Today, as in the past, each branch of the military will promote its programs in the context of the present crisis. In their budget submissions, each will emphasize those missions that it can perform, it not uniquely, at least effectively during the present passage at arms. In this tactic, the Navy's dilemma is that the capital ship of the past two decades and the dominant maritime platform of the future, the submarine, has only a peripheral role in actions against land-locked countries. The Department of Defense's decision to convert four Trident ballistic-missile submarines into cruise-missile platforms (SSGNs) only heightens this problem. With the demise of the DD-21, the SSGN becomes the arsenal ship, and the qualities it brings to a conflict beyond that of a generic vehicle with large numbers of strike weapons are likely to be ignored.
As a shore bombardment vehicle in an unthreatened environment, submarines bring capabilities no better than other platforms. The usefulness of submarines should not be promoted by trying to find a niche in this market but by holding to a clear vision of their true utility.
The nuclear submarine brings characteristics well beyond stealth to the battlefield, but stealth is its first attribute. For a submarine, stealth means invisibility, a characteristic difficult to grasp by other warriors who lack such a luxury. In addition, the driving engine provides a high speed of advance and endless endurance: no loitering along the way or departure from station for replenishment. There exists no effective threat against these platforms, so no resources need be devoted to self-defense and no area of the ocean can be denied them. Selectively loading weapons appropriate for a particular situation, they can arrive early, reposition quickly, and reinforce rapidly.
Understanding these capabilities is essential to using weapons effectively—not all Tomahawks are equal. The submarine's ability to stay close inshore regardless of the enemy gives its missiles capabilities beyond the most ambitious visions for the arsenal ship. With short times of flight, its weapons will respond to time-urgent targets far quicker than even a tactical air "ready five" strike package. With the Navy's land-attack weapons based in submarines, surface ship magazines can be optimized for theater ballistic missile defense and cruise missile defense of the carriers, amphibious ready groups, and theater bases and ports. Acknowledging that the submarine will be the vehicle to penetrate defended littorals lessens the burden on designers to provide stealth characteristics in new surface ships. Using weapons based in submarines to suppress enemy air defenses (SEAD) not only is more effective than other forms of SEAD but also improves the effectiveness of follow-on tactical air attacks by several orders of magnitude.
The temptation to configure or describe missions in light of the war against terrorism to justify current and future budgets is overwhelming. While the real policy of the United States is reflected in the national budget and influencing policy therefore means influencing the budget, supporters should guard against promoting their organization, platform, or service unrealistically. The second order penalty in dedicating a weapon system to a niche market in which it is peripherally useful is neglecting its broader utility or real niche. In the case of the submarine, even as an arsenal ship, it is those broader attributes that make it worth the investment.
Current documents relating to future national security requirements are written with a general character that does not compromise current or future programs. Rather than pronouncements that shape policy, like the U.S. Navy's original Maritime Strategy, this literature defends the status quo. Trying to use "Forward ... From the Sea" to understand the opportunities or difficulties that wait in the future generally is fruitless. "Joint Vision 2020" offers little beyond promises that precision weapons will produce quicker conflict resolution with fewer casualties and lighter logistic requirements. Amounting to little more than an apologia for force size and composition, these visions do not offer much to guide middle management or serve as useful instructions for future plans.
By outlining its future in budgetary terms focused on individual weapon systems and a pervasive concentration on individual platform capabilities, the Navy is building many things—not creating a fleet. By failing to educate the rest of the Navy about the potential submarines bring to future engagements and conflicts, submariners have contributed to this doctrinal myopia.
While there is no hesitation in Congress or the Office of the Secretary of Defense about building only nuclear submarines for the United States, the president of the War College in the spring of 2001 advocated building diesel submarines. The Navy's most prolific policy writer, its representative to the Quadrennial Defense Panel, joined him. The nuclear submarine's advantages of stealth, endurance, and speed have long been evident to submariners here and abroad. That leading individuals in the upper reaches of the thinking Navy would advocate building conventionally powered platforms demonstrates the submarine community's failure to make clear the nuclear submarine's fundamental utility to a wider audience.
One reaction to this problem easily could be, Who cares? After the battle line disappeared at Pearl Harbor, submarines were the only platforms that could take the offensive, and they did so without regard to the operations of the rest of the fleet. They performed poorly as scouts at Midway in 1942, and although more successful in the Battle of the Philippine Sea in 1944, their missions rarely were tied to the fleet's operations. In the Cold War, submarine tactics and procedures developed without regard to the rest of the Navy until the emergence of combined arms antisubmarine warfare in the 1980s. Even then, submarines were tied only loosely to battle groups in operations that envisioned penetration of waters populated by enemy submarines. Until now, submarines have operated independently, without much regard for the operations of other forces and vice versa. Few in the fleet hierarchy concerned themselves with submarine warfare.
With this background, the general ignorance in the service of the utility of submarines is not surprising. But if the failure to understand submarine warfare is perpetuated, the platform's advantages will not be exploited in the future. Officers in tactical command who do not grasp the utility of the nuclear submarine's stealth, speed, and endurance, or who do not know how to overcome the limitations of intermittent communications, and who do not see that submarine firepower has attributes not available in other platforms, will limit artificially the effectiveness not only of the submarines but of the rest of the fleet as well.
The parallel with the period between the two world wars is instructive. The policy for submarines in the 1920s restricted attacking anything but warships. The senior submariner on the Naval War College faculty in 1923, lecturing on German submarine commerce raiding, said "we will never use them that way." But soon thereafter, Commander Thomas Withers, an outspoken advocate of operating submarines independently of the battle line, was sent to the Naval War College faculty. By 1935, the concept of independent submarine operations was well understood by submariners, and while not endorsed as official policy, seems to have been understood by most of the senior leaders, many of whom were qualified in submarines. Independent operation became the basis for the submarine designs of the 1930s that resulted in the fleet boats of World War IV.
Six hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Navy Department ordered submarines to conduct unrestricted warfare against Japan, implementing a policy in direct contradiction to what was publicly espoused and legally binding up to that moment. A response this definitive and quick was possible only because it had been prepared before 6 December 1941. Articles in the Naval Institute Proceedings through the late 1920s and 1930s asserted the rules restricting submarine operations were unrealistic and impossible to execute in a wartime scenario. Writer after writer predicted that when war came they would be discarded. But because the supporting doctrinal development was limited, execution was ineffective for almost a year. It was not just that the torpedoes did not work. Tactical doctrine was faulty and operational experience under realistic conditions was lacking. Practice and tactical' research had been limited by considerations related to treaty limitations and public opinion. Realistic environments were not created for exercises. Getting started took time, energy, and direction, much of which could have been invested before the war started.
The decision to convert Trident submarines to cruise missile platforms (SSGNs) and the demise of DD-21 as a land-attack destroyer make broad knowledge of submarine warfare outside the submarine force critical. The Navy will deploy an arsenal ship in the foreseeable future and most missions will be related to theater considerations, not battle group operations. It will be a nuclear submarine with capabilities vastly different from the surface ship conceived for this mission. If the officer in tactical command views this asset as simply another missile platform, much of its inherent utility will be lost. There will not be enough officers with experience in submarines to populate the commands and staffs that will employ the ship: all naval officers in joint commands will have to have at least a working understanding of the advantages and limitations of submarines regardless of their warfare specialties. The only way such knowledge can be created is for those who do understand to teach and those who need to understand to pay attention.
Again, the interwar period has a precedent. Then the issue was tactical naval aviation. Many senior officers, Admirals Bull Halsey and Ernie King, for example, became "naval aviators" courtesy of short courses of formal instruction. Admiral Chester Nimitz, a submariner, learned while serving on the staff of the Commander, Battle Fleet, where he was instrumental in the early development of the circular formation. Admiral Raymond Spruance, a surface warfare officer, became a skilled employer of naval aviation on the job. The general comprehension of and agreement about the Navy's operational processes by the senior leadership during World War II reflect a remarkable unity of understanding and effort by officers from a wide variety of backgrounds. With today's officer corps reflecting an even greater diversity in a more technically challenging environment, understanding all the pieces that make up the fleet is daunting. But the importance of nuclear submarines to the future maritime environment is so great that ignorance of their capabilities, limitations, missions, and potential usefulness will be as glaring an omission in a professional officer's understanding as ignorance of aviation would have been in 1945.
To communicate the submarine's usefulness in the context of future fleet operations requires explicit activity—activity that should avoid reference to the war against terrorism. The Navy must develop a simple strategy that describes the fundamental characteristics of a nuclear submarine and how it can best be employed. Such an argument should be careful not to try to be all things to all men, or to justify any specific program or promise things that may or may not come to pass. Acknowledging limits as well as promise is important if the education is to be effective; the people it is to lead will soon discredit any tenet that is not realistic.
Academic tomes are not needed: these exist but are shelved references rather than useful vectors. Operational concepts that espouse the important points and emphasize the desired attributes and outcomes are the aim. These must be explicit. The design should be to condition not only present decision makers but also those who will succeed to positions of authority in the future. At the same time, forming such arguments gives submarine officers a coherent picture of their missions, generates a general understanding in other naval professionals, and focuses the development of tactical procedures and processes. In short, the goal is to build an appreciation of submarines leading to a Navy that operates as an integrated fleet, rather than as a collection of platforms.
Such propositions will not provide details that support campaign analyses or research-and-development decisions. They provide a vision inside Submarine Force and a basis from which to organize, equip, and train rather than a rationalization of this year's budget. In today's Navy, the leadership tenure is too short to provide a comprehensive understanding of every aspect of the profession. Submarine officers no longer command cruisers or battleship divisions as did Admiral Nimitz. The basics that must be communicated to an ever more diversified officer corps must be enduring, concise, and accurate—not propaganda. The resulting summary serves as the "talking paper" for professional visitors to submarines and submarine organizations, the script for players in war games, where much education takes place, and the basis for critical thinking about the future utility of this major portion of the naval service.
The war against terrorism offers little opportunity to correct the general ignorance in the Navy about submarines, and attempting to project submarine capabilities into this milieu only weakens the general case. Except for being able to reload Tomahawks for small salvo strikes, submarines bring little uniquely valuable to the present campaign. But a long-range strategy summary can bring a consistency of purpose at every level of leadership and management. The understanding that there are "only submarines and targets" in any future war at sea must not be lost because a maritime war is not on the horizon. The SSGN will expand the opportunities and capabilities not just for submarines but also for the surface Navy, naval tactical aviation, and the Air Force. If the SSGN is viewed simply as an arsenal ship, it and the forces that it could support will never be employed to their full potential. A general strategy that encompasses all the facets of the fleet can be the basis of intellectual investments from which tactics and strategy flow. To create this vision will require educating the Navy on the roles submarines can play.
Admiral Holland has been a frequent contributor to Proceedings since 1975. He served primarily in submarines while on active duty.