decisions on a par with Roosevelt, Truman, Reagan, and Bush. Mr. Ford deserves the same consideration as those presidents in having a ship named for him.
"Aircraft Carriers Are on Their Way Out"
(See S. Turner, pp. 16-18, July 2006; M. Fuqua, B. Hanley, L. Parker, K. Hammon, pp. 8-10, August 2006; L. Smith, J. Manvel, pp. 8, 76, September 2006 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral Robert Dunn, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare) and current President of the Naval Historical Foundation-In July, Proceedings carried an article by Admiral Stansfield Turner opining that unless the Navy reformed its forces as he recommended, specifically moving away from dependence on aircraft carriers, both the Navy and aircraft carriers would soon be superfluous. Opinion is often good but it's always trumped by facts. In this instance the following facts apply.
First and most obvious, and contrary to opinion expressed in the subject article, carriers are not the province of the aviation community. They are national assets, called for by every president since Harry Truman in times of crisis, even called for by the president for whom Admiral Turner served as director of Central Intelligence, Jimmy Carter. It is the nation that needs carriers. Even within the Navy they are not the province of aviators. Every warfare specialty and every staff community recognizes the importance of the aircraft carrier and contributes to its operations and its efficiency; all recognize that without the aircraft carrier the Navy would be far less effective and far less useful to the nation and allies alike.
The stated opinion, "There will almost always be an alternative in the Air Force," ignores situations such as when Turkey said, "You can't land here," at the start of the Iraq War. It ignores the situation when any other nation says, "Not in my backyard!" A recent case in point: Air Force fighters could not reach Afghanistan until the United States went through some torturous diplomatic negotiations with several Central Asian nations. Meanwhile, Navy strike-fighters operated in support without restrictions from carriers in the Indian Ocean.
Admiral Turner's opinion that, "There is no perceptible threat to our use of the seas to justify a large Navy," ignores both current events and current naval thought. For example, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Mike Mullen has recently pointed out that the Navy is more than control of the seas. I quote from a report of his talk at the Current Strategy Forum held in Newport this last June and carried on page 6 of the July Proceedings. "The CNO challenged the Navy to rid itself of the notion held by so many for so long that maritime strategy exists solely to fight and win wars at sea and the rest will take care of itself. In a globalized, flat world, the rest matters a lot."
Admiral Turner also opines a regret about a "traditional pattern of carrier warfare," but one wonders just what that is. Is it fleet battles such as Coral Sea, Midway, and the Marianas? Is it sustained support ashore such as Korea and Vietnam? Is it augmenting quarantine during the Cuban Missile Crisis? Is it participating in the nuclear deterrent during the Cold War? Is it contributing to the battle ashore when the Air Force didn't have all the assets required, as happened in Kosovo, Kuwait, and Iraq? Is it providing the only platform available for inserting air and special forces into Afghanistan? Or is it providing a platform for relief in Banda Aceh and other places?
Fortunately, the nation's decision makers, in the Congress and in the administration-any administration-do understand the essential roles played by the aircraft carrier and its aircraft whether it be Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Global War on Terrorism today, or China, Iran, or Korea in the future. As for being superfluous, why not ask a grunt, a combatant commander, an ally, or a president? When it comes to aircraft carriers, one won't find superfluous in their lexicon.
"Double the Coast Guard Reserve"
(See J. Dolbow, p. 66, August 2006; M. Suck, p. 8, September 2006 Proceedings)
Captain Robert L. Desk, U.S. Coast Guard-I am shocked and saddened by Major Stack's rash generalizations and obvious lack of understanding of Coast Guard operations on the five immense inland seas and complex connecting waterways that form the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway system. His assessment that the multi-mission Coast Guard stations that dot the shores of the Great Lakes "have become more-or-less inland police-boat stations" is an affront to the dedicated Coasties, active, reserve, and auxiliary, who work tirelessly to carry out all the Coast Guard's statutory responsibilities and mission objectives.
In the reality that is our post-9/11 world, Coast Guard personnel on the Great Lakes are indeed spending considerable time and effort on maritime security; however, not at the expense of the search and rescue (SAR) mission.
The Coast Guard's many diverse missions provide an omnipresence on the waterfront that others don't enjoy. "Call the Coast Guard!" is the first response to everything from a mariner in distress to a mysterious object on the pier. The Coast Guard's "cop on the beat"-like familiarity with all things maritime is the linchpin to its success.
The Coast Guard's volunteer Auxiliary is critical to this essential familiarity, but so is the routine interaction with the maritime public, facilitated by the boarding of small recreational vessels by active duty Coast Guardsmen. Yes, these boardings do result in the prosecution of violations of federal boating regulations such as "small children not wearing life jackets, drunken boaters, and expired flares." Is that a bad thing? In addition to improving maritime security along the northern border, these boardings might just prevent a SAR case from happening in the first place.
I'm disappointed that Major Stack feels the Coast Guard Auxiliary is somehow underused on the Great Lakes. I would challenge him to work with the leadership of the Auxiliary to learn more about the Coast Guard's operational planning processes and the many great success stories in leveraging the Auxiliary as an important force multiplier. He should also do a little reading on Coast Guard history (especially on the Great Lakes) and its unique lifesaver, guardian, warrior service culture.
"Mine Warfare Confronts an Uncertain Future"
(See R. O'Donnell and S. Trover, pp. 42-47, July 2006 Proceedings)
Captain Michael B. Brands, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)-Captain O'Donnell and Dr. Truver raise valid concerns for the future of mine warfare. The decommissioning of the Osprey (MHC-51)-class mine hunter ships, which will reduce mine countermeasures surface assets by more than half, and the consolidation of the Commander, Mine Warfare Command with the Fleet Anti-Submarine Warfare Command are strong indicators that a new period of neglect is already underway.
Mine warfare has always been the redheaded stepchild of the Navy, never receiving the attention it deserves. It is not considered high tech or prestigious. It is a discipline that requires time, patience, and persistence. Equal parts science and art, it is learned largely by hands-on experience, not overnight or part time. Because of its low-tech image, young officers are not encouraged to pursue mine warfare as their warfare specialty. They are encouraged to follow careers in the major warfighting communities: submarines, aviation, and surface ships. As a result, Navy decisionmakers grow up with little experience and understanding of mine warfare. The new Fleet Anti-Submarine and Mine Warfare Command will be dominated by mainstream officers who will focus on what they know best. The name of the command even indicates where the emphasis will lie.
For several years the Navy has put a lot of effort into developing an organic mine warfare capability for its surface combatants. The idea is that these ships can perform their own mine hunting when required rather than depend on an independent mine countermeasures force. Commanders don't have enough assets now to accomplish all the tasks they are required to perform. To stretch the available forces to the maximum extent possible, lower priority requirements and taskings are often postponed or canceled.
Training is often one of the first requirements to be sacrificed to tasking and schedule. This is especially true for mission areas that are considered secondary, as mine warfare often is. As the Navy struggles to maintain the size of the Fleet and keep it from shrinking further, individual ships may be forced to forgo training in some mission areas in order to make time to accomplish higher priority missions. The result of this temporal squeeze is a situation where a ship may have the equipment to perform its own mine countermeasures, but will not be able to do so because of a lack of crew experience with that equipment.
If the Navy is serious about operating in littoral areas, mine warfare needs more emphasis, not less. The littorals are the perfect environment for all phases of mine warfare, both for the enemy and us. Offensive mine fields can pen the opposition in their own harbors or deny them access to areas we wish to control. Mine countermeasures will enable friendly forces to access areas where they can best support land operations.
Maximizing the beneficial effect of mine operations requires a robust force of dedicated assets manned by professionals thoroughly trained and experienced in the nuances of this critical skill. Hopefully the Navy can learn from its history and implement the recommendations of its experts to avoid short changing its capability to use and deal with these weapons that wait.