With President Olusegun Obasanjo at the helm of a democractic government, the United States recognizes Nigeria's potential in Africa. A strong Navy will promote stability and peace on the continent.
Nigeria's return to civilian control in May 1999 after many years of military dictatorship has been followed by a dramatic upsurge of naval diplomacy in the form of flag showing, training cruises, visits of admirals, logistic support, and training teams from foreign navies.
According to Vice Admiral Victor Ombu, Nigerian Chief of Naval Staff, "within a few weeks of the civilian takeover, messages were received from several countries—USA, Britain, Germany, India, Brazil, and South Africa—indicating their interest to resume old ties with the Nigerian Navy. They wanted their naval ships to come to Nigeria immediately on flag showing. They wanted senior Nigerian naval officers to visit their fleet and their shipyards." Nigerian naval authorities initially asked for the postponement of such visits to enable the Nigerian Navy to revive its ailing fleet to meet high international standards and thus be in a position to "maintain our old tradition of having fleet exercises with our foreign naval visitors."
But the foreign navies were eager to make political points and support democracy by renewing naval ties with various offers of assistance. The United States was the first to deploy a warship (the USS Carter Hall [LSD-50]) to make a port call in Lagos in November 1999. This was followed by the British frigate HMS Somerset in January 2000, a German task force in May, and many naval delegations, especially from the United States. Many more naval visits are expected.
The world has been pleased that Africa's most populous nation has at last shed its pariah-state status and reentered the community of nations. Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo has visited all the major capitals of the world, including Washington, D.C. President Bill Clinton visited Nigeria in August 2000. His visit was regarded as the high point of Nigeria's democratization process, which Clinton described as a "new day for Nigeria and new hope for Africa."
What are the implications of this renewed hope for naval cooperation, especially between the United States and Nigeria? How can the Nigerian Navy participate in joint training exercises to prepare for contributing to global maritime issues, especially the peacekeeping missions to which the United States and other developed countries are committed? Specifically, can opportunities presented by the current rapport between the governments of the United States and Nigeria lead to further strengthening of navy-to-navy cooperation?
To start with, we must understand that Nigeria takes the United States as a role model for its sea-power ambitions. First, it is commonly believed that as the United States underwrites the security of the "free world" as a superpower, so Nigeria should underwrite the security of the African continent. As the argument goes, this is Nigeria's "manifest destiny" as a major power center in Africa. The U.S. Navy is seen as the most cooperative, deploying to different regions of the world from NATO Standing Naval Forces to UNITAS and RIMPAC exercises, West African training cruises and many other international programs. Therefore, the dream is that the Nigerian Navy be similarly used as an instrument of policy to promote cooperative ventures in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Gulf of Guinea Commission, Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and the South Atlantic, linking Nigeria with such nations as South Africa, Brazil, and Argentina.
Second, Nigerians are well schooled in the rubric of power in interstate relations. They were very much at home with the Cold War-era rhetoric, which placed emphasis on military power for competition. Having a powerful navy is a component of modern statehood, and policymakers often are fascinated by the use of navies as handmaidens of diplomacy.
Many Nigerians believe that the prestige of the country is enhanced when its naval ships sail to other parts of the world to show the flag. This led to the commencement of the Nigerian Sea Power Project (a program of building a credible sea power) in the 1970s and 1980s. Ironically, this program suffered severe setbacks under the 15-year military regime because of economic mismanagement, failure to prioritize ship and equipment acquisition, a poor maintenance culture, sanctions imposed on the military regime for human right abuses, and a gross underestimation of the financial implications of acquiring, maintaining, and operating a modern navy.
The civilian government inherited a mélange of ill-maintained ships, logistic quagmires, and demoralized personnel. During a visit to naval establishments in October 1999, the Nigerian Minister of Defense, Lieutenant General Theophilus Danjuma, expressed sadness at the deterioration of the fleet. He felt nostalgic for the good old days of a Nigerian Navy that sailed around the world to show the flag, and he promised to restore the lost glory of the Nigerian Navy by replacing its obsolete ships with "bigger and more sophisticated ones."
Africa's most populous, vocal, and politically ambitious nation requires a strong navy to keep its coast well defended and to protect its offshore economic resources, on which the prosperity of the nation heavily depends. Nigeria also would like to give military muscle to its political leadership role in Africa as a leading peacekeeper or, more accurately, peace enforcer, as demonstrated in the Liberia and Sierra Leone crises during which African nations felt abandoned and had to take their destiny in their own hands.
At one end of the spectrum is the vision of a Navy that must be able to meet the popular national aspirations of leading the African people. It also is reasoned that Nigerians, in large numbers, are living and working in different parts of conflict-ridden Africa. Sometimes the need arises to evacuate them in crisis.
At the other end is the need to have a Navy with the capability to guard the Nigerian offshore tapestry—oil and gas installations, fishery resources, and maritime environment. The Navy also should be able to deal effectively with the plague of pirates in West Africa, prevent coastal smuggling, enforce immigration law, ensure safety at sea, and prevent pollution at sea.
What should be the shape and size of the fleet that will meet all these missions? In his analysis of the fleet required by the Nigerian Navy, Vice Admiral Ombu reasoned that: "Our involvement (in peace enforcement) may not always give us the opportunity of having secure airfields. Our troops require close air support. We cannot run away from ships that carry helicopters to support troops ashore. It is also imperative that we have a well-equipped hospital ship. If we had, about half the lives lost in Liberia and Sierra Leone could have been saved. We are working on all these things gradually."
On the Coast Guard missions of the Navy, the admiral explained:
Considering the huge area the Navy has to patrol, if we are to patrol effectively, our man-o-wars (frigates and fast attack craft) are unsuited for EEZ [exclusive economic zone] patrol. Firstly they have high-speed engines with very high fuel consumption rate. They also have short endurance of a maximum of five days. For EEZ Patrol most navies use offshore patrol craft with low-speed engines and low consumption rates that have long endurance up to three weeks. Therefore, they have comfortable crew quarters and large reservoir of water and victuals, so that they can stay out at sea for long periods and can make meaningful patrols instead of dashing out and dashing back into harbor. Furthermore, they carry helicopters, which increase her patrol range enormously. The helicopter flies around and directs the mother ship to target for investigation. If we are to take control of our territorial waters, to know what each ship is doing, if we are to protect our very rich aquatic reserve from illegal poaching and from unlicensed fishery, if we are protect ourselves against illegal maritime research, if we are to do all of these efficiently, we need offshore patrol vessels.
Although Coast Guard duties have been integrated into the responsibilities of the Navy, blue-water aspirations have distracted the Navy from the committed pursuit of its brown-water roles in the past. The challenge facing Nigerian policymakers today is how to equip and train the ideal Navy, given the country's heavy debt burden, internal political turmoil, religious controversies, ethnic divisions, technological backwardness, and excruciating poverty of the ordinary people—all of which seem to make naval discussions superfluous.
Happily, the country's return to democratic rule seems to have rekindled hope of naval revival. During President Obasanjo's state visit to the United States in October 1999, he met U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen and requested U.S. assistance in teaching Nigerian soldiers how to create a civilian-controlled military. William Cohen was in Nigeria in April 2000. There have been many promises of assistance and several U.S. agencies now are in Nigeria carrying out many training programs.
From the naval point of view, Nigeria requires a new set of priorities for maritime policing and defense. The starting point should be acceptance of the direct link between the Navy and national wealth. Seafaring and wise management of sea resources can bring enormous wealth to the nation.
Nigeria depends on oil export mainly to the United States for more than 90% of its foreign exchange earnings. A comprehensive security solution to the potential disruption of oil production and other activities should be given priority—ships, boats, logistic and appropriate training.
The Nigerian Navy has a long history of supporting the economic well-being of the country. Its fortunes are directly linked with the performance of the economy. And since Nigeria has an enduring dream to have a large Navy to meet its perceived leadership position in Africa and the black world, the first step is to protect oil offshore. When the nation is rich, the fleet can be big and vibrant.
Naval authorities in June 2000 released a seven-point program for resuscitating the fleet. It focuses on upgrading offshore policing and filling gaps in the fleet and includes:
- Resuscitating 38 inshore patrol craft for inshore patrol of creeks and harbor approaches.
- Refurbishing of four Town-class patrol craft for coastal approaches.
- Acquiring flat-bottom boats and training of special boat sections to deal with vandalization of oil pipelines in creeks.
- Upgrading of support facilities such as the naval dockyard with additional slipway and test benches for local repairs, design, and building of small boats.
- Extending of the lifespan of bigger ships for homeland defense and subregional commitments.
- Acquiring several large offshore patrol vessels, training ships, helicopter landing ships, and associated helicopters for peacekeeping duties.
- Intensifying all categories of training.
This program will require a far greater financial burden than the Nigerian economy and naval budget can carry. Meaningful naval cooperation by navies of the developed countries, especially the U.S. Navy, should include helping democratic Nigeria revive its fleet, which is an essential ingredient for securing the West African subregion. An assisted Nigerian Navy will be far more cost-effective for the developed countries with economic and political interests in this part of Africa.
Commodore Oladimeji served in the Nigerian Navy from 1972 until 1994. He attended Defense Information School at Fort Benjamin Harrison and has published seven articles in Proceedings. He is a training consultant in leadership, communication, and information technology based in Lagos.