The U.S. Marine Corps is reaping the benefits of a decade-long transformation of its reserve component. Its performance in the recent Iraq war—by units such as this sniper team from 2d Battalion, 23d Marines, one of four reserve maneuver battalions deployed to the Central Command's area of operations—demonstrates that the Marine Reserve is an effective member of the Marine total force.
In a 9 July 2003 memorandum entitled "Rebalancing Forces," secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld states three principal objectives: improved reserve responsiveness, a review of joint requirements, and increased efficiency of mobilization. Before the release of the memo, Marine Forces Reserve already had achieved 90% of the changes called for by secretary Rumsfeld. It now is engaged in an intense effort to implement the lessons learned from the recent mobilization.
Rapid Response
Structure active and reserve forces to reduce the need for involuntary mobilization of the Guard and Reserve. Elimincite the need for involuntary mobilization during the first 15 days of a rapid response operation (or for any alerts to mobilize prior to the operation). Structure forces in order to limit involuntary mobilization to not more than one year every 6 years. -Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
The ability to get inside the enemy's decision cycle and strike before he is able to mount a coherent defense is one of the secretary's key lessons after Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OEF/OIF), as stated in his 9 july 2003 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee. If important components of U.S. combat power are in the reserve and if mobilization takes an extended period of time, then the National Command Authority is left with an awkward choice. Either mobilization must occur long before any operation, providing time for an opponent to prepare his defenses, or combatant commanders must go into battle with "one boot off," lacking an important element of combat power.
An alternative solution to the challenge of rapid response has several parts. First, minimize the need for reserve mobilization during the first couple of weeks of any rapid response operation. In OIF, fewer than 400 Marine Corps reservists were activated prior to 15 days into the operation. second, reduce the time lag between when a unit, detachment, or individual receives mobilization notification and when that element arrives at the appropriate airport or seaport to board its strategic lift. The Marine Reserve also met this challenge.
While the Department of Defense (DoD) set a goal of a minimum 30-day warning to reservists before mobilization, this notification can be informal. Initial vague warnings gradually become more detailed and credible until a formal alert is received. Warnings can be either strategic (non-unit-specific, usually open source) or tactical (unit specific, usually restricted access). The events of 11 September 2001 were an example of an extremely strong strategic warning and illustrate an important characteristic of mobilization warnings: the stronger the strategic warning, the less need for a long tactical warning. After the 11 September attacks, most Marine reservists expected immediate mobilization and began to prepare their families and employers for their departure.
The timing of a tactical mobilization warning depends on service policy, the web of friendships throughout the Corps, and the speed of the request-for-forces process. The longer the process takes, the greater the coordination required between DoD and Marine Corps headquarters and the more likely units will receive detailed warning. During the mobilization for OIF, units reported receiving a tactical warning of about 7-10 days, according to the Enduring Freedom Combat Assessment Team-Reserve, and almost two-thirds of the mobilized Marines felt they had sufficient warning. The period from the date of notification of mobilization of a reserve unit or detachment until it was awaiting strategic lift to go outside the continental United States was only 8-13 days. In fact, the movement of some Marine Reserve units and detachments was so rapid that they exceeded strategic lift capability, resulting in several weeks' delay at the ports of departure. Including the wait for strategic lift, the average time from the issuance of a deployment order until a Marine Reserve unit's arrival in theater was 34 days, about half the average for all reserve and National Guard units mobilized.
There are several reasons for the more rapid deployment capability of the Marine Reserve. Both the National Guard and Army Reserve have an evaluation process that takes place between mobilization and deployment; units that receive an adverse evaluation require lengthy postmobilization training. This process is not needed in the Marine Reserve because active-duty inspectors and instructors are assigned to every unit, giving gaining force commanders confidence that reserve units' quality is comparable to that of active units.
Another reason for the more rapid mobilization capability of the Marine Reserve is the strong effort to maintain unit integrity. While the Navy and Army each mobilized hundreds of one- or two-person detachments from their selected reserve units, the Marine Corps mobilized no one-person detachments and only 24 two-person detachments, states the U.S. General Accounting Office report, "DoD Actions Needed to Improve the Efficiency of Mobilization for Reserve Forces."
Joint Requirements
Establish a more rigorous process for reviewing joint requirements, which ensures that force structure is designed appropriately and which validates requests for forces in time to provide timely notice of mobilization.
- Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
To maximize the combat power of the Marine Corps total force, reserve units must be assigned appropriate responsibilities. Capabilities assigned to a reserve unit must not require an excessive number of activations so the unit can achieve and maintain the required level of mobilization and combat readiness. On activation, reserve and active components must be able to integrate immediately into an effective total force team. What is an excessive number of activations? How often can a reserve unit be activated before it is "broken," that is, before retention, recruiting, and training become too difficult or too expensive? secretary Rumsfeld's July 2003 memo posits a structure whereby involuntary mobilization would occur no more than one year in six. If this is the standard, then there are at least two solutions for a reserve unit with a capability that results in an excessive number of activations. Either that capability can be moved to an active unit, or there can be an increase in the number of reserve units possessing this capability so that each unit faces a decreased likelihood of activation in any given year. The costs of active and reserve units with the same capability and the expected potential of activation are the major determinants of which situation is optimal.
Based on the OEF/OIF experience, the Marine Corps is looking at areas to rebalance the active/reserve mix. In addition, reserve units must achieve and maintain a level of readiness and proficiency enabling them to integrate seamlessly into a total force. A combatant commander must determine not whether the average active Marine unit is better than the average reserve Marine unit, but which unit is the "next best." If the combatant commander already has 10 infantry battalions in his area of responsibility and needs an 11th, then he wants the next-best battalion regardless of whether it is active or reserve.
Marine Reserve units use the same readiness standards as active-duty units. Evaluating the success of a reserve unit in meeting these standards is primarily in the hands of the active-duty inspectors and instructors team, not the reserve commander. Victory in battle goes to the joint force that most successfully uses combined arms. It is very rare for a unit to win a battle by itself; victory usually requires sustained joint effort from a variety of units. However, in a number of cases, Marine Reserve units were singled out for praise.
Bravo Company, 4th Light Armor Reconnaissance Battalion, made the first two kills of Iraqi armored vehicles. Reserve tanks, light-armor vehicles, and amphibious assault vehicles fought the entire war at the front. A reserve infantry battalion, 2d Battalion, 23d Marines, led the 1st Regimental Combat Team for several days on the attack north. Two reserve C-130 aircraft squadrons conducted almost all of the assault support missions in OIF because of their advanced night takeoff and landing capabilities. Reserve engineers from 6th Engineer Support Battalion built a 90-mile hose fuel system, the longest bridge, and the largest tactical fuel farm in Marine Corps history. And after the capture of Baghdad, 3d Battalion, 23d Marines; 2d Battalion, 25th Marines; and the 4th Light Armor Reconnaissance Battalion provided security and governance for entire provinces by themselves.
One reason Marine Reserve and active components have integrated so well is that Marine reservists go to the same basic, military operational specialty, and advanced schools as their active counterparts. In the other services, it is not uncommon to have separate active and reserve school tracks. In the Marine Reserve, all officers and many senior noncommissioned officers formerly were on active duty. Reserve Marine officers complete an average of 6.3 years of active service. In contrast, many Army Reserve and National Guard Officers have no active-duty experience. Marine Reserve units participate in many of the same training exercises as active units. But probably the most important cause is the gradual peacetime integration of the active and reserve Marine components.
A wide range of civilian skill sets may give reserve units a special capability to handle the nonstandard missions that are becoming more common in the global war on terrorism. 3d Battalion, 23d Marines' successful tour as the governing authority of Wassit Province during phase IV of OIF exemplifies this. The war and collapse of the former regime had left civil government and public services in ruins. In al Kut, there was no police or fire protection, the courts were not meeting, and even the local radio station was off the air. The commander of 3d Battalion rapidly was able to assign reservists who were policemen and firemen in their civilian jobs to organize these essential services. Knowing that two of the officers who filled infantry billets in the battalion were practicing attorneys in civilian life, he assigned them to help reestablish the civil and criminal courts. he was even able to get the local radio station back on the air by identifying a Marine whose civilian job was as a radio DJ and engineer. An additional advantage is that the residents understood that everyone they dealt with was a Marine and therefore a "hard target."
Mobilization Efficiency
Make the mobilization and demobilization process more efficient. When reservists are used, ensure that they are given meaningful work and work for which alternative manpower is not readily available. Retain on active duty only as long as absolutely necessary.
- Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
A great deal of attention has been focused on shortening the period of mobilization to avoid overstressing the reserve system. However, this must not detract from two equally important determinants of the system's long-term viability: the importance of the assigned mission and the predictability of the period of mobilization.
Marine reservists, their families, and their employers tend to be more supportive of activations if the call-up is perceived to be for an important reason, such as a large-scale contingency. If the President has spoken about the importance of calling up reservists, mobilization and demobilization tend to go more smoothly. Family and employer accept the fact that the reservist must go. More limited mobilizations, when a few units, detachments, or individuals are activated without a great deal of publicity and without a national statement of necessity, can be more difficult.
The predictability of the period of mobilized service also is important. A large proportion of Marine reservists are college students. While most schools are very supportive of activated Marines, they offer little flexibility in terms of when the reserve Marine can return following demobilization. Most reservists must wait a year from when they were mobilized to reenter school.
A similar problem can arise in business. Many employers, especially small businesses, cannot simply share the work of the mobilized employee among their remaining staff. Employers are forced to hire a temporary employee or contract with a staffing agency to fill the gap. If a reservist is demobilized early, the firm can either break the agreement with the temporary employee and accept the ill will and financial penalties, or retain the temporary employee for the contracted period even after the reservist returns, paying two salaries for one job.
A compromise is necessary between minimizing the mobilization period and providing sufficient predictability of mobilization length. An excellent example of such a compromise is the current demobilization guidance that allows a reservist to remain on active duty for as much as 90 days after his or her unit has been demobilized.
Although there is wide variance in service missions and strategies to accomplish them, not all missions and strategies are consistent with maintaining a healthy reserve capability. If war fighting is the primary mission of the reserve, the importance of war fighting ensures that families and employers are willing to support their reservists. And the relative rareness of large-scale conflict means a unit or detachment can expect mobilizations only once every six or ten years.
The Transformation Continues
The transformation of the Marine Reserve during the past decade has improved greatly its ability to integrate with the active component and make a significant contribution to the warfighting capability of the Marine total force—but there is room for improvement.
Numerous after-action reports and lessons-learned efforts have concerned the Marine Reserve experience in OEF/OIF. In addition to a joint forces study of the mobilization of the National Guard and reserve, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command sponsored an extensive and well-written study of Marine Reserve forces in OIF. The U.S. General Accounting Office report, "DoD Actions Needed to Improve the Efficiency of Mobilization for Reserve Forces," and the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory study of the 1st Marine Division in OIF, while narrower in scope, also provide valuable insights. In addition, since the end of ground combat in OIF, Marine Forces Reserve has received almost 900 observations and lessons learned.
Shortly after the end of ground combat, Commander, Marine Forces Reserve, established a process to identify important lessons learned about important issues and assign them to a fast-track process. A separate operational planning team was established for each topic and the teams were tasked with developing detailed, practical recommended actions to resolve any problems with organization, equipment, training, mobilization, and utilization. Solving these problems will improve further the mobilization and combat readiness of the Marine Reserve.
In July 2003, after the declaration of the end of OIF ground combat, secretary Rumsfeld challenged the services to make far-reaching and urgent transformations in the reserve and National Guard components. The performance of the Marine Reserve in OIF revealed it had previously achieved 90% of the secretary's goals. A post-transformation, rebalanced Marine Reserve component mobilized, integrated with the active component, and helped win the war. To the extent that the Marine Corps focuses on war fighting as the primary mobilization mission of the reserve, a robust Marine Reserve capability can be maintained indefinitely.
Colonel Gunter is officer in charge of Civil-Military Operations for III Marine Expeditionary Force. he previously was officer in charge of the Marine Forces Reserve Mobilization Assessment Team. In 2002, he was the first Marine Reserve colonel to command the 7/8 Combined Arms Fire Exercise. Colonel Gunter has 31 years of active and reserve service.