“Aircraft Carriers Are on Their Way Out”
(See S. Turner, pp. 16-18, July 2006 Proceedings)
Captain Michael T. Fuqua, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Admiral Turner has a long and distinguished record as a naval officer and public servant. Unfortunately, he has badly missed the mark in this article. He claims that the main capital ship of the U.S. Navy, the aircraft carrier, has become “superfluous” and is on its way out. Balderdash!
Right up front. Admiral Turner makes a critical mistake in focusing on the ship. The carrier is magnificent, has evolved tremendously over the last several decades, and no nation on earth can claim to possess such a formidable naval asset. But the weapon system that Admiral Turner blithely dismisses as being 65 years old and no longer dominant is the carrier’s air wing. By any measure, air wings embarked aboard today’s carriers are as state of the art as any force in the world. And far from being ineffective, the Hornets, Hawkeyes, Prowlers, Seahawks, and other aircraft that compose a modem air wing can respond to any crisis, at any time, and effectively project power when called upon by the President. Just ask the U.S. forces on the ground during Operations Enduring Freedom or Iraqi Freedom their opinion of carrier aviation.
To make the case that aircraft carriers are still in existence because of parochial interests is insulting not only to the Navy but also to all those in other agencies, including Congress, that have continued to support, fund, and upgrade this vital national asset. Do naval aviators believe that the aircraft carrier has been a critical asset to this country in the past and has an important place in its future? Unquestionably, yes. But that does not mean the community could or would subvert national security to artificially favor a capability that has outlived its usefulness.
I agree with Admiral Turner’s assertion that substantial changes in technology are taking place and will have a dramatic impact on how we fight in the future. Unmanned technologies are being developed that will cause a sea change in the Navy. But that does not mean an aircraft carrier is any less valuable. These new unmanned systems will be carrier-based, allow for continuous presence over a target area, and be able to target or attack at will. While some of our unmanned aircraft can be controlled from vast distances, the aircraft carrier, with a mix of manned and unmanned aircraft, not only will be able to more effectively attack a wider range of targets, but it will continue its vital roles of diplomatic presence, disaster relief, humanitarian missions, and a host of other tasks vital to our national security.
Admiral Turner displays a breathtakingly narrow view of naval forces when describing their use. To assert that “there is no perceptible threat to our use of the seas to justify a large Navy” belies the very expeditionary nature of our Navy. In the 21st century, the Navy has rightly, in my view, shifted its focus to the littorals And that strengthens, not weakens, the argument for aircraft carriers. If there is any aspect of our military today that provides assured access in remote areas of vital national interest, it is the Navy, largely through the use of aircraft carriers.
Lieutenant Colonel Brian Hanley, US Air Force—Admiral Turner asserts that aircraft carriers are “superfluous” and that we ought to consider the “possibility that time and technology have passed this classic weapon system by.” At first glance this makes for an attractive argument, but a competing viewpoint is worth considering.
It must be small comfort to a beleaguered U.S. Marine Corps detachment to know that a technician in an “air conditioned command center” is ready to push a button that will launch a missile at a fast-approaching group of armored vehicles. A computer system cannot replace human judgment. An F/A-18 air crew can size things up with their own eyes and settle matters on the spot—and sometime they accomplish what was thought impossible thanks to courage and perseverance Our advanced C4I systems are marvelous things, but it is unlikely that a pilotless drone or a computer server will ever earn the Medal of Honor.
What is more, the sound of jets overhead can tip the morale aspect of an engagement in our favor. A fast jet flying at treetop level can overturn soft vehicles burst the eardrums of soldiers hunkered down in the dirt, and generally harass an enemy just at the moment when he needs to have his wits about him. Carrier-based aircraft can do so much more than this- too—medical evacuation, tactical transport, airborne tactical control, etc. We remove them from the order of battle at our peril.
Finally, it would be a mistake to assume that the U.S. Air Force can provide air superiority in every possible situation. Air Force fighters need overseas bases from which to operate. The ability to provide air cover might be hamstrung or thwarted by diplomatic issues—e.g., whether or not a given country allows armed aircraft to operate from or pass over its territory. Depending on neutrals can exercise dominion over an expeditionary effort every bit as much as the twin tyrants of geography and time.
In the spirit of joint-mindedness, it would a good thing if limited Air Force funds were spent not on additional fighters in order to compensate for the shrinkage of naval aviation but on space systems, strategic communications, and a modernized fleet of transport and refueling aircraft. These things would benefit our ability to wage war across the globe; the diminution of our carrier force might well have the opposite effect.
Lieutenant Commander Larry Parker, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Admiral Turner opines that “remotely controlled, long-range missiles aimed at remotely detected and identified targets” make aircraft carriers “superfluous.” In his estimate, because of advanced technologies, the day of the carrier is past, and the most powerful, most versatile weapon system ever developed, which can put the might of the United States off any hostile coast in a matter of days, should be given up in favor of “distributing the Navy’s capability to project power ashore over many platforms.”
Giving up our carriers would be a mistake. How many wars have been averted because of the mere presence of a U.S. Navy carrier battle group? Other than aircraft carriers and attack submarines, what assets do we have to decisively counter China’s growing blue-water capability? If anything, we should be expanding our blue-water fleet rather than repeating past mistakes and drawing down. Let England be our example—when it ceased to invest in sea power, it ceased to be a world power.
Kevin D. Hammon—Admiral Turner dead wrong on this issue. We do net carriers. Advanced military technology whether it be drones, cruise missile or stealth packages, will not replace the power-projection capability of the aircraft carrier. Technology needs to be there enhance it. As with any system, shouldn’t the carrier be looked at as a dynamic package that can be enhanced or redesigned technology evolves? The carrier can be the platform to deliver the overwhelming strike packages when geography limits access.
The question shouldn’t be has technology left carriers behind, but how can we use technology to allow the carriers to deliver these components into littoral regions where the dangers of diesel submarines, stealthy mines, and antiship missiles lurk.
We are now at a historical transition point. We’ve exited the Cold War, entered the era of the Global War on Terrorism In the future there could be a conflict with China, a nation with global aspirations. We’ve also been quite lucky not to be pulled deeper into the various African flashpoints. If any of these came to fruition would you really want to face them without carriers?
“The LCS: Built to Fight”
(See J. Harts, pp. 26-29, July 2006 Proceeding)
David Byrd—Lieutenant Harts’ article dances around key questions that every one else dodges with regard to the littoral combat ship (LCS). First, will someone please point to a current or planned place called a “contested littoral” on a map What coastlines can be expected to have such a place, other than in leftover naval' battles of prior wars?
China? Not likely. Get close enough and their naval antiship capability makes the “littorals” likely to be littered with hull fragments. North Korea? It doesn’t own anything to fight with that can’t be erased with a decent air strike. The Gulf Been there, done that, used battleships Next time, use air strikes and erase the coastline.
Getting past “where,” the other question is, what. What exactly is the LCS supposed to contest in the contested littorals? Other boats? Who has them, and why do we need an LCS to kill them? We can currently eliminate any naval threat with the existing air, surface, and subsurface fleet. Invasion? With current technology, any contested beach is a killing zone until the opposition is neutralized. These days, we do it from the air, not with offshore gunfire. At any rate, who would try to attack a coastal defense force with a ship and at close (littoral) range, to boot?
In summary, why has no one asked the question: “Where will an LCS fight?” The “what” is simple: whatever threat you want to make up. The where are the “contested littorals,” and so far no one has identified such a place that is expected to be populated with suitable combatants for the LCS to fight. The LCS’s battlespace has been carefully crafted to be a place that needs just the LCS. As arguments alter the battlespace, the littoral combat ship’s modularity gets tweaked. As LCS affordability wanders around, the definition of its battlespace shifts to fit.
If the modular “affordable light combat ship” (aka, corvette) is the real need, and I suspect down deep it is, then let’s drop the “contested littoral” fiction and define a mission in useful terms that makes sense in the world in which it will live and fight.
Remo Salta—What we really need is some honesty in the littoral combat ship (LCS) debate. Any ship that can carry a helicopter and is going to have antiair, antiship, and antisubmarine warfare capabilities looks, smells, and sounds like a frigate. Or, at the very least, we are going to have a large corvette. Either way, this does not seem like the type of “low-value” or “expendable” warship designed to take the fight into highly contested coastal waters.
We don’t need another expensive warship that the Navy will be afraid to risk near the shore. The current LCS sounds like a ship that is too expensive for littoral warfare and not heavy enough for prolonged blue-water operations. We also don’t need a small warship that can do a lot of different tasks poorly. Furthermore, the current LCS would have no capabilities against mines, which could be a substantial problem in coastal waters.
If we want a small warship built for combat in coastal waters, then we should be looking at ships such as the Danish Flyvefisken-class Stanflex 300 patrol vessels that were built specifically for that purpose. The ships in this class have a standard hull but can be rapidly reconfigured to perform several different roles through the use of containerized weapon systems. The ships can be quickly adapted to either the surveillance, surface combat, antisubmarine warfare, minelayer, or mine countermeasures/mine hunter roles within a few hours.
“DD(X) and the (New) Real World”
(See A. Agraviador, pp. 26-29, July 2006 Proceedings)
Captain Robert O. Strange, U.S. Navy (Retired)—I find it difficult to accept the premise of Ensign Agraviador’s article- Are we to believe, as the author suggests, that the enemy today will be the same enemy that the United States must confront in the future? Ships designed today must be developed with our best projection on what the future threat will be. Yes, the Global War on Terrorism is the current threat, but will it also be the only threat of the future? I believe that the question is, should the Navy be designing ships to meet today’s threat or should we project on what future threats may face our forces during the expected life of particular ship class?
The article further suggests that we should apply some of the DD(X) technologies to other platforms. One wonders how this might apply to the 155-mm guns that are so desperately needed by the U.S. Marine Corps to fulfill its naval gunfire support requirements.
Marine Corps advocates from the Commandant on down have stressed the need for larger caliber guns than currently exist in the Fleet today. Extensive modeling and simulation and Fleet war games employing the projected capabilities of the DD(x) have conclusively proved this need, and that only ships of the DD(X) class are capable of fulfilling it. There have been well-meaning groups who have advocated bringing the Iowa (BB-61)-class battleships back into service to provide this capability The DD(X), with its two 155-mm guns, was designed to provide a formidable fire-support capability with an automated system requiring a fraction of the manpower of a reactivated battleship. Yes, size of the DD(X) becomes a factor when the ship is provided with such a formidable capability.
Although Ensign Agraviador makes some valid points in his article concerning the high cost of new construction and the affordability issue, the fact remains that Navy decision makers must carefully weigh these considerations for countering the future threats that may confront the Navy/Marine Corps team.
Mike Cohen—Ensign Agraviador reflects not only a shockingly narrow view of the “real world,” but a disturbing and increasingly popular mentality that we should put all of our strategic eggs in either a blue-water or brown-water basket.
Repeating a familiar refrain, the author argues the false premise that “the enemy is no longer a large nation-state’s organized army and navy but an extremist wrapped with explosives on a jet ski driving toward the novel, expensive, DD(X).”
Perhaps he has forgotten about Communist China, North Korea, and Russia, all of which have very formidable armies and navies. Perhaps he has forgotten a critical lesson of past wars, that today’s friend can rapidly become tomorrow’s enemy. While terrorism gets more headlines, it certainly does not mean that all-out wars between nations are relics of the past. It does not mean that we can in any way lose our momentum in staying a technological step ahead of potential adversaries.
While Ensign Agraviador comments that the bombing of the USS Cole (DDG- 67) “marked the turning point of our strategic goals and vision,” it should not have been the turning point of anything. Attacks on moored ships have been a tactic since the beginning of naval warfare. Indeed, there was nothing new—nor, given its location, should there have been anything unexpected—about the way the Cole was attacked.
During the Cold War, attacks such as the Cole experienced were always a threat, and the solution was simple—we kept our warships out of ports where intelligence indicated there was any possibility of that happening. From my experience on both submarines and aircraft carriers, we didn’t even visit ports where there was the remotest threat, let alone where a nation was known to be a terrorist haven.
Sad to say, the attack on the Cole had nothing to do with technology—it was the result of a poor tactical decision, pure and simple. The destroyers refueling in Aden were not only sitting ducks for such an attack, they were on so predictable a schedule that the terrorists were able to do several dry runs and even had a false start before the actual attack.
The fact is that we will always face both brown-water and blue-water threats, and despite our best efforts, there will never be a one-size-fits-all weapon platform that meets every need.
Indeed, experience with the most recent multi-purpose platforms shows that they are more expensive to design and build, more difficult to operate, and more expensive and difficult to maintain. That, in turn, translates into difficulty funding the programs and lower numbers of ships and aircraft.
As the Cole fiasco showed, however, before we can even begin to be concerned about the suitability of weapon platforms, we must first use a little common sense and look at our tactics.
Using the ensign’s example, if our concern is the kamikaze jet ski or the suicide barge, then we take advantage of the fact that neither operates in the open sea and keep our ships out of range of such a threat, as we did during the Cold War.
To support that strategy, we need more oilers and other auxiliaries so we can keep our combatants out of vulnerable positions. But this is truly the easiest part of the problem to solve. We can win if we play our game, not the other guy’s.
The war against terrorism is more one of brainpower than technology. Regardless, it should never drive us to forget that, contrary to Ensign Agraviador’s theory, the “old” type of enemy has not gone away.
“Crossing Swords: ‘The Generals’ Revolt’”
(See J. Scales, p. 8, July 2006; P. Trump, p. 8, July 2006; E. Blackmore, p. 8, July 2006; H. Castner, pp. 8-10, July 2006; J. Riggs and G. Worthington, pp. 14-17, June 2006 Proceedings)
Commander Michael Collins, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)—Major General Riggs argues that serving military officers are never allowed to openly break from administration policy, and claims that it is appropriate to criticize when safely retired. Rear Admiral Worthington, by contrast, seems to argue that admirals and generals should stay silent even into retirement. Both miss the real issue.
A quote attributed to John Paul Jones says “He who will not risk, cannot win.” So if a retired flag or general officer speaks out, who cares? They risk little, so their comments mean little.
History will remember favorably Admiral Louis Denfield and General Eric Shinseki. When asked for their professional military opinions, they gave them candidly to elected officials of our nation in open testimony. Nobody could accuse them of having an ulterior motive—no book deal, television gig, not angling for an ambassadorship in the next administration. They were true professionals. When congressional leaders asked for their military judgment, they gave the best they could. Yes, it differed from the party line, and yes, they paid a price for it. That is moral courage. And that is why their opinion mattered so much. They will be remembered fondly by history.
Commander Chip Laingen, U.S. Navy (Retired)—The exchange between Major General Riggs and Rear Admiral Worthington was illuminating on several levels, but two flawed assumptions seem glaring in both of their arguments.
First, both assume their service on active duty involved apolitical contribution to policy. The Constitution and subsequent law and precedent do not prohibit commissioned military officers from contributing to the political-military policy-making process—the laws only limit their public actions within the political process, and prohibits them from questioning the direct military orders that result from then elected and appointed civilian chain of command.
Officers have been influencing their political superiors and the political planning and outcomes of their operations since the Revolutionary War. When officers retire, that ability to influence policy changes in nature. The legality of their free speech is not in question, but because they were previously influential in the political policy process, the “appropriateness” of their discourse is then directly proportional how much they showcase their status as retired officers when they are engaged in public debate as civilians.
Second, both General Riggs and Admiral Worthington assume that anyone involved in current policymaking is listening to retired flag officers at all. It's not that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and others in the chain of command don’t respect and value their opinions and expertise; it’s just that they are rightly and truly irrelevant the second they join the retired ranks. This is the case by definition, of course; and it is so also because then access to relevant information becomes almost immediately outdated, including strategic and tactical intelligence that informs political policy decisions.
The enemy, however, is listening, and listening intently to the din of our free media, which does consider the opinions of our retired admirals and generals as entirely relevant to the overall national debate on military policy, broadly stated. They are, therefore, emboldened by retired flag officers who speak out against current policy. While their intent is clearly not to “aid and abet” the enemy, the impact is entirely the same.
No one questions the legality of our retired officers to speak freely, in any venue; and as General Riggs points out, the appropriateness of their speech is thoroughly subjective anyway. I do, however, question the judgment of these retired officers, who no doubt speak out in order to ultimately protect those with whom they so recently served. In this case, the pen is in fact mightier than the sword, and can help to put the sword in the wrong hands.
John S. Mitchell—Retired flag officers are certainly permitted to criticize any Policy. However, intent is the real issue of whether it is right and appropriate. Is the criticism intended to contribute professional experience, intellectual depth, and constructive advice to aid the formulation of an optimum solution to a serious challenge? Or is the criticism simply an after-the-fact effort to justify a failure to recognize a flawed plan or inaction at a time when vigorous dissent could have led to changes that had significant impact on subsequent events?
To date there has been a great deal of criticism but few recommendations of what we should or can be doing defiantly other than fire Secretary Rumsfeld and depart Iraq. It is always easy to criticize a plan after events have demonstrated deficiencies or a failure. It takes much more courage to object to the point of falling on one’s sword as a plan is being developed.
While a junior officer is expected to salute smartly and carry out a lawful order, the same should not hold true for flag officers during the planning of a crucial operation. How strenuously should you dissent if you have knowledge of, or are directly involved in the development of a Plan that, in your professional judgement, is seriously flawed? What do you do if real concerns expressed by professionals withthin the chain of command are continuity rejected until a plan emerges that is essentially authored by the boss with a Path to shift blame if it doesn’t succeed? as stated by Admiral Worthington, decision from above are either accepted, or if reservations are serious enough, resignation /retirement must be the individual course of action.
Flag officers are not politicized, marginalized, and nano-managed unless they allow it to occur. When the chips were down the flag officers who are now criticizing after the fact valued their stars, prestige, and position above their professional judgement and loyalty to the troops they were sending into harm’s way. Had a cadre of flag officers retired in protest when they felt their advice wasn’t valued or even wanted, their actions might have resulted in a far better plan. It could possibly have resulted in a contingency plan based on something more realistic than our being welcomed as liberators by cheering crowds bearing flowers.
One less star in retirement would have been the maximum price the generals would have placed at risk for a courageous act that could have changed the course of history and saved countless lives. In retirement do they have a right to criticize? Certainly. Should their criticism be given any credibility? In my opinion, anyone in a position to take real action to influence a plan prior to implementation shouldn’t be given any credibility for criticism after events have unfolded.
Finally, as General Riggs obliquely implies, are “lucrative defense industry jobs,” “political appointments in any future administration,” and the “Washington insiders club” the ultimate goal of a military career? If so careerism has indeed taken over at the senior ranks of our military.
“Midway is Our Trafalgar”
(,See B. Tillman, P. 10, July 2006; J. Roherty, P. 10, July 2006; G. Graessle, p. 10, July 2006; M. Stotzer, p. 75, July 2006; B. Fort, pp. 62-66, June 2006 Proceedings)
Margaret B. Rafferty—I applaud Commander Fort’s arguments for a Midway memorial. However, he missed the two principal reasons America does not commemorate Midway in the same way the British do Trafalgar. One is that Midway, a great tribute to a team effort, did not produce one shining star the way Trafalgar did. We have no Nelson. The other, and sadder, reason is that the U.S. Navy is a small part of what America is. It does not have the same overwhelming appeal to the American general public that the Royal Navy has for the British. We are about so much more than our Navy. That being said, I fully support increasing the awareness of the history of the U.S. Navy and am firmly behind Commander Fort’s efforts to create a Midway memorial.
Captain Eric J. Shaw, U.S. Coast Guard— In the June 2006 issue of Proceedings the caption under the picture on page 66 states that the USS Saipan (LHA-2) was, “sadly, the only U.S. vessel to participate in the international naval review to commemorate the bicentennial of Trafalgar.” If the photographer had panned just to his or her right the picture would have included the U.S. Coast Guard Barque Eagle (WIX- 327). We, too, participated in the International Fleet Review in the Solent. Sadly, we were the only U.S. vessel to continue into Portsmouth to participate in the follow-on International Festival of the Sea. The Saipan had departed the scene.
“Coast Guard Reorganization: Much More is Needed!”
(See J. DiRenzo and C. Doane, pp. 69-72, June 2006 Proceedings)
Captain Henry N. Helgesen, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired)—Yes, more can be done! The easiest thing to do would be to remove the Captain of the Port and Environmental Response responsibilities from the Marine Safety Offices and turn those duties over to the Group commands. Let the Marine Safety Offices concentrate on the marine inspection, investigation, licensing and certification, and documentation functions. It’s not a new concept, since in some of the larger ports the Captain of the Port and the Marine Safety Offices were always separate commands. It worked well.
Another option is to transfer the maritime safety issues out of the Department of Homeland Security to the Department of Transportation, since the civilian aspects of the Coast Guard are becoming militarized by Homeland Security. Congressman James L. Oberstar (D-MN), the ranking member of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, has announced that he wishes to pursue this matter. The merging of the Groups and the Marine Safety Offices creates a further militarizing of the marine safety functions. This is a matter that has also been discussed for many decades, namely, removing the marine safety functions from under the military aspects of the Coast Guard and placing them in the hands of a civilian body. This is probably the time to do it.
“A New Role for the Trident Fleet”
(See T. Benedict, pp. 26-29, June 2006 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Thomas J. Wilson, III, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Captain Benedict has outlined a thorough engineering approach to modifying an existing weapon system to address new challenges. With modifications, the current Trident fleet can engage an expanded target set, thus providing a new weapon to the combatant commanders and a new mission to the submarine force. Sounds like win-win.
Before we get too far down the acquisition pipeline, I would like to hear more about the concept of operations. What is the target set? How does one launch a ballistic missile and not cause those down range to surmise a nuclear first attack has been initiated? Perhaps the target is located in a country that does not possess the means to know the convention- ally-modified Trident submarine has just launched, but others might and they could react.
I would assume a conventionally-modified missile could service a hardened or deeply buried target. Does the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) feature hardened or deeply buried targets? GWOT targets tend to be remote training camps or globally dispersed cells calling for a more “personal” approach than a ballistic missile. If we are looking past GWOT to state enemies, can we launch a conventionally-modified Trident missile without expecting a nuclear retaliation, given that the enemy is so capable?
Captain Benedict further claims that this weapon system will fill the 0-to-60 minute gap by being able to engage anywhere on the planet, thus eliminating the need to concentrate our forces on foreign soil. Perhaps. At the most fundamental level, to employ any weapon system one needs a target, and all targets are the result of some form of intelligence, be it eyes on target, radar, electronic intelligence, etc. I’m sure that it is technically possible to listen to a voice on a cell phone, identify it as a target, trace the call to a grid coordinate, get release authority, and transmit that to a submerged shooter in 60 minutes, but there might be a problem or two to resolve before sending a conventionally-armed Trident missile—that could be confused with a nuclear version—downrange.
As for deterrence Captain Benedict states that aggressors will be deterred by a capability that can reach out and engage them anywhere on the globe. Beyond GWOT that might be true, but first it must be demonstrated that a conventionally-armed ballistic missile has the ability to seriously impact the targeted country, thus deterring some sort of action or behavior. If it does, then why are nuclear weapons needed with their attendant political complications?
Finally, what does it cost to own and use a conventionally-modified Trident missile? One might argue that the 9/11 cost to the United States alone would justify developing and maintaining a conventionally-modified Trident missile force, but I would ask how it could have prevented 9/11.
We apparently have the technical ability to build this weapon system. Its employment remains a question for me.
“No Glass Jaw”
(See R. Girrier, pp. 36-38, June 2006 Proceedings)
Captain Joseph C. Sharp, U.S. Navy Reserve serve—Captain Girrier’s article is a nice synopsis of antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, the submarine threat how technology, exercises, and a team approach are providing improved ASW capabilities. What is missing is an analysis of the needed volume of ASW assets to counter actual and projected threats Even with the improved ASW capability Captain Girrier identifies, in a war will have enough ASW assets to accomplish assigned missions?
Years of involvement in submarine operations, interviewing diesel submarine commanding officers after ASW exercises, and study of the Falklands War indicate that although we may not have a “glass jaw,” we simply don’t have enough “fighters to put into the ring The rate that weapons and expendable sensors (e.g., sonobuoys) were used by the British during the Falklands War was extreme, and shortages occurred early in the conflict. In 100 days of British ASW assets were able to detect and destroy one Argentine submarine Another submarine remained undetected the entire war.
Similarly, during current ASW exercises against diesel submarines, initial detection is difficult, even with the geographic constraints implemented during all ASW exercises. Exercise participant agree that geographic constraints and acoustic augmentation is required to create any “play time” at all during ASW exercises. In war there will be little geographic constraint, no augmentation and a dedicated enemy trying to stay alive and accomplish a mission.
As Captain Girrier indicated, “the essential challenge in ASW remains unchanged. . . it is a matter of detection...” Careful analysis of our ability to initially detect high-end, un-augmented, out of area, deploying diesel submarines in a geographically unconstrained enviironment is required. This analysis should provide a basis of the ASW assets needed to detect a high-end diesel deploying from port. That information could be used to project the ASW assets necessary to bottle up a potential enemy’s submarine fleet or protect vital operating areas or shipping lanes. Where actual assets are not available in the numbers deemed necessary, acquisition of the additional ASW assets would be ideal. At a minimum, it is imperative to recognize the truth, adjust leadership expectations, and modify tactics and plans. We may, not have a glass jaw, but do we have enough fighters?
China Working on Antiship Ballistic Missiles”
(See N. Friedman, pp. 90-91, July 2006 Proceedings)
Steven J. Forsberg—Norman Friedman’s column on Chinese efforts to develop, antiship ballistic missiles is timely, but it leaves out several very important points. Mr.Friedman comments on ships being moving targets and the difficulties inherent in identifying and targeting them. Because of their great range, however, ballistic missiles can be used against ships in port. For example, from mainland China, the DF-15 could probably threaten all ports in South Korea and Taiwan, and the DF-21 could cover ports in Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines. Anyone using any of these ports would have to be cognizant of the possibility of an “out of the blue” strike with only minutes warning—not enough time to move a vessel from pierside.
Targeting is made vastly easier when the potential target area has been reduced to a small pre-determined area at a fixed point. Indeed, with sufficiently small circular error probability (CEP) one does not even need terminal guidance. All it would take is a cell phone call telling what pier is occupied. Even if warships are at sea, maritime supply of nations requires commercial vessels to come pierside (or use fixed mooring points, i.e., for offshore unloading of oil). A few successful attacks pierside against high-value roll-on-roll-off shps or supertankers could throw more than a minor kink into a war effort.
The proliferation of ocean surveillance technologies is making the oceans more transparent than ever for more people. For example, the Canadian Radarsat has a quite effective ocean surveillance mode used by the government of Singapore to track traffic through the Malacca Straits. High-frequency radar (of both surface wave and backscatter types) can provide long-term tracks. Newer weather satellites in geosynchronous orbits can sometimes detect a ship’s exhaust (“ship tracks”).
The proliferation of commercial port reporting and ship beacon systems is, as Mr. Friedman’s column pointed out, making everything more clear. Numerous systems controlled by numerous nations, dynamically linked, will make efforts at countermeasures problematic. Increasingly, you can run but you can’t hide, and with ballistic missiles reaching over vast ranges, you can’t feel safe, either.