Naval construction battalions (Seabees) have a distinguished heritage dating back to World War II that reflects their motto: "We can build and we can fight." As a child, I remember reading stories of how Marines took islands while the Seabees repaired runways and built bridges in the midst of the fighting. Now I know firsthand how they operate. In Iraq, the building continues at an incredible pace, and the beneficiaries of the labor cannot say enough about the skill and stamina of these fine young men and women.
In the year I served with the Seabees, my respect for their can-do attitude and productivity grew by leaps and bounds. At the same time, however, I fear their military and tactical training is insufficiently cohesive. My desire here is to stimulate thought and discussion on how to improve their conduct of job-site security and force protection, which now take a backseat to engineering productivity.
Homeport military training of Seabee battalions is accomplished during a three-month block, after which there is no further emphasis on it unless it is part of the Seabee Combat Warfare qualification process or a field exercise. Thus, force protection is not considered again until deployment to a combat zone, when weapons are issued, battle-sights are established in a controlled environment, and live firing is conducted if a suitable area is available. Thereafter, the focus soon returns to productivity.
Force protection is not incorporated in homeport training or planning outside the military training block. While the technical phase of Seabee training does not lend itself to security and force protection, the skills application training (SAT) phase is a golden opportunity to reinforce what is covered in the three-month military block. Planning and threat assessments during the SAT phase would establish the proper number of personnel needed for force protection and ensure the seed planted during earlier military block training keeps growing.
While at homeport, for example, I do not think Seabees should stand security watches in battle gear when they undertake community building projects at local citizens centers. But because job-site surveys are done routinely before work starts, they can serve as training vehicles for tactical reconnaissance. By thinking tactically, leaders can ensure appropriate security measures are taken into account as an integral part of job planning. Production would not be affected adversely, and the number of Seabees required for various security contingencies would be established.
Weapon handling is another aspect of security that requires review. Based on my experience and that of other advisors, insufficient attention is paid to familiarizing Seabees with their weapons. While at homeport, are personnel periodically required to carry their rifles in the course of a day's work so they can get used to them? Do crew-served weapons teams do the same? Leaders will find that such training evolutions are rarely, if ever, undertaken-for reasons that range from the time "wasted" in drawing weapons from the armory, to alarming the base police over the prospect of armed personnel roaming about, to "we've never done that before." The list of excuses goes on and on.
Firearm accidental discharges and related incidents result most often from carelessness that derives from lack of familiarity with the firearm involved. By drawing and carrying their weapons periodically, Seabees will get used to handling them safely. They will develop "muzzle awareness" and feel more comfortable with their weapons when they have to carry them during deployments and combat situations. In addition, short but realistic live-fire exercises would substantially enhance the Seabees' confidence and teach them the immediate actions they need to take when their weapons malfunction.
Increasing weapon-handling opportunities will teach Seabees to take better care of that critical part of their toolboxes. Without weapons and competent shooters, security is nonexistent. Force protection does not require full-time specialists. All military units—especially Seabee battalions—must be capable of defending themselves.
On engineering jobs that take a large number of people, I have heard it said that security tasks would be augmented by the unit being supported. Perhaps-but no plan or arrangement survives initial contact with the enemy. We cannot gamble the lives of our Seabees on haphazard assumptions.
Because extensive commitments in Southwest Asia seem likely to continue, the Seabees must assign a higher priority to upgrading force protection planning and training. As the naval services rediscovered in Lebanon and Yemen, paying lip service to security leads to disaster.
Gunnery Sergeant Camacho, a reserve Marine advisor, recently returned from deployment to Iraq with Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 3. In civilian life, he is a police officer in Aurora, Colorado.