Transformation is not a buzzword for a future state of readiness, but a continuous process of preparedness for handling the battlefield of today and forecasting what will be on the battlefield tomorrow. Plans and actions are adjusted constantly along the way to improve, integrate, and economize capabilities.
The way ahead has little to do with slogans and "super fighters" available 20 years from now. It is a state of mind that started yesterday, applies today, and will be carried forward to the next hill and beyond. The goal is to win all operations—from humanitarian to actual combat—any place, any time, and with any required mix of power. In addition to coping with asymmetrical threats in today's war, the armed forces must adapt existing capabilities to evolving security changes that are expected in the next fight. Waiting for systems that "leap generations" will not provide winning capabilities today or within the next ten years.
No form of transformation can succeed unless the incestuous relationship among the services, Congress, and defense contractors is altered dramatically. Absent Department of Defense approval, the services should not be permitted to solicit congressional support for their programs. Senators and congressmen who champion programs in their states and districts should be required to demonstrate that those programs support national security policies. Defense contractors should pay most of their own research-and-development costs before soliciting government acceptance—and, as in the civilian sector, eat development failures. Service traditions must continue to be respected, but not allowed to impede potential. There is nothing wrong with putting soldiers on board aircraft carriers, Marines beyond the littorals, and Marine expeditionary unit elements under theater special operations commands. Innovation and audacity should be encouraged, regardless of service boundaries.
The operating forces need practical strategic lift that optimizes military and civilian resources. Tactical systems often are developed with little regard for their deployment and employment under combat conditions. For example, the Army's new interim force light armored vehicle (LAV III) cannot deploy to unimproved airstrips in C-130 cargo aircraft because of its weight—nor can it be dropped by parachute if airfields are not available. Although the Army has the largest and most advanced helicopter force in the world, the LAV III cannot be carried by its heavy-lift CH-47 Chinook. Once on the ground, forces must be able to maneuver rapidly, maintain contact with communications that are compatible throughout the combined arms team, and direct air, ground, and naval fires where needed.
We can transform conventional forces to handle a wide range of operations: flexible enough in organization, training, and mobility to maneuver across deserts, fight in cities, and transition from peacekeeping to combat rapidly. This will take a mix of different forces that can adapt readily to the terrain and enemy at hand, with leaders trained for heavy, light, and special operations missions. The United States needs forces that can employ "gun powder and wheaties" in concert with one another. They must be able to use information operations as well as weapons to defeat the enemy, reduce his will to fight, and influence local populations.
First-class training is critical to transformation. High-technology enhancements will mean nothing if the troops are not trained in their use or lack confidence in them. Forces can be transformed with little expenditure of money on technological improvements if current units and systems are integrated for more efficiency, more effective tactics and techniques are developed, and leaders are instilled with how—as opposed to what—to think. A transformed mind-set is one that can handle the chaotic and uncertain situations created by the collapse of political, economic, and security systems. Leaders must be able to operate in countries that have no effective governments, where the enemy and front lines are not easily identifiable, and rules of engagement are conflicting. Our forces are expected to deal with terrorists, drug traffickers, warlords, militant fundamentalists, and paramilitary units—and still be able to overcome large maneuver formations and formidable defense systems. This is a tall order, but it is essential to world order and we have the only armed forces that can fulfill it.
Our enemies are transforming in Afghanistan and elsewhere. They adapt to our operations and tactics, our national attitude, and reactions in Arab and Western domains. They are transforming their remaining forces and adjusting their means of power relative to the changing environment. We will never stay ahead of them unless we consistently and aggressively take the same approach.
Retired Army Brigadier General Grange is the Executive Vice President & Chief Operating Officer of the McCormick Tribune Foundation.