"Barbarians at the Gate"
(See P. Marx, pp. 32-36, May 2004 Proceedings)
Major Steven Ziomek, New Jersey Air National Guard-I have to wonder exactly what "war on terror" Paul Marx was referring to when he put down the contribution of air power. While his thesis that the United States must abandon its current global doctrine and focus exclusively on the global war on terrorism is dubious at best, what grabbed my attention is his complete lack of understanding of air power.
According to Marx, "Urban-centric warfare largely negates the supremacy of U.S. air power." After spending a paragraph explaining why air power is ineffective, he finishes by saying, "Helicopters, vertical/short take-off and landing aircraft, unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs), and close air support dominate the global war on terrorism air war." All of these are elements of air power. It is only in the Cold War era that Marx claims the Navy and Air Force are stuck in that there was a separation among bombers, fighters, and rotary-wing aircraft.
Furthermore, in 2004, "strategic" and "tactical" are at best dated mission descriptions, not a type of air power. I doubt very much that any B-52 crew who carried Litening targeting pods into Iraq would describe their aircraft as strategic weapons platforms limited in their ability to provide close air support. In fact, targeting-pod-equipped aircraft are the weapons of choice to support the guerrilla war in Iraq. They provide the most firepower at the least risk to both ground troops and aircrew, as well as the lowest potential collateral damage. It's safe to say that air power is one of this country's biggest advantages in both Iraq and Afghanistan, not its biggest failing.
In his endnotes, Marx also attacks the concept of the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF). Once again, he shows his complete misunderstanding of a concept. The AEF is not an "overly convoluted substitute for an aircraft carrier." While at some point in the 1990s that thought may have crossed the mind of an air staff planner, that is not how the AEF was developed or is used. The AEF is a force management tool. It provides a combatant commander with a distinct set of air-power capabilities that include fighters, bombers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, airlift, and tankers. The objective is to prevent a commander from repeatedly asking for specific assets resulting in certain units always being tasked while other equally capable units never deploy. If there is any question that this is how the Air Force views the AEF, one need only look at the effort the service put into rebuilding the AEF cycle after Operation Iraqi Freedom. The goal is stability in an airman's life, not to get more money from the Navy to put into Air Force fighters.
Finally, as part of his attack on air power, Marx points out that General Giulio Douhet's vision has yet to be achieved. So what? Douhet was an air-power theorist, notable for the fact that he was the first person to view air power as a force capable of influencing war on a strategic level. His views were colored by the experience of World War I and his objective was to show that there was an alternative to the massive battlefield slaughter that resulted from trench warfare. just because Douhet's vision has not been achieved does not mean air power is a failure and its impact negated in the global war on terrorism. It may simply mean that Douhet's vision was flawed.
Only at the end of his article did Marx hit the nail on the head. The military's greatest strength is its people. The people of the armed forces took equipment and a construct designed to fight the Cold War and turned it against a widespread group of "fanatical jihadists." It would be naive to abandon a military designed for worldwide across-the-board operations just because it is not perfectly suited for the war on terrorism. just as 11 September 2001 was a horrible surprise, there is no guarantee there won't be further surprises in the future. The United States must maintain defenses for any potential threat, not just the one we have today.
Colonel Philip G. Wasielewski, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve-As the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force returns to Iraq, one of the tactics it will use to gain victory will be a modified version of the Combined Action Program (CAP). If the soon-to-be lessons learned from Iraq revalidate the utility of this counterinsurgency technique, I suggest the CAP be exported to Afghanistan, to assist in the uprooting of the Islamic extremist infrastructure that still exists there.
During the Vietnam War, the Combined Action Program teamed a rifle squad of Marines and a Navy corpsman with a regional forces platoon (local militia) to protect individual villages. These combined forces worked to deny their villages to the enemy and to build its ties to the government by providing such services as security, humanitarian assistance, civic action and psychological operations, economic and social development assistance, and training to local forces.
The CAP was one of the most successful counterinsurgency programs of that war. Experiences from Iraq certainly will add to our knowledge of this operational concept, and it might be worthwhile to begin preparations now to establish a CAP in Afghanistan with Marine Corps, U.S. Army, or selected coalition forces.
It is in the Afghan countryside that the war to destroy the remaining Taliban and al Qaeda elements will be won or lost. Only a sustained military presence and installation of a strong central government can prevent these terrorist groups from reestablishing sanctuaries from which to recruit, train, and hide. Many efforts are going on to make this happen, but none incorporates all the features a CAP offers. A CAP could be a vital link between operational mission by Special Operations Forces and the hearts-and-minds operations of provincial reconstruction teams, and a force multiplier to both.
In the near term, a CAP-type initiative would have to come from existing forces. One course of action would be to task organize a Marine infantry battalion along CAP lines and then give it a tactical area of operations (TAOR) in which to test this concept. Eighteen CAPs could be formed out of the rifle squads of two rifle companies. The weapons platoons of the two companies would be attached to the different CAP squads based on the commander's estimate of the terrain and enemy situation. One rifle company, the battalion weapons company, and headquarters and services company would form a fire base near the center of the TAOR to serve as a quick reaction force.
This experiment will require an influx of corpsmen beyond the battalion's normal manning, to have one with each CAP squad. This is vital not just to take care of the Marines but also to provide medical assistance to the local population, which is an essential part of the hearts-and-minds campaign. Each CAP also will need at least two interpreters, one for the squad leader and one for the corpsman. The CAP squads also might require more motor transport, engineering materials (especially wire and barriers), and communications assets than are normally found in the battalion. Higher headquarters will need to provide these resources as well as attach psychological operations, civil affairs, additional intelligence, and engineering personnel to the battalion.
In addition, the CAP must have day-today interaction with the local militia/internal security forces. The CAP squad will serve as both a trainer and a "stiffener," so local forces will have the confidence to conduct the patrols, roadblocks, raids, and cordon and search operations needed to take the initiative from the guerrillas. The return on these extra resources and efforts will be increased intelligence collection and a successful hearts and minds campaign.
In the beginning, the battalion will need operational funds and access to other resources such as uniforms and training ammunition. During its deployment, the battalion headquarters will work with the higher headquarters of the local Afghan security forces to improve its commandand-control capabilities and training programs and ensure it develops access to resources to support subordinate units once U.S. forces leave. Battalion headquarters also will have to work to ensure these local security forces develop into extensions of the central government in Kabul and not of the local warlords.
The experiment is not without risks. Cross-border terrorist attacks still threaten our forces, and small forces in villages are more vulnerable than large fire bases. However, the CAP in Vietnam, facing similar threats, proved successful especially in gathering local actionable intelligence, providing protection to the local population, and increasing the effectiveness of the local military and paramilitary forces. The same insurgency challenges that faced us in Southeast Asia now face us in Central Asia. A renewed Combined Action Program might prove useful for another generation of Marines dealing with an age-old problem.
"Assassination and Abduction: Viable Foreign Policy Tools?"
(See J. Collins, pp. 66-67, April 2004; W. H. Parks, pp. 8-12, J. Collins, p. 12, J. Sanford, p. 14, B. Killebrew, pp. 14-16, May 2004 Proceedings
Lieutenant Commander David Douglas Winters, U.S. Navy (Retired)-Colonel Parks raises an inappropriate example of legitimate military action. he likens an unmanned Predator attack launched by the CIA using Hellfire missiles against suspected terrorists to the Air Corps attack on Admiral Yamamoto, a lawful military action-a remarkably poor analogy.
The CIA is a governmental, but civilian, organization. It is not military by any definition. It is not subject to military law (the Uniform Code of Military justice). It is not under military discipline. CIA operatives take no military oath; they are not even police officers. In short, the CIA is not militarily accountable.
If the CIA undertakes roles that rest rightfully only in the domain of the military, it is, strictly and legally speaking, illegitimate. Such action borders on, if not crosses into, the realm of war crimes. Indeed, we have a bunch of folks locked up in Guantanamo Bay as "illegal combatants" right now.
When the CIA initiated the Predator attack, it overtly and improperly undertook a military role, delivering weapons of mass destruction in execution of actions that could be legally legitimate only in a military context. This marked a sharp departure from previously acceptable conduct.
With the exception of a few voices in the wilderness, the CIA's improper excursion appeared to go largely unnoticed. Fortunately, however, no more such CIA conduct/misconduct, at least of such an overt nature, appears to have recurred. One might hope this indicates that the organization had been reigned in. However, Colonel Parks's disturbing reference to it as an instructive example gives reason to doubt this.
So let us get this one thing straight. When the CIA undertakes overt missions the subject of which is the destruction of human life, it may or may not be legitimate, and may or may not violate policies against assassination. But the one thing it emphatically is not is lawful military action.
"Learning from the Masters"
(See D. Combs and F. Kacher, pp. 46-48, January 2004; R. Taylor, p. 14, March 2004; R. Carius, pp. 14-18, March 2004; D. Cox, p. 16, April 2004 Proceedings
"The Coast Guard Needs Help from the Navy and Marine Corps"
(See G. Mones, pp. 40-45, January 2004; R. Disque, p. 24, K. Bonner, p. 24, March 2004 Proceedings)
Commodore James Goldrick, Royal Australian Navy-First, Rear Admiral Carius's critique of Admiral Zumwalt has the benefit of his own experiences of 197074, but may be unfair in his comment that "Admiral Zumwalt . . . having been selected deep for the CNO billet, lacked command experience, having had no ship command above the rank of commander." From Admiral Zumwalt's memoir On Watch, it is clear that he captained no less than three ships, culminating in the new missile frigate Dewey (DDG-45), amounting to the best part of five years in sea command. he later had a year as a rear admiral at sea and then the Naval Forces Vietnam post as a three star. he regretted missing out on a numbered fleet, but his seagoing experience compares well with many outstanding U.S. Navy officers over the past century, as well as those from other navies.
Second, I was concerned by Kit Bonner's exaggeration of the U.S. Coast Guard's situation in the northern Arabian Gulf in the opening stages of the war. It is not true, however significant their role, to say that Coast Guard units "aside from the U.S. Navy's Chinook (PC-9) and some support from the Royal Navy, . . . were the major allied maritime units in the Northern Arabian Gulf." Not only were there Australian ships close up to the Iraqi coast alongside the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Navy, and Royal Navy, but there was also the Polish support ship Kontraadmiral Xavier Czernicki. In addition, Coast Guard boarding parties were operating from the Australian amphibious ship Kanimbla, which served as a forward-very much forward-operating base for the coalition rigid hull inflatable boats and boarding teams and as command ship for the maritime operations in the northern Gulf. The Australian frigate Anzac and the British frigates Marlborough, Chatham, and Richmond were well inside the approaches to the Khawr Abd Allah waterway between Iraq and Kuwait and played a vital role in providing naval gunfire support to the Royal Marine forces ashore.
This is not an exhaustive list of maritime coalition efforts at the start of the war, but I hope it makes the point.
"Where Are the Weapons of Mass Destruction?"
(See R. Riggs, p. 106, March 2004; P. Malone, p. 10, April 2004; F. Possert, p. 22, R. Melley, p. 22, J. McClaran, p. 24, May 2004 Proceedings)
Walter E. Thielhart-We were not wrong! There have been numerous articles and letters published in recent months saying we were wrong, there are no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Television has also been active in trying to get high-ranking people to say we made a mistake, our intelligence was at fault or somebody's lying. I believe Iraq has such weapons even though they have not yet been found.
Iraq had chemical agents in mines, shells, and bombs during Operation Desert Storm. During my career in engineering management I was involved in research and development of chemical agent detection equipment for the armed forces. One device in particular is the M21 remote sensing chemical agent alarm, developed under contract for the U.S. Army through Edgewood Arsenal. The program was in the engineering development phase at the time of Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The Marine Corps Research and Development Center (MCRADC) asked the Army for some units to take to Iraq. Ten of the units were refurbished and were deployed in Iraq.
Following Desert Storm, Marine Corps Research and Development Center personnel came to our company and spoke to our staff. We learned that the Army had used five units at certain fixed sites and the Marines had used five units in a bounding overwatch mode during their advance into Iraq. They told us that during their operations, chemical agent was detected on two occasions.
One detection occurred while the M21 was looking over an Iraqi minefield. The minefield was blown up and agent was found to be rising from the field. The other occurrence followed the aerial bombing of an Iraqi ammunition dump. Chemical agent was emanating from the bombed dump.
Not only did Iraq have chemical agents, but they were stockpiled and deployed in weapons. It is completely unreasonable and illogical to think Iraq would voluntarily dispose of these weapons after Desert Storm. just because they have not yet been found does not mean they do not exist.
"Martial Law, 2004 Style"
(See E. Fidell, p. 26, April 2004 Proceedings)
Captain Michael C. Farkas, U.S. Army Reserve, Judge Advocate General's Corps-Reading Mr. Fidell's surprisingly one-sided piece leaves me unable to determine what is worse: the fact that an attorney of his stature would present an unfair and dismissive viewpoint that disregards the valid legal principles behind our government's policies regarding enemy combatants, or the fact that his opinion represents a seemingly endemic societal refusal to acknowledge that this country is at war. I suppose that the latter is worse, since the public has come to expect attorneys to present their particular views to the exclusion of all others. What no one should forget, and everyone should take pains to better comprehend, is that the law permits dynamic and specific measures in response to wartime threats. Our government's use of these measures should continue.
Members of opposing armed forces (i.e., the enemy) are not ordinary domestic criminals. Specific tenets of the law of war apply to them, which provide for more than just a separate procedural framework for prosecution. For example, the law justifies unique treatment of fighters captured during hostilities and recognizes a marked difference between legitimate enemy combatants and war criminals. The Supreme Court of the United States has endorsed the law of war's domestic application with regard to combatants captured on American soil, and its decisions in this regard form much of the basis for our government's current policy. Indeed, the questions of that policy's limits and the Commander in Chief's ability to implement it are being addressed before the Supreme Court as this letter comes to print. The most important question in this context, however, is not whether our government can continue to detain and ultimately prosecute enemy combatants in a manner consistent with the practices employed since 11 September 2001, but only to what degree it can do so. Mr. Fidell and others argue that our government's current practices have no legal basis and should be abolished. Such policy, he avers, "runs dead against the American grain." he is wrong.
If 11 September taught us anything, it is that wartime threats require wartime actions. As the President has recently admitted, before 11 September al Qaeda was at war with us but we were not "on a war footing" with them. Traditional law enforcement and judicial processes were and continue to be grossly insufficient to deal with such a strategic threat to our national security. I do not advocate "martial law" nor do I endorse a wholesale rollback of our civil liberties. What I do believe, and what I demand of my government, is that our war effort should utilize every available resource at our disposal under the law. Our founding fathers understood, and our constitution, Supreme Court, the United Nations' various international tribunals, and the current administration all recognize that the law of war imposes different standards on wartime combatants, especially illegal ones. Al Qaeda members and those aligned with them (e.g., Hamdi and Padilla) are illegal wartime combatants wherever they may choose to conduct operations. While some measure of review should (and does) exist to determine whether they are properly classified as such, they are not "civilians" entitled to full habeas corpus rights. We must treat them accordingly if we are to prevail.
Our government does not operate with impunity. The upcoming Supreme Court hearings are proof of that. Although I am sure Mr. Fidell would welcome a further opportunity to challenge the common law and constitutional justification (or lack thereof) underlying our country's detention of enemy combatants in the global war on terrorism, I believe such a debate misses the point. Too often influential voices are dismissive of both the existence of legitimate legal bases for our country's actions as well as the compelling need to call upon those principles in time of war. I prefer to direct my energies toward making our government's policy work and promoting a better understanding of its justification, rather than unfairly tearing it down and presenting no viable alternatives.
"If You're the Chief, Be the Chief"
(See B. Stewart, p. 64, February 2004 Proceedings)
Captain Mark C. Nesselrode, U.S. NavySince "Ask the chief and "The chiefs are the backbone of the Navy" are still two of the most prevalent phrases spoken in the fleet, it shouldn't have been surprising and was most refreshing to see a chief-forgive my lumping a master gunnery sergeant into the chief petty officer mess, but it is applicable, as many who remember Marine security detachments on board ship will admit-published and honored for one of the most lucid and accurate portrayals of leadership I have read in Proceedings or any other source.
My greatest concern as I read, with growing interest and admiration, was the possibility of two very sad outcomes: (1) the enlisted sailors and the chief petty officers to whom Master Gunnery Sergeant Stewart was speaking never will hear about or read this article, and (2) the vast majority of officers of all ranks, but especially junior officers, will not read it because they mistakenly will decide that the title or author are somehow unworthy of their time.
The article is seminal in its approach to leadership. It harkens back to various discussions on the subject by Admiral Hyman G. Rickover. Although many did not care for his style or methods, the success of the nuclear power program is irrefutable. His belief that to be a leader one must be technically competent (which should never be confused with technically educated), and completely versed in the duties of a subordinate to understand and properly lead has been proven time after time. Master Gunnery Sergeant Stewart's espousal that not only these tenets but a leader's accountability ("our example must be a total package-not just in uniform, but 24 hours a day and 7 days a week") are crucial is something that seems to be missing in the "upbringing" of our sailors and junior officers.
The need for the Navy to downsize to permit recapitalization is unquestionably the right thing to do. The need for the Navy to exercise covenant leadership, which requires all who aspire to to join the chief petty officer mess or become the future department heads, executive officers, and commanding officers, cannot be lost in the effort. We will need greater adherence to the very sage and absolutely critical concepts highlighted by Master Gunnery Sergeant Stewart as we build ever more technically challenging platforms manned by continually decreasing numbers of personnel.
"Why Did Navy Helos Cross the Beach?"
(See K. Lenox, pp. 50-52, January 2004 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander John Zerr, U.S. Navy, Helicopter Antisubmarine Squadron 4 Maintenance Officer-Many thanks to Commander Lenox for highlighting the overland mission requirements of the Navy rotary-wing community. Despite the fact that Naval Special Warfare (NSW) support and combat search and rescue (CSAR) have been primary missions for years, these capabilities are little understood at the higher levels of Navy leadership.
With the re-emerging emphasis on antisubmarine warfare (ASW), many in higher leadership positions think ASW and overland missions are mutually exclusive for Navy rotary wing. This is not the case. The Navy's HH-60H, resident in helicopter antisubmarine and special helicopter combat support squadrons, was designed for the primary missions of NSW support and CSAR. It has no ASW capability. Using this helicopter for NSW support does not negatively impact the inner-zone ASW capability of the strike group.
During the John C. Stennis (CVN-74) Strike Group's recent workup period, Helicopter Antisubmarine Squadron 4 maintained a two-HH-oOH NSW detachment away from the carrier during the major exercises-composite training units exercise (CompTUEx), Air Wing Fallon, and joint task force exercises (JTFEX). The detachments proved to be resounding successes while meeting all overwater mission requirements. Dedicated work with Navy SEALs in which the helo crews and the SEALs plan, live, and operate together, such as was done on these detachments, developed the close working relationship with NSW Squadron 1 that will pay off on deployment. The John C. Stennis Strike Group will deploy with a ready and robust NSW capability, ready for quick reaction tasking from the combatant commanders.
In his CNO Guidance for 2004, Admiral Vern Clark states that "winning the Global War on Terrorism is our number one objective." With special operations at the forefront of war, the resident NSW capability achieved by the John C. Stennis Strike Group should be the model for future deploying strike groups.
Flag and General Officers and Senior Enlisted Leaders of the Naval Services
(See pp. 127-142, May 2004 Proceedings)
Captain Diane J. Diekman, U.S. NavyI noted with dismay that your list of admirals showed "Line" admirals and then those with specialties. Because U.S. Naval Regulations divides officers into line and staff, your breakout implies all the others are staff corps, which is not true. Restricted line (RL) officers (engineering, aerospace engineering, etc.) are as much line officers as are those in the unrestricted line (URL). The proper divisions are line and staff, not URL and RL/staff. In the future, please at least refer to the first group of admirals as "unrestricted line." That section does not contain all the line officers.
EDITOR'S NOTE: The flag list we publish follows the Navy's listing. We will address this issue with the appropriate office in the Navy.
"Why We Need Nonnuclear Submarines"
(See A. Edmiston, pp. 53-56, January 2004; P. Sawyer, April 2004 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral William J. Holland Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)-Commander Sawyer's comment nicely addresses why battery-powered submarines do not meet the needs of the United States, but neglects some fundamental errors in the premises of Commander Edmiston's article. It seems one of the consequences of operating only nuclear-powered submarines is a dearth of knowledge about battery-powered ones and a failure to understand their limitations. The result of this ignorance is resurrection of beliefs that are wrong.
The size difference between battery-powered submarines and nuclear-powered ones is insignificant. Sail height is the major contribution to a submarine's dimension in the water column and is governed by the need to keep the hull far enough below the surface to avoid the trough effect in rough seas. Short sails have proven unattractive in this regard, so now this dimension is essentially the same regardless of the means of propulsion. Except for ballistic-missile submarines, the difference in the length is less than 200 feet (Kilo = 235 feet, Los Angeles = 360 feet), insignificant in an ocean measured in hundreds of miles.
A nuclear submarine is easier and safer to operate in shallow water than a batterypowered submarine. The power and responsiveness of a nuclear power plant allows higher-speed operations with more effective control surfaces than from a battery-powered boat. This is especially attractive in shallow waters subject to strong winds resulting in short wavelengths.
Bottoming a submarine is an evolution of last resort, not an advantageous maneuver. It is an endeavor that battery-powered submarines are forced into when pursued closely and running out of battery. It is akin to playing possum, hiding and hoping. Lack of practice with bottomed submarines perpetuates this myth, but reducing power when reverberation is limited teaches active sonar operators to distinguish a boat from the bottomparticularly in shallow waters with slight gradients. Bottoming only makes the antisubmarine warfare force's job easier.
Intelligence gathering by submarines cannot be performed adequately by stationary platforms. Some repositioning is almost always required because the line of sight is only a few feet. Being responsive to opportunities requires urgency that taxes battery-powered submarines.
That these fables continue to arise, even among submarine-qualified officers, indicates a failure to appreciate the truths of antisubmarine warfare and the limits of battery-propelled submarines. Exercises and practice that allow ASW platforms to work against real submarines, nuclear or battery powered, is the answer.
EDITOR'S NOTE: This subject is discussed in depth by Admiral Holland in "Battling Battery Boats" June 1997 Proceedings, pp. 30-33.
"Every Night I Pray for America"
(See K. Allred, p. 30, May 2004 Proceedings)
Commander Victor H. Krulak Jr., Chaplain's Corps, U.S. Navy (Retired)-Captain Allred made the common mistake of confusing a gun salute with volleys. What is fired at a military funeral or memorial service is three rifle volleys. If there are seven riflemen in the detail, 21 rounds are fired. The gun salute is fired to honor a dignitary, and the number of guns fired varies with the seniority of the dignitary. In this country the only official who rates a 21-gun salute is the President.
"From Our Archive"
(See p. 22, April 2004 Proceedings)
Captain Robert B. Workman Jr., U.S. Coast Guard (Retired)-In the description below the photograph on page 22, you list lieutenant Commander A. C. Read as "aircraft commander" and lieutenant Elmer Stone as "crewmember." Whereas it would be correct to address both Read and Stone as crewmembers, it is not correct to address Commander Read as NC-4's aircraft commander. Commander Read was the commanding officer and navigator. Lieutenant Stone was pilot and lieutenant (junior grade) Hinton was copilot.
In fact, prior to his assignment as pilot of NC-4, lieutenant Stone was the Naval Air Station Rockaway's seaplane officer, tasked with certifying the new NC aircraft for the transatlantic flight. This is perfectly understandable because Coast Guard aviators had the experience with offshore, heavy sea landings and takeoffs used in search and rescue. lieutenant Stone had considerable experience as a test pilot for open sea operations.