Russian-made antiship missiles such as the SS-N-25 arm the navies of many potential adversaries. These ship killers—and the small, swift craft that carry them—remain significant threats that the U.S. Navy can ignore only at its peril.
At 0942, the dhow crewman lowered his binoculars, made a quick grease pen mark on his marine radar, and jotted down coordinates from his GPS. He then picked up the satellite telephone and read off his notes. Seventy-four miles to the east, two Tarantul corvettes turned smartly and began launching a salvo of eight SS-N-22 antiship cruise missiles. Forty seconds later, the two ships turned away making 38 knots.
Skimming the sea undetected, the missiles crossed the first 55 miles in less than two minutes. At 0945, a U.S. Aegis cruiser detected the first Mach-3 contact at an altitude of 25 feet, off her starboard beam. Several were closing, but many were passing well aft. Precious seconds passed before the decision was made to engage. Sixteen seconds later the first four-ton missile hit the cruiser and her SPY-1 radar went dead.
A dozen miles to the southeast, at 0946, the U.S. aircraft carrier's tactical action officer still was trying to raise the cruiser, which had served as the battle group's air warfare commander, for clarification when explosions buckled the flight deck and filled the ship with flames.
The final casualty report showed a collective loss of more than 1,600 personnel, the loss of a cruiser, a carrier, and most of an air group. What had gone wrong? Had they failed to acknowledge the threat? Had they ignored force protection requirements?
The threat defines defense. Today, the threat to surface vessels is in flux both politically and technologically. The post-1989 world retains much of the lethality that characterized the Cold War, but is experiencing wide instability. We have witnessed a resurgence of ethnic, religious, and regional rivalries around the globe, with nations and non-state organizations jockeying for regional dominance. Democracies remain rare and precarious outside the West, with anti-Western extremists waiting in the shadows to wrest control. Thus, even when courting friendship, the leadership and intent of these countries are unpredictable beyond only a few months.
As the number of nations considered potential threats has grown, so too have the number and lethality of platforms under their pennants. There now are 14 countries with active research-and-development programs developing a range of platforms and weapons for sale throughout the world. First-rate naval capabilities are available to any country with the cash and the desire, and highly automated systems and weapons and modular installation make "overnight" developments in a country's naval capabilities a serious possibility.
Once an enemy decides that conflict with the United States is inevitable, a surprise attack followed by a battening down of the hatches to weather the storm is a logical strategy. Thus, an attack likely will occur before there are any indications of a change in threat status. For U.S. naval forces, the combination of long range, lethality, and speed makes the modern antiship cruise missile (ASCM) the fundamental threat. The number of ASCMs deployed already is significant and growing quickly.
Although the ASCMs now in use by potential enemies still include improved first-generation missiles such as the SS-N-2C/D (51 nautical mile range, Mach-.9 cruise speed, 1,050-pound warhead), these are being augmented or replaced by the latest in ship-killing technology, the SS-N-22 (87 nm/Mach 3/660 lb.), SS-N-25 (80 nm/Mach-.9/330 lb.), and SS-N-27 (140 nm/Mach 3/440 lb.). There is an active market in upgrading existing platforms to the SS-N-22/25 standard, including domestically produced equivalents. Given the open container configuration of the launch platforms, they are readily upgradable to the newer systems. Although the SS-N-22 is almost twice as heavy and 50% longer than the older missiles, it can be replaced one for one in certain cases. The SS-N-25 is considerably smaller, which allows the use of a quad container in place of the single container of older missiles, providing a 400% increase in total numbers with the same weight.
Antiship Missile Patrol Boats
About 80% of the world's warships are patrol-sized craft. These can be purchased in high numbers compared to open-ocean combatants. Freed of requirements for high endurance or berthing, patrol craft concentrate a high ratio of their tonnage into offensive weaponry. Thus, a 500-ton patrol boat might carry a more lethal antiship missile battery than an 8,000-ton cruiser. This makes for an ominous threat.
First-generation missile boats such as the Osa II remain in inventory with some countries, but second-generation craft such as the Nanuchka-, Tarantul-, and Combattante-class corvettes now are the main contenders. When first introduced, these ships provided greater sea-keeping capabilities and defensive armament, but still were restricted in operations. Newer vessels, such as the Swedish Visby, incorporate stealth and stronger air defenses. These ships are off the drawing boards, in the slips, and on the market.
Over-the-horizon tactics and coordination historically have been the Achilles' heel of these platforms, diminishing their capabilities. The revolution in computers and communications, however, has made simple yet very capable communication systems standard on new platforms and allowed for their easy integration into existing platforms. In addition, targeting unmanned aerial vehicles are proliferating. Even commercial technologies (e.g., encryption, satellite telephones, and GPS) provide formidable capabilities, allowing for a scenario in which any merchant, fishing, or pleasure vessel could be a potential precision targeter and where even first-generation ASCM platforms could be orchestrated into a well-informed matrix.
An example of a modern patrol boat currently for sale and seen in many of the world's navies is the Russian Tarantul Project 12421 corvette. At only 550 tons, the Tarantul is a lethal combination of speed (38 knots), antiship missiles (4 SS-N-22 or 16 SS-N-25), command-and-control systems, and point defense (one 76-mm gun, SA-N-5 or SA-N- 11 missiles, and an AK-630 gatling gun) that rivals many frigates and destroyers around the world. Its range of 2,400 nautical miles is half that of most destroyers, but more than sufficient for any littoral action.
Countering the Threat
Absorbing the first hit or the first round of hits cannot be an option. A single SS-N-22 could disable, if not sink, anything smaller than an aircraft carrier. A carrier likely would suffer a mission kill from one hit, and several would bring the seaworthiness of the vessel into doubt. All of this would come with a staggering loss of life. It also would provide an enormous military/psychological/political victory to the enemy, even if his entire force subsequently were lost.
There are two options for defeating a foe with unpredictable intent and advanced ASCMs: pull back the defensive ring and rely on point defense systems to destroy the first attack, or extend the defensive ring and strike the launch platforms before they can conduct an attack.
The first option is a setup for disaster. It would allow an enemy to position, time, and target for the best possible attack at his discretion. Even with only a basic understanding of U.S. Navy defensive capabilities, the problems presented by the geometry and physics of a four-ton, Mach-3 missile cruising at 20 feet above the surface are clear. The radar detection range for such a missile would be very short; reaction time and number of engagements would be compressed; and the missile would cross from a Phalanx's maximum engagement range to impact in half the time it took to read this sentence.
The best place to engage the modern ASCM threat is in its nest, on the deck of the platform carrying it. During the Cold War, Soviet ASCM threats within launch range were capped continuously with an armed monitor or "bird dog." The launch platform was to be engaged instantly if hostile intent was detected. The littoral complicates the problem by providing cover to the launch platform, but the concept remains the same. If all platforms cannot be located, then the entirety of the "launch basket" must be monitored around the clock with an asset capable of immediately locating, identifying, and attacking any emerging ASCM platform.
Matching Assets to the Mission
The launch basket area of an SS-N-22 covers more than 22,000 square nautical miles. A one-hour buffer to protect against a 35-knot platform increases this to 46,000 square nautical miles; expanding it to two hours means 76,000 square nautical miles. Any landmass would reduce the area to be covered, but it also would complicate the search by requiring constant monitoring of the coastline.
Covering the buffer area would be necessary to allow for short gaps in coverage. Many of the assets available to a battle group are not adequate to the task of covering these zones. Surface combatants would be put at risk: their sensor search ranges are far too short to provide adequate standoff; they can launch AGM84 Harpoons over the horizon with help from airborne assets, but they must be within range of an enemy to launch; and they more than likely would be outgunned by a faster, more lethal ASCMs. Helicopters also are inadequate: although excellent against less-capable ships, mission and sensor range and loiter time are far too short to cover the ASCM threat; cruise and sprint speeds are too slow to pounce across a large search area; and defensive antiair systems generally outrange helicopter weaponry, which may be inadequate to achieve a mission kill. Submarines, although largely safe from the attacks of small combatants, would be unable to operate in very shallow water, would have to lie within the path of approach to detect the enemy, would have a very limited ability to attack ships in port, and could be outrun.
Fixed-wing aircraft are the only viable counters. There are, however, challenges to sanitizing a large patrol area even for these assets.
- The E-2C Hawkeye—Provides excellent active coverage of all zones; has good passive capability (key to determining intent), but electronic surveillance is a tertiary mission for the crew and depends on cooperative contacts; relies on other aircraft for identification and attack; and 24-hour operations or multiple-mission tasking is taxing on squadron assets.
- F/A-18C/E Hornet/Super Hornet—Identifications limited to fair weather and visual range; if directed by an E-2C, can sanitize 3,600 square miles (one grid square); has a fast reaction time within launch basket; has a good weapon capability; requires tanking or flex deck to fill bird-dog requirements; full coverage of 87 nautical mile basket would require 7 dedicated aircraft per cycle, and full coverage of two-hour buffer would require 22 aircraft per cycle; and any protracted coverage would be taxing on squadron assets, especially in light of other mission requirements.
- F-14A/D Tomcat—Has the same search restrictions as the F/A-18; its high speed makes interception of ASCM more feasible; and has inadequate weapon capability and standoff range to engage platforms.
- S-3B Viking—The only organic, all-weather classification-capable aircraft; able to classify contacts at 150+ miles; capable of full active search of entire zone at 200-nautical-mile radar range; has a good passive detection capability of electronic emitters; a single aircraft can classify all contacts in inner and outer zones during a single cycle; has an excellent bird-dog capability if armed; has Harpoon capability (Maverick capability currently on two aircraft per squadron); tanker-equipped aircraft retain full search capability, but are left toothless; has an inadequate reaction speed to attack contacts immediately across the threat zone; and has an excellent communication suite to direct attack aircraft to emerging target.
Matching Weapon to Threat
Should the enemy attack during clear weather, there are many suitable antiship weapons. The best choices would be the Harpoon or AGM-65 Maverick. Should the enemy attack under a low cloud layer or surface fog, there are only two options: radar bombing and the Harpoon. The effectiveness of radar bombing is questionable against an alerted maneuvering target, especially from the high altitude necessitated by point defense systems.
The Harpoon is the only effective all-weather antiship weapon carried by Navy aircraft. Employed with its full programming from close range, it has proved to be an extremely discriminating weapon suitable to any application.
With only two hours or less to engage an emerging ASCM platform, an aircraft needs to launch with the weapons required. There will not be time to order a strike package, and surface combatants should not be forced to be the first line of defense.
Sustained Vigilance
Any use of ASCMs against the U.S. Navy likely will occur as a massed surprise attack with the hope of inflicting maximum damage before our forces are alerted. Once launched, such an attack could cripple a battle group and cause extensive loss of life and damage to our national interests around the world. We must overcome the natural complacency that comes from being the world's sole superpower and always respect the capability of ASCMs.
Sustained vigilance against an unconfirmed threat is difficult, but it is something we mastered during the Cold War. To counter a sucker punch, battle groups must keep a constant and complete surface plot focused on the ASCM platforms of potential threat countries. Many battle group assets can perform the mission, but the E-2C and S-3B are essential. E-2Cs are required to coordinate strike-fighter assets and manage the plot; the S-3Bs' inverse synthetic aperture radar (ISAR) with its long-range classification capability is an important force multiplier that conserves assets. Most important, S-3Bs are the only organic platforms capable of classifying ships in inclement weather.
The S-3B fleet is aging. Retirement of the airframe has been scheduled, but there is no replacement in sight. During the past 20 years, the Navy has funded six versions of the F/A-18 and now the Joint Strike Fighter, but battle groups soon might be incapable of dealing with a 500-ton adversary on a foggy day. Solutions range from funding a successor sea control airframe to upgrading the E-2C with an ISAR capability or perhaps even an illuminator for the Standard SM-2 missile. Whether it is a new airframe or an upgrade for the E-2C, protection of the fleet from the most likely of threats should be a priority.
Author's Note: The information used in this analysis was gleaned from Combat Fleets of the World (Naval Institute Press) and Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, Jane's Defense Weekly, and Jane's Intelligence Review.
Commander Eurom is a weapons and tactics expert for the Sea Control Weapons School at Naval Air Station Jacksonville. Lieutenant Hughes is the intelligence officer attached to the school.