From 8 to 18 December 1902 the future of U.S., British, German, and Venezuelan relations hung in the balance as the U.S. Navy established itself as the nation’s preeminent instrument of diplomatic influence. At the helm of this push for naval deterrence was President Theodore Roosevelt.
The turn of the 20th century marked the apex of colonial competition among the Great Powers. Germany had made a rather late start in its imperialistic drive, but its leader, Kaiser Wilhelm II, approached the challenge of territorial acquisition with enthusiasm. He even considered an invasion of the United States. Ultimately, however, he shifted his focus to other nations in the West. In May 1901, a German warship appeared off Margarita, Venezuela, and began mapping approaches to the harbor.
As 1901 progressed, European demands for repayment of Venezuelan debts became strident. While the administration of William McKinley urged Venezuelan President Cipriano Castro to make a good-faith effort to repay the loans, McKinley's vice president, Theodore Roosevelt, in a well-publicized speech, qualified this support with the observation that the Monroe Doctrine remained in effect.
Roosevelt assured neighbors to the south that while the 1823 doctrine posed no threat to them, it promised conflict for any "Old World Power" that sought territory in the New World. He took the additional step of spelling out his personal interpretation of the doctrine directly to the German Consul-General. Two months later, this conversation must have weighed on the ambassador's mind as he called on Roosevelt again, this time expressing his nation's sympathies following McKinley's assassination.
Shortly after entering the White House, Roosevelt accepted a report, prepared for his predecessor, from Navy Rear Admiral Robley D. Evans. It detailed the strength of fighting vessels available to the Great Powers and demonstrated the need for, in Evans's words, "greater celerity in the completion of such vessels as are already authorized ... while an equal or greater necessity for a further increase in our limited number of fighting ships should ... be impressed upon Congress in the most emphatic manner." Roosevelt soon after commented, "I am straining nerve to keep on with the upbuilding of the Navy."
Not surprisingly, Roosevelt had interpreted a German communique issued in December 1901 as a challenge to the United States and to him personally. Stating that Germany did not seek territorial gains, it went on to say circumstances might require that it pursue "temporary occupation" of Venezuelan harbors and their accompanying customs houses. From the U.S. perspective, the German assurances—in the wake of Germany's "temporary" seizure of territory in China—were not comforting.
Preparations
In June 1901, the General Board of the Navy under Admiral of the Navy George Dewey had sent a report to McKinley, stating the Navy could control the Caribbean
if we retain, in peace, vantage points on the shores of Cuba and create a strongly fortified naval base in Porto [sic] Rican waters. This control will reach Orinoco [near the present eastern border of Venezuela] and the Guianas.
By the end of Roosevelt's first month, a detachment of U.S. Marines began permanent fortification of Culebra Island. In another two months, portions of the island were ceded to the Navy and conversion to a naval base began.
Throughout the late 19th century and into the 20th, small U.S. Navy vessels operated routinely out of Venezuelan ports, providing detailed intelligence. In early 1901, the commander of the USS Scorpion, Lieutenant Commander N. Sargent, commented, "He [President Castro] imagines he can gain the reputation of wielding a firm foreign policy" at U.S. expense. "I am also informed upon very reliable authority that the Germans are not wholly guiltless in this antagonism." Reports continued to arrive at the Department of the Navy with details of increasing revolutionary unrest and European interest in "intervening" to restore order throughout the crises.
The U.S. Navy had begun conducting "winter exercises," with Admiral Dewey's General Board assigning the tasks and monitoring results. The first mention of the winter 1902-3 exercise appears in a Navy General Board memo dated May 1901. Navy Secretary John D. Long refined the plans in November 1901 to include inspections, followed by live-firing exercises (with limited ammunition expenditures), culminating in a simulated battle on the high seas between two large naval forces. As tensions rose between the European powers and Venezuela, however, the nature of the exercise began to morph.
In early 1902, the German ambassador to the United States, Theodor von Holleben, warned the Kaiser that Roosevelt would respond strongly to a permanent German military presence in South America. The Kaiser characteristically bulled ahead with his plans, saying: "We will do whatever is necessary . . . even if it displeases the Yankees."
Six months after assuming the presidency, T. R. accepted the resignation of his former boss, Secretary Long, and appointed William H. Moody, a strong proponent of military preparedness. In a quick series of maneuvers, the two inexorably modified the character of the exercise.
In June, Roosevelt asked Dewey, the nation's best-known living hero at the time, to assume command of the combined Atlantic Fleet for the winter exercise. Revealing the intended targets of his decision in a letter to Dewey, Roosevelt wrote, "Your standing ... abroad, is such that the effect of your presence will be very beneficial."" In August, Roosevelt confided to a good British friend and noted European socialite, M. P. Arthur Lee, that Dewey was training the fleet for war. Deeply sensitive to the significance of symbolism in diplomacy, T. R. finished his summer foray by offering Dewey use of the presidential yacht Mayflower as his flagship.
In July, Secretary Moody ordered U.S. Navy assets to survey the Venezuelan coast for possible German landing zones and to submit suggestions for their defense. Later, he informed his bureau chiefs that the President was "deeply interested" in the forthcoming maneuvers and directed all involved to provide "hearty and vigorous cooperation" to ensure "that this mobilization of the fleet be successfully accomplished." He concluded "that this movement is a test of our ability to meet war demands" and that he would "sanction all reasonable expense within the law and regulations, in order that the vessels engaged ... may be prepared."18 In October, Moody issued the final instructions for the exercise just two months away.
Kaiser Wilhelm II remained undeterred. In July, he requested that Great Britain (which Venezuela also owed a great deal of money) act with Germany in a joint military campaign. Two months later, in a typical uncontrolled boast, Wilhelm played up the capabilities of his navy to visiting U.S. Army General (and Roosevelt confidant) Leonard Wood. By early November, it appeared the forces of Germany and Great Britain were poised to impose their will forcibly on Venezuela. Admiral H. C. Taylor, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, advised T. R. that war between the United States and the European powers was likely, should the situation turn violent.
On the evening of 24 November, Roosevelt hosted a private dinner at the White House to honor an old friend, German diplomat Baron Speck von Sternburg. Von Sternburg could be counted on to convey Roosevelt's intentions and his own personal impressions directly to the Kaiser's senior staff. Also in attendance was Admiral Dewey.
Dewey was a cultured man with a reputation for fierceness when antagonized, and one subject always was sure to raise his hackles—Germany. While he restrained his comments in public, it was well known throughout Washington's social elite that Dewey held Germans in particular distaste because of confrontations preceding and following the Battle of Manila Bay.
Roosevelt's intent in inviting Dewey for dinner could not have been missed by a professional diplomat of von Sternburg's caliber. Despite all the signals, however, the Kaiser remained convinced Roosevelt was bluffing, and on 25 November 1902, Germany and Great Britain announced their intention to blockade Venezuela.
Britain's role throughout the "First Venezuelan Crisis" is somewhat muddled. Its cooperation with Germany was extensive, and the ability of the Royal Navy to project force and secure British interests was unquestioned. It seems, however, Britain's intentions were limited to recovering its loans and protecting its citizens threatened by instability in Venezuela. What is certain is that Prime Minister Arthur Balfour's government would not risk its carefully nurtured relationship with the United States.
On 1 December, Roosevelt traveled to the Washington Navy Yard to wish Dewey well on his voyage. T. R.'s final instructions were not recorded, but Dewey certainly did not sail merely to oversee an "exercise." As her husband sailed south, Mildred Dewey recorded in her diary: "I dread there may be war over Veequela [sic] . . . how can Georg [sic] get thru three wars unscathed."
The Caribbean
According to Roosevelt's later accounts, as the Mayflower dropped anchor off Culebra on 8 December, he issued an unrecorded ultimatum to the German ambassador, demanding Germany either accept arbitration within ten days or face armed conflict.
Unlike previous winter exercises, the 1902-3 maneuvers gathered every available battleship, cruiser, and torpedo boat in the Atlantic. Dewey marshaled 53 ships to counter the 29 ships available to Britain and Germany in the Caribbean. Even before he arrived in Puerto Rico, Dewey inquired about the positions of all logistical support ships in the Atlantic, and on his arrival he issued a message requiring all ships to submit a list of supplies required for them to meet "all contingencies." Moody wired his naval attaches in London, Paris, and Berlin to report to him the desertion rates of the respective European navies in a rough attempt to ascertain their readiness for war. Dewey directed all ships outside Culebra's harbor to maintain sufficient steam pressure to get under way at a moment's notice. Perhaps the most glaring example of Dewey's novel approach was his order to naval medical personnel to establish a 60-bed hospital ward in Puerto Rico. This and his other actions were not typical of Dewey. In fact, on his second day in the harbor, he scuttled the carefully prepared schedule and announced his intention to begin inspections of the major combatants.
In Washington, according to Roosevelt biographer Edmund Morris's timeline, on the afternoon of 14 Decemher, Roosevelt increased pressure on the Germans by advancing his deadline one day to the afternoon of the 17th. Dewey remained unaware of this increase in tensions as he wrote his son on the 14th: "Things look rather equally Venezuela way, but we are not in it at present."
Early on the 15th (the morning following T. R.'s afternoon meeting with Ambassador von Holleben), Moody sent a wire to Dewey, directing him to maintain a swift "messenger" vessel in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Dewey acknowledged compliance with the order and pointedly asked if the fleet would be dispersed for the holidays on 17 December. Later that day, Dewey's chief of staff sent a message to San Juan: "Recent intelligence from Washington indicates the possibility of urgent dispatches arriving anytime." Shortly after transmitting this cable, Dewey recalled all his ambulatory sick from Puerto Rican hospitals to man his ships.
The morning of 17 December, Moody cryptically instructed Dewey not to disperse the fleet. It can be surmised that both expected the worst. Dewey had inspected his warships. Supplies of coal and ammunition had been loaded, and the force had been exercised vigorously together at sea. Word from Washington indicated no change in the German position, and reports from U.S. vessels standing off Venezuela were disheartening. On 13 December, British and German warships had fired on the Venezuelan fort at Porto Cabello, destroying its outer walls. The report stated further that increasing European heavy-handedness was deteriorating the situation. As evening fell, Dewey ordered his senior commanders to report "for consultation relative to the Venezuelan question." The discussion continued far into the night.
In the middle of that night, another cable arrived from Moody. During the previous day, German Ambassador von Holleben had rushed to relay Kaiser Wilhelm II's acceptance of Theodore Roosevelt's ultimatum. Moody's cable directed his commander at sea to "carry out your proposed holiday itinerary. Merry Christmas."
Conclusion
Edmund Morris described the vacant diplomatic record surrounding the First Venezuelan Crisis as a "white shape of some vanished enormity, a reverse silhouette cut out of the gray text of history." The historical record is clarified, however, by the correspondence and actions of Theodore Roosevelt's principle tool of diplomacy: the U.S. Navy. Perhaps nowhere is the true intent of the 1902-3 Winter Exercise made clearer than in the words of Mildred Dewey, who wrote to her son on 18 December 1902, even as her husband was receiving word to disperse the most powerful fleet ever assembled by the United States: "I hope to God the fleet will not have to take part in an international war instead of maneuvers. I believe that darling, intrepid G. D. [George Dewey] would be glad he is in it if it came. But we can't fight Eng & Germ [sic] . .. at once." Later, on 4 January 1903, as Admiral Dewey prepared to return home, he summarized the success of his mission in his own letter to George Jr.: "[the exercise] has been very interesting and I think beneficial to the Navy & Country. I have no doubt the Venezuela question would have given considerable trouble had it not been for this splendid fleet on the spot."
Following the Venezuelan Crises, the U.S. Navy continued to grow and exert increasing influence throughout the world. In late 1903, it guaranteed the success of the popular uprising in the northern Colombian province of Panama, which subsequently declared its independence and concluded a rapid agreement with the United States to build a canal linking the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Responding to increasing tensions in the Pacific, Roosevelt later dispatched his celebrated Great White Fleet on an around-the-world cruise.
Roosevelt's recognition, that wherever the Navy went, the full sovereign power of the nation went with it, established a model of diplomacy backed by the presence of naval force that remains a mainstay of U.S. foreign policy. Such an approach, Roosevelt felt, must be predicated on the assumption that the naval force be large and capable enough to make enemies understand that to engage one warship was to engage the entire nation. If the stick was big enough, one could speak very softly indeed.
Lieutenant Commander Hendrix is serving on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel in Washington, D.C. Two studies cited here and written by Edmund Morris formed the basis for this article.