Provide the Capability for Interdiction Operations
Lieutenant Ben Perman, U.S. Coast Guard Reserve
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) poses a grave threat to global security. Despite the catastrophic . consequences of WMD and the asymmetric nature of their threat, maritime powers such as the United States have a unique opportunity to gain the upper hand, because all WMDs will probably be on board a commercial vessel at some point during the proliferation cycle. Indeed, several U.S.-led counter proliferation initiatives, the Proliferation security Initiative (PSI) most notable among them, focus interdiction on the high seas, before these weapons can enter the local transportation networks of target nations or intermediary states.
High seas interdiction operations, however, are tactically complex, demand excellent intelligence, require large commitments of resources, and may lack sufficient authority and jurisdiction to withstand legal review. By comparison, boardings closer to shore are safer, have the full authority and jurisdiction of the coastal state, are less costly in terms of resources, and periodic inspection can be implemented as a routine part of port entry requirements. More overt legal vessel boardings in the territorial seas must be conducted by teams trained and equipped in the detection of weapons of mass destruction.
Every day several hundred of the world's approximately 29,000 commercial vessels are boarded by port states in an effort to exert control over foreign vessels in their ports and waterways. Few are boarded by teams equipped with simple scintillation counting equipment. As a result, the discovery of illicit radiological shipments is nearly impossible without intelligence derived from infiltration of known smuggling operations. Equipping all boarding teams with a common detection and analysis suite will overcome this limitation and provide an additional arena for overt intelligence collection. Still, fielding novel technologies to deter the threat of WMD requires sustained coastal boardings by the port state to be effective.
International law and the economic forces that drive international shipping (and, by extension, smuggling) lead to the conclusion that the most effective locations to focus interdiction operations are areas where all elements of jurisdiction intersect. The at-sea boardings proposed in the current concept of PSI operations, although critical in circumstances where actionable intelligence exists, may, despite all diplomatic efforts, lie outside of the boarding state's legal authority.
With regard to the security of the United States, the Coast Guard is responsible for the "high ground" in WMD interdiction, the waters of the territorial sea. Here, vessels can be boarded and inspected in accordance with prevailing U.S and international law while their movement and operations are directed by the local Captain of the Port, exercising his Magnussen Act authority. Contrary to popular analysis, boardings in the territorial seas can be conducted in waters that provide ample stand-off distances from continental U.S. port infrastructure. More traditional maritime homeland security boardings require far fewer resources and can be conducted on a more routine basis to cover potential threats that have not been targeted by detailed intelligence.
Getting the Right Tools
One possible limitation is that, without detailed intelligence, the boarding team is not aware of any one item, or situation, that indicates the presence of weapons of mass destruction. They must recognize anything that would indicate the presence of WMD and be capable of responding to the discovery of these weapons and related materials. Enhanced training for boarding teams places a greater requirement on personal protection capabilities. This is an area that the Coast Guard must address.
Personnel assigned to homeland security boarding operations must be better equipped to handle the very situation they are being sent to combat: specifically, WMD coupled with improvised explosives devices. Current Coast Guard law enforcement and administrative boarding team training, although maintained at a high level of quality in general, largely ignores WMD awareness. The Coast Guard also has no effective service-wide detection and screening capability. This was highlighted by the M/V Palermo Senator boarding in the port of New York where possession of only the most rudimentary scintillation counters led to a four-day debacle.
As a matter of force protection and national security, all Coast Guard boarding teams should be equipped with modern, accurate spectrometers that can discriminate between most radionuclides and can provide the on-scene commander with the data required to make informed decisions. Broadly arrayed electronic chemical analyzers are currently not compact enough to be deployed with boarding teams. This does not. however, excuse the Coast Guard from making use of the more portable state-of-the-art chemical detectors.
If the threat of WMD entering the United States is from maritime shipments, it is clear that some effort must be made to provide boarding teams with simple detection kits. Biological detection is currently even more difficult than chemical detection. Boarding teams should be taking environmental samples from the vessels they board for follow-up analysis at forensic laboratories. Boarding team members need only wipe various surfaces with swabs where contamination is likely to linger and send them to a Homeland Security lab for analysis, a job that could be taught and mastered in less than an hour. It is important to note that many Coast Guardsmen are already highly trained in hazardous material identification and safety. The container inspection program provides the core capability that would be expanded to train WMD detection specialists within the Coast Guard Port Safety and security community.
Near-Shore Boardings
The idea of WMD interdiction boardings being conducted so close to the U.S. coast seems counterintuitive, unless jurisdiction and cost in resources are considered. The goal of a domestic boarding program would be to greatly increase the number of vessels boarded while limiting the cost to the government and the shipper's clients. Unlike at-sea boardings that are prosecuted by teams dispatched from a lone surface combatant, the Coast Guard has the opportunity to seek the assistance from various agencies ashore. Once an onboard discovery is made, the Captain of the Port already has statutory control over the vessel and her crew while it is in U.S. waters.
An additional factor in supporting an increased focus on domestic boardings is that targeted ships can be directed to protected waters to facilitate safer boarding conditions. The most significant benefit is that jurisdictional issues are simplified for the purposes of control, investigation, and eventual prosecution.
Near-shore boardings have been all but ignored as a critical component of national security imperatives in combating weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. Current Coast Guard policy tends to regard WMD interdiction as a special mission assigned to the lone Enhanced Marine Safety and security Team. By reserving all WMD interdiction capabilities to one team, the situation in coastal interdiction is similar to the Proliferation security Initiative, because very few individual boardings will be prosecuted.
This creates an obvious national security short-fall and exposes sector boarding teams to undue risk, because they possess only the minimum training and equipment for their own force protection. sector personnel currently receive training that enables them to carry out other Coast Guard missions in an all-hazards setting. The success of the Container Inspection program and Marine Environmental Protection missions demonstrates that the task of identifying and reacting to most weapons of mass destruction is not beyond the capabilities of the sector boarding teams. In fact, to achieve any measure of deterrence, a certain percentage of boardings should be randomly targeted, and those, more than any other boardings, should have WMD detection as their primary objective.
The Coast Guard, and more specifically the sectors, have the authority and area of responsibility for this mission. They ought to have the capability as well.
Lieutenant Perman is the maritime security specialist at Toeroek Associates, Inc., supporting the Defense Threat Reduction Agency WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative, and Reserve Chief of the Port Safety and security Branch. Prevention Department, U.S. Coast Guard sector Baltimore.
Preparing the Battlefield
Lieutenant Commander Chris Davis, U.S. Navy
The Navy must make better use of intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB). Although practiced in a token manner by carrier strike groups, IPB is used haphazardly. While current intelligence products are somewhat useful, warfare commanders are not provided the clearest possible picture. Developing a formal doctrine would enhance planning and execution while improving combat effectiveness.
Intelligence preparation of the battlespace is conducted continuously during operational planning and execution. It has four distinct phases: definition, description, enemy evaluation, and determining adversary courses of action. Potential intelligence products include battlespace representations reflecting physical and meteorological characteristics, a representation of the enemy's doctrine, the enemy's preferred and historical tactics description, high-value and high-priority target identification, the adversary's capabilities assessment, courses of action assessment, and battle plan event-by-event listing with anticipated enemy reaction.
The Need for a Doctrine
The Navy needs a formal intelligence preparation of the battlespace doctrine for many reasons.
* Naval forces have always practiced this informally
* Other services practice formal IPB
* Naval forces have an inherent collection, evaluation, and dissemination capability relevant to the all source-intelligence picture
* It allows planners to realize exactly what they do and do not know about the adversary and the battlespace
* IPB forces operators, planners, and intelligence specialists into an iterative analysis, planning, and reassessment process that provides greater flexibility in dealing with rapidly changing operations.
Naval forces have always attempted some form of intelligence preparation of the battlespace and continue to do so today. For example, when the air defense commander enters commercial air corridors into tactical displays, an attempt at IPB has been made. It may seem contradictory to say naval forces have always done intelligence preparation of the battlespace, yet argue the Navy needs formal doctrine to support it. However, just because a process is attempted, does not mean it is accomplished effectively and efficiently. While beneficial, these attempts to conduct IPB without a formal process result in products that do not provide the greatest possible battlespace awareness. Indeed, one could argue that by creating formal IPB tools for individual unit use, the Navy is continuing a tradition of command by negation, leaving tactical interpretation at the lowest possible level.
Since other services practice IPB, it is necessary for the Navy to adopt a process that can be seamlessly and easily integrated into joint and combined doctrine. If the Navy is the first in an "undeveloped" theater either via forward presence, surge capability, or sea-basing, then one can envision many scenarios in which naval forces turn over battlespace management to other components as the theater develops. This planning and execution relief-in-place can be greatly facilitated by using similar planning products and tools. Likewise, it remains equally important to maintain a similarity of planning and execution products to reduce the likelihood of tactical seams in the joint commander's perception of the battlespace. Seams could be exploited by an adversary if he becomes aware of them or is lucky in selecting courses of action.
By implementing a formal maritime intelligence preparation of the battlespace doctrine, products and procedures will be standardized Navy-wide. In other words, when the numbered fleet commander and the commanding officer sit down for their respective briefs and planning meetings, they will receive the same data sets organized in, more or less, similar formats. This will ensure each commander has insight into what is known and what is assumed in the planning process. This is an extremely key point if an assumption ultimately turns out to be false.
Intelligence preparation forces planners, operators, intelligence, and meteorological personnel to work hand-in-hand developing basic plans and, more important, planning branches and serials. It may be true that no plan survives first contact with the enemy and detailed planning's real advantage is that it gives all command echelons an informed and coherent structure within which to make decisions. However, in many cases planning is done by specialized planning cells, with little insight from those who must execute the plan and those who provide intelligence support.
There are many potential arguments against implementing a maritime intelligence preparation of the battlespace doctrine. One might say that this doctrine is already well established at the joint level, and naval forces should simply conform to existing joint doctrine; that it is simply a staff process that provides little to the ship commander; or that procedures such as intelligence preparation have little value in the Global War on Terror. Each raises valid concerns and could indicate potential shortfalls.
The Maritime Component of Joint Doctrine
While joint doctrine exists, it seems likely that not every operation will be a joint or combined operation. A need exists to provide maritime-unique intelligence preparation. Moreover, it seems likely that if individual naval units are to conduct intelligence preparation of the battlespace or to interpret its products, service-unique doctrine is required. Maritime intelligence preparation must be given a Navy-unique flavor.
The idea that maritime intelligence preparation of the battlespace is a staff function without relevance to the individual commanders who execute the battle plan is, perhaps, representative of how planning is done by the carrier strike group. However, during exercise Majestic Eagle 2004 and Joint Maritime Course 042, the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) intelligence team developed intelligence products to support carrier combat direction system and bridge watch teams, greatly enhancing their awareness and ability to conduct ad hoc planning in response to adversary actions.
While these products were developed primarily as training tools to develop situational awareness for watchstanders dealing with multiple simultaneous scenarios, this approach was also useful in developing ad hoc tactical plans. Standardizing intelligence preparation products and how they are interpreted via formal doctrine can only improve effectiveness across the entire strike group.
Perhaps the strongest argument against maritime intelligence preparation of the battlespace is that it was designed for force-on-force actions and may not be relevant to likely naval missions in the Global War on Terror. However, this idea does not withstand serious analysis. One realistic scenario is providing force protection for an isolated shore detachment. A systematic analysis of adversary courses of action, geography, weather, and adversary reactions to the security plan is just as useful as it would be in a traditional operation. Likewise, conducting maritime interdiction operations in the North Arabian Sea or off the Horn of Africa requires a systematic analysis of weather, relationships between companies and individuals, and shipping patterns.
Intelligence preparation of the battlespace cogently organizes how one views the battlespace. Likewise, it provides a systematic method of including relevant intelligence support to planning. Moreover, it ensures that intelligence collection managers and analysts provide the best possible intelligence on developing operations. The Navy must take ownership of the process by developing a doctrine that captures the maritime nature of naval operations while standardizing it with joint doctrine.
Lieutenant Commander Davis is the Navy fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. He has completed numerous deployments on surface ships and overseas tours at Commander, Fifth Fleet; Naval security Group Activity, Philippines; and Naval security Group Detachment, Diego Garcia.
Too Little Tactical Technique
Colonel G. I. Wilson, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired) and Lieutenant Colonel H. John Poole, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)
Iraq's elections are over, but its insurgency is not. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard (Sepah) and Lebanese Hezbollah are now involved. Sepah has studied psychological warfare and subterranean defense in North Korea. If it investigates offense, the war will get much harder. North Korea has a 100,000-man Light-Infantry Training Guidance Bureau.
Counterinsurgency is like peacekeeping or police work. To keep from alienating the population, one must tactically defeat each cell. That cell can only be surprised by a tiny, dismounted force. Thus, counterinsurgency troops take more risks than their conventional counterparts. Those without world-class light-infantry skills get hurt. Until we change how we train at the squad level, we are burdened with too much firepower.
To beat insurgency, one needs the equivalent of Asian light infantry. Asian infantrymen can stealthily cross battlefields, need supporting arms only as a deception, and can exfiltrate almost any encirclement. Ten Chinese divisions reached the Chosin Reservoir undetected in 1950, and a North Vietnamese Army division exfiltrated the Hue City Citadel in 1968. That takes troops with both conventional and unconventional-warfare skills. Through hit and run, they engage ten times their number. Their training involves collective thinking and field experimentation. Their days are spent in battle-drill competition and free play.
Meanwhile, U.S. infantrymen seek a 3 to 1 edge. Their tactics, techniques, and procedures are canned and limited to what their organization has theoretically learned about short-range combat, and what the new lieutenant expects his platoon to already know.
While our shooting procedures are excellent, we lack ability to exercise force at close range. Our methods for walking point, stalking, tracking, and short-range infiltration are virtually nonexistent. Microterrain appreciation, night familiarity, and obscuring movement are not abilities to which high-tech, motorized heavy infantry aspire. Their backup communication means could usefully be silent and devoid of motion signature.
In U.S. assault technique, all elements move forward on line, firing their weapons at maximum sustained rate. For the squad and center fire team, the "guide" is toward the center. For the flank fire teams, the guide is toward the side closest to the center. Individual riflemen maintain some spacing, remain upright, and elevate their weapons. While none of these procedures seems worthy of rehearsal, several in fact are. Infantrymen who do not regularly pick lanes while moving forward converge toward the center and commit fratricide. Those who do not practice in vegetation can't guide toward center or flank.
The problem is the way U.S. troops are trained. From the time they memorize their general orders, they live and die by the book. Whether the book is well written is not at issue. They (and their instructors) believe it to be their doctrinal edict. Most tactics manuals were never intended to be strictly followed. They contain guidelines to be adapted to the situation. As control over enlisted training is centralized, this "live-by-the-book" syndrome is exacerbated. The cost is initiative.
To generate enough initiative to practice maneuver warfare, Eastern armies decentralize control. They have more basics. Our triad of "shoot, move, and communicate" is only sufficient for attrition warfare. Their list includes "sensory awareness," "passive defense," and "individual deception." They have procedures with which to better do the following: (1) see, hear, smell, taste, and feel; (2) take cover, hide, and escape; and (3) deceive an adversary. They enhance peripheral vision through defocusing on a finger. They crawl, dig spider holes, and double back on their own tracks. Some mimic a cat after disturbing a can.
To surprise a defender, Asians use "stormtrooper" techniques pioneered by the Germans in 1918. The German assault troops blew their explosives during a precision artillery bombardment and assaulted with bayonets and concussion grenades when the artillery shifted. The North Vietnamese Army followed 82-mm mortars with satchel charges, and 61-mm mortars with thin-skinned "potato mashers." If the nine-man NVA squad got through the wire undetected, it stayed in column with the RPG man in the lead. He could shoot (while his companions dropped fragmentation grenades into bunker apertures) without compromising the indirect-fire deception. If the squad was fired on, its riflemen could shoot to the side and downward without endangering each other or sister squads. Where it met light resistance coming through the wire, the first of its three-man "cells" deployed on line inside the breach. When the whole squad assaulted on line, the light machine gunner carried his RPG by the handle, and AK-47 men fired in the semi-automatic mode. Everyone maintained yards of interval, trotted, and shot from the waist or "combat-glide" stance. Unlike the Marine assault, each composite technique had surprise as its goal.
When encountering the enemy, U.S. infantrymen can no longer reenact the single, outdated, and predictable procedure in their manuals. They must display initiative while running the most situationally applicable of several locally developed, updated, and practiced tactical techniques. For an American rifle company to hold its own at short range against an Eastern counterpart, its training of the squad and below must be experimentally driven from the bottom up instead of doctrinally driven from the top down. Each company's NCOs must be allowed to collectively identify and fix their own deficiencies. Their techniques will improve as long as the simulated casualties and surprise indicators (speed, stealth, deception) are statistically tracked.
Marines are taught to instantly assault any ambush less than 50 yards away. Unless the threat is within feet, Eastern soldiers drop to the ground and crawl away.
A March 2005 Internet circle carried a piece about Fallujah. Purportedly written by a sergeant, corporal, and two lance corporals, it proposed: (1) breaking every serious contact to permit supporting arms to arrive, (2) frontally assaulting buildings from the bottom up to facilitate casualty removal, and (3) staying in a tight "stack." The Marines' accomplishments are noteworthy, and their lessons refreshing, but the state-of-the-art in urban assault remains the "blooming lotus," or inside-out approach. It was applied to cities in Hue and Saigon, and to a building in the Peruvian hostage rescue. It favors the traditional "top-down" assault in which dispersion is allowed and withdrawal discouraged.
To fully realize the significance of tactical technique, one must go back to his days as a hunter, Basic School student, or football player. What Marines lack is surprise-oriented individuals and small-unit movement memory. Their initial assessment drills unnecessarily expose them and telegraph intentions. So, instead of reacting instinctively, they must stop to confer and do the unrehearsed. The foe is now ready, and the Marines get their feet (and assignments) tangled up.
A better way to train enlisted Marines has been substantiated by several battalions. It requires each company's NCOs to collectively arrive at three ways to handle each type of combat situation, and to practice all of them. When the enemy appears, every squad element has three tactical options instead of the predictable standard. One must only have 20 or more NCOs, get three-fourths to agree, and test their solution against "three-second sight pictures." Squad PT provides rehearsal. With rubber rifles, troops run Indian file until a battle-drill is directed. As the terrain and drills vary, the squad becomes more accomplished.
Iraq's elections are over, but its insurgency is not. To hunt down guerrillas, Marine squads need light-infantry techniques. Let's change how we train at the squad level and below before the Global War on Terror gets any larger.
Lieutenant Colonel Poole, a retired Marine infantry officer, currently trains active-duty units. A previosly retired Marine Corps engineer, Colonel Wilson recently returned to active duty in Iraq.