The new F-100 frigate, fitted with the U.S. Aegis antiair combat system, gives Spain the only European antiballistic missile capability and could lead to a much larger role on the global stage.
Until recently, the fact that the Spanish F-100 frigate program would provide the government with strategic naval tools was not widely known—and perhaps even hidden, given the population's animosity toward defense-related issues. In recent months, however, the frigates have been pushed into the limelight as Spain's contribution to a potential antiballistic missile shield. What makes the story of the F-100's strategic capabilities unique is these were not top-level requirements. They were built in by the Armada as the program evolved.
The F-100 class can be considered to be scaled-down versions of the USS Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class destroyers, although they are designated as frigates because of the politically correct ring of the term and their role, displacement, capabilities, and lineage. They are very capable antiair warfare (AAW) platforms with strong multipurpose capabilities. The class will honor famed admirals in the Armada's proud history; F-101 Alvaro de Bazan is named for an admiral whose dash and skill averted a possible disaster while be was in command of a reserve division in the battle of Lepanto (1571). He eventually was named "Admiral of the Ocean Sea" by King Philip II.
Developing the F-100
In the past decade, the Armada has participated in numerous failed multinational efforts to develop and field an AAW ship, starting with the NFR-90 in the late 1980s (with just about the whole of NATO), followed by LAMS/FSAF (with France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Spain participating), and then TFC (a program between the Netherlands, Germany, and Spain). By 1995, the Armada was able to convince a weakened Socialist government to give the nod to a controversial approach to acquiring the desired AAW ships. Although not formally abandoning the TFC consortium, the combat system and associated radar would be an off-the-shelf Aegis system. The idea was to tie the configuration of the Spanish Aegis suites to a U.S. Navy suite, and DDG-51 Flight IIA ended up being the baseline. With the Alvaro de Bazan (F-101) to be delivered in October 2002, and the remaining three at one-year intervals, a long struggle by the Armada has come to a fruitful resolution.
The new center-of-right government that took office in mid-1996 embraced and gave additional impetus to the inherited program. The result was a ship designed by Izar (the state-owned shipyard) that integrated the DDG-51 Aegis suite with only 80% of the displacement of the Arleigh Burke class. Some compromises were made, such as a reduced number of Mark 99 illuminators and a single Mark 41 vertical launch system forward. But the F-100 was to be a helicopter-capable vessel, with a hangar and facilities for an SH-60B helicopter.
The program has continued without reported costs overruns and is running ahead of schedule. This was made possible by the teaming of Izar and Lockheed-Martin as first layer contractors as well as the comprehensive participation of other Spanish companies. But above all, it was possible because of the vision and determination of a group of Spanish naval officers who previously had gone through several failed attempts to develop an AAW combatant.
This group of naval officers cleared the way for the two capabilities that make the class such a political asset in today's geopolitical environment. By deciding that the Aegis suite was to be that of U.S. destroyers, and ensuring that the F-100 Aegis always would evolve, tied to a U.S. baseline, they opened the road to an antiballistic missile (ABM) capability. By deciding that the Mark 41 vertical launch system would be the "strike" variant, instead of the "short" version, they paved the way for a deep precision-strike capability. It would be just a political decision after that.
Spain Wants to Play Big
In March 2000, with the first vessel of the class nearing its launching date, new general elections were held in Spain in which the slim center-of-right majority that had ousted the Socialist government in 1996 gained an absolute majority, led by Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar. During his first term, the number one priority had been economics. His second legislature, starting in mid-2000, was to have an increased political slant, with one of its stated goals to increase the "weight" of Spain in the international scene. This was to be achieved both from within the European Union and outside of it.
Within the European Union, Spain would seek status as one of the "big" states, together with France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Numerous political and bureaucratic battles were fought, and many others still rage. It is a tribute to Mr. Aznar's tenacity that he has achieved many of his objectives in this arena, in spite of Spain's population, which at 40 million is about two-thirds the size of the populations of France, Italy, or the United Kingdom, and about one-half that of Germany. Population size is a basic yardstick in the European Union to establish relative power, quotas, and funding.
Madrid wholeheartedly supported increased investment by Spanish companies in Latin America, continuously marketed itself as a useful broker in the Mideast conflict, and lobbied for a seat in an expanded G-8. And there was, of course, the United States. A strong effort was directed at achieving a special relationship with the United States. Advances were made under President Bill Clinton's administrations, but it was only at the outset of President George W. Bush's tenure that a breakthrough was achieved.
Europe Falls Behind
Along with its NATO allies, Spain participated in the Kosovo campaign, mainly through its detachment of E/F-18 aircraft deployed at Aviano, Italy. Although small in size, the detachment was active in precision strike and suppression of enemy air defenses missions.
From a strictly Spanish point of view, the Kosovo conflict was an opportunity to show that Spain was ready to take its place in joint operations with its allies. But from a more general perspective—and in spite of all the euphoria at the outcome of the war—NATO members knew well how close to failure the 78-day bombing campaign had come. With a ground offensive ruled out from the outset, the conflict had become a clash of wills between NATO and the Yugoslav dictator. Just prior to his giving up, despair was beginning to take hold throughout NATO headquarters, and doubts about pursuing the bombing any further was beginning to spread through the member nation's capitals.
Finally, and unexpectedly, the war was "won" by means of the air campaign alone. Of the lessons learned, two were particularly poignant:
- The abysmal difference between the United States and the rest of the NATO members when it came to equipment and weaponry such as surveillance platforms, numbers and variety of precision-strike weapons, electronic warfare aircraft, and combat search-and-rescue helicopters
- The allies' zero tolerance for friendly casualties and near zero tolerance for collateral damage to the enemy
Part of the problem with lagging weapons supposedly was addressed after the war when the European Union members of NATO launched a political initiative to improve the military capabilities of Europe by identifying areas of critical needs, prioritizing them, and funding them. To this date, little has been done in the area of funding, and capability gaps continue to exist if not widen.
But it is the absolute intolerance of casualties that is the most worrisome, forcing NATO to fly its bombing missions from high altitude, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the missions. The altitude of the strikes also increased collateral damage to the enemy, which became a powerful force acting against NATO as public opinion questioned the intervention. It was a matter of luck that no more aircraft were downed and no aircrews lost. The United States is affected by this modern-day warfare malaise, but not with the severity that it affects its continental European allies. In all likelihood, modest losses of aircraft and crew would have forced certain countries participating in the campaign to inhibit their activity or withdraw altogether. The fact that the losses did not take place should not lessen the gravity of the situation. Most of the NATO countries pronounce themselves ready to stand up and fight, and yet have no political or social capacity to absorb even low levels of punishment. Paradoxically enough, two of the NATO countries with a higher level of tolerance to sustain casualties—the United States and the United Kingdom—are also the only ones with an alternative to manned aircraft in the long-range Tomahawk strike missile.
ABM: A Discovery is Made
President George W. Bush's inauguration brought with it a renewed emphasis on ballistic missile defense. Bringing this issue to the forefront meant facing various levels of opposition from the European allies, from open hostility on the part of France, to a wait-and-see attitude from the United Kingdom, and everything in between.
In June 2001, President Bush set out for his first trip to Europe to confer with his allies. At the top of the agenda was an explanation of the views of the United States on the missile shield. The President's first stop was Madrid, where the surprise materialized. In the cumbersome and subdued manner of diplomatic speech, Prime Minister Aznar presented Spain's position with respect to the missile shield: "The framework of the Cold War is behind us now, so the proposal by the American administration can guarantee higher levels of security when facing new world challenges."
In the following days, the leading Spanish dailies gave wide coverage to the potential ABM capabilities of the F-100 ships under construction, and presented them as Spain's contribution to the missile shield. There was a widespread notion that this idea had been filtered by the government to the media to promote the perception that there was more than words behind the Prime Minister's statement of support to President Bush.
The F-100s had been "discovered" by public opinion and by the government itself. All of a sudden, Spain had gained some of the political clout it was seeking. Although the point was not made openly, given the political will the F-100 class could attain initial ABM capabilities on a short timetable that could closely follow that of the United States. No other nation in Europe will have that capability in the foreseeable future, whether naval or ground based. France and the United Kingdom have not even planned a naval ABM capability. The thought of a Spanish frigate holding AAW/ABM guard over a European Union amphibious landing in Northern Africa, for example, probably is not soothing to certain national prides.
In all likelihood, the future will bring more conflicts, and the European Union will be tested again. For all of its rhetoric, the European Union will be faced with the same zero tolerance for casualties. Will it opt-out of high-risk operations and leave the United States and the United Kingdom to shoulder the burden of any such operation? Given the scenario, it may not be long before the F-100s get discovered again, and this time for a different reason. In the not too distant future, the European Union may be looking for ways of saving face without having to send its "parade-only" soldiers to a shooting war. A perfect way of achieving this may be by offering its two deep-strike assets as an alternative to air strikes or ground intervention—Tomahawk missiles launched from Royal Navy submarines and Spanish F-100 destroyers.
Naturally, for the F100s to operate Tomahawks, a political decision to equip them with those weapons has to happen first. Once again, there is no other European nation (except the United Kingdom) with the potential to operate the weapon without major investments in acquisition or modification of existing platforms.
The U.S. Factor
The cooperation of the United States with the F- 100 program seems an exception to the policy of European integration, which includes the industrial aerospace and defense sectors. Although Spain supports steps to integrate, Prime Minister Aznar seems to be more in tune with Mr. Blair's politics and close relationship with the Americans than with some of its central European counterparts.
In recent months, the perception that the Aznar administration is playing the "American card" has gained wide acceptance, and the F-100 is seen as an engine for this attitude. The perception is that Spain may be able muster more muscle by leveraging U.S. options in its defense industry privatization scheme and weapon system procurement road map. Spain would integrate with Europe to an extent, but also would reach alliances with U.S. industry in certain critical areas.
For example, Eurocopter's Tiger attack helicopter, widely held to be the "natural" choice for the Spanish Army aviation requirement for such an aircraft, suddenly is facing tough competition from Boeing's AH-64D Apache. This approach is annoying Spain's continental allies, and getting support from the United Kingdom. In this context, a fully abled F-100 destroyer is in the interest of both Spain and the United States.
When operational, the four ships of this class will be much more than just the AAW platforms initially intended. They will be powerful tools of foreign policy for the Spanish government, giving it unparalleled capabilities in Europe, and contributing to the effort by the Kingdom of Spain to increase its political influence on the world scene.
Mr. Campbell-Cruz is a business development manager in one of Spain’s leading defense companies and regularly contributes articles to defense-related publications.