Superior technology increases the chances of victory on the battlefield, but winning or losing still depends on the ultimate smart weapon: people, such as infantrymen, who can take and hold ground. The Desert Storm and Kosovo campaigns sustain this view. In On War, Karl Von Clausewitz stated, "Arming and equipping are not essential to the conception of fighting." While conceding that fighting determines the character of arms and that arms modify the character of war, Clausewitz largely restricted the art of war to the actual conduct of battle and not necessarily the science behind it.
Throughout dramatic reductions in defense spending in the 1990s, the U.S. armed forces lived off the fat of the Reagan military budgets of the 1980s. Currently, weapons and aircraft are aging at an alarming rate as they operate at levels that increasingly stress people and equipment. To meet field requirements in the face of such operational tempo, defense planners must buy replacements at rates higher than programmed while maximizing the effectiveness of existing platforms. Yet, pressure on the budget is tremendous, notwithstanding the promises of acquisition reform, use of commercial equipment, and infrastructure reductions. Is technology the answer?
For the time being, we have the luxury of placing technology in the hands of war fighters without accelerating programs unduly. Even so, we cannot pursue every idea that promises revolutionary improvements. Instead we have to be carefully adaptive to take advantage of advances in the commercial sector. Planners must ensure that development programs focus on the technology requirements of war fighters and concurrently foster opportunities to pursue revolutionary ideas that represent technological "pushes."
The United States relies on technology as a force multiplier. Dramatic changes in the world order are reshaping how U.S. leaders look at—and fund—defense programs. While it is essential to maintain the lead in research and development (R&D), we should not ignore lessons of the past. There must be a balance between the degree of technological sophistication that is employed and the quantities of technically advanced weapons and equipment that can be deployed effectively and efficiently. This balance determines how far and fast to innovate and advance. Technology cannot be allowed to develop so rapidly that it leaves operational and tactical doctrine scrambling to keep up with its potential. When technology falters, the loss should not be devastating in its final effect; it must not outstrip the military's capacity to adjust to its failures. In the end, war will be reduced to its purest form—and the warrior who retains basic fighting and technical skills will be the most successful.
Because we are involved in developing advanced weapon systems—and not technological heretics—clarification is necessary. Technology is a force multiplier that offers flexibility and enhances tactical capabilities, but it is a double-edged sword. Technology is an investment and also a consumable that can overburden the ultimate war fighter if it is not applied appropriately. In the past, misapplications of technology and the rush to impose it on war fighters have raised concerns that it can outstrip the capacity of people to adjust to implementation. Thus, methods of incorporating technology must be weighed and planned carefully.
Fiscal reality is bringing clearer thinking to research and the technology it affords war fighters. We no longer can afford technology as an end in itself (if we ever could). No nation depends on its technological base more than the United States; it must remain on the cutting edge of well-defined and orchestrated military and commercial technology implementation. However, it is arguable that we will be able to do so in the light of austere R&D funding—especially in the area of industrial process technology research—unless the various elements of the R&D community can be harnessed and made to dovetail economically to meet national security needs.
Paths for Innovation
In applying technology to warfare, we must ensure that war fighters get what they need, rather then what technologists and systems operators think they need. Regardless of President George Bush's latest defense budget, there is continuing reliance on existing, less expensive weapon systems that might well be less than optimal (or even unreliable) because of age and other factors. In many cases, technological manufacturing innovation can find ways to improve them so they meet—and in some cases exceed—current and future standards at affordable costs. To that end, the Department of Defense (DoD) established a program in the late 1960s for identifying and integrating warfighting requirements through enhanced manufacturing technology.
In the Navy Department, the manufacturing technology (ManTech) program functions under sponsorship of the Office of Naval Research. Like many other government operations, this program has downsized and streamlined operations in recent years. Acutely aware of its obligation to war fighters and their supporting arms, Navy ManTech provides a mechanism for development of enabling manufacturing technology to produce, repair, and maintain Navy and Marine Corps weapon systems. The Navy program concentrates primarily on reducing the risks inherent in transitioning from R&D to production, which has a direct effect on system affordability. In addition, it stimulates industry to invest in and implement new manufacturing techniques.
War fighters and their combat service support elements are key to the direction of this vital R&D resource. Navy ManTech's customers range from acquisition system program executive officers and program managers responsible for transitioning major naval weapon systems from development into production, to logistics managers at naval depots and shipyards responsible for repair, overhaul, and remanufacture of major weapon systems. Navy and Marine Corps systems command personnel at all levels should become familiar with this program because ManTech representatives are assigned to the various systems commands to help resolve problems facing the operating forces. To meet the criteria for ManTech selection, projects must:
- Provide a solution to a well-defined Navy/Marine Corps need
- Demonstrate technical feasibility
- Develop pervasive technology applicable to multiple weapon systems
- Encompass technology development at higher risk levels than those assumed normally by industry
- Permit timely implementation for achievement of anticipated benefits
- Provide improved cost, performance, and safety
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare
War is inherently uncertain, dynamic, and disorderly. To win, commanders must accept and overcome the incredible confusion of combat—and they must be able to generate worse conditions for the enemy. The weapon systems issued to war fighters are the tools that (directly and indirectly) will generate confusion and disorder in the enemy's ranks. The greatest military leaders understood and used maneuver in prosecuting their campaigns—and often it was technology that gave them the edge in evolving their doctrine and operating principles.
Until recently, the Marine Corps emphasized to the doctrine of operational maneuver from the sea (OMFTS), with its reliance on over-the-horizon operations. Technology is critical to this concept—for example, the use of air-cushion and other advanced landing vehicles. Now, OMFTS is being looked at as a "worst case scenario." Major General William Whitlow, Director of Expeditionary Warfare (N-75) in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, notes that the Corps needs to shift from OMFTS to a more comprehensive operational concept. "We ... will always need and require our source. Without a Navy, there wouldn't be a Marine Corps—it's as simple as that. We come from the sea and we return to the sea."
However, General Whitlow notes, OMFTS is quite limiting. "What you want is to be able to do all of these advance force operations, hitting them hard before they can build up. Do all that first. Then, if you are not successful, you still have the ability to kick the door down and bring all of that power to bear on one point." This approach will require looking at multiple options for accomplishing the mission. The need for more flexibility will, in turn, add to the importance of the role of technology. Without it, the evolution of modern doctrine will be unachievable.
Conclusions
It is clear that core industrial-type research remains essential to focusing all R&D elements on the current and future needs of war fighters. In testimony before Congress, Lieutenant General Martin Steele, former Marine Corps Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies and Operations, best summed up the desired technical direction for the naval services when he said, "We have long had a saying in the Marine Corps that the guiding principle of our transformation strategy must be `Equip the man, not man the equipment.' That is to say, as important as changes in technology might be, one thing is certain-it will be the young men and women in our armed forces who will continue to make the critical difference on tomorrow's battlefields. Technology will matter, but only if it is used to empower the young men and women of our armed forces to prevail against the new adversaries and in the new and lethal operating environments we see just over the horizon."
General Feigley is Commanding General of the Marine Corps Systems Command. Captain Cook, a former nuclear submariner, is director of the Institute for Manufacturing and Sustainment Technologies, a Navy ManTech center of excellence at The Pennsylvania State University’s Applied Research Laboratory. Colonel Johnson, a former naval aviator, is a research administrator at the laboratory.