"The Corps since Vietnam: Changed for the Better?"
(See S. Forsberg, pp. 65-67, November 2001 Proceedings)
Captain Keith F Kopets, U.S. Marine Corps—One could not have written a more inaccurate, misleading, and jaundiced account of the Marine Corps. Consider the following: "Most of today's Marine recruits are ambitious and smart, and are therefore inherently dangerous to the organization they serve. They are not disloyal, but they are careful to get the orders they like. They often view their superiors much like voters view elected officials: as the providers of goodies." That is news to this Marine. I guess the Corps should start recruiting dumber and less ambitious men and women. One wonders about the source of Mr. Forsberg's wisdom. He presents no evidence, cites no sources, and names no names.
"Marines have always yearned for a more relaxed atmosphere, regular hours, and no onerous duties," claims Mr. Forsberg, a non-Marine. I have never met a Marine who did not yearn for a challenge or responsibility.
Some passages of this article are just plain wrong. The Marine Corps does not have "commandos." Marines do not spend "an annual day at the rifle range"; they spend a week, when they have to qualify. The Corps' drug policy today is "zero tolerance," not "automatic discharge." There is a difference: the former does not always lead to the latter.
Mr. Forsberg glosses over the malaise that permeated the Corps for more than a decade after Vietnam. From 1972 to 1975, almost half the recruits who signed up for the Corps failed to complete even one enlistment because of drug use or other disciplinary problems. By the end of that period, the Corps had the worst rates of courts-martial and imprisonment among the armed forces.
The Corps does not miss its drug users, its alcohol abusers, or its racial militants. Nor would our drill instructors today produce better Marines if they struck and swore at recruits, as Mr. Forsberg implies. Why has the Corps decided it can take only the best if it is to accomplish its mission? "Perhaps it is the path of least resistance," Mr. Forsberg says, answering his own question. "These kinds of kids are easier to manage." This is ignorance speaking. To accept anything less than the most qualified and motivated recruit is to jeopardize lives. The only way the Marine Corps can handle a large influx of less-than-stellar recruits during wartime is by maintaining a solid core of trained professionals during peacetime.
There is no magic ingredient to the Corps' development as an elite fighting force. The cement of unit cohesion always has been peer pressure through shared responsibility and hardship, not beatings, abuse, and leadership by intimidation. Mr. Forsberg claims the Corps "in no way relied on" self-discipline in the past. He is wrong: Self-discipline is unselfishness, a trait Marines have had in abundance—especially during the Vietnam War.
The Marine Corps today is not a dumping ground for sociopathic youths or the refuse of the other services. Nor is it "made up of a superior brand of men and women who have won some sort of lottery." The Corps today is a reflection of society, a group of hard-working Americans who have earned the title "Marine."
"Go After Them and Eliminate Them"
(See J. Webb, pp. 34-35, November 2001 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Dean Woodard, U.S. Navy (Retired), Fellow, University of North Texas—When you closely examine exactly what the Chinese are doing on the ground (as I have) with Muslim states, you will come up with different answers from Mr. Webb's. The Chinese design is to subjugate their own Muslims in Xingiang Province. The Islamic world, including central Asia, is aware of how the Chinese have brutalized their own people. There is no Chinese design to gain more Islamic territory. Mr. Webb once again has to try to explain why he chickened out under fire while at the Pentagon. Considering the Naval Institute's coverage of Mr. Webb, I have to wonder if Proceedings is his personal propaganda mill. Enough is enough! Not all of us are enamored with his observations.
"Actions We Must Take"
(See R. Lanham, pp. 42-43, November 2001 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Carl Obermeier U.S. Naval Reserve—Senior Chief Lanham raises important points in regard to the future direction of our nation and military. However, he misses the mark on a couple of important issues.
First, while there is little question as to the desirability of an increased sky marshal presence, adding uniformed personnel does little to increase the deterrent effect while significantly increasing the expense of the program. Adding uniformed marshals creates a target for would-be terrorists, and they would be the first individual "taken out." The strength of the system lies in the fact that no one knows who the marshal is, thereby creating an uncertainty. A stronger deterrent would be to widely publicize the increased use of undercover marshals.
Second, constitutional issues aside, "muzzling" the media is not a tactic any free society should practice. The ability of our news media to report the news in a free and unfettered manner has been a cornerstone of what our nation stands for and what our military defends. Perhaps we should increase media access to operational information since a better-informed public is more likely to be supportive of increased military action to combat terrorism. Such a tactic also could lead to greater anxiety for our foes by creating an anticipatory stressor.
Changes are necessary in the wake of 11 September, but all actions must be rational and weighed both pro and con. Otherwise the terrorists will have achieved one of their objectives.
"SAM Threat Over Iraq"
(See W. Hudson, U.S. Navy, pp. 32-36, October 2001 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Roger Pyle, U.S. Navy—Commander Hudson presents a convincing argument for the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and standoff weapons in the power projection and strike roles, and I agree with most of his arguments. It is true that in the past 30 years, U.S. forces have operated in environments where air assets have been relatively unchallenged, and have mostly had to contend with surface-to-air threats. It is also true that those systems have continued to develop and become greater threats. And it is true that because of those increases, and for political reasons, precision targeting and stand-off weapons have significant advantages over manned aircraft in terms of allowable risk. However, when he presents UAVs and standoff weapons as suitable for all air-power missions, and a panacea for future air wars, I must strongly disagree. UAVs and stand-off weapons are not suitable for and are unable to accomplish air superiority and close air support missions, and although we have been largely unchallenged in the air over the past three decades, there is clearly no guarantee of that in future conflicts.
Commander Hudson bases his arguments on the tremendous stealth capabilities of UAVs and the ever-increasing precision capabilities of modern stand-off weapons. There is no doubt these systems can exploit the airspace over hostile territory for long periods of time. But to imply that manned aircraft no longer have that capability, and to say "manned airborne weapon systems are reaching the limits of their capabilities" is simply wrong. The stealth era for manned aircraft is really just beginning with the B-2 and F-22, and there is no reason to think these aircraft will not be as effective as stealth UAVs. There also is no reason to think they will not be effective delivery platforms for precision weapons.
Also, there is no reason to assume that stealth UAVs and precision weapons will always achieve a warfare commander's objectives, and therefore certainly no reason to rely solely on those systems. Commander Hudson quotes George Friedman, who states that "every weapon system (or general culture of weapons) has a life cycle that begins with the simple purity of the offensive and culminates in a weapon system overwhelmed by its own defensive measures." If this is true for manned aircraft as Commander Hudson implies, then it must also be true for UAVs. Judging from recent UAV losses over Iraq and Afghanistan, it appears that the "simple purity of the offensive" is already over for the UAV, and defensive measures have quickly caught up.
It has been true since the German Gotha strategic bombing campaigns for World War I through the Linebacker campaigns of Vietnam that the bomber, or strike aircraft, will not get through unless properly escorted. This is also proving true for UAVs and cruise missiles; they may not get through unless enemy integrated air defense systems are suppressed. Suppression packages employed during today's strike missions are used against enemy surface-to-air threats just as escort fighters have been used against enemy air threats in the past, and are still used today. Those packages may be required to ensure that UAVs survive and precision stand-off weapons get to their targets.
Finally, although UAV and precision stand-off weapons have significant advantages over manned aircraft in reconnaissance and interdiction missions, they are unsuitable for air superiority and close air support. Because of the fluid nature of air superiority and close air support missions, the delays inherent in UAV and stand-off delivery systems make those systems inadequate in these roles. Further, these missions always will be required, and always should remain primary mission areas for Navy and Marine aviators, because whenever ground forces are deployed on the battlefield we have an obligation to ensure the airspace above them is secure and that they receive fire support when and where they need it.
"Reform Is Overdue"
(See J. Macris, pp. 54-57, November 2001 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral Robert F Dunn, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare—Like the dandelions that rise unwanted every spring, there rise at predictable intervals those who cry for the early demise of the aircraft carrier. Yet, even as they write, the carriers are invariably called on to serve the nation in ways seldom predicted. Perhaps it will be said that it was just Lieutenant Commander Macris's bad luck that he was published just as the carriers were delivering 70% of the ordnance delivered by air in Afghanistan and General Tommy R. Franks has called for even more carriers on station. We are almost two months into the war and, except for long-range bombers, land-based air has yet to fly more than a few token sorties. Carrier aviation has made major contributions to the elimination of the Taliban and proved yet again it can be on station and deliver effectively on short notice. Yet the champions of change for change's sake are calling for a rollback in numbers of these sovereign and movable parcels of American real estate. Worse, one of the most prestigious professional publications we have has succumbed to the siren song of "reform." One would think that the Editorial Board and the staff of Proceedings would have seen so much of this sort of thing that they would have demanded references.
"Reform" as defined by those who cry for revolutions in military affairs seems to be "something radically different." Unless the ships of today are replaced by something dreamed up by Hollywood and the aircraft are remotely piloted, it just cannot be "reform." Unless the battle is run with information technology based on the very latest, and unproven, whiz-bang gadgetry, it cannot be "reform." An example in the article is the call for use of "`virus bombs' to cripple a foe's command-and-control network." How about a foe who doesn't have a sophisticated command-and-control network? Would a "virus bomb" have hurt Osama bin Laden? Could a "virus bomb" have hurt the Northern Alliance? Yes, we must take advantage of every bit of modern technology we can, but it would be foolish to use the new stuff just because it looks like "reform."
Besides, despite what it may look like to the uninformed, or those who have special axes to grind, the Navy is continually reforming. The carriers may look like they did at the end of the Cold War but peel back the covers ever so slightly and one will find aircraft and weapons only dreamed of by the fleet in 1989. One will find command centers and command-and-control systems orders of magnitude more capable than those of 1989. One will find weapons so precise that they have changed the face of air-to-ground warfare. One even will find sailors and officers better trained and operationally more ready than in 1989. That is real reform.
One may not find many unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) in the fleet today, but they are indeed coming. One day they may even replace aircraft for some missions, but that does not mean the end of the large-deck aircraft carrier. The carrier is large and carries lots of airplanes because it affords a concentration of force and an economy of scale not approached by a smaller ship. When UAVs finally do become reliable and are produced in numbers adequate to the tasks at hand, it will undoubtedly be from the decks of large aircraft carriers that they are launched.
To help make his points about the need for reform Commander Macris has succumbed to a shorthand version of history. While some individuals may have fought the advent of steam or the rise of naval aviation, the naval bureaucracies most certainly did not. With regard to the steam transition, I refer the reader to a recent Public Broadcasting System documentary entitled "Warship." Therein, the transition to steam is well covered and conveys the eagerness of all navies to eliminate historic dependence on the vagaries of the natural wind. The problem was more than wind, however. The steam engines of the early 19th century were large and heavy and thus had to be installed amidships, part of the machinery even extending above the main deck. This meant that guns could be placed only at the bow and stern, thus reducing dramatically the number of guns that could be carried, an unsatisfactory situation. It was not until the turret mechanism was developed that a way was found effectively to combine heavy firepower with steam propulsion. By the way, most of those 1,200 commercial steamboats in New Orleans were either pilot boats or Mississippi River sidewheelers. It's a red herring to use that as an argument for steam in the Navy.
The business about the "Gun Club" fighting against aviation is an even worse red herring that should have long ago been stomped out. Admiral William A. Moffett himself, the "Father of Naval Aviation," had commanded a battleship before he moved to the head of naval aviation. It was the General Board, made up of nothing but "Gun Club" admirals that authorized the conversion of the collier Jupiter to the Langley (CV-1). With the development of near-over-the-horizon rifles on the early 20th-century battleships, they needed a way to call the fall of shot. Those "Gun Club" people wanted aircraft. You can look it up.
"The Air Force Is Disarming Itself"
(See E. Riccioni, pp. 80-83, November 2001 Proceedings)
Paul J. Madden—Colonel Riccioni is misleading in saying the F-22 will cost $190 million per plane, up from $50 million. The $140 million unit cost difference wasn't for the plane, it was for time. Buying that kind of time was good for the budgeters but bad for the war fighters.
Raw materials make up less than 10% of the price of a plane. The other 90% is labor and facilities. These are semifixed costs relatively independent of the quantity produced. What they are dependent on is time. A sure way to drive up the unit price of a plane (or anything else) is to take a decade or more to develop it, then stretch out the production over many more years at low production rates. To paraphrase then-President Gerald Ford, if we bought beer the way we buy planes, we couldn't get a six-pack for less than $110.
It's called the "death spiral." The initiating culprits usually are other budget priorities (F-22) or design fiddling by the customer (B-2). Also, the longer the development, the more tempted the customer is to fiddle. Once you upset the timetable, the spiral starts. It leads to further budget-driven stretch-outs and even lower production rates.
The ways to reduce unit costs are to have a short development time and a high production rate. If you forget the already sunk costs, you still could build F-22s at F-15 prices—just buy 150 per year. This isn't a secret in Washington. But doing it means raising taxes. Not doing it means wasting taxes we do spend.
Colonel Riccioni was also misleading regarding the B-IB's lack of use. The original defensive avionics subcontract was politically directed. The subcontractor botched the job. Buying effective defensive avionics has been the victim of other budget priorities ever since. Plus, the U.S. Air Force is guilty of trying to cram two pounds of Shinola in a one-pound bag. They fly the 395,000-pound gross weight plane at 477,000 pounds by beefing up the landing gear. It didn't help the flight performance or the engine and airframe fatigue life.
"Every Sailor Should Be a Rifleman"
(See R. Evenson, p. 128, October 2001 Proceedings)
Captain Jason Gelfand, U.S. Marine Corps—I support the argument that every sailor should be a rifleman. Navy basic training should include rifle, shotgun, and pistol training so that all sailors are adequately prepared to defend their ship or station. Jeff Cooper wrote that simply carrying a guitar does not make one a musician. Similarly, carrying an unloaded weapon does not make one a gunfighter.
The training should be structured so that each sailor is trained to bring the weapon into action from the carry mode most prescribed by commanders in the fleet. Simply put, sailors should be trained as they are expected to fight. For example, if commanders are ordering sailors to carry the M-9 pistol in a top flap military issue holster with no magazine inserted to mitigate the risk of a negligent discharge, then sailors should be trained to draw from that holster, insert a magazine, chamber a round, and fire quickly and accurately under stress. One way to create stress is to have a time limit for each string of fire. Another way is to have two sailors shooting side by side in competition to knock down reactive targets, such as metal plates. The training should be structured so that each sailor understands that speed without accuracy is insufficient, as is accuracy without speed. This is an important concept, because the Navy does not want slow fire bullseye shooters, nor does it want shooters who can quickly shoot through a magazine without hitting their opponent.
The shotgun training should emphasize the different types of ammunition available, their employment, and performance. The Navy could benefit from sailors who can switch from buckshot to slugs and back again as the tactical situation requires. In addition to greater range capability, many armor-piercing slugs are available, which adds a limited antivehicle and anti-small-boat capability to the commander's force protection plan. To employ slugs, the Navy should be buying shotguns with ghost ring sights. Sailors using shotguns have to learn the pattern of the shotguns in the their armory with the issued duty ammunition. Every shotgun performs differently, despite identical barrel length and manufacturer. Sailors also should be zeroing duty weapons with slugs. As with the pistol, the sailor must be trained to bring the weapon into action under stress from the carry mode prescribed in the fleet. This typically means an empty chamber with the weapon slung over the shoulder.
The rifle training provided must be applicable to the weapons of the fleet. What is the point of training with only the M16 if a sailor will be using the M-14 while guarding the ship? If the Navy is going to use both the M-14 and M-16, then sailors should receive comprehensive training in the use of each weapon.
This training is time consuming and expensive. Some will question if the cost is worth the benefit. Is it not more costly to lose a sailor to a negligent discharge, or to lose many sailors because a guard was unable to engage targets quickly and effectively? Every sailor on guard duty should be a trained gunfighter.
"CNN: Three Years after Tailwind"
(See P. Smith, p. 2, September 2001 Proceedings)
Gregory L. Vistica—I wish General Smith would make up his mind. One moment he is telephoning me with praise for my story in Newsweek that was the first to report that CNN's Operation Tailwind program was fatally flawed. Now he is lumping me in with the journalists who were responsible for the Tailwind story, accusing me of disregarding the truth and lacking ethics as a journalist. General Smith cites my New York Times story on former Senator Bob Kerrey's admitted role in the killing of innocent Vietnamese villagers as a case in point.
Let's set the record straight. Had General Smith bothered to call me and not practice the bad journalism that he criticizes in Proceedings, he would have saved himself from making such egregious and wrong statements.
General Smith compares the Kerrey story to CNN's Tailwind segment and the articles by the Associated Press on No Gun Ri. He claims "a key witness was not on the scene" in Vietnam. All seven members of Kerrey's SEAL Team were present in the village of Thanh Phong. Five of the seven team members, including the commanding officer, Bob Kerrey, confirmed to me that innocent women and children had been killed. Ultimately, six SEALs acknowledged the killings. The seventh SEAL, Gerhard Klann, the most experienced operator on Kerrey's team, went even further and said the killings were not an accident but the tragic result of an operation that went bad. There were two Vietnamese eye witnesses who supported Klann's account; one found by 60 Minutes II, the other by the Los Angeles Times and several other respected media organizations. In all, there were nine witnesses, quite the opposite of General Smith's claim. In addition, SEAL after-action reports as well as original Army communication logs that report an atrocity were found in historical archives.
General Smith says "another key witness has had major psychological problems," yet he doesn't say who. All seven SEALs assimilated back into society and held steady jobs. Only Kerrey has said he had emotional problems. Unfortunately and improperly, General Smith freely throws out the charge with nothing to substantiate it. Does he have psychological records? Or is he merely reporting hearsay?
General Smith says "many witnesses denied the charges but reporters and producers did not believe them." In my story, I reported that there were three different versions of what happened on the night of the killings, all of which conflicted with the others in some ways but in others were similar. I pointed out the holes in Klann's story as well as Kerrey's. Each SEAL I interviewed, as well as other officers with firsthand knowledge of the raid, spoke on the record. Their views, some of which disputed Klann's memory, were reflected fully in the story. After the Times story was published, Kerrey and five of the SEALs publicly disputed Klann's account. This was included in the 60 Minutes II broadcast.
Last, had General Smith done what all good reporters do—confirm the facts—he would have learned that Bob Kerrey and I worked together closely on this story. Kerrey told me he wanted my Times story to come out despite the contrary views offered by his former SEAL teammate, Gerhard Klann.
Clinton G. Majors, Original Member X-Ray Platoon, SEAL Team One—As a former U.S. Navy SEAL with combat service during the Vietnam War, I am bothered a great deal by a program aired by 60 Minutes II entitled "Memories Of A Massacre." I am an original member of X-Ray Platoon, Seal Team One. X-Ray Platoon was the hardest hit SEAL platoon to serve in Vietnam, with all platoon members being wounded at least once and most members wounded twice or killed in action.
Statements made by Senator Bob Kerrey have upset me and a few other Vietnam-era SEALs. In "Memories of a Massacre," Senator Kerrey makes a number of statements that go against SEAL Team standard operational procedures. We also worked in a free-fire zone but did not kill women and children just because they got in the way. We were never ordered to kill women and children, and most SEALs I know and served with would not cotton to this.
In his own defense, Senator Kerrey has made statements that place a black mark on all Navy SEAL combat veterans, and more important, on members of all military units that served in combat during the Vietnam War.
I have stood by and waited to see if any organization was going to come out in protest. I guess they won't, so I am here to do so. Ex-Navy SEAL Kerrey's combat actions should be looked into. Like Ex-Navy SEAL Gerhard Klann, I do not believe that any medal was warranted for that night's work. I also believe that his Medal of Honor action reports should be gone over with a fine-tooth comb. Some former SEALs believe that a criminal investigation should be undertaken.
I have a diary written by a former SEAL I worked with, covering many combat operations that Gerhard Klann participated in as far back as 19 December 1967. The diary provides details on how SEAL operations took place, giving the names and the sex of captured prisoners, and states that when a mission was compromised the SEAL squad saddled up and was extracted from the area.
These things were what we called standard operational procedures. A dead enemy soldier cannot pass on much information. Our main mission was to capture the enemy and bring him in for questioning. We were not nighttime murders of women and children and I resent the fact that this is what Bob Kerrey would now have the American public believe.
I feel it is my duty as a Vietnam veteran to stand up and defend our honorable actions in a war we felt was worth our attention. I want the truth to come out. It is our right and our duty to demand the truth. I have problems living with the ghost of my teammates who died in Vietnam and I will not stand by watching the memory of SEAL team actions in Vietnam be disgraced.
If Bob Kerrey cannot remember what really happened, he should step back, regroup, and clearly state so. I remember in detail the deaths of my teammates: Lieutenants Michael Collins, Frank Bomar, James Ritter, and Harold Birky, and in detail the actions leading to the wounding of each teammate.
I am proud to be a Vietnam vet, and proud to be an ex-Navy SEAL. I feel Bob Kerrey owes all Vietnam combat veterans an apology.
"It's Not Your Father's Hornet"
(See P. Finneran, J. Lockard, pp. 80-83, October 2001; T. Erhard, J. Tritten, pp. 22-26, November 2001 Proceedings)
Lieutenant B. W. Stone, U.S. Navy, Weapons Training Officer, Strike Fighter Squadron 81—At first blush, the article appears to be a piece of shameless advertising. The authors illustrate the Super Hornet's capabilities with carefully chosen configurations and best-case scenarios. While most of the claims they make are true to some extent, their article leaves the impression that the Navy need only buy the aircraft on the programmed schedule, and Boeing will deliver a wonder jet that will solve most of the shortcomings of the current strike-fighter fleet.
It is not that simple. It would be unfair to dismiss the authors' claims merely as advertising, but one must point out that the statistics given for the airplanes are based on the performance of brand-new airframes with comparatively few flight hours. Similarly, many of the advantages the Super Hornet is claimed to possess are based on sensors and technology that will not be introduced to the fleet for years, if at all.
The authors are correct in asserting that the aircraft's potential for success is great. However, its actual performance will be determined by a number of factors that they fail to address:
Advanced Targeting Forward-Looking Infrared (ATFLIR). The image quality provided by the ATFLIR is an enormous improvement over the current Nitehawk FLIR pod. If, however, the Navy buys only as many as are currently programmed, the ATFLIR is doomed to have the same problems as the Nitehawk pod. Under current plans, the Navy will buy ten ATFLIR pods for every 12 F/A-18s, compared to the eight Nitehawk pods bought for 12 F/A-18s. There are only general plans for spare parts, and there are no plans at all to buy extra pods to replace those lost through attrition.
To buy fewer pods than aircraft means that, even with a full complement, pods must be shuffled between aircraft every time a plane is "down" for scheduled maintenance. The act of repeatedly downloading and uploading a FLIR wreaks havoc on delicate internal mechanisms and causes the pods to wear out. Even with an appropriate supply of spare parts, the technicians who repair the pods must waste valuable time shuffling them between aircraft. Without replacement FLIRs or parts, these assets are lost to the squadrons.
This problem has reached crisis proportions in the fleet. There are no longer eight Nitehawk pods per squadron, nor anything close. By scraping the bottom of the parts barrel, the Navy is currently able to provide eight FLIRs only to those squadrons on cruise. There are generally no FLIRs at all for squadrons between cruise and the start of work-ups, and at best two to four pods available during work-ups. The last four pods generally arrive in the last weeks before cruise, needing considerable work to be made fully operational.
At best, this just-in-time supply system provides FLIRs to those jets actually launching into combat. But the system does not provide the training necessary to utilize the FLIRs, as there are none with which to practice during work-ups. Students now must rely entirely on simulators for training, as the fleet squadrons no longer can spare the FLIRs. Training ordnance allowances are sharply limited, but the FLIR shortage is so acute that squadrons sometimes are unable even to expend the few laser-guided training rounds they are allocated.
While the sharper resolution provided by an ATFLIR would be a valuable asset in combat, it can be so only if the Navy refuses to repeat past mistakes. We should no more consider flying a jet without a FLIR than a jet without radar. If we don't buy enough ATFLIRs to account for attrition and still equip every single jet with a pod, the ATFLIR will be every bit the expensive headache that the Nitehawk pod has become.
Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS). This helmet-mounted missile and bomb sight provides challenges similar to the ATFLIR. To begin with, the AIM-9X missile with which the JHMCS is intended to work will not be operational for another year or two, despite the fact that it grew out of a requirement identified in Vietnam. The JHMCS must progress at a far faster pace if it is to be of any use to Super Hornet pilots.
Even if the sight does make it to the fleet, however, current procurement plans call for only one helmet per aircraft. These sights must be specifically fitted to each user, and any attempt to switch helmets around will create the same complications as those experienced with FLIR pods. (A typical squadron has 50% more pilots than planes, and helmets would have to be "pooled" to have a helmet-mounted sight in every plane on every hop.) If the Navy is serious about introducing the JHMCS as a weapon system, we must buy enough to provide for attrition and still have one helmet per pilot. If we intend to integrate both cockpits of the F/A18F, the one-helmet-per-plane buy would make the shortages still more acute.
Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) Radar. There is no question the AESA radar offers potential for performance and reliability superior to today's mechanically scanned radars. There are many questions about its introduction to the fleet that must be answered before AESA can deliver on its promises.
As the authors note, AESA is not scheduled to hit the fleet until 2006. By that time, half of the Super Hornets scheduled for production will already have been delivered. If the Super Hornet is to realize the benefits of AESA, the Navy must retrofit earlier production lots with the new radar. Currently, however, there are no plans to do so.
While it would certainly be expensive to install new radars on the older jets, it is likely to be more expensive not to. The Super Hornet production run is already minuscule by corporate mass-production standards, and the cost of spare parts is likely to become prohibitive if current procurement procedures are followed. Although the "legacy" Hornet has been out of production for less than a year, parts availability already has become a problem, and the prices of parts have skyrocketed. The problem would double if the Navy were forced to maintain supply trains for two different radars.
Reliability and Maintenance. The authors cite operating costs as high as $17,000 per flight hour for the F-14A, and claim that the Super Hornet will reduce that figure to less than $7,000. Were the Navy to transition to all-F/A-18 air wings, the proposed savings top $800 million annually.
This optimistic figure overlooks the critical factor in such high costs: the age of the airframe. F-WAs cost so much to maintain because they are nearly 30 years old. Their systems have been "rode hard and put away wet," the Navy no longer buys spare parts from the manufacturers, and the reworked parts that are available are prone to early failure. As a result, aircraft availability suffers and the maintenance man-hours required per flight hour increase steadily.
Nor is this problem unique to the Tomcat community. The oldest operational F/A-18Cs rolled off the assembly line nearly 15 years ago, and they are beginning to show their age as well. A lack of newly produced spare parts has led to a greatly increased cannibalization rate, which doubles the number of maintenance man-hours required to accomplish a particular task. A lack of spare parts has reduced aircraft availability for those squadrons not actually on cruise, as those parts that are in the supply system are hoarded for deployed units. Extended operations in salt-water environs have taken a corrosive toll on the airframes. Corrosion-control inspections such as the Planned Maintenance Interval, accomplished at a depot by civilian workers who are under no contractual obligations to complete the work expeditiously, can rob squadrons of more than one-third of their jets for months on end. The composite parts that seemed such a boon because of their high strength and light weight can cause major headaches if damaged. Even relatively minor injuries can cause composite parts to "delaminate" enough to fail an inspection. Such delaminations, if they can be fixed at all, must be fixed in depots that have the large ovens necessary for curing epoxy resins. No squadrons have these facilities, and shipboard ovens are not large enough to handle all the necessary repairs. Most composite parts are no longer made, and shortages have become so acute that many "new" flaps and ailerons have been salvaged from F/A18As that were retired to the desert boneyard years ago.
The authors' assertion that the "Super Hornets have proved to be just as reliable as the F/A-18s before them" may, therefore, damn with faint praise. I do not doubt the engineering know-how or the quality manufacturing that has been necessary to produce these fighters, and the Super Hornet pilots with whom I have spoken confirm the capabilities of the brand-new jets. It would, however, be the height of folly to buy another new series of fighters that, 15 years hence, will sit idle for lack of parts. If the Super Hornet is to succeed, the Navy must not rely on the rosy guarantees made by two vice presidents of the Boeing Company; we must instead ensure that the parts shortages that have plagued the "legacy" Hornet are not repeated.
The solution lies in the model acquisition program discussed in the last section of the article. As any student of economics can attest, buying 284 jets in the course of a ten-year production run is not conducive to the sort of cost-efficiency that might be obtained in a genuine massproduction situation. The Navy ought to accelerate procurement to maximize potential savings. Initial production aircraft cost nearly $70 million, and the authors report that the price per aircraft has now dropped to $50 million. They urge foreign military sales because of the potential savings for the domestic market. Would it not make more sense to increase and accelerate the domestic buy to realize those savings? Such a move not only would reduce the cost per unit, but also would provide spares to replace the jets that inevitably will be lost through attrition.
In a well-meant but misguided attempt to reduce flyaway costs further, Boeing has taken steps to speed up production and reduce the number of fasteners in the nose section of the Super Hornet. This move is potentially penny wise and pound foolish; changing horses in midstream will lead to two different systems with two different parts requirements. The Hornet community recently has suffered a rash of accidents as a result of a similar confusion between wheel bearings for F/A18s and those for EA-6Bs.
The half-measures in procurement to which the Navy has become accustomed may have filled warfighting requirements in the 1950s, when brand-new jet designs were provided to fleet fighters almost once a year. Half-measures may have been appropriate Band-Aids to fix problems caused by the lean budgets and piecemeal deployments with which the Clinton administrations plagued the Navy. But they no longer are appropriate in a Navy that is attempting to recapitalize with aircraft that can fight over the long term.
The smart solution requires a commitment by the Navy and the support of Congress. The Super Hornet, with all attendant systems, should be standardized. Only then should the Navy buy its full run—as quickly and cheaply as it is possible for Boeing to make them.
Finally, the Navy must channel the money thus saved to ensure a steady supply of spare parts over the life of the Super Hornet. To do otherwise will merely guarantee those jets an early grave marked by the same readiness nightmares that the authors claim the Super Hornet will fix.
"Sea Lance Ensures Access to the Littorals"
(See R. Harney, p. 96, October 2001; F. Mulcahy, D. Byrd, pp. 28-30, November 2001 Proceedings)
Thomas Schoene, Senior Analyst, Anteon Corporation, Center for Security Strategies and Operations—This article appears to raise more questions than it answers. I am particularly concerned by what appears to be a mismatch between Sea Lance's stated mission and the concept for supporting it in the field. Although logistics support is mentioned in passing, it deserves a more serious examination.
Sea Lance was conceived primarily for operations in the face of a robust access denial threat. However, it has only limited crew facilities and apparently limited endurance. Dr. Harney states that Sea Lance would be "supported by shore facilities or tenders." Unfortunately, the very accessdenial threat Sea Lance is designed to counter makes access to such shore facilities uncertain.
Depending on such facilities to support the lynch pin of an access ensurance force seems unwise. Indeed, it undermines one of the defining characteristics of naval forces: their ability to project power without the need for host-nation support. With other naval and joint doctrine emphasizing the need to reduce the footprint of forces ashore, any access ensurance force cannot afford to be dependent on landbased logistical support.
The other proposed alternative is to use some sort of tender or mother ship. While it would eliminate the need for access to shore facilities, the use of tenders brings its own problems. There are no existing tenders that could service these craft. Twenty years ago, the Navy had some 25 tenders or repair ships, but today only two submarine tenders remain. They are already fully employed with other tasks. Thus, it seems likely that any Sea Lance tenders must be purpose-built.
The size and cost of the tender required to support Sea Lance is difficult to estimate but would seem to be significant. Such a ship would have to have extensive maintenance and supply facilities as well as crew accommodations for the Sea Lance crews. It seems likely that it would also have to be able to dock the Sea Lances (or at least some of them) while their crews live on board the tender. Docking a single Sea Lance and its associated grid deployment module would require a large well deck, roughly the same size as that of many current amphibious ships (LSDs or LPDs).
This would imply a ship of at least 12,000 tons full load displacement. An alternative would be to moor the Sea Lance craft alongside, which would require benign conditions and would limit the tender's mobility. Even without the dock, a ship of at least 5,000 tons would be needed. European navies use tenders of this general size to support fast-attack craft, although they are not expected to support long-term, out-of-area operations.
To maximize the availability of its littoral craft, this tender would need to operate fairly far forward, necessitating a significant degree of self-defense capability, adding to the cost of the ship. The simplest approach would probably be to duplicate most or all of the Sea Lance combat system aboard the tender, which would simplify maintenance and support.
To offer sufficient operational flexibility, it seems reasonable that there should be one tender for each squadron of ten Sea Lances, or one for each carrier battle group with which Sea Lance would operate. This would suggest as many as a dozen tenders could be needed.
"Combat Fleets"
(See A. D. Baker, p. 124, October 2001 Proceedings)
Editor's Note—The photo of the Japanese Takanami-class destroyer should have been credited to Mitsuhiro Kadota.