The Pirate Coast: Thomas Jefferson, the First Marines, and the Secret Mission of 1805
Richard Zacks. New York: Hyperion, 2005. 448 pp. Illus. Notes. Biblio. Index. $25.95.
Reviewed by Frederick C. Leiner
In the spring of 1805, William Eaton, a former army captain and U.S. consul to Tunis, whom the Navy commissioned as "Navy Agent for the Several Barbary Regencies," but who styled himself "General," led a motley band of eight U.S. Marines, European mercenaries and riffraff, the deposed bashaw of Tripoli and his retinue, Bedouin tribesmen, and Arab cavalry across the Libyan desert from Egypt towards Tripoli. The Jefferson administration had half-heartedly given Eaton secret authority to start an insurrection as a means of freeing the 307 American sailors held hostage as a result of the grounding of the frigate Philadelphia off Tripoli in October 1803. Eaton had little food, almost no money, a pack train of surly camels, no certain idea where he might find water, wavering support from the U.S. Navy, and no good map (a problem replicated by the publisher). Somehow, Baton's determination and leadership kept his little army together on a march of nearly forty days across more than five hundred miles of desert. Against tall odds, Baton's irregulars stormed Derne, the second city of the Barbary power of Tripoli, and held it against counterattacks.
This colorful story is the focus of Richard Zacks' The Pirate Coast, which reads like a movie script. Zacks, a freelance journalist who wrote a previous book about Captain Kidd, has written a popular account, based largely on Baton's voluminous papers. Zacks has a knack for the telling anecdote, and writes with understanding about the American sailors' lives as slaves, the Barbary world of souk and sand, and the fatigues and privation of the march. Eaton emerges in full form, not a completely likeable man to be sure, but a blunt, soldiery character. Zacks has also found a new eyewitness source, the letters of Antoine Zuchet, the Dutch consul to Tripoli, although the book would have benefited by the letters of other foreign consuls, which Richard B. Parker used in Uncle Sam in Barbary (2004). Zacks refers to the 1805 expedition as the first "covert op" in American history, and he may be the first to call it that, but Eaton and his march have long been a favorite topic of Barbary War historians, and have received renewed attention since 11 September 2001 and the resulting war on terrorism.
Some of Zacks' interpretations are questionable. One legacy of Baton's trek, he opines, is the elevation of the Marine Corps from a lowly, "underrespected outfit" to an elite force. But the Marines were not lowly; in 1807, Stephen Decatur wrote the secretary of the Navy, "Our marines Sir we have ever considered as our sheet anchors, men whom we can rely upon in the worst of times." Zacks wholly approves Baton's loyalty to Hamet Karamanali, the ex-bashaw used as a rallying point for opposition to the regime in Tripoli, and condemns Jefferson for selling him out. Morally, he may be right. Yet in his elliptical way Jefferson made it clear that the goal of U.S. policy was to minimize tribute, cheaply ransom the Philadelphia sailors, and resolve the war, not to reinstall Hamet, and Eaton should have known it; moreover, Zacks glosses over the fact that tribute was an established facet of U.S. relations with the Barbary world.
Zacks displays ignorance about ships and the navy. He refers to the Philadelphia's figurehead being "at the masthead" (it would have looked odd there, to be sure), and writes unhelpfully that "ropes were tied to change the angle of the sails." And while her mainmast may have "towered 100 feet," it is nonsensical to claim, "when fitted with topmast, topgallants, and royals, the whole extended a heroic 230 feet." The navy did not have drydocks in 1804 from which a fleet could emerge, and the orders to Decatur to "carry all by the sword" in burning the Philadelphia did not mean assassin-like "silent throatslitting."
Zacks has a penchant for weird phrases, italics, and parenthetical asides, as if he were telling the story over a few beers. He thinks Baton's wife becoming pregnant after his periodic visits home is a funny punch line. To Zacks, cannon "blasted out a chest-beating huzzah of victory," patriotic speeches are "nationalistic rah-rah," and President Washington is "General George." Zacks' recurrent reminders that the Barbary moneylenders were Jewish and that the bashaw's favorite wife was, as he puts it, a "Negress," also seem peculiar for a modern writer.
The Pirate Coast is a fast read, full of action, but marred by a sophomoric style and many errors.
Mr. Leiner, a lawyer who lives in Baltimore, is the author of Millions for Defense: The Subscription Warships of 1798 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000).
Launch the Intruders
Carol Reardon. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005. 440 pp. Illus. Maps. $34.95.
Reviewed by Captain Edwin A. Shuman III, U.S. Navy (Retired)
In a somewhat remarkable achievement for a non-aviator, Dr. Carol Reardon, a history professor at Penn State University, has done a most credible job in portraying the inner workings of an A-6 squadron in the combat environment. I felt as though the clock had turned back thirty yeans and I was there.
Launch the Intruders is a history of Attack Squadron 75 (VA-75), the A-6A Intruder component of Carrier Air Wing 3 deployed aboard USS Saratoga (CVA-60) from 11 April 1972 to 13 February 1973.
The deployment as documented is somewhat typical compared to those prior to the bombing restrictions in the spring 1968. It would seem, however, that the bombing halt in Route Package 6—the Hanoi area—gave the North Vietnamese a golden opportunity to beef up their ground-to-air capability. An elevated pucker factor was the natural result.
The ship and air wing deployed under extremely short notice with the emergency recall bill used to gather the far-flung officers and men. The ship had been expected to deploy to the Mediterranean at a later date. The planes were not ready, the men were not ready, and no doubt the ship was not ready. Navy people can do amazing things when the heat is on. The ship left on time with all airplanes and almost every man on board. The author did a great job of melding the squadron life with family life. The unexpected combat deployment brought out the best in the Navy families, which Dr. Reardon captured nicely.
A few years before the period covered by this narrative, in 1968, I had deployed as maintenance officer with VA-35. Then, we had new airplanes, superb parts support, and great assistance provided by company technical representatives for nearly all of the airplane's systems. It appears that VA-75's airplane availability problems, as described in the book, suffered for lack of these assets. It only made their tasks more difficult.
The author also does justice to the capably led VA-75 team, all of whom were combat proven and carefully screened for command. The Saratoga's commanding officer, Captain Tim Sandcrson, was a highly experienced and talented naval aviator. The air wing commander (CAG), Commander Dick Bordone, was one of the best; a fearless, highly decorated pilot with more than 200 combat missions and past commander of VA-75. Commander Hoot Foot began the cruise as VA-75's CO and was succeeded by Commander Charles Earnest. After Earnest was killed late in the cruise, Commander Bill Greene assumed command.
The author's historical insights appear to be gleaned mostly from the squadron's junior officers. Their perspective of events, while possibly totally accurate, may also be somewhat skewed. I knew many of these pilots and bombardier/navigators. For one, I was honored to be the best man in the wedding of the late Commander Roger Lerseth to Captain Christine Picci.
This engaging book will be of significant interest to all who flew the Intruder and to any history buffs who are interested in the Vietnam air war.
Captain Shuman is a 1954 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and the Naval Test Pilot and Post Graduate Schools. He was shot down north of Hanoi on 17 March 1968 and spent the next five years as a POW. He retired in 1996.
The Pentagon and the Presidency
Dale R. Herspring. Lawrence, KS:University Press of Kansas, 2005. 490 pp. Illus. $45.00
Reviewed by Charles A. Stevenson
Why is there so much conflict between U.S. presidents and senior military leaders?
Dale R. Herspring seeks to answer that question by examining the civil-military relations during each administration since Franklin Roosevelt. His well-researched and highly readable chapters show that even the most popular and successful presidents have still hit rough seas when dealing with the Pentagon.
He finds, perhaps surprisingly, that prior military experience is no guarantee of good relations, for two of the four presidents deemed to have the best relations with the military, Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan, never served in uniform and two of the three who saw the greatest conflict during their presidencies, Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon, both had served in the Navy. Moreover, the presidents with the most extensive military service, Dwight Eisenhower and Jimmy Carter, both saw significant civil-military conflict when they were in the While House.
Herspring, a professor of political science at Kansas State University, has seen both sides of the civil-military divide as a foreign service officer as well as a naval officer, active and reserve. In contrast to those scholars whose perspective on civilian control is top-down, his focus is on the feelings and reactions of those "controlled."
From that perspective, the most important factor is how well presidents understand and accommodate military "culture," the professional standards of those in uniform. Herspring concludes that when the president "fails to provide leadership and violates military culture, conflict will result and potentially intensify." The U.S. military expects presidents to consult with them, on use of force questions especially, and then to give clear orders. In Herspring's analysis, military leaders also expect and prefer: a clear chain of command, operational and tactical autonomy, respect for military expertise, control over military discipline and promotions, and assumption of personal responsibility by civilian leaders.
The greatest conflicts have resulted, the author argues, when presidents failed to accommodate one or more of those military cultural preferences. Thus, Lyndon Johnson is faulted for his "confused, disordered approach to formulating his Vietnam policy." Richard Nixon had problems with the Chiefs because of his disregard for the chain of command and secret bombing of Cambodia that "forced [the Chiefs] to lie." And Bill Clinton's civilmilitary troubles are blamed on his personal behavior and his "efforts to use the military for social experiments," particularly the proposal to allow gays in uniform.
Since the author's framework and focus is on the presidency, he only mentions in passing other factors that have exacerbated civil-military tensions. For example, some of the biggest conflicts he mentions were not between the president and the military, but between the secretary of defense and the chiefs - notably Robert McNamara, James Schlesinger, and Donald Rumsfeld.
Herspring notes that the military "also works for the United States Congress," thus creating unclear lines of authority of civilian control. While he argues that the services began using their allies on Capitol Hill to fight the administration only during the Truman years, I believe that the practice goes back to the earliest days of the Republic-and is a much more significant factor in understanding U.S. civilmilitary relations than most writers acknowledge.
The framework of presidential leadership style and military culture is useful but flexible. Each chapter summarizes the major civil-military interactions during the president's term, especially on use of force questions when they arose. It's history with a focus.
Herspring's categorization of presidents in terms of high, medium, or low civilmilitary conflict is also useful but not rigid. One could disagree with his placement of different presidents while still finding great enjoyment and education from his chapters.
Perhaps the hardest judgment for those in uniform to admit is Herspring's point that "the U.S. military is no longer apolitical." Instead, it has become "a bureaucratic interest group much like others in Washington." The book makes a strong case in support of that ominous conclusion.
Dr. Stevenson was Professor of National security Policy at the National War College during 1992-2005.
The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War
Andrew Bacevich. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 270 pp. $28.
Reviewed by Michael S. Neiberg
Andrew Bacevich has written a powerful book that seeks to explain a radical and perilous transformation in America. A nation that had once prided itself on isolationism and an avoidance of war has become a nation that now defines itself on the basis of its military strength and understands its global military dominance as barely adequate for its own defense. Bacevich sees the problem in national, bipartisan terms, a refreshing change from the vituperative partisanship of American political discourse. At root, his new American militarism represents a combination of Wilsonian idealism and the post-Vietnam desires of disparate groups (including politicians of both parties, military officers, evangelicals, and purveyors of popular culture) to rehabilitate the armed forces. The results are a glorification of the military, outsized expectations of what that military can accomplish, and the acceptance of a state of perpetual war as the normal condition of international relations.
Unlike Woodrow Wilson, who saw war as a temporary measure reluctantly employed, the new American militarism seeks to use military might preemptively to remake the world in America's image. The end of the Cold War removed the constraints of the superpower system and 9/11 weakened many of the nation's self-imposed constraints, which in turn unleashed the full power of the new American militarism. The nation's willing embrace of an unlimited Global War on Terror without foreseeable ends demonstrates the dominance of this new paradigm. Bacevich argues that by 1980, well before the end of the Cold War was in sight, the United States had begun to shift its main strategic focus from the USSR to the Persian Gulf. American acceptance of the 9/11 attacks as an act of war (not a crime) sealed the deal.
Bacevich's new militarism poses serious threats to the health of the very nation that has fallen under its spell. Although it presents the allure of security behind a massive blanket of military supremacy, the new militarism actually has made the nation less safe by committing it to a series of military operations that have had dangerous unintended consequences. The missteps of American military and diplomatic policy in the Middle East during the 1980s, for example, led to support for Saddam Hussein as a prop against Iran, a visible-and to many Muslims, grossly offensive-garrisoning of Saudi Arabia, and military support for mujahadeen warriors, many of whom later became members of al Qaeda.
The logic of the new militarism compels corporations, citizens, and politicians of both parties, to "support the troops," even though relatively few Americans have any first-hand understanding of the military. The result is a military that, Bacevich argues, resembles the professional French Foreign Legion much more than the citizen-soldier model Americans have traditionally held as their standard. Americans thus support the military from a comfortable distance without having to make any personal sacrifices; the American flag decals can stay on the brand-new Hummers because the new American militarism guarantees the flow of oil, no matter the cost. Consequently, the anti-war movement of 2003 had little impact on policy and attracted no national political figures willing to assume the mantle of its leadership.
Bacevich's thesis explains a wide variety of American behaviors in recent decades, including such disparate events as the popularity of the film Top Gun, Michael Dukakis's need for a photo op in a tank, and (although too recent to be mentioned in the text) the recent scandal over religious zealotry at the United States Air Force Academy. Indeed, he contends, the role of evangelicals is crucial to the development of the new American militarism. When mainstream churches became disillusioned with Vietnam, evangelicals, who saw in the military a moral oasis in a nation growing ever more sinful, kept the faith. The military then rewarded their loyalty with special access and accepted the role of the moral paladin in a society falling from grace. Without the support of evangelicals, militarism "becomes inconceivable."
Readers of this book are likely to find points of serious disagreement with many of Bacevich's core points. Few readers will agree with all of the ten solutions proposed in his final chapter. Moreover, Bacevich presents no heroes and finds villains on both the right and the left. Despite this—or perhaps because of it—those concerned with the nation's recent past and its foreseeable future must read The New American Militarism. It will become a central part of the debate on how we have arrived where we are and what it means for the United States and for the world.
Dr. Neiberg, author of Making Citizen-Soldiers: ROTC and the Ideology of American Military Service, is professor of history at the University of Southern Mississippi and co-director of the school's Center for the Study of War and Society.