Operation Enduring Freedom was highly successful, accomplishing most of the stated U.S. strategic objectives. The fundamentalist Taliban regime collapsed in a matter of weeks, and the Afghani people enjoy far more freedom now than at any time during the past 20 years. The al Qaeda international terrorist network and its supporting structure in Afghanistan have been seriously, if not fatally, disrupted. Thousands of Taliban and al Qaeda fighters were killed or captured. The U.S.-led victory was relatively quick and achieved at the cost to the United States of only 31 killed and fewer than 100 injured. Yet despite these successes, some serious political and security problems remain in Afghanistan.
Operation Enduring Freedom confirmed that the relationship between policy and strategy remains the most critical factor in conducting a war. Policy always dominates strategy, and clear, militarily achievable political objectives are critical for ultimate success in any conflict. Determining a desired end state is the first and most important step before the use of military sources of national or coalition power. Mistakes made in policy are hard to overcome by strategy and operational art.
The operation showed a high degree of professionalism and dedication by all service members. U.S. air power was undoubtedly the key factor—although not the only one—in the U.S.-led victory. Smart munitions, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), satellite communications, and advanced information technologies were used extensively and successfully during the conflict. The operation, however, revealed some potentially serious problems in the application of operational warfare. Moreover, the U.S. military is in real danger of learning some false strategic and operational lessons from the conflict.
Desired End State and Strategic Objectives
Any military action with a strategic objective and intended to end hostilities requires the determination of a desired end state by the highest national leadership. Such guidance should state in clear terms what political, diplomatic, military, economic, informational, and other conditions should exist in a theater after the end of the hostilities. Only afterward can strategic objectives be determined.
The broader the desired end state, the greater one's flexibility to determine strategic objectives and to modify, refine, or alter them in the course of a conflict. Also, by articulating a militarily achievable desired end state, the highest national leadership would be in a much better situation to measure the progress of a campaign or major operation.
The United States had two courses open in determining the desired conditions at the conclusion of Enduring Freedom: the establishment of a commonly accepted central government in Kabul or a country fragmented along ethnic lines. The establishment of a central government would lead to the end of civil war, free elections, and the start of economic reconstruction and recovery. Such a situation, while highly desirable for both political and military reasons, is extremely difficult to create given the country's recent history. A fragmented Afghanistan perhaps is a more realistic ultimate outcome. Yet such a situation most likely would lead to greater instability in the region as the neighboring powers support their proxies and try to carve up spheres of influence in the country. Ironically, a fragmented state would reduce the possibility of the emergence of another radical Islamicist regime that could provide safe haven for international terrorist networks such as al Qaeda. Also, a fragmented Afghanistan would be too weak to pose a serious threat to any of its neighbors, although it would not serve as a buffer between competing powers. Other aspects of the desired end state could include the creation of conditions for the country's economic reconstruction, significantly reducing the production of opium, and the appeal and influence of militant Islam on the Afghani population.
The U.S. national strategic objectives in the war against international terrorism include the destruction of all components of the al Qaeda network worldwide and other radical groups dedicated to attacking the United States and denying the terrorists safe havens and other forms of support. The ultimate objective of these efforts should be to reduce drastically the ability of international terrorist groups to inflict political, economic, psychological, and other damages on the United States and its allies.
The task of Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command (CinCCent), was to translate these national strategic objectives into strategic objectives for the theater. On 7 October 2001, President George W. Bush announced that the U.S. military action was designed to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations, to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime, to bring bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders to justice, and to prevent al Qaeda's network from posing a continuous terrorist threat.
Method of Combat Force Employment
Even in an undeveloped theater such as Afghanistan, strategic objectives usually cannot be accomplished in one fell swoop. Therefore, the planners work backward to derive intermediate operational objectives. In a conventional war, the accomplishment of each operational objective would require planning and the conduct of a major operation. The ultimate strategic objective was accomplished through a single major offensive air operation and series of major tactical actions aimed at seizing the northern, eastern, southern, and western parts of Afghanistan. The unique feature of the operation was that each of the four operational objectives on the ground was accomplished through a major tactical action rather than a major operation. Enduring Freedom can be considered a counterterrorist campaign, the first such in history.
Critical Factors and Center of Gravity
In any conflict, the optimal use of one's military and nonmilitary sources of power is achieved by focusing on defeating or neutralizing an enemy's center of gravity (COG). For any military objective, there is a corresponding center of gravity. The higher the level of war, the smaller the number of COGs because there are fewer—although larger—objectives to be accomplished. At the strategic level, there is a single COG, while at the operational and tactical levels normally multiple COGs exist.
A COG always is found among an enemy's critical strengths, never among his critical weaknesses. It cannot be identified in isolation from a specific military objective to be accomplished. Both the objective and its corresponding COG are related closely. Whenever the objective changes, the enemy's critical strengths and weaknesses must be reevaluated as well. This, in turn, would require modification or refinement of the existing COG, or in case of a drastic change in the scope and the content of an objective, identification of a new COG.
For U.S. planners, the enemy's strategic center of gravity was the leadership of al Qaeda and the Taliban—and their will to fight. Because the Taliban regime was largely dependent on al Qaeda for its own survival, bin Laden and his inner circle represented the most important part of the enemy's strategic center of gravity. In many cases, an enemy's will to fight can be degraded seriously by inflicting on him a series of defeats in the field. This is hard to achieve when fighting fanatics such as hard-core Talibans or al Qaeda fighters. The only way to accomplish one's objective is by physically eradicating or capturing the leadership. Reportedly, of the 20 to 25 close associates of bin Laden, so far only one-third have been eliminated or captured. At least 15 top aides of bin Laden are in flight. Most of the 550 al Qaeda members held in Kandahar or Guantanamo are foot soldiers.1 As long as the leadership is at large, the ultimate strategic objective in Afghanistan will be difficult to consolidate.
In planning and executing a campaign against terrorists, one's efforts should be focused against an enemy's strategic COG. In contrast to a conventional war, an international terrorist network's leadership must be physically eradicated or at least captured. Otherwise, it is difficult to consolidate and exploit one's strategic success.
In Afghanistan, for each of the operational objectives there was a corresponding COG. Initially, the Taliban fighter aircraft and surface-to-air missiles were operational COGs. Subsequently, the Taliban and al Qaeda forces defending the northern, eastern, southern, and western parts of the country also were considered operational COGs.
Geographic Positions and Distances
The conflict in Afghanistan reconfirmed the enduring value of favorable military positions in planning, preparing, and executing major operations or campaigns. The U.S. maritime forces, land-based aircraft, and ground forces and their logistical supplies had to be moved from staging areas—in some instances a dozen of thousands miles away.
In the initial phase of the operation, the U.S. military lacked adequate host-nation support to insert its ground forces and tactical land-based aircraft into the area adjacent to Afghanistan. Hence, the U.S. Navy's carrier battle groups deployed in the Arabian Sea played a critical role in the initial phase of the operation. They made subsequent successes possible by carrying out the major part of the initial sorties. Without their contribution, the collapse of the Taliban regime would have taken longer. A combination of long distances and the short effective range of the aircraft, however, limited carrier aircraft to an average of 100 attack sorties per day.2 In addition, they needed a large number of tanker sorties to reach their targets.3 The carrier-based aircraft flew some 500 miles each way. Similarly, the B-1s and B-52s that flew from Diego Garcia and the B-2s from the United States required heavy use of in-flight refueling and significant diplomatic efforts in securing basing and overflight rights.4 The B-1s and B-52s had to fly a total distance of some 5,500 miles and each of their trips lasted 12 to 15 hours.
The conflict in Afghanistan confirmed some old lessons, such as the importance of geographical positions and distances on the outcome of a major operation. While information has an ever-increasing effect on the factor of space, one's forces still have to be moved at a relatively low speed and over a large space. They also must be supplied and sustained to overcome the factor of space and time. Hence, it is preposterous to claim that the geography and distances are somehow devalued. The United States was able to project its power over many thousands of miles from home bases and sustain that power for a long time. Even the ability of the United States to project power was limited, however, because of lack of support from host nations and restrictions imposed on its forces based on land. As in the past, the sea continues to provide the easiest access to many parts of the world's land mass. The conflict in Afghanistan was perhaps the first in which carrier-based air power created conditions for subsequent success in the employment of land-based tactical aircraft.
Operational Command and Control
Sound command organization is one of the most critical prerequisites for the successful employment of forces at any level, but especially at the operational and higher levels. During the operation, CinCCent remained in Tampa, Florida. It was explained that the advances in communications and teleconferencing allow atheater commander to control his forces regardless of long distances involved. Also, it was argued that a modern commander does not need to be physically in the area of operations to exercise effective command and control, or to lead and motivate his subordinate forces. Relocating CinCCent's headquarters to Saudi Arabia would have resulted in a symbolically larger U.S. presence in the region that could potentially lead to more political complications and also increase security risks.5
Some experts assert that what matters is whether the commander can be where he needs to be to influence the conduct of the battle.6 This view, however, misses a key point in modern command and control at the operational level. A theater-strategic commander should remain at his main headquarters so that he can most effectively monitor and control the events in his entire area of responsibility, not just the part of his theater where combat takes place. CinCCent is concerned not only with the conflict in Afghanistan, but also has to be involved in planning and preparation for possible contingencies in other parts of his area of responsibility. Ideally, he should maintain undivided attention to the strategic aspects of the situation. The ability to use advanced communications and information technologies should not be used as a justification for not establishing an intermediate level of command. Distance and time still matter, and the need for a commander to lead and motivate his forces remains one of the tenets of successful operational leadership.
One solution would have been the establishment of a theater of operations (perhaps called the Southwest Asia Theater of Operations). Such a theater command could have been led by a three-star flag officer directly subordinate to CinCCent and headquartered close to Afghanistan. The boundaries of such a theater would have encompassed Afghanistan and adjacent land areas used for basing of U.S. and other coalition forces, the Arabian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, and parts of the Indian Ocean. There would be significant improvement in control of subordinate forces deployed in the theater, and a great reduction in the amount of information passing on to CinCCent headquarters.
One of the principal tenets of U.S. command and control is centralized direction and decentralized execution. Decentralization of the decision-making process is a prerequisite for giving subordinates sufficient freedom of action. In contrast, a centralized execution leads to lack of initiative on the part of subordinates and forces the higher commander to take over part of their responsibilities in combat. This is not only bad for morale, but distracts the theater commander. The conflicts in Kosovo and Afghanistan reinforced the trend toward further centralization of command and control in U.S. military. Rather than reinforce decentralized command, advances in information technologies have led in the opposite direction.
Perhaps the most serious problem in the U.S. military today is the continued deterioration of the previously successful and well-proven method of centralized direction and decentralized execution of planning military actions at all levels. Advances in information technologies and communications should lead to further decentralization. The theater-strategic commander should focus on his responsibilities in the entire area of operations and leave the planning and execution of a major operation or campaign to a subordinate theater commander. This not only would preclude the theater-strategic commander from interfering with subordinate commanders, but would prevent his being bogged down in tactical details. The U.S. joint doctrine regarding operational command and control is sound and has proven its value. The problem is that it is poorly applied or is not applied at all. This is a potentially fatal flaw that could cost us dearly in a conflict with much stronger and smarter opponent.
Role of Air Power
The use of U.S. air power was the principal factor in the speedy collapse of the Taliban regime. In the initial phase of the operation, U.S. heavy bombers and carrier-based attack aircraft destroyed the Taliban's air defenses, communications, and military installations. It was not until the fourth week of the offensive, however, that air power shifted to the support of the proxies on the ground. The end of the Taliban regime then came rather quickly because of the combination of the punishing air strikes and the offensive of Afghani allies on the ground. The key to success was the availability of Special Forces on the ground to identify and designate targets for the aircraft. Reportedly, in many cases the response time was less than 20 minutes from the moment a target was spotted to its destruction. Fewer aircraft and fewer sorties were required to destroy targets than in the past. Some missions reportedly involved only a pair of bombers or attack aircraft.7
The role of Navy carriers as a platform of choice was reconfirmed. There should be no discussion of whether we need carriers or land-based air. We need both because their capabilities are complementary. Without carriers in the area, it is difficult to see how success would have been achieved.
Operation Enduring Freedom demonstrated that the effectiveness of air power against enemy forces on the ground was much higher than in other conflicts because of the extensive use of smart munitions and much more accurate targeting information provided by the Special Forces on the ground. This led to a smaller number of air sorties with much higher effectiveness per sortie. Simply because these tactics proved highly successful in Afghanistan, however, does not mean that they could be repeated with the same results in some other conflict against a much stronger and resourceful enemy. Also, inserting Special Forces on the ground to provide timely targeting information would be much more difficult and riskier in the urbanized environment or territory under tight control of the enemy forces. In short, the use of air power in combination with the Special Forces on the ground can be expected to be successful in some counterterrorist operation or campaign in the future, but not in major regional contingencies.
The greatest danger of the lessons from Afghanistan is that U.S. policymakers will rely predominantly on land-based aircraft in resolving the next crisis. Air power should be used in combination with forces on the ground and at sea to achieve the best results.
Targeting
The target selection followed a similar pattern to NATO's Allied Force (Kosovo), where the targets were selected and attacked regardless of whether and to what degree they contributed to the accomplishment of a given military objective.8 Among other things, focusing on targeting makes it much harder to determine whether and when a certain objective is accomplished and leads to a considerable waste of one's time and resources. As Kosovo showed, such an approach to warfare almost invariably leads to a war of attrition at the operational and strategic levels. This might not be important in operations like Enduring Freedom where victory is assured, but it is a different matter in fighting a much stronger opponent.
Another problem in the use of U.S. air power in Afghanistan was a clear overemphasis on avoiding collateral damages. Reportedly, virtually every strike or attack was approved by CinCCent in Tampa.9 Lawyers were heavily involved in approving the list of targets to be attacked, at all command echelons. The lawyers participated in determining whether a specific target was used for military purposes, evaluating the propriety of using certain type of munitions, and deciding whether a successful attack on such a target was outweighed by civilian losses.10 Although the commander made a final decision, this process was unnecessarily complicated, cumbersome, and time consuming. Reportedly, on too many occasions excellent intelligence and great advances in shortening the time for carrying out a strike were severely degraded because of the unduly long time for getting approval from the higher commanders. In some instances, the planners were forced to remove some targets from the list because of legal objections, although they were considered important for military reasons.11 While concern for avoiding collateral damage is critical for maintaining and sustaining public support for war, a better balance should be found so that legal issues are not allowed to adversely affect the success of a given military action.
Objectives and tasks—not targets—should dominate the planning process at any level of command. A targeteering approach is inherently attritional, and thus leads to a waste of time and effort because targets are selected and attacked without regard to their relationship to tasks and objectives. More seriously, such an approach to warfare, especially at the operational and higher level, cannot but lead to the loss of the broader perspective on the situation on the part of the operational commanders and their staffs. Enduring Freedom reinforced this negative trend toward overreliance on technology and tactics of platforms and weapons over combined arms tactics and operational warfare. Target selection and approval is becoming increasingly complex and time-consuming. The resultant loss of military effectiveness cannot be justified by using specious political and legal arguments.
Ground Forces vs. Proxies
In Afghanistan, proxies on the ground proved to be the key for the speedy collapse of the Taliban regime. The Northern Alliance and Eastern Alliance troops forced the Taliban and al Qaeda forces to concentrate, thereby becoming an easy target for devastating U.S. air strikes. The United States was faced with a choice of either relying on the Northern Alliance and other Afghani proxy forces or introducing a larger U.S. ground force. An advantage of relying on Afghani proxies was a significant reduction of political complications and greater chance for success in the post-hostilities phase. A disadvantage was that the Afghani proxies often had different objectives than the United States. In contrast to the U.S. way of warfare, which seeks clear-cut victories, the Afghanis generally prefer negotiated surrenders and switching sides rather than utterly defeating their domestic opponents.
The fighting at Tora Bora in December 2001 and Shahi Kot in February 2002 was less conclusive for the United States and its proxies than official statements might otherwise suggest. In both operations, a major part of the Taliban and al Qaeda fighters apparently survived and escaped to fight another day. Reportedly, during the fighting in Tora Bora, several hundred al Qaeda fighters escaped over the White Mountains into the poorly controlled northwestern frontier area of Pakistan.12 Many experts believe that if the United States had committed larger numbers of ground troops during the fighting, bin Laden and his top aides would have been captured.13 The consequences of the failure to capture the top leadership of al Qaeda are still to be seen.
The lack of a sizable U.S. presence on the ground almost certainly avoided protracted and costly conflict with the majority of the Afghani population because the United States was not perceived as a foreign occupier. At the same time, a high price was paid for using Northern Alliance and other Afghan surrogates instead of sending in sizable U.S. ground forces.
Role of Technology
Many experts have asserted that the success in Afghanistan proved the value of the "revolution in military affairs." While many new technologies successfully passed the test, it must be remembered that U.S. forces possessed overwhelming power and faced a weak opponent. The enemy never had a chance to challenge air power. The victory in Afghanistan was easy and cheap because Afghanistan had few economic centers and poor infrastructure. The Taliban air defenses were virtually nonexistent and that accounts for the fact that the United States obtained air superiority within hours. The Taliban had few, if any, antiaircraft weapons with the reliability, range, and guidance systems to pose a credible threat against high-flying aircraft equipped with the most advanced sensors.14 The UAVs were used against almost nonexistent opposition, and Special Forces were allowed to roam freely in the countryside.15 At sea, the U.S. and coalition forces faced no opposition at all. Nor did the Taliban possess any capability to interfere with or attack U.S. computer networks.
Network-centric warfare enthusiasts assert that their ideas have been proven in Afghanistan because targeting information from sensor to shooter was obtained almost instantly. Critical advances in computer networking and broadband satellite communications enabled intelligence from UAVs and other sources, such as the radars on board the E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (J-STARS) aircraft, to be combined with signals intelligence and satellite images. But the conflict in Afghanistan only proves that netting of diverse platforms technically works in a nonhostile or low-threat environment. It does not tell us whether U.S. systems are robust enough to operate smoothly in the face of a determined physical and electronic attack by a resourceful and skillful enemy.
Too much emphasis on technology is unsound because the human element of warfare is being dismissed as irrelevant to our modern age. Technological advances have steadily reduced uncertainties in the situation on the battlefield, but they cannot eliminate the Clausewitzian "fog of war" and "friction."
The emphasis on technology and tactics of weapons and platforms already has some serious and negative repercussions. This trend must be reversed soon. Otherwise the United States might find itself outthought and outfought by a relatively weaker but a more agile opponent who pays attention not only to tactics, but also to operational art and strategy and therefore better matches ends, means, and ways to achieve victory.
1. "Die Jagd auf ein Phantom," Der Spiegel, 22 April 2002, p. 137.
2. Lothar Ruehl, "Amerikas 'langer Arm' zwischen den Kontinenten," Neue Zuercher Zeitung, 8 December 2001.
3. Tom Bowman, "Studying Lessons of Battle Success," Baltimore Sun, 17 December 2001.
4. Bryan Bender, et al., "Afghanistan: First Lessons," Jane's Defence Weekly, 19 December 2001.
5. Richard Hart Sinnreich, "The Long Arm of Command," The Washington Post, 31 December 2001, p. A17.
6. Sinnreich, "The Long Arm of Command," p. A17.
7. Joseph Fitchett, "High-Tech Weapons Change the Dynamics and the Scope of Battle," International Herald Tribune, 28 December 2001.
8. Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO's Air War for Kosovo; A Strategic and Operational Assessment (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), p. xix.
9. William M. Arkin, "Fear of Civilian Deaths May Have Undermined Effort," Los Angeles Times, 16 January 2002.
10. Esther Schrader, "War, On Advice of Counsel," Los Angeles Times, 15 February 2002, p. 1.
11. William M. Arkin, "Fear of Civilian Deaths."
12. "Turning the Tide in Afghanistan," Boston Globe, 31 December 2001, p. 1.
13. "Why Osama Escaped," Boston Globe, 19 April 2002, p. 18.
14. Edward Cody, "Taliban's 'Hide-and-Wait' Strategy Failed," The Washington Post, 23 December 2001, p. A12.
15. Loren B. Thompson, "The Limits of Transformation: Some Words of Caution about Rumsfield's Revolution," Defense Week, 22 April 2002, p. 1.