Transformation under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights
Col. Douglas A. Macgregor, USA. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003. 320 pp. Photos. Bib. Index. $34.95.
Reviewed by Colonel Robert B. Killebrew, U.S. Army (Retired)
Army Colonel Douglas Macgregor has produced a hugely ambitious but uneven study of contemporary and future warfare, covering everything from the organization of Army brigades and joint task force headquarters to globalization and revolutionary Islam. Through historical interpretation and analysis of recent U.S. experience, Macgregor argues for a national strategy of joint expeditionary warfare, with land operations as the centerpiece and catalyst for the joint team. Today's U.S. Army, he asserts, is not optimally organized to do that-a result, he believes, of conservative, if not fossilized, leadership stretching back to World War II. "At the moment," hesays, "any proposal to organize or deploy the Army that diverges from theoperational patterns of WWII and the cold war—seemingly revalidated during Desert Storm-is rejected. . . . The hastily assembled and largely unready task forces sent to Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan point to structural and institutional weaknesses in the Army that have persisted for fifty years."
This is mostly a book about the Army, and Army critics will find plenty of ammunition in Macgregor's lambasting of that service's leadership, operational skills, and efforts at transformation thus far. Some of his shots hit close to the mark, particularly when he critiques Army decisions on future force transformationmuch better, he asserts, to be reorganizing current Army force structure around existing hardware than waiting for the pot of gold promised by research and development.
As Macgregor fans might expect from his previous work, Breaking the Phalanx (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), he directs much of his criticism at the Army's divisional organization, which be believes to be basically unchanged from World War II. It is, he says, overstructured, unwieldy, and ill suited for the kind of war of movement the new strategic era requires. A part of the book is taken up with his detailed proposals on the reorganization of divisions into brigade-level combat units. Although this portion might be opaque to nonsoldiers, Macgregor's recommendations add up to smaller, permanently formed "combat groups" to replace the Army's current flexible, task-organized brigade structures nestled inside permanent divisions.
Macgregor's swings lose much of their punch, however, through a combination of circumstances. The first, and most obvious, is that a new Chief of Staff, General Peter Schoomaker, already has begun to experiment with organizational changes that moot many of Macgregor's arguments. For example, unit (instead of individual) replacement is functioning in the Afghan and Iraqi campaigns. New training initiatives are under way. In particular, trials have begun in divisions on modifications to the Army's divisional and brigade structures. Early returns point to smaller, but still task-organized, brigades inside divisional structures that will be modified based on combat experience.
Second, Macgregor falls into the common trap of elevating "global joint expeditionary warfare" to the level of national strategy. He is not alone. "Expeditionary warfare" was coined by General Al Gray, Commandant of the Marine Corps in the late 1980s and early 1990s, for a smaller purpose-to distinguish Marine Corps capabilities in the post-Cold War era. Subsequently, the military services seized on expeditionary warfare as a new force shaping strategy. When the second Bush administration came to office, an expeditionary "strategy" seemed to fit with the administration's early inclination toward unilateral neo-isolationism and campaign pledges to "transform" the military.
As events in Iraq show today, expeditionary is only a capability, not a strategy. The idea that "rapid, decisive operations" can quickly end wars before casualties mount and political opposition grows is delusional. It is the same hubris that led Germany to overextend blitzkrieg. It does not make Macgregor's case stronger when he cloyingly praises the President and secretary of Defense for having "restrained the tendency to commit forces and munitions on a scale that [was] disproportionate to the requirement" in Iraq, a decision that probably contributed to the breakdown of order and today's insurgency. The administration has discovered that winning wars is different from winning battles, and Macgregor's focus on rapid, decisive operations now seems dated.
Third, the author's wide-ranging critique of the Army would be better served by fewer offhand slapshots and more accurate and appropriate historical examples. Repeatedly referring to today's Army as "the World War II" Army is as misleading as it is unnecessary. Decrying nepotism in the service by citing the examples of Generals "Black Jack" Pershing and George Marshall defeats his point. And the Korean War ended because the Elsenhower administration sought stalemate for domestic reasons, not because "our artillery and air-delivered firepower" could not defeat the Chinese. And there are other misfires. The author, however, is a noted defense critic and writer, and Transformation under Fire reflects his strong opinions on Army organization and national strategy. Discerning readers will find much to think about here.
Colonel Killebrew was an infantry officer for 30 years and served in special forces, mechanized infantry, and airborne units. He currently consults and writes on national security issues.
The Marine Corps Way: Using Maneuver Warfare to Lead a Winning Organization
Jason Santamaria, Vincent Martino, and Eric Clemons. Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2003. 256 pp. Maps. Notes. Bib. Index. $22.95.
Reviewed by Major General J. M. Myatt, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)
I applaud the authors' grasp of the significance of a philosophy of leadership based on maneuver warfare and its potential application to the business world. Far too often, leaders in business lack any philosophy of leadership. Maneuver-warfare-style leadership, including understanding the importance of commander's intent, mission tactics, and learning to act decisively in a world of disorder made up of uncertainty, friction, and fluidity, can help create and sustain a winning organisation. The emphasis on "trust tactics" with decentralized decision making, so long as the commander's intent "two-levels down (up)" is understood, will help any organization create its own competitive tempo of operations. Thus, the leadership analogy for maneuver warfare in business is solid.
Aside from the emphasis on leadership, I tried hard to envision how a corporation might embrace this book for teaching maneuver warfare to the various levels of leadership in its organization. The corporation I joined on leaving active duty in 1995 is one of this country's most patriotic, and one that works hard to support the U.S. military's endeavors wherever the military is engaged. The corporate leadership is made up of several military veterans. Even so, they very carefully avoid military analogies when leaching their leadership/management how to lead, because it often is counterproductive to use the terminology of warfare with an audience of civilians who never have served in the military. In fact, I was somewhat taken aback that any use of warfighting terminology often is rejected. Interestingly, the corporation has hired consulting firms to teach leadership with terminology that avoids reference to military examples. I am not optimistic other corporations will want to use this book as their model for a "winning organization."
As for accuracy of the text, I question several statements (on pages 10, 16, and 69) that the Marine Corps adopted maneuver warfare because it was a "perennially under-funded and under-manned organization" forced to do more with less. I was close to General Al Gray's team of "thinkers" who pushed for the adoption of maneuver warfare in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s because it meant "fighting smart" and teaching the Corps' leaders to strive to defeat opponents by outthinking them, rather than outgunning them. In fact, the height of the Corps' congressional funding and manpower authorizations coincided with some of General Gray's most enthusiastic maneuver warfare teaching symposiums.
The authors' continued emphasis on maneuver warfare's applicability to a "smaller, lighter force, with limited resources" is odd. "Fighting smart" is not just for the resource-constrained. It should be how all organizations operate, teaching their leaders how to lead and win.
Finally, I always was taught that maneuver warfare is a way of thinking, with broad guidance in the form of concepts and values. The authors based this book on adherence to "seven guiding principles." Our original Marine Corps Manual on Warfighting did not have a checklist; instead, it emphasized outthinking one's opponent. Being given a list to memorize diffuses the intellectual aspect of maneuver warfare. I would have preferred the authors develop concepts discussed in an article by Professor Thomas Czerwinski of the National Defense University ("Command and Control at the Crossroads," Marine Corps Gazette [October 1995]), where he examined successful leadership in warfare since the 18th century. In his article, Czerwinski concluded that the only consistently successful style of leadership has been one that emphasizes a leader's ability to influence the decisions of his subordinate commanders through the teaching of his vision for the outcome of an engagement, rather than his ability to control all of his subordinates' actions. This is the essential leadership lesson for winning organizations, because it is the lesson most managers have yet to learn. In tough, tight economic times, corporations often fall back on the tried-and-true practices of cutting all overhead costs and trying to control all decisions at all levels-with attendant negative consequences. It is in those tough times when corporations need the leadership lessons of maneuver warfare.
General Myall is president and CEO of the Marines' Memorial Association in San Francisco, California.
Havoc's Sword
Dewey Lambdin. New York: St. Martin's, 2003. 372 pp. $25.95.
Reviewed by Commander Tyrone G. Martin, U.S. Navy (Retired)
This latest Alan Lewrie naval adventure, set in the age of the French Revolutionary Wars, opens on the chilling note that the maimed and malevolent French Captain Guillaume Choundas, who has crossed paths and swords with Lewrie on more than one occasion (and bears the scars), has arrived at Guadeloupe with orders to leave no stone unturned to disrupt the revolution in Haiti and regain that half of Hispaniola for France. Lewrie, in the meantime, is in Jamaica acting as second to a longtime friend in a duel with a young member of a powerful island family. The young man is mortally wounded, making it advisable for the victor and his party to get out of town. Thus, Lewrie becomes the captain of choice to receive orders on independent duty supporting a Foreign Office effort to subvert Haiti in the British direction.
Heading first to Antigua, to let the admiral there know of the undercover operation unfolding in his area of responsibility, Lewrie detours for a look-see at Guadeloupe and happens to arrive just as Choundas's frigate is anchoring and a heavily laden merchant ship is arriving. Brushing aside a guard schooner, Lewrie blasts Choundas before he can get fairly under way again, then sinks the merchantman. In one swoop, he damages Choundas's flagship beyond the local capability for immediate repair and eliminates a shipload of war stores intended for whichever of the squabbling Haitian leaders Choundas might entice. Lewrie and his Foreign Office cohorts also send the captured officers of the merchantman ashore under the impression that the British had advance information about the arrival of its important cargo. This sends Choundas, when he learns of his setback at the hands of the hated Lewrie, into a paroxysm of anger and frustration leading to a witch-hunt to discover the presumed traitorous spy within his ranks.
The British, meanwhile, try their own hand at regaining influence in Haiti, but their man on the scene proves to be so incompetent that he becomes a joke among the several Haitian contenders, including Toussaint L'Ouverture and Andre Rigaud. A new factor in the mix appears in the form of units of the new U.S. Navy, which Lewrie sees as valuable if rather prickly allies against the French. An exciting series of events takes them to a showdown with Choundas and company with unexpected results.
After the dark domestic clouds of the previous story, here, in the fall of 1798, Lewrie has time to consider his marital situation from afar and comes to the conclusion that he will do all he can to restore domestic harmony. His duties make it easy to put aside his "ram cat" tendencies of yore, much to his satisfaction, but another cloud appears in the form of a 13year-old product of a former dalliance, now a U.S. Navy midshipman. Life is never dull for Alan Lewrie.
Author Dewey Lambdin once again provides a vivid picture of a former time, with much historically accurate detail woven into his story. A big attraction is the sense that Lambdin is not only creating the tale, but also seeing the sights, hearing the sounds, smelling the smells, and feeling the emotion as he writes. One is not merely receiving a report of events, but is on the scene. This is a fun read.
Commander Martin is a former commanding officer of the Constitution and author of A Most Fortunate Ship: A Narrative History of Old Ironsides (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003).