When the U.S. military fails to confront a problem squarely, external powers often impose the solution. Ineffectual military efforts to improve "jointness" resulting in subsequent passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DoD) Reorganization Act in 1986 serves as an example. Today’s situation is similar.
Defense analysts and others have used various terms to describe ways to improve the capabilities of U.S. forces. In the 1980s, the favorite expression was the "military reform movement." After Operation Desert Storm, "military technical revolution" came into fashion, followed shortly by "revolution in military affairs." Now the operative term is "transformation." Each expression suggests a desire for the services and joint forces to develop capabilities different from those possessed currently and planned for the future. Radical change often is desired, notwithstanding that evolutionary change is the norm in military and civilian affairs.
In the 20th century, the United States had to adapt its military to changing conditions on four notable occasions. With the possible exception of carrier aviation and amphibious operations in World War II, the case can be made that military preparations for both world wars fell short. We obviously failed to adapt adequately in the Vietnam War. The only conflict we undoubtedly were ready to fight was the Gulf War. Military leaders must adapt to changing conditions again—while they deserve credit for recognizing the challenges, their approach leaves much to be desired.
It is instructive to compare past successes and failures. Foremost among success factors was an officer corps that intensely studied the profession of arms through the lens of history and recognized the enduring nature of war, with its inherent fog, friction, and uncertainty. Those officers wrote their ideas clearly and then opened them to rigorous debate. Their concepts relied on solid intellectual content, not slogans and buzzwords. Much of the work done by Navy and Marine officers in the 1930s, and Army and Marine officers in the 1980s, reflected these attributes and were manifest in the doctrinal manuals they produced. Having observed and participated in some of the hard but exciting work of the 1980s—and witnessed its trial on Kuwaiti battlefields—I can attest to its effectiveness. Leaders at all levels welcomed ideas; ranks of the authors of innovative notions mattered little. What counted was the ability of new thoughts to prove their merit in wide-ranging, open debates in service schools and journals.
In addition, I have been involved for ten years in many attempts to launch reforms and can attest to the futility of most of them. Asking bright but relatively inexperienced contractors to create meaningful thoughts to support catch words—such as "dominant maneuver," "information dominance," and "effects-based operations"—is unlikely to lead to the kinds of operating concepts needed to guide joint forces in future conflicts.
We have to create an open process where all ideas are welcomed and subjected to the test of honest debate in many venues. Concept papers must not become incomprehensible documents littered with hundreds of acronyms. Leaders must demand intellectual rigor in thinking and writing, and insist that officers study history in depth. The staff process should not be confused with scholarship; nor can combat development be subjected to rigid schedules of experiments and exercises. Concepts are matured in simple, low-cost war games, refined in larger controlled experiments, and evaluated finally in exercises where the "enemy" is permitted to think and adapt. Only those ideas that survive the final crucible should be incorporated into military doctrine and allowed to guide organizational design and acquisition of weapons and equipment.
Although military leaders have had more than ten years to take advantage of the lessons of the Gulf War and the lesser conflicts since, there is little evidence they have done so fully. There is less evidence they are capable of carrying out the needed changes. Regardless of several Joint Staff vision statements, the services continue to focus mostly on traditional competencies. Diversity is a good thing, but the nation can no longer afford four separate operating concepts. It is incumbent on the joint community—represented by Joint Forces Command—to spell out a joint operations concept.
I have great optimism that Joint Forces Command can lead the way, provided it refocuses on warfighting issues and avoids political-military concerns, such as effects-based operations, and ill-conceived planning techniques, such as operational net assessment. If the armed forces do not devote themselves to joint operating concepts soon, they had best be prepared to cope with actions directed by the Congress and DoD.
Before he retired in 1997, Marine Lieutenant General Van Riper commanded the Marine Corps Combat Development Command at Quantico, Virginia.
Preparing for War Takes Study and Open Debate
By Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper, USMC (Ret.)