"UAV: Unemployed Aviators Vanquished?"
(See A. Winberry, pp. 84-85, July 2002 Proceedings)
Commander Sean Clark, U.S. Naval Reserve, Strike Fighter Squadron 201—While I appreciate Ensign Winberry's look at the future uses of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), I am struck by some of the faulty reasons by which he claims that aviators should be taken out of the equation.
Aviators don't need "seat-of-the-pants sensory input" to maintain situational awareness. Situational awareness comes from multiple sources: onboard electronics sensors, off-board communication inputs, and simple airborne reasoning, just to name a few. The latter probably is the most important awareness generator, and actually being in the environment that one is fighting in is paramount to that reasoning. It is the aviator's brain and his ability to make instantaneous decisions that make him lethal in combat environments.
If it flies, an unmanned aerial vehicle will need an aviator to fly it. Physics of flight do not change just because the aviator is not on board the aircraft. Talk to any Air Force pilots who have done a tour flying UAVs and they will tell you that it is just as challenging as flying in the cockpit of an actual manned aircraft. One friend of mine compared flying UAVs to "flying with blinders on looking through a soda straw."
Last, there is no combat without risk. I am all for minimizing the risk to human life and for reducing the loss of precious military assets. But to think that UAVs are the end-all to winning the next war is shortsighted and not based on reality. I liken the current UAV Mafia to the same folks that told us in the Vietnam era that the gun was no longer needed now that we had superior air-to-air missile technology. Hogwash! UAVs are being shot down at an alarming rate because of the lack of an onboard human to see and evade the incoming threat. Combat is risky by nature, and manned aircraft provide the type of lethality needed to defeat our enemies.
"The Marines Have Quit Their Posts"
(See W. Holland, p. 112, June 2002; B. Trainor, July 2002 Proceedings)
Major General Kevin B. Kuklok, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, Assistant Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations—While attempting to disparage the contributions of the Marine Corps, Rear Admiral Holland actually highlights the value of our expeditionary ethos and our ability to continually evolve and transform to ensure the nation's success. He also illuminates some recurring misconceptions that threaten the security of our forces and the synergy of the vital Navy-Marine Corps team.
The Marine Corps always has played an integral role in maritime-based power projection. Even before Congress established the Marine Corps as a separate service in 1798, key missions in combat included leading boarding parties and operating as a major component of landing parties. Recognizing the changed circumstances of the tactics of naval warfare in the 20th century, the Marine Corps evolved to meet a critical fleet need for expanded power projection. The development of amphibious doctrine had its birth in the rise of U.S. global and naval power, and its impetus is as much a result of visionary direction from Navy officers such as Rear Admiral William S. Sims as Marines such as Major General John A. Lejeune.
Power projection by a maritime nation requires three critical elements: sea power to take the fight to the enemy; an irrefutable land force to change the enemy's will; and a capability that links our sea power and our land power. Hardwon experience has taught us that the effectiveness of this connecting piece is maximized when it flows from the sea. Moreover, a single-axis strike capability, by itself, always will be susceptible to counteractions by a resolute foe. Whether used or not, the ability to span concepts of naval and military operations requires a unique combined arms expertise—one whose effectiveness is readily apparent to an enemy and places him on the horns of a dilemma. It would be difficult to re-create this critical capability if we were to forego it based on flawed and simplistic rationalizations. The rise of U.S. global power in the past century and the unique relationship between our land power and sea supremacy through the distinctive amphibious capabilities of the Marine Corps are interconnected events. The development of the Fleet Marine Forces did not create a second army, but a unique capability that allows the United States to leverage both our sea and land potencies. The continued evolution of the synergy of these capabilities, supported by effective specific and general-purpose air and space forces, will be increasingly important in this century. This primary role of the Marine Corps was not adopted and maintained for self-aggrandizement, but for the demonstrated benefit of the nation.
The argument that force protection is beneath sailors is a specious claim that threatens the welfare of those placed under our command. All leaders must dispel the dangerous notion that security, one of the fundamental principles of war, is only the responsibility of a select and specially trained few. The author confuses the responsibility of all commanders to "take all appropriate actions to safeguard personnel, to prevent unauthorized access to installations, equipment, material and documents, and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, theft and terrorism" (Article 0826 of Navy Regulations). They also must provide trained antiterrorism security forces teams able to employ combat skills for specific situations. If we are to prevent future tragedy, we cannot allow a mind-set to develop that believes that security is a boring and fruitless collateral duty that is someone else's responsibility. It is everyone's responsibility, and we all depend on each other to survive.
In a world with unlimited resources, a case could be made for infinite specially trained antiterrorism forces. In response to the circumstances of the all-volunteer force, the Navy and Marine Corps intelligently constructed our current dedicated security forces, as the Navy is now doing with regard to shipboard manning. Working together, we developed a coherent and layered structure of force protection and security capabilities. Vigilance and discipline by responsible activities in each service ensure that the proper balance of specialized forces complements organic capabilities.