By teaming with other sea service communities and navies of allied nations, sailors such as Sonar Technician Third Class Jeff Mercliffe, listening in the western Pacific on board USS Shoup (DDG-86) in April, are building an acoustic advantage that should deter provocative submarine activity around the world.
Experimentation in submarine warfare began as early as 1775 with David Bushnell's Turtle, and submarine development and interest in its potential as a weapon evolved throughout the 19th century. In World War I, the submarine made its debut as a significant weapon in modern warfare-both defensively, for the protection of coasts and harbors, and offensively, off foreign shores.
In World War II this weapon and its tactics were perfected further with the employment of U-boats-at first, to great effect. But the Allies learned, adapted new tactics and technologies, and countered, sinking some 785 German submarines (of 1,158 constructed) in the Battle of the Atlantic, and some 128 Japanese submarines in the Pacific.
Historically, warfare has been in a technological spiral, a thrust and parry in offensive and defensive tactics, techniques, and procedures at ever-increasing levels of sophistication and capability. In these cyclic passes, we revisit many of the same lessons, in new light, and with enhanced capabilities, and from our hard-earned operational experience, we continually adapt, improve, and innovate so that we may prevail.
Until we make the oceans transparent, the essential challenge in antisubmarine warfare (ASW) remains unchanged. It is a matter of detection, acoustic or otherwise, and the rapid transfer of that information to effect tactically relevant action, whether it is continued tracking, avoidance, or actual prosecution. Given this realization, and in the interest of gaining the most effective results, ASW has come to be recognized as a true team endeavor. The collective contributions of ships, aircraft, submarines, and supporting systems-sometimes working in concert, sometimes independently-have achieved the objective in past conflicts, both hot and cold. This has been the thrust of U.S. Navy efforts, and we are now taking this concept to the next level, achieving a greater, more comprehensive undersea tactical awareness by using advances of the past few years and by partnering more extensively with our allies.
Our technical capabilities over the decades have matured logically. A brief look at antiair warfare (AAW) development provides a parallel example. Given increasingly lethal air threats developed in the latter half of the 20th century, the Aegis system came on board to lend speed of response and vastly improved situational awareness at the unit level to the AAW problem. The speed, agility, and redundant communication links the Cold War prompted, combined with the networked systems and vastly improved interoperability of the post-Cold War era, have greatly improved results.
Team warfare at the theater and tactical level was never more ready to take on the submarine threat. In the past, the ASW team concept was clearly well founded-the means to achieve devastating results are in reach-with improvements continually coming on line. This is the essence of the ASW vision we have been developing, a vision implemented across a broad front. Matching distributed sensors to platforms, sharing a truly coherent picture (from the tactical to the strategic), and achieving rapid prosecution by way of a variety of options is a sea change in capability.
This bundled solution set presents reinforcing capabilities and overlapping engagement opportunities. It also leverages teamwork-true integration across communities (and nations)-a hallmark of the American way of fighting and something we have especially focused on over the last few decades. This team concept is not something gained overnight; it cannot be bought, and it cannot be imported. It is developed through trial and error, introspection and adaptation.
What We're Facing
Submarines are not a larger-than-life ten feet tall. In some cases, according to Eric Wertheim's Combat Fleets of the World 2005-2006, they are more like 73.8 meters long, displacing 3,126 tons submerged for the Russianbuilt Project 636 Kilo class; and 76.6 meters long and displacing 2,250 tons for the Chinese-built Project 39 class, to name a few. They carry an array of weapons and are potent, to be sure, but not invincible. These are diesel-electric-powered, and their fundamental concept of operation and employment has been around for nearly a century.
The antiship cruise missiles they bring to the fight is a newer twist, but not without precedent. The view from the submarine remains relatively unchanged; they look through a straw to see, and they listen both acoustically and electronically for the information they need to choose a target. The very medium they rely on for cover hampers their absolute tactical awareness. While batteries bring a stealthy approach, they also mean slower speeds and diminished endurance. Everything comes with a trade-off. Air-independent propulsion (AIP) is the next generation of development, bringing increased endurance and speed with only slight increases in sound propagation. Recognizing submarines as an entire weapon system and how they must operate to deliver their punch is key to unraveling the myths and countering these threats effectively, both actively and passively. It is much more than just the torpedoes and missiles they carry. These advances have not remained unmatched, however, which brings us to the old cyclical spiral.
What's New and What's Not
Sound propagation in water has not changed; that is a matter of physics. What has changed is our ability to more fully understand it, model it, and generate more accurate environmental awareness at the tactical level-awareness that heretofore was most often the realm of laboratories and those with Ph.D.s. Add to this increasing improvements in acoustic processing and sensitivity, along with the vastly improved training for our crews, and we begin to understand the acoustic advantage and who really retains it.
Advances in sonar, namely the AN/SQS-53C, our primary surface hull-mounted system, and new developments, such as the Multi-Function Towed Array (MFTA), have improved our ability to track sonar contacts. Embedded systems on board our ships are providing a wider range of acoustic training for our crews and ASW teams-realistic and integrated-improving the proficiency of our war fighters in this challenging mission area.
Our approach to ASW balances both active and passive systems. We are listening to multiple paths from the air, surface and subsurface, and we have been for decades. But we are doing it much better now, and sharing that information more rapidly. The concepts underpinning ForceNet come into play as we are able to share tactically relevant information faster and more comprehensively than ever.
The recent growth in numbers of modern diesel-electric submarines in the worldwide inventory has driven an increased emphasis on training alongside these vessels. U.S. Navy training with allies who have these submarines has grown substantially in recent years, and our current leasing arrangement for exercise services with the Swedish submarine Gotland is a prime example of our tactical focus. The result is increased proficiency on the part of our operators, coupled with a more rapidly fused and comprehensive operational picture.
Similarly, our improved environmental awareness leads to improved tactical awareness and more highly informed decisions, offensive and defensive. Increasing effectiveness in prosecution once detections are made is an equally important thrust. Ship-borne helicopter (light and regular) and fixed-wing coordination continue apace with technological developments. Improvements in torpedo design, such as the new Mk 54 lightweight weapon, along with efforts to revisit earlier tactics, such as depth bombing, are all contributing factors to a revitalized approach. The challenge is significant, to be sure, but our approach is methodical and multi-faceted.
A Team Approach Crosses National Boundaries
Consistent with the logic and effectiveness of a team approach in ASW is the inherent suitability of allies working together. This is a mutually reinforcing concept and a win-win proposition for the nations concerned. When the shared interest becomes regional stability and military balance in a globalized world, pooling assets and information is a rational solution. This is a prime example of the collective product (ASW superiority and the security it brings) exceeding the sum of constituent capabilities. Mutual self-interest and the enhanced effectiveness of a collective, coordinated effort in this challenging area fuel the pursuit of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in ASW. Nowhere is this more clearly illustrated than in the combined exercises featuring ASW operations practiced regularly by our units.
In the Pacific Theater from 2005 to 2006 this team approach was a highlight during Operation Talisman Saber in the waters off Australia, in two separate ship ASW readiness and effectiveness measuring (SHAREM) exercises with regional allies, during AnnualEx 17G with the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force, and during the annual Foal Eagle exercises with the Republic of Korea. While sharing mutual security interests and establishing cooperative relationships, in these exercises the allies practice tactical procedures across national lines, increasing the respective navies' proficiency with each iteration. This concept works, and its tempo is already high and building further.
The Way Ahead
Some nations may choose to amass submarines in pursuit of their national agendas or to advance their maritime capabilities. These remain elusive goals, however. Such pursuits naturally spur equal and opposite reactions, wellpracticed responses in this case, another turn in the already deep U.S. spiral of capabilities.
Technology has focused on the ASW problem for decades now, and a broad and balanced approach featuring overlapping capabilities is now linked to the effort. From the U.S. perspective, ASW is true team warfare, and the capability to share information-leveraging it to maximum tactical advantage-has never been better.
Potential adversaries face a redundant array of reinforcing tactics, techniques, and procedures that would put their submarines at risk through multiple detection schemes and overlapping opportunities for engagement. There is no single solution, no single-point failure. Instead, we have much-improved operational awareness, linked to multiple engagement platforms, the absence of which in years past provided the very cloak submarines so desperately needed to survive.
In the end, and given the circumstances of the fight, we will approach a point at which our ASW calculus will account for numbers of subs killed per sortie, not sorties required per sub kill. This is a significant shift in thinking, but it describes the direction the U.S. Navy is moving. Submarines are by no means fish in a barrel, but U.S. and allied assets have no glass jaw when employing this teaming approach, either. The acoustic advantage is shifting.
Captain Girrier has commanded USS Guardian (MCM-5), USS Roosevelt (DDG-80) and is currently co mmander of Destroyer Squadron 15, forward deployed in Yokosuka, Japan.