The author arrived in the USS Paul Hamilton in late 2002 to command maritime interception operations in the Arabian Gulf and become a strong and vital link in the Coalition forces that supported Operation Iraqi Freedom.
On 30 October 2002, I joined the destroyer USS Paul Hamilton (DDG-60) with a staff of 15 officers and sailors to take over from Royal Australian Navy Captain Peter Sinclair and his hard-worked team as maritime interception operations (MIO) commander in the North Arabian Gulf. Within 20 miles of the Paul Hamilton were a half-dozen Australian, British, U.S., and Polish warships. After months of preparation and planning, I still felt daunted by this assignment. My first reaction to Peter's thorough handover was surprise at the amazing command task the Royal Australian Navy had garnered. This was mixed with the realization that it was a job of unremitting pressure. Just as the handover was completed, we had a surge in operational tempo with the sortie of an Iraqi PB-90-class patrol boat into our area.
Although the first week proceeded at breakneck speed, with daily Iraqi patrol boat activity in our area and mass dhow breakouts from the Khawr Abd Allah waterway, my primary aim was to get to know the key players. First, there was the captain of the Paul Hamilton, the astute and gracious Commander Fred Pfirrmann. For all my team the Paul Hamilton holds a special place; it was a terrific ship, and our time in her was all too short. In the carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) resided my immediate superior, Rear Admiral John Kelly, Commander Cruiser Destroyer Group Three, who was supported by Commander Destroyer Squadron 31, Commodore Mark "Buz" Buzby.
The other key players were the ships of the Maritime Interception Force (MIF). They included the Australian frigates HMAS Melbourne and Arunta, both stationed close to the Iraqi coast. Together they completed 300 boardings. The oldest combat ship in the Royal Navy, the destroyer HMS Cardiff, soon joined them. With her Royal Marine boarding parties and a capable operations team, the Cardiff quickly gained a reputation for being a very smart outfit. There also was the professional and enthusiastic Polish support ship ORP Kontra Admiral Xavier Czernicki and the shore-based SEALs and Polish GROM special forces who would come out on assigned evenings from Kuwait to conduct boardings.
The MIF ships were a polished group, with not one weak link among them. This is one of the strengths of a multinational force. In my time in the MIF, we had 27 ships pass through the task group, and it was rare to get a dud. The MIF also had a more complete suite of capabilities over a similar national task group. It was important, however, to work out each unit's particular strengths.
Within the first few weeks, the first of the many changes in the guard took place within the MIF. I shifted to the destroyer USS Fletcher (DD-992), and HMAS Anzac and Darwin replaced the Melbourne and Arunta. In early December, the USS Constellation (CV-64) arrived to replace the Abraham Lincoln. In short order I had a new boss, U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Barry Costello, assisted by Commander Destroyer Squadron 7, Commodore Mark Balmert. In addition, there was a new clutch of U.S. ships: the cruiser Valley Forge (CG-50), destroyers Milius (DDG-69) and Higgins (DDG-76), and the frigate Thach (FFG-43). There are dramatic changes when a new battle group arrives. It is a testing experience, but on the whole it was an experience from which we benefited.
In late 2001, the Anzac had demonstrated the tactical value of stationing a frigate at the mouth of the Khawr Abd Allah (inside Iraqi territorial waters) for intercept operations. Because of the shallow depths, all smugglers had to pass through that stretch of water before passing into Iranian territorial waters to commence their passage down the Gulf. But the situation in late 2002 had intensified. On one side, the MIF was strengthened as an indirect result of the war on terrorism; with more ships, a continuous presence in the mouth of the Khawr Abd Allah was possible. On the other side, smugglers had become more daring with welded hatches, electrified guardrails, and other passive defenses. On our arrival in theater my staff and I were very determined not to let up the pressure. In particular, we did not want any "steel hulls" to escape.
After an initial period of very high dhow activity, the effect of Ramadan slowed the smuggling traffic dramatically. The movements of Iraqi PB-90 patrol boats had developed into a pattern of sovereignty patrols a couple of days a week in our area. It was clear from our discussions with the merchant manners who plied the waters that the MIF ships intimidated the PB-90s. We were keen to maintain this psychological edge and always brought a frigate forward when a PB-90 was active. As tension grew, larger Iraqi vessels, including Saddam Hussein's presidential yacht, proceeded down the Khawr Abd Allah, through our area, and up the Shatt al Arab to Basra. In mid-December, we joined the Milius as the Fletcher finally left the Gulf for Fremantle.
As Christmas 2002 approached, the MIF maintained its unremitting presence both in the entrance to the Khawr Abd Allah waterway and farther south in the U.N. holding area called "Comiskey." The MIF consisted at the time of the Valley Forge, Milius (command ship), Cardiff, Higgins, Anzac, Thach, Darwin, and Czernicki. In addition, we had boarding teams from the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Navy SEALs, and the Polish GROM.
As the sanction work continued, the political situation seemed to be heading inevitably toward conflict with Iraq. In preparing for combat operations, our three worst seenarios were Iraqi mining, a blue-on-blue incident involving our own boats, and a collision involving helicopters unfamiliar with the confines of the northern Arabian Gulf. We created some important procedural measures to improve our cohesion, including improved merchant ship, aircraft, and boat reporting and tracking procedures. The MIF commander also was designated the northern Arabian Gulf local surface warfare commander, and moves were under way to establish a local air warfare commander. These small but important steps were to ensure not only that the MIF could operate in a broader warfare context but also that when the inevitable force build up occurred, the much enlarged coalition force could operate safely in this relatively confined area.
It was at this time that the close links forged between successive task group commanders, the U.S. commander Destroyer Squadron 50 (Commodore John Peterson), and their staffs became crucial. Commodore Peterson was working on key aspects of the planned maritime campaign against Iraq, an enormous undertaking for his small staff. Both the Royal Australian Navy task group staff and our liaison officers ashore were placed ideally to help in this work. After two months of planning and consultation, a detailed plan was completed. The MIF would use its expertise in the northern Arabian Gulf to support an array of tasks. I was assigned the role of maritime interception operations screen commander.
The almost daily arrivals of new ships left little doubt there would be a war. Among the arrivals were the Royal Navy frigates Marlborough, Chatham, and Richmond. Other new faces were the U.S. Coast Guard cutter Boutwell (WHEC-719) and the patrol craft Adak (WPB-1333), Aquidneck (WPB-1309), Baranof (WPB-1318), and Wrangel (WPB-1332). They were joined by the heavily armed U.S. Navy patrol boats Chinook (PC-9) and Firebolt (PC-10). These were much needed additions for the envisaged inshore operations.
The arrival of the amphibious ship HMAS Kanimbla into theater was much anticipated. Initially, she was viewed as providing important strategic lift and was to be assigned to the coalition naval logistics commander. While the Kanimbla would have been excellent in that role, she also had a proven track record in MIO. We quickly realized her unique combination of shallow draft, large communications bandwidth, multiple combat information centers, planning space, and accommodation for coalition boarding parties made her a perfect match for the command ship for Khawr Abd Allah clearance operations. On the Kanimbla's arrival in Bahrain, my staff and I shifted to that ship from the Milius.
From a national perspective, the Kanimbla gave the Royal Australian Navy task group a national flagship and greater sense of independence. The support facilities and accommodation space she provided were extremely useful for the entire MIF. For example, she could embark the growing media contingent and insert them into the rest of the MIF for brief manageable periods. She also had a Sea King helicopter that proved an essential enabler in the build-up phase.
In the week or so preceding the war, one event after another attracted our attention. Most important to me was that the Iraqis were on the move in our operating area. The last of the Iraqi large naval or government ships had sailed down the Khawr Abd Allah and around into the Shatt al Arab and Basra. Our merchant shipping contacts told us of Iraqi military personnel on tugs and that explosives would be laid on the oil terminals (Mabot and Kaaot) and navigation marks. Rumors of mines abounded. We strongly doubted mines had been laid, but we shadowed all Iraqi vessels closely. In preparation for the conflict, nearly 130 coalition boarding party and support element sailors were embarked in the Kanimbla.
Two days before the war began, a mass breakout of dhows occurred. The crews had heard of the impending hostilities, and in their desperation they started to jettison cargo. The last thing we needed was flotsam and jetsam floating down the Gulf. After a hasty series of conference calls, Commander Fifth Fleet approved our recommendation to clear the Khawr Abd Allah rather than turn the dhows around. It was the effective end of the 12-year embargo. After a few minutes of assigning units to task on a white-board, my operations officer executed the revised plan. It worked amazingly well. For their part, once the dhow crews understood what was happening they were very compliant. For some boarding teams and dhow crews it was a poignant moment. After months of being boarded and turned back, this was their last meeting.
As expected, word of the clearance quickly spread up the Khawr Abd Allah, and the following day the large steel hulls made their outbound passage. In all, 56 dhows and 47 merchant ships were inspected and cleared in about three days. This early clearance was a bonus for us, because it emptied the waterway in preparation for combat operations.
On the early morning of 19 March, the Chinook, with my forward liaison team embarked, was ordered to intercept an Iraqi tug heading from an offshore oil terminal to Basra. On board were a handful of U.N. workers potentially destined to be held hostage. In some minor brinksmanship, the U.N. workers were removed and the tug allowed to proceed on her way. As feared, the U.N. workers reported Iraqi military personnel were present on the two offshore oil terminals with suspicious equipment.
That afternoon, on the eve of the war, the ship's company went down to the tank deck to draw the last of the individual chemical and biological protection equipment. People quietly went about their spaces and sorted their personal affairs. That evening, our friends in the U.S. and Polish special forces landed on Mabot and Kaaot. The Anzac was ordered in for close support. Within the hour all was secured, and fortunately the Iraqi explosives had not been set.
At the same time, SEALs were securing the two related shore oil installations. Two hours later the artillery and air bombardment and the Royal Marines' assault of the Al Faw Peninsula commenced. Most of the MIF units were close inshore; although visibility was poor, the sound and shock waves of the artillery and air strikes were strong. At the same time, U.S. Navy cruisers and destroyers were announcing one by one that their Tomahawk missile firing zones were activated. Around 0300, the Marlborough, Anzac, Chatham, and Richmond were detached for their bombardment. At approximately 0600, the Anzac commenced the first fire mission. We monitored the progress in a chat room and on the naval gunfire support coordination circuit.
During the night, another aspect of the operation unfolded: protection of an amphibious transit lane for the fast air cushion landing craft (LCAC) to take equipment from Bubiyan Island across the Khawr Abd Allah to the Al Faw Peninsula. The Chinook, Firebolt, Adak, and Aquidneck reported three Iraqi tugs and a barge coming down the Khawr Abd Allah. They boarded the vessels, which proved suspicious only for their large crews. I ordered the tugs to be held north of the assault lane and had the Kanimbla dispatch a boarding party with U.S. Navy explosives experts to board the tugs at first light for a closer inspection. In the light of day, a petty officer in the boarding party noted an electrical cable running from a hut on the barge into the barge pontoon itself. After a short inspection a trap door was found, behind which were 68 mines.
Reports came in bit by bit on the size of the find. I needed to know if any mines had been laid, and there was a report of five empty slots on the mine rails. As could be appreciated, our first reports up the command chain led to much pressing for answers to myriad questions. My initial assessment was that if any mines had been laid, they would lie further up the Khawr Abd Allah. To help clarify matters, I sent the Kanimbla's executive officer and specialist clearance diver, lieutenant Commander Mick Edwards, up to the tugs to take charge of the scene. With their assessment and more information volunteered from captured Iraqis, I was sure no mines had been laid. The Iraqis in fact had intended to lay a field farther south 48 hours later.
The possibility still existed of additional Iraqi mine barges farther up the Khawr Abd Allah, and a sweep by SEALs from the Joint Venture (HSV-XI), did much to reassure me that this did not occur. By midnight on day one events were pretty well under control. For me, it was time to finish off reports to go up the coalition and Australian command chains. The other opportunity the lull provided was to discuss our next task with my team. This was to support the mine-clearance operations up the Khawr Abd Allah.
During the next couple of days, events moved quickly. Once the Al Faw Peninsula was secured, the five coalition mine countermeasures vessels and two helicopter-towed sleds commenced operations. My lead unit to protect this group was the Chinook, commanded by the very level-headed and brave Lieutenant Colin Hayes.1 When I told him I was removing the embarked U.S. Coast Guard boarding party and wanted any unnecessary personnel off the Chinook because she was the first non-mine countermeasures vessel to proceed up the channel behind the hunters, he thought for a moment and said it seemed a reasonable call, and we moved on to the next subject.
The Iraqi asymmetric threat initially materialized as a foray of four small suicide boats. Fortunately, they were chased by Iranian naval forces and beached themselves. In response to this threat I detached the Chatham and Darwin as a surface action group under the Chatham's commanding officer, Captain Michael Cochrane. The ships were equipped with a good combination of weapon systems to deal with small inshore contacts, and they remained off the mouth of the Shatt al Arab until the danger of these boats had passed.
The progress of the mine countermeasures force up the Khawr Abd Allah was difficult, with a large numbers of mine-like objects littering the bottom. This was hardly surprising, with the waterway having been a battle zone on several occasions in the past century. As the mine hunters made their way up, our patrol craft and small boats commenced ever-lengthening patrols. The Kanimbla provided fuel, water, and other support for the craft.
Our plan called for sustained riverine patrols. The Al Faw Peninsula was a sparsely populated area, and the Royal Marines were thin on the ground. The prospect of a new minefield would have further delayed humanitarian aid shipping. In short, it was a vulnerable flank for the coalition.
One of the most significant difficulties in executing any plan is to know when to deviate from it. An example for us was our small-boat patrols. It became clear early in the war that after the initial mass breakout of shipping, the once-congested Khawr Abd Allah was empty. Many of the crews had gone home. This meant the need to board ships along the river had vanished, with only the riverine patrol requirement remaining. Two days into the boat patrols, four crews got into difficulties when a southwesterly change came through with winds exceeding 65 knots. Fortunately, all crews found refuge in either our versatile LCM-Ss or in two mine hunters. The following day, I flew up to Umm Qasr to see for myself the state of the Khawr Abd Allah and to visit the divers. During that flight I looked down through the dusty conditions on a lone rigid-hull inflatable boat near Warbah Island. They could see nothing and nobody but we could see them. The risks I was putting the boarding parties under versus the negligible operational gain came home to me. So after only two days, with Commodore Peterson's endorsement, the small-boat riverine patrols were halted on the entry of the first humanitarian aid ship, RFA Sir Galahad. It was not a universally popular decision, but the pendulum had swung in the maritime campaign. My priority now was to get those boarding parties home safely.
The Sir Galahad's arrival effectively meant the end of our mission. We retained command of the riverine patrols because we felt strongly about not taking our eye off the ball. As if to underline this point, the ever-vigilant Chinook found a cache of mines, small arms, antitank missiles, and a partly inflated suicide boat on the shore.
By the beginning of April, the U.S. Navy and Royal Navy rapidly drew down their fleets. As part of the draw down, the Darwin was sent for a well-earned port visit, and the Kanimbla was to go into port on 6 April. As such, I handed the MIF to Commodore Peterson in the Valley Forge. The time was right to go, and we were a spent force by this stage. After a round of farewells, the Kanimbla shaped course for Jebel Ali. On arrival, I handed over to Captain Mark Kellam the duties of Commander, Royal Australian Task Group 633.1. I was very proud of the MIF, and it was a great honor to serve with a dedicated and talented team.
1 Lieutenant Hayes was a deserved recipient of a Bronze Star for his outstanding service.
Commodore Jones is director general of information capability development at Australian Defence Headquarters in Canberra.