Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was one of the most decisive U.S. victories.1 A dictatorial regime ruling a population of 25 million was defeated in only 21 days of fighting instead of the planned campaign of 125 days.2 U.S. forces showed remarkable improvement in their conduct of joint/combined warfare since the Gulf War in 1990-1991. New technological advances were integrated successfully with sound tactical and operational concepts. The coalition commanders displayed a high degree of operational flexibility and agility.
The Plan and Its Execution
The original version of Central Command's (CentCom's) campaign plan envisioned a major joint/combined air offensive aimed at obtaining air superiority over Iraq. This would be followed by two related initial major air-land operations. One was aimed at seizing southern Iraq with its major ports and oil fields, and another was intended to seize control of the northern part of Iraq. Afterward, two successive major air-land operations, one from the south and another from the north, were aimed at seizing central Iraq and the country's capital, Baghdad.
The strategic objective of OIF was clearly expressed and militarily achievable. It included the end of the Saddam Hussein regime; the elimination of weapons of mass destruction; the capture or driving out of terrorists who had found refuge in Iraq; and the securing of Iraqi oil fields and resources.7 The strategic center of gravity (COG) for the coalition forces was Saddam Hussein, his inner circle, and his security apparatus. In the final days of the battle for Baghdad, the Iraqi leadership vanished. Since then, 34 leaders from the list of 55 have been detained or given themselves up. The coalition's failure to capture or eliminate Saddam and his inner circle, however, complicates the stabilization efforts in Iraq.
In the initial phase of OIF, the operational COG for land- and carrier-based air operations was Iraqi fighter aircraft and ground-based air defenses. In southern Iraq, in the initial major air-land operation, it was the two most capable divisions (6th armored and 51st mechanized) of the Iraqi regular army III Corps in the Basra-Nasiriyah area. The four Republican Guard divisions defending outer defenses south of Baghdad were the proper operational COG for the coalition forces prior to the attack on the city.8 The city of Baghdad was, in military terms, an operational objective to be captured or controlled, not a strategic center of gravity.
The deployment of the coalition ground forces did not proceed in an orderly fashion. The planners opted for a "rolling start" in which part of the ground forces would start the offensive and additional forces would be phased into the theater gradually.9 It was unusual that the phasing-in of the additional forces was based on the progress of the operation rather than calculations prepared in advance.10 The information age reinforces the need for the timely arrival and movement of forces in the theater. Forces should be phased into the theater only when the conflict breaks out unexpectedly or when there is no time to deploy the entire force before the start of the operation.
The operational idea for OIF was innovative and bold, and it provided for speed of execution and synchronization of the coalition ground, air, and special force elements. The lack of access to Saudi territory forced the planners to concentrate more than 100,000 coalition troops in a small area in northern Kuwait. The planners also took into account that the first operational objective on the ground was a quick capture of the Basra and Rumayla oil fields before the Iraqi forces could set fire to the wells.11 Another major concern was preventing the Iraqis from firing their Scud missiles against Israel. Hence, a large number of the U.S. special forces were inserted into western Iraq to seize certain key points there.12
The speed of the advance was one of the principal features of the operational idea. The planners envisaged that coalition forces would reach the outskirts of Baghdad 25-30 days after the start of the ground offensive.13 The disadvantage was that the rapid advance would open flanks and stretch lines of supply too thin.14
The sector of main effort was the area west of the Euphrates River, and the sector of secondary effort was the area east of it. The final plan envisaged that the main attacking force would advance through the desert of southern Iraq and west of the Euphrates River, bypassing Iraqi divisions. Simultaneously, a supporting force would advance east of the Euphrates River.15 The British forces were tasked to occupy the Basra and Umm Qasr areas. The V Army Corps, with two divisions (3rd Infantry Division and 101st Airborne Division), was the main force in the south, and the I Marine Expeditionary Force and the British 1st Armored Division were the supporting force (see map). In the original plan, the 4th Infantry Division would advance along the Iraqi-Turkish border southward to Tikrit and then to Baghdad.16 As it turned out, the 4th Infantry Division was denied entry to Turkey's territory and did not take part in the combat phase.
On 20 March, coalition forces advanced on a relatively narrow front deep into Iraqi territory and toward Baghdad. The coalition forces in the sector of main effort approached the point of culmination on 24 March, after reaching a position about 50 miles from Baghdad. Almost at the same time, a severe three-day sandstorm delayed further advance.17
The primary reasons for the 72-hour pause were logistical difficulties caused by the speedy advance and ever-extending lines of communications between logistical bases in Kuwait and the frontline units. These, in turn, gave the Iraqi Fedayeen paramilitary forces an opportunity to harass coalition forces in the rear. The Iraqis, however, were unable to coordinate and mass their forces to attack weak points in the coalition lines.18 Undoubtedly, a more adept and skillful enemy would have done more damage.19 The coalition forces, however, only slackened their efforts, and many offensive operations were conducted with air forces continuing to provide close-air support.20
Because of inadeqaute force levels, planners could not provide for an operational reserve or reinforcements in the initial phase of the operation. By 25 March, three coalition divisions were 300 miles deep into Iraqi territory, but the follow-on division was three weeks away from being phased into the theater.21 The absence of readily available reinforcements was one of the serious flaws in CentCom's plan.
The success of the coalition ground troops largely was the result of overwhelming air superiority. Of about 300 Iraqi aircraft, not one took off. Antiaircraft radar defenses were quickly wiped out. Shoulder-launched Iraqi surface-to-air missiles and light antiaircraft guns were virtually useless against coalition aircraft, which used long-range standoff weapons and rarely flew below 10,000 feet.22 The high speed of advance of the coalition forces on the ground exposed the Iraqi forces and made them more vulnerable to coalition aircraft.23
The Navy's aircraft flew half of the 15,000 strike sorties, and its ships and submarines fired more than 800 Tomahawk cruise missiles. Carrier-based aircraft were used extensively for providing close-air support to the coalition forces on the ground. Coalition surface forces and maritime patrol aircraft protected friendly shipping in the Gulf and conducted maritime interception operations. More than 95% of all supplies were shipped by sea.24
Some things apparently did not go as smoothly as expected. Close-air support to the ground forces intensified only after ground forces moved 220 of the 300 miles to Baghdad and lost momentum.25 Despite dramatically increased precision, the bombing of leadership targets failed to bring down the Iraqi regime. The "shock-and-awe" offensive only disrupted Iraqi strategic command and control.26 The Iraqi Republican Guard divisions moving from the north toward the south proved difficult to stop because they were dispersed. They were not successfully attacked until they regrouped some 30 miles from Baghdad.27
Postconflict planning apparently started late and was poorly done.28 Its execution was even worse. The planning reportedly was based on some overly optimistic assumptions regarding the attitude of the Iraqi population and underestimated the difficulties of restoring some basic needs in the aftermath of the collapse of the tyrannical regime in Baghdad. The problems in the postconflict phase of OIF were compounded because the final plan envisaged bypassing major cities and towns.29 The result was that too many of the Iraqi forces were allowed to melt into the population. The insufficient number of troops also did not allow coalition forces to seize and control a rather large part of Iraqi territory west of Baghdad and the area between Baghdad and Tikrit. U.S. forces were not present in substantial numbers in that part of Iraq for almost two months after the fall of Baghdad.30 This, in turn, allowed the Saddam loyalists to mount ambushes and attacks against U.S. convoys.
Old Lessons Reconfirmed
OIF reconfirmed the Clausewitzian teachings on the relationship between policy, strategy, and operations; on the nature of war; and on the role of the human element in warfare in particular. Military victories mean little and can be detrimental if the policy aims and the desired strategic end-state fall short or are not achieved at all.
The Clausewitzian concepts of the fog of war and friction were demonstrated on numerous occasions during OIF. Although coalition forces achieved an unprecedented degree of transparency over the battlefield, there were several significant gaps in their knowledge of the enemy. The whereabouts of Saddam Hussein and his inner circle remain a mystery. The process of finding Iraqi chemical and biological weapons has been unsuccessful so far.31
As in any war, there were some surprises. The coalition commanders expected that the Iraqi division-size forces in the south would surrender.32 The number of Iraqi prisoners, however, was only about 6,200 rather than the expected 50,000.33 Another great surprise was that the Iraqis did not, as feared, use their chemical and biological weapons against coalition forces.34
Coalition forces assumed that by largely bypassing cities and towns on the way, they would advance toward Baghdad relatively easily.35 The Fedayeen militia appeared in much greater numbers and acted more aggressively than the coalition commanders expected.36 The Baathist-led resistance in the port of Basra was not anticipated. U.S. Marines planned to seize the city of Nasiriyah within six hours, but it turned out that one week of heavy fighting was required. The Marines had to fight off constant ambushes as Iraqi militia used women and children as cover.37
The high degree of cooperation among all services was one of the main positive features of OIF. Coalition forces had an enormous advantage in their ability to integrate their diverse ground, air, sea, and special forces elements into a coherent whole. Joint employment was highly flexible and shifted depending on the situation.38
OIF proved how critical it is to have a thorough knowledge and understanding of the key aspects of operational warfare. The operation highlighted the utter falsity of the view that combat will be continuous, without operational pauses, and that there will be no need for reserves.
In an operation such as OIF, it is important to properly balance operational factors against the ultimate strategic or operational objective. In general, the larger the force, the shorter the conflict and the fewer the losses for both friendly and enemy forces. Larger forces also provide a margin of safety in case planning assumptions prove wrong. One of the worst errors is to initiate a campaign or major operation without sufficient and timely reinforcements and reserves. The enemy's morale also is much more adversely affected by facing a numerically larger force. Occupation duties normally require a larger force mix than is required in the combat phase.
OIF also reconfirmed the role of logistics. Inadequate logistical support and sustainment and overextended and vulnerable lines of communications are frequent causes for forces approaching or overshooting the point of culmination.
The war in Iraq showed once again the timeless role of the human factor in warfare. High levels of professionalism, leadership, training, unit cohesion, morale, and discipline are key for victories. The coalition commanders displayed the highest level of leadership and professionalism. They repeatedly changed their plans on short notice based on changes in the situation on the battlefield.39 All this was greatly enhanced by major advances in computerization and integration.40 One of the reasons U.S. forces were so successful in Baghdad was that they used the lessons learned during the fighting in the city of Najaf.41
In contrast, the Iraqi leadership was highly inept. Saddam Hussein and his two sons are dilettantes in the art of war, and it showed. The Iraqis did not make any use of their country's natural defenses. All the advantages of defense were thrown away before they could be used.42 The Iraqi army's quick defeat provided yet another example of the consequences of excessive centralization of command and control. Once the Iraqi top leadership lost control, subordinate commanders could not act on their own.
New Lessons Learned?
OIF provided relatively few new technological, tactical, or operational lessons. Some of them confirm tentative lessons learned in the conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. These lessons should not be accepted as definitive until more empirical evidence is obtained. The fact that the coalition fought a highly incompetent opponent should be taken fully into account.
The U.S. focus on fielding and using diverse precision weapons largely has been proved to be the way of the future. These weapons have been demonstrated to have great value in attacking an enemy's leadership and communications nodes and in providing close-air support, especially in an urban environment. The highest Iraqi leadership in Baghdad was "blinded" and unable to exercise effective control over subordinate forces.43 The use of precision weapons showed for the first time that an enemy's leadership would have great difficulty finding a safe place to hide. The danger, however, is in overemphasizing the importance and effectiveness of precision weapons. They are not as effective as their proponents argue in forcing a country's leadership to surrender or stop fighting.
The war in Iraq demonstrated the increasing maturity of network-centric technologies in providing an extraordinarily fast connection between target acquisition and target destruction. The time to attack moving targets reportedly was reduced to an average of 45 minutes.44 OIF demonstrated for the first time the enormous value in the fusion of logistic information from satellites, radio frequency identification devices, and other systems. Coalition commanders were able to track the status of logistical supplies in real time.45
An ever-increasing reliance on the speed of information flow, however, should be a cause of great concern for the U.S. military. The more forces rely on information, the more they are vulnerable to information loss. Network-centric warfare has been applied extensively in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and especially Iraq. In none of these cases did the loser have the capability to disrupt or even interfere with U.S. space-based and airborne sensors and computer networks. This might not be the case in the future. The vulnerabilities inherent in such a complex system could be exploited by a more capable and resourceful adversary using asymmetric tactics.
Proponents of network-centric warfare claim that superiority in the air, information superiority, and speed can result in a much smaller, more agile force. It is true that enormous advances in precision weapons combined with information technologies have led to a significant increase in the combat power and effectiveness of U.S. forces in the air. The increase in the ground forces' combat power is not of the same magnitude and quality as that of air forces and naval forces. The experiences of the war in Afghanistan and Iraq are insufficient to embrace the notion that air power in combination with small forces on the ground can quickly and decisively defeat a much stronger opponent. The netting of forces, battlespace knowledge, and speed of command, coupled with light and highly mobile forces lacking in numbers and organic firepower, might not be sufficient to defeat a numerically strong and determined adversary. As the postconflict phase in Iraq already demonstrated, there is no substitute for having large numbers of troops on the ground.
It would be easy to fall into the trap of believing that urban warfare is not a difficult problem for highly sophisticated and capable forces. The prolonged efforts of the British to seize control of Basra, and especially the Russian experience in Grozny, are more indicative of the difficulties inherent in urban warfare than the fall of Baghdad might suggest.
OIF further demonstrated the capabilities of the special forces and Central Intelligence Agency paramilitaries. The growing fusion of land forces and unconventional capabilities is a trend for the future, although it will be more difficult if special forces cannot easily blend into the population.
Conclusion
Thorough planning, preparation, and execution of strategic and operational deployment are among the most critical parts of a campaign or major operation. Any improvisation in deployment planning is costly and potentially fatal. Logistical planning, buildup, and sustainment likewise are critical for sucess.
OIF showed that the U.S. military has flexible, agile commanders who can make proper decisions and take appropriate actions in accordance with changes in the situation. They also are superbly trained. All these advantages could be degraded if the trend toward excessive centralization and micromanagement from the top is not reversed.
The process of learning sound lessons should not be politicized or personalized. Programmatic decisions that are going to determine the long-term direction of our military must be made with the greatest care. A single-minded focus on technological lessons to the exlusion of operational and strategic concerns will do much harm.
A wide, vigorous, and open debate is needed to arrive at any definitive lessons learned. Our potential opponents also are studying the Iraqi and coalition performances in OIF. If we are not diligent and objective, they might derive more sound lessons than the victors.
Dr. Vego is Professor of Operations, Joint Military Operations Department, at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.
1. Operation Telic for British forces and Operation Falconer for Australian forces. back to article
2. Evan Thomas and Martha Brant, "The Education of Tommy Franks," Newsweek, 19 May 2003; James Kitfield, "Army's Race to Baghdad Exposes Risks in Battle Plan," National Journal, 28 March 2003. back to article
3. Joseph L. Galloway, "Risks of Iraqi War Emerging," Philadelphia Inquirer, 25 March 2003, p. 1. back to article
4. John Walcott, "Doubt on War Felt at Top Levels," Philadelphia Inquirer, 1 June 2003. back to article
5. Peter J. Boyer, "The New War Machine," New Yorker, 30 June 2003, p. 60. back to article
6. Joseph L. Galloway, "Franks: We Held 25% of Iraq before War," Miami Herald, 20 June 2003. back to article
7. Jim Garamone, "Rumsfeld Lists Operation Iraqi Freedom Aims, Objectives," Defenselink, 21 March 2003. back to article
8. David A. Fulgham, "Not So Fast," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 31 March 2003, p. 22. back to article
9. Kittfield, "Army's Race to Baghdad Exposes Risks in Battle Plan." back to article
10. Vernon Loeb and Thomas Ricks, "Questions Raised About Invasion Force," Washington Post, 25 March 2003, p. A17. back to article
11. Lawrence F. Kaplan, "Strategic Attack: Rumsfeld's Bad Options," New Republic, 14 April 2003, p. 18. back to article
12. Vago Muradian, "Allied Special Forces Took Western Iraq," Defense News, 19 May 2003, p. 1. back to article
13. Mark Mazetti and Richard Newman, "The Seeds of Victory," U.S. News & World Report, 21 April 2003. back to article
14. Michael Inacker, "Saddam hat seine Strategie geaendert," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30 March 2003, p. 2. back to article
15. Mazetti and Newman, "The Seeds of Victory." back to article
16. Loeb and Ricks, "Questions Raised about Invasion Force," p. A17; Ben Rooney, "U.S. Puts Tactics before Tanks With a Fraction of Schwarzkopf Force," Daily Telegraph, 26 March 2003. back to article
17. "Ein Lehrstueck fuer den Krieg des 21. Jahrhunderts," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13 April 2003, p. 6. back to article
18. David Mulholland, "Luck or Good Judgment," Jane's Defence Weekly, 16 April 2003. back to article
19. Greg Jaffe, "Rumsfeld's Vindication Promises a Change in Tactics, Deployment," Wall Street Journal, 10 April 2003, p. A1; "Key Generals: Response to 'Fedayeen' a Vital Milestone in Iraq," Inside the Pentagon, 8 May 2003, p. 1. back to article
20. James Kitfield, "Attack Always," National Journal, 6 May 2003. back to article
21. Galloway, "Risks of Iraqi War Emerging," p. 1. back to article
22. "Shock and Awe Can't Do a Job," Toronto Star, 13 April 2003, p. 1. back to article
23. Anthony Cordesman, The "Instant Lessons" of the Iraq War (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Third Working Draft, 14 April 2003), p. 8. back to article
24. Jason Sherman, "Logistics Success Built on Sealift," Defense News, 12 May 2003, p. 32; "Statement of Admiral Vern Clark, U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations, before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee for Defense," 2 April 2003, p. 2. back to article
25. Fulgham, "Not So Fast," p. 22. back to article
26. Thomas Houlahan, "Strategic Bombing in Iraq War," UPI.com, 24 April 2003, p. 1; Johanna McGeary, "3 Flawed Assumptions," Time, 7 April 2003, p. 58. back to article
27. Stephen Hedges, "Air War Credited in Baghdad's Fall," Chicago Tribune, 22 April 2003. back to article
28. Rajiv Chandraskaran and Peter Slevin, "Iraq's Ragged Reconstruction," Washington Post, 9 May 2003, p. A1. back to article
29. John H. Cushman and Thom Shanker, "War in Iraq Provides Model of New Way of Doing Battle," New York Times, 10 April 2003. back to article
30. Michael R. Gordon and Douglas Jehl, "Foreign Fighters Add to Resistance in Iraq, U.S. Says," New York Times, 22 June 2003, p. A12. back to article
31. Greg Miller, "Analysis of Iraqi Weapons 'Wrong'," Los Angeles Times, 31 May 2003. back to article
32. "Key Generals: Response to 'Fedayeen' A Vital Milestone in Iraq," p. 1; David Ignatius, "The CIA and the Coup That Wasn't," Washington Post, 16 May 2003, p. A29. back to article
33. Jonathan Weisman, "Iraq Chaos No Surprise, But Too Few Troops to Quell It," Washington Post, 14 April 2003, p. A28. back to article
34. Miller, "Analysis of Iraqi Weapons 'Wrong.'" back to article
35. "Key Generals: Response to 'Fedayeen' a Vital Milestone In Iraq," p. 1; James Kitfield, "Attack Always"; Thomas E. Ricks, "What Counted: People, Plan, Inept Enemy," Washington Post, 10 April 2003, p. A1. back to article
36. McGeary, "3 Flawed Assumptions," p. 58; "Key Generals: Response to 'Fedayeen' a Vital Milestone in Iraq," p. 1; Roland Watson, "Rumsfeld Doctrine Gives Spoils of War to Washington's Hawks," The Times (London), 12 April 2003. back to article
37. Mazetti and Newman, "The Seeds of Victory." back to article
38. Cordesman, The "Instant" Lessons of the Iraq War, p. 5. back to article
39. William Matthews, "Triumph of Jointness," Defense News, 14 April 2003, p. 1. back to article
40. Cordesman, The "Instant Lessons" of the Iraq War, p. 5. back to article
41. Kitfield, "Attack Always." back to article
42. John Keegan, "Saddam's Utter Collapse Shows This Has Not Been a Real War," Daily Telegraph, 8 April 2003. back to article
43. Scott Cannon, "Time to Study Lessons Learned in War," Kansas City Star, 2 May 2003, p. 1. back to article
44. Matthew French, "Network-Centric Warfare Progressing," FCWCOM, 1 May 2003. back to article
45. Dan Caterinicchia, "Military Logistics Boosts Asset Visibility," Federal Computer Week, 16 June 2003. back to article