To be successful at both homeland security and law enforcement missions while balancing the needs of many other missions—such as search and rescue and maintaining aids to navigation—the Coast Guard will have to make radical changes in its approach to war fighting. Before 11 September there was much debate as to whether the international community's efforts to combat the flow of illegal drugs into North America and Europe was a law enforcement problem or was tantamount to war. As the Coast Guard examines new strategies and implements new tactics in the war on terrorism, a similar discussion rages: is it a war, a law enforcement action, or something in between?
The Coast Guard is not the only armed service or other federal agency struggling with this issue. The Department of Defense (DoD), one of the Coast Guard's primary partners in homeland security, is involved in a similar debate. The declared war on terrorism has blurred the distinction between foreign wars and domestic crimes and prompted rethinking of the Pentagon's command structure and force assignments. Although many of the strategic, operational, and tactical elements of warfare are employed in combating drug traffickers, they do not equate to what we traditionally have thought of as combat. But in the aftermath of 11 September, war no longer is viewed simply as armed forces maneuvering for control of geographic space. It also includes asymmetric warfare, which pits national and multinational military forces against the unpredictable threats of supranational entities using unconventional tactics. In this context, the war on drugs provides valuable lessons for the war on terrorism.
Several key elements are missing from the countertenor and counterdrug missions: unity of effort, defined and measurable objectives, effective use of available resources and—most important—a continuous flow of tactical intelligence that can be tailored to the needs of different interdiction units and used in a timely manner. With the overwhelming emphasis on homeland security missions, both Coast Guard and DoD forces are constrained by tight maintenance budgets and the need to deploy too few units over too many operational areas at sea and ashore.
Fortunately, the Coast Guard's ability to fulfill a key component of the homeland security mission—total maritime domain awareness—is within reach. It is rooted in ensuring that adequate intelligence preparation of the battle space (IPB) is conducted before enemy and criminal elements are engaged. Numerous agencies conduct intelligence operations to locate smugglers bringing illegal narcotics or terrorist equipment and support into the United States. There are gaps in consistent real-time tactical information, however, and this is where ongoing IPB would be of great assistance.
In the past, operational planning efforts have not considered this important foundation fully in combating the potential capabilities of maritime terrorists or drug traffickers. Locations for conducting IPBs have not been assessed thoroughly. Decision makers should match region and mission with priority. For example, are terrorist incursions via the Great Lakes the greatest threat, or would an IPB of the West Coast's largest ports be a better use of limited resources? This is a strategic decision facing the Coast Guard and all other agencies striving to secure our 96,000-mile shoreline, which stretches from northern Maine to the western tip of Alaska.
For practical guidance in establishing intelligence doctrine, the Coast Guard should look to Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 2, Intelligence. Just as the Marines consider maneuver warfare the basic tenet of their warfighting philosophy, the Coast Guard needs to exploit the true interoperability and complementary nature of tactical intelligence and operations to gain maritime domain awareness. As in standard counterdrug operations, maneuver warfare places priority on gaining advantage by using the "combination of different arms and weapons, the gathering and dissemination of pertinent information, and the technical application of combat power within a tactical action—all to cause the enemy's defeat."
The Coast Guard and other agencies involved in homeland security or counterdrug actions operate in changeable, complex, and often uncertain tactical arenas. The Marines articulate the importance of ensuring that the tactical operator is ready for the enemy. "Maneuver warfare requires a firm focus on the enemy." It aims to seize the advantage by avoiding enemy strengths and exploiting his critical vulnerabilities. Using the same methods to uncover our own vulnerabilities and set a ready posture for the Coast Guard will require continuous evaluation of mission priorities, funding, and personnel utilization.
- Coordinated IPB must be the basis for any movement of forces, and it must use all available national capabilities and assets (regardless of departmental ownership) to produce a picture that is accurate, timely, and integrated. This will require increased intelligence staffing in the Coast Guard and elsewhere. At the same time, federal agencies that have paid lip service to the sharing of information in the past must be more cooperative.
- In IPB, one size does not fit all. Intelligence staffs must understand the tangible and intangible aspects of terrorist and counterdrug intelligence collection and dissemination, and they must know the type of information required by frontline personnel. Perspectives vary according to organizational missions. Tactical information needed by police officers responding to a terrorist threat at Los Angeles International Airport differs substantially from that needed by a Coast Guard boarding officer approaching a vessel off the coast of California.
- Analysis of the enemy's methods will furnish the basis for establishing strategic and tactical priorities. It will help Coast Guard intelligence analysts, planners, and operations and marine safety personnel to anticipate the actions of smugglers and terrorists. Analysts must understand how the enemy views situations; the risks he will take; the extremes he will go to; and how he is likely to react when faced with obstacles or setbacks.
- Coast Guard operators have to understand the moral and cultural imperatives underlying enemy actions. Seeing the situation from the opponent's perspective is especially important when he has a significantly different set of cultural or societal values. Given his outlook, behavior that appears irrational—and therefore surprising—to us may reflect perfectly reasonable and predictable actions. For the most part, drug smugglers are motivated by greed. Assessing terrorist motivations (and targets) is more complex because they vary from movement to movement. One trait common to terrorists and drug lords is that the loss of some of their agents is viewed as the price of doing business—and, like conventional military forces, they recruit constantly.
- The Coast Guard should embrace IPB as a normal way of doing business and budget accordingly. Federal, state, and local officials routinely assess the threat of "dirty bombs" (explosives surrounded by nuclear waste or other radioactive material) planted in shipping containers. By focusing on this threat and looking for ways to detect it before it reaches U.S. ports, an IPB product can be developed that also can serve as the foundation for other interdiction protocols.
- The Coast Guard must acquire the ability to predict more accurately the evolving trends, modality, and routes being used by terrorists and drug traffickers. In the case of the war on drugs, this must be done despite record seizures. Regardless of how appealing it may be in the short term, the Coast Guard should avoid the temptation of making tactical decisions that move cutters, aircraft, and maritime safety and security teams based on old intelligence. All hands must gain a full understanding of leading indicators for both the new mission and the old war.
As the Coast Guard reduces the number of surface and air patrols under the pressure of lean budgets, it must employ more efficient and effective tools to increase the probability of detecting and monitoring drug-smuggling and terrorist activities. This can be accomplished by evaluating gaps in the current intelligence posture—human, signal, and electronic—and programming information resources accordingly. This cannot be a quick fix. There must be an enduring commitment to make this a top priority. In the end, this approach will increase interdiction while reducing wear and tear on our aging and overextended fleet.
While it commits precious resources to newer homeland defense tasks, the Coast Guard cannot abandon or reduce its efforts to stem the flow of drugs. Still, it has the opportunity to develop IPB studies that will provide the force multiplier needed in the war on drugs—and at the same time make a significant contribution to the war on terrorism.
Captain Gibson commanded five cutters during his career; in 2001, he retired as chief of operations of the Coast Guard Atlantic Area. Lieutenant Commander DiRenzo, a former cutter commanding officer, is assigned to the Atlantic Area’s operations division as the antiterrorism force protection coordinator and regional strategic assessment coordinator.