The world's oceans continue to be the "great commons" that connect the United States to a maritime world—with the nation's freedom to operate and its commerce protected by the U.S. Navy, as has been the case for more than 225 years.
The U.S. Navy is an expeditionary force with a tradition of forward deployment. On any given day, roughly one-third of the Navy's ships are forward deployed to the four corners of the earth, providing freedom of action across a wide range of contingencies by supporting the ability of the U.S. military to provide rapid, sustained, worldwide response.
As the new administration considers priorities for the future of the U.S. military, it is clear that the nation must sustain a certain level of investment in the Navy. The question is: How much? In answering that question, it is important to look at the four key "returns" on the nation's investment in its Navy deployed forward:
- Command of the seas in peacetime ensures the stability of the maritime "commons" that is the foundation of the country's economic well-being.
- U.S. sovereign power forward provides timely, often decisive, response in crises and shapes the international security environment.
- If crisis becomes war, forward-deployed naval forces will assure access for joint forces arriving from outside the theater of operations.
- Navy capabilities to assure access will enable the U.S. military to transform to a lighter, more expeditionary joint force that can deploy rapidly from the continental United States.
Commanding the Seas
In an era of increasing globalization, U.S. economic prosperity is linked inextricably to trade across the oceans. U.S. exports support 11.5 million jobs and have fueled one-third of the nation's economic growth since 1993. The value of U.S. trade, as a percentage of gross domestic product, has risen from less than 10% in 1968 to more than 25% in 1998.
Beyond the statistics, however, globalization has changed the way in which trade is conducted. Container shipping is the new heart of the global economy, fueling the efficiency of an intermodal transportation system (i.e., ship-to-truck, truck-to-rail, etc.) that permits just-in-time supply chains to function. Currently, more than 60% of the value of intercontinental trade travels by containership, a figure projected to increase to 80% by 2020. This intermodal transportation system depends on 16 global superports, with the sophisticated infrastructure and depth of water to handle large container vessels. (Above, the 1,043-foot Regina Maersk enters Singapore.) Freedom of access to these economic hubs is critical to the world economy and to the U.S. economy in particular.
Singapore, for example, handles more than 300 million tons of cargo annually, or one-fifth of the value of worldwide daily maritime trade. Nearly half of all U.S. computer imports travels through Singapore, as does more than one-third of all the global transshipment activity that feeds just-in-time supply chains. Any interruption of shipping in or around this single superport would have grave implications for the world's economy.
Another bulk commodity that travels mainly by sea and that the world cannot do without is oil. Today, 25% of the world's oil supply flows through the Strait of Hormuz. If anyone were to block this critical choke point, it would have a devastating impact on the world economy. Worse, with nearly 70% of the world's oil capacity located within the Persian Gulf region, it currently would be impossible to make up the supply differential from other sources.
Responding to Crises
In addition to guarding the global commons, the Navy provides forward-deployed sovereign U.S. combat power to respond to crises and to shape world events in ways that favor the expansion of freedom and democracy. Combat credible forces, operating overseas wherever and whenever the United States desires, allow unambiguous demonstration and application of U.S. sovereign power as events warrant, either with the help of allies or alone. When a crisis occurs, the Navy usually is close enough to respond rapidly, with a force that is immediately employable. Over the past decade, the Navy has responded in this fashion on at least 156 occasions. Every one of the past 12 deployed Navy carrier battle groups has been called into combat in southeastern Europe or the Middle East. Most of these operations were executed by naval forces that were in regular rotational deployments. After answering these calls to action, these same forces continued their routine deployments.
During Operation Desert Fox in December 1998, for example, U.S. naval forces struck 85 different targets in Iraq over four nights of combat with very little warning time. To achieve tactical and strategic surprise, only naval tactical aircraft participated during the first day of operations. This was possible because no additional U.S. forces had to be moved into the area. This is the employment of sovereign U.S. combat power in the fullest sense.
Naval forces have served the nation's interests in other ways as well, from evacuating U.S. and allied citizens from hostile countries to enforcing sanctions against Iraq and Yugoslavia. Over the past decade, naval forces have conducted 19 noncombatant evacuation operations, 32 humanitarian assistance operations, and more than 5,000 maritime boardings in support of U.S. drug policy and U.N. sanctions—all as part of routine deployment operations. These demonstrations of U.S. resolve help to secure our national interests and reinforce U.S. credibility abroad.
Forward-deployed, credible naval combat force also provides the power to shape the international security environment. Over the past decade, U.S. naval forces conducted more than 20 demonstrations of force at the right time and place to send powerful messages that undoubtedly helped to keep the peace.
Recall the events of March 1996. Increased tensions between China and Taiwan culminated in Chinese ballistic missile tests in the waters off Taiwan. Financial markets dropped in response to the threat of conflict, and the fate of Taiwanese democracy and the outcome of their elections appeared to be at risk, jeopardizing the long-term stability of the region. In response, the Independence (CV-62) battle group—already in the Western Pacific—was ordered to take station off the east coast of Taiwan, to be joined shortly by the Nimitz (CVN-68) battle group. Tensions subsided, the peace and security of the region were sustained, and U.S. capability and resolve clearly were demonstrated to the world. Shortly thereafter, the financial markets stabilized. So by helping to create a framework of regional security and stability, U.S. naval forces prevented further escalation and quieted economic turmoil. It would have been difficult for non-deployed forces to have this much impact in such a short time.
In addition to demonstrating U.S. commitment to defending its national interests, forward-deployed naval forces provide military engagement opportunities that promote interoperability and improve ties between nations. Similarly, forward-deployed naval forces help to establish a regional knowledge base as U.S. naval forces train and operate around the globe.
Assuring Access
One premise of U.S. national military strategy is that the nation must have immediate and sustained access to any region of the world at any time. In the coming decades, U.S. access may be challenged by nations that seek to expand their regional influence in ways that compete with the interests of the United States. Land-based cruise missiles, mines, advanced conventionally powered submarines, and increasingly sophisticated space-based satellite targeting could emerge as threats. Some nations may choose to develop ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, coordinating the employment of these systems with information warfare. However, even if these threats come to fruition, it is likely that they would be more effective when used against fixed land-based forces than they would against mobile naval forces.
Nevertheless, guaranteeing immediate and sustained access in the face of these challenges is an issue for the entire joint force. Naval forces must play a critical role in enabling access for land-based forces arriving from outside the theater. Naval forces on rotational deployment, already present in regions of concern, can provide much of the early combat power for any contingency, while easing the entry of joint combat forces.
As forces begin to flow into theater, on-scene surface combatants can project missile defense for forces at sea and ashore, protecting coastal airfields, ports of debarkation, and amphibious lodgment areas. These maritime theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD) forces also would ease the demands on airlift in the critical early phases of conflict, delaying the point at which land-based TBMD forces must be brought in, thereby allowing a more rapid flow of offensive forces into the theater.
Forward-deployed naval forces also provide timely, pinpoint offensive power projection through carrier air wing strikes, submarine and surface combatant cruise missile strikes, and special-operations-capable amphibious warfare ship missions. This firepower from the sea will clear the way for joint operations ashore until the joint forces are firmly established and sustainable.
Facilitating Transformation
The Navy also will play a key role in enabling the transformation of the other services. The Navy's inherent capability to create the conditions that ease access for the other components of the joint force will be critical to the efforts of the Army and Air Force to become lighter, more expeditionary, and able to operate at a higher tempo with a smaller footprint ashore. At the same time, the Navy will continue to support the efforts of the Marine Corps to move the point of entry beyond the beachhead.
Already expeditionary, the Navy's own transformation is about changes in force posture-not necessarily force structure. The Navy will focus on the ability to act faster than an adversary by evolving its force posture from platform-centric to network-centric operations, with an emphasis on effects-based warfare.
To understand this transformation, one needs to appreciate that most Navy platforms are long-term capital investments—e.g., two-thirds of the ships sailing the seas or being built today still will be operational in 2020. Therefore, one must look beyond the hulls and airframes and into the guts of the ships and aircraft to see how they have evolved over time with improved capabilities and new doctrines.
During the 1980s, just 14 Navy platforms—the aircraft carriers and embarked air wings—were able to strike targets ashore. When the Cold War ended, the Navy adjusted its doctrine to direct power ashore as articulated in ". . . From the Sea." As a result, today's Navy has 144 surface ships and submarines—in addition to its 12 aircraft carriers and embarked air wings—that can strike targets ashore.
Less than a decade ago only about a dozen aircraft in a carrier air wing were capable of delivering precision-guided munitions (PGMs). Today, all 50 carrier air wing strike fighters are PGM-capable. During Desert Storm, the notional air wing was capable of striking 162 aim points in a successful day of normal flight operations. Improved weapons and aircraft make today's air wing capable of striking more than four times as many targets—with fewer airframes. By 2010, currently programmed improvements will result in an air wing capable of striking more than six times as many aim points, with devastating accuracy, as its Desert Storm counterpart.
And the Navy's transformation continues. The future Navy will not limit stealth to its submarines. Surface ships will encompass low-observable technologies as well. Further, new-generation ships and aircraft will use open-system architectures and modular designs to allow for the rapid incorporation of emerging technologies while reducing manning.
Investing for the Future
The Navy's challenge is to choose its investment wisely so that the right capabilities can be provided in a fiscally constrained environment. The Navy's modernization and recapitalization programs specifically address asymmetric and area denial threats by investing not only in new mission areas that will continue to ensure command of the seas, but also in the transformational systems that provide a knowledge-superior networked force using cyberspace and space to ensure speed of command.
The Navy's investments in capabilities such as unmanned aerial vehicles, high-speed/high-capacity command-and-control links, and networked ship information technology installations will provide some of the means by which naval forces will be netted with other organic and national sensors to permit a tempo of operations superior to that of any likely adversary. At the same time, the Navy needs to emphasize evolving mission areas that are necessary to support its contribution to the joint war fight. These areas include countermine capabilities, unmanned undersea vehicles, and a network of distributed acoustic sensors and shooters to detect, identify, and clear mines so that merchant shipping can bring in land-based forces.
Learning from the Past
It is vital that the Navy continues to build on its long history of experimentation. From the "Squadron of Evolution" in the late 1800s, which developed tactics for the Great White Fleet, to the USS Langley carrier prototype, which demonstrated naval air power during the interwar years, to Submarine Development Squadron 12, which was established in 1949 and still conducts undersea experimentation efforts today, experimentation has been an integral part of the Navy's culture. Experimentation ships – such as the USS Norton Sound (AVM-1), dedicated to missile and gun system development, and USS Antietam (CV-36), critical for antisubmarine carrier and hunter-killer tactics—delivered to the fleet tactics, systems, and concepts of operations that directly increased the nation's warfighting capability.
Even as Navy force structure has been reduced from Cold War levels, the threats to which the Navy must respond have proliferated. Rather than a single, well-understood and formidable threat, the United States now faces multiple, poorly understood, unpredictable challenges. Kosovo, Korea, the Persian Gulf, terrorism, and international drug cartels are some of the national security challenges around the globe to which the Navy must respond every day. The shift from bluewater to littoral operations-to directly influence events ashore as embodied in ". . . From the Sea"—required an exploration of new concepts of operations and systems, as well as new opportunities provided by emerging technology. A few years ago, the Navy recognized that future naval concepts and capabilities required a culture of innovation and a systematic mechanism to explore new ideas. As a result, the Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) was established and chartered to coordinate Navy experimentation in concert with other centers of excellence such as Submarine Development Group that were focused on fully developing tactical capabilities through active experimentation.
Guiding the Future
As in the interwar years, the Navy now is conducting a broad series of fleet battle experiments, orchestrated by the Navy Warfare Development Command and executed by fleet commanders. To that end, the Navy has dedicated forces to explore an emerging core competency. Two Aegis cruisers will test how to project defense ashore with area theater ballistic missile defense. A third ship—the Third Fleet flagship, USS Coronado (AGF-11), will develop information-related and command-and-control operations. Already new concepts have developed from these efforts, and the resulting systems, such as the Naval Fires Control Network, will increase significantly the Navy's ability to project offensive power ashore. To ensure that future investments return the right kinds of warfighting capabilities, it is important to further invigorate Navy experimentation.
To be effective, however, experimentation must be focused: priorities must be established; frequent experiments must be conducted to uncover the best ideas; units assigned to conduct experiments must continue real operations so that they remain grounded in what is important; joint and fleet battle experiments need to be continued to investigate both joint and component concepts of operations; and most important, experiments must be allowed to fail so what does not work can be learned along with what does. Such a vigorous regime will produce innovation. As Linus Pauling said, "The best way to have a good idea is to have lots of ideas."
Admiral Keating is the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy, and Operations.