We are getting it wrong. Federal government authorities and the legion of security "experts" who popped up since the 11 September attacks often are focusing on the belief that the international terrorists' main maritime objective will be coastal ingress using containers on rogue ships and ship high-jackings. Instead, terrorists will do what they did before: strikes akin to that on the USS Cole (DDG-67) in October 2000.
Our homeland is vulnerable to entrance by sea, as evidenced by the flood of Chinese, Haitian, and Cuban migrants. But the Immigration and Naturalization Service estimates there are already between 5 and 11 million illegal immigrants inside our borders (remarkable both for the size of the estimate and that it could be off by 100% and still be within the margin of error). The enemy is already here. Al-Qaeda has put great emphasis on recruiting in North America, with results that surpass its efforts in Europe.
With respect to shipboard containers, al-Qaeda doctrine calls for accumulating and assembling explosives and weapons on scene, rather than smuggling them into theaters of operations. The exception to this practice would be of necessity a nuclear device. The U.S. authorities would do well to concentrate container efforts on detecting and countering nuclear threats.
Because al-Qaeda prefers an attack profile of short duration, a rogue ship traveling anything more than a short distance would take much time, during which any number of things (for example, foul weather and engineering casualties) could bedevil terrorists just as they bedevil sailors. Al-Qaeda always has preferred to minimize variables—and this option would require maritime skills not yet evident in its inventory.
Harkening back to Abu-Nidal's hijacking of the Achille Lauro, it should be recalled that the caper was a signal failure for the terrorists. The terrorists have learned the difference between defeat and failure. Defeats are opportunities to learn; failures are not repeated. Since that ill-fated affair, terrorists have not conducted an operation where objectives were fuzzy and control was less than complete. Further, it is clear they have gotten out of the hostage game and are concentrating on the killing game.
The assault on the Cole was a model operation. A suicide boat rammed the guided-missile destroyer in Aden's harbor, killing 17 sailors, wounding 31, and taking a major U.S. combatant off the line. Osama bin-Laden was so impressed with this success that he recited a poem celebrating it at his son's wedding three months later. Actually, the attack on the Cole was the second such attempt-the first was to have been against the USS The Sullivans (DDG-68) in Aden the previous January. However, the inflatable boat had been loaded improperly and it foundered. Unaware of terrorists intentions, the destroyer executed her brief refueling stop and departed.
Since the Cole incident, terrorists planned similar operations in Singapore and the Strait of Gibraltar, but their attacks were aborted when their cover was compromised. Recently, on 10 October 2002, the French tanker Limburg was damaged by a suicide boat off Yemen. One crewman was killed, the ship was disabled, and 90,000 barrels of oil were spilled into the Arabian Sea. Al-Qaeda learned these tactics from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil-Elam, a Sri Lankan and Indian nationalist movement that has conducted similar operations for almost two decades. Last year, they added merchant ships to their list of military targets. Although al-Qaeda has little in common with the Tigers, it is adept at forming tactical alliances to further its goals-so long as the United States remains the principal enemy.
These kinds of terrorist attacks—in port, inshore, in narrow seas—comprise clear and present danger to Western ships. They conform to al-Qaeda's doctrine of assembling the means of attack on scene, allow for an attack profile of very short duration, and do not require the experience of blue-water sailors. The tactic of using divers to plant underwater hull charges appears in al-Qaeda training doctrine and is a related threat. Indeed, some of the 11 September operatives who took flying lessons in the United States also took diving lessons. Here the same criteria obtain—inshore, locally produced devices, and brief approaches to contact.
Terrorist groups grow and evolve. Only a fool thinks he can be indemnified from any possible terrorist action. Even so, certain attacks are more likely than others and the maritime community would do well to first defend against the former. Guarding against every conceivable maritime contingency is impossible, unnecessary, and ultimately dangerous.
Retired Coast Guard Captain Brown has an extensive background in intelligence analysis. He works as a maritime security consultant in Londonderry, New Hampshire.