In mid-March 2006, Joint Forces Command released a remarkable study titled Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam's Senior Leadership. The 230-page report was a painstakingly well-researched analysis of the war drawing heavily on interviews with Saddam's senior military officers and a bevy of captured Iraqi documents. What made the report newsworthy was an extraordinary allegation arising from one of those captured documents, dated 25 March 2003 and titled "Letter from Russian Official to Presidential Secretary Concerning American Intentions in Iraq."
That document began with the striking revelation that: "The information that the Russians have collected from their sources inside the American Central Command in Doha is that the United States is convinced that occupying Iraqi cities are (sic) impossible..." (italics mine). The letter went on to note, wrongly, that the American tactic was to isolate Iraq from its western borders and bring the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) in from Jordan. The source of the document was reportedly the Russian ambassador in Baghdad, now serving in Algeria. The news created quite a stir.
When the story broke, it ran as "Russians gave war plans to Saddam," inferring treason and foul play. Obvious questions such as how did Russian intelligence gain access to America's top secret war plans, especially in Doha, and was this the work of a freelancer or a directive from Moscow, were immediately raised and not only by those suspicious of the Putin administration.
The White House and Departments of State and Defense quickly damped the story down, denying any knowledge of the information. The Russian foreign and defense ministers issued strong denials of Moscow's part in the affair. While some in the United States could easily accept deceit on the part of the Russians, how likely was it that presumably an American in Central Command would provide such secret information to a foreign source and commit treason in the process?
To those experienced in these matters, disinformation seemed a better possibility. If the document was authentic, it could have confused and possibly deceived Saddam into resetting his defense accordingly-based on absolutely wrong information about the assault avoiding Baghdad and getting the 4th Infantry Division into the fight speedily.
A little history is helpful in sorting out whether this was treason, disinformation, or a hoax. While it seems unlikely that an American in Central Command would have passed such sensitive intelligence to the Russians, sadly, treason is not out of the question. Americans have committed treason in the past, providing our enemies with the most sensitive of intelligence. From Benedict Arnold during the Revolutionary War to the infamous case of John A. Walker Jr. and the spy ring he created with family and friends inside the U.S. Navy, secrets have been passed to enemies for reasons ranging from purely mercenary to highly ideological. For those who may not remember, while in the Navy, Walker worked for the KGB for 16 years until arrested in May 1985.
It is also plausible but exceedingly unlikely that Russian military intelligence could have planted a "bug" or a wire in Central Command headquarters and purloined the war plans. Yet that is more the stuff of Hollywood than the real world.
Disinformation or hoax may prove perhaps a more accurate explanation for the current controversy. However, another incident offers a distant possibility. During the 1999 NATO bombing campaign against Serbia, the United States struck the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. The Clinton administration made a compelling case that the attack was purely accidental. The Chinese simply did not believe that, with the phenomenal technologies America possessed, such accidents could happen.
As for the current controversy, whether persons unknown used real or doctored information on U.S. war plans to poison U.S.-Russian relations will remain part of the lore of conspiracy theories. We may never know the real story. While it is tempting to believe the worst, at first cut this would seem a brilliant stroke of disinformation. But, in fact, it would have made no difference if the intelligence had been accurate. The war would have had an identical outcome. The unanswerable question is whether or not a campaign of deception and disinformation could have had a different effect on the peace. In other words, were there other actions that could or should have been taken during the war that would have put Iraq on a faster road to peace and stability? Now that would make a really interesting story.
Harlan Ullman is a columnist for
Proceedings and the Washington Times. His latest book, America's Pro mise Restored: Preventing Culture, Crusade and Partisanship from Wrecking Our Country, is due out in June.