Force protection is in the forefront of every sailor's mind. Tragic events, such as the attack on the USS Cole (DDG-67) last fall, have put those words in bold red neon. What should the Navy do to protect its forces? How can it incorporate force protection into daily routines? The simple answer is train, train, train. The tough answer is trust, trust, trust.
By enforcing its philosophy, "Every Marine a rifleman," the Marine Corps ensures that all Marines are on the same basic sheet of music. This produces many positive results, but I will touch on only two: It ensures every Marine has the knowledge and skill necessary to use a weapon properly in countering threats, and it makes it clear that every Marine—regardless of military occupational specialty or rank—can be employed as a rifleman. The Navy needs to adopt this philosophy if it intends to take effective force protection measures.
By not offering detailed force protection training until sailors reach the fleet, the Navy starts behind the eight ball. Such training should begin on the first day of recruit training. In the case of fire controlmen—a rating from which security forces are drawn—an entire year might pass from the day they graduate from boot camp and complete "A" and "C" schools until they reach the fleet. Steps have been taken to send fire controlmen to ships in temporary additional duty (TAD) status for training while awaiting the start of "C" school. However, training usually is devoted to subjects such as damage control rather than force protection. In any case, ships are unlikely to spend funds to send TAD sailors to the range for weapons training because they will not be on board long enough to be useful.
Current policies create major problems for commanders and force protection officers. They have to start from scratch to instruct new sailors in force protection, rules of engagement, and use of deadly force. After administering a course of instruction at the individual ship level, they have the more difficult job of ascertaining that their trainees have the requisite judgment to determine when to open fire in accordance with rules of engagement. In short, are they confident in the training they provided and do they trust the sailors they trained?
Training is, the easiest task to tackle. Force protection and weapons proficiency classes should be incorporated in the boot camp syllabus. Until June, recruits trained with laser-equipped M-16 rifles. However, as in my case, many fleet sailors have never fired M-16s with live ammunition because their ships' armories have M-14 rifles. Recruits must be trained with the weapons they will be issued in the fleet. Since last June—in response to feedback from the fleet—recruits have been trained with Mossburg 12-gauge shotgun simulators and Beretta 9 mm pistols. (Pistol training includes live firing on a small arms range.) These are important steps in the right direction.
Comprehensive marksmanship training will require extra funding, but I would rather spend a few extra thousand dollars to teach sailors how and when to shoot than spend the same dollars to bury them. If training sailors properly means extending the length of boot camp, then so be it. As threats to the Navy change, training must change to meet them. Small arms training is in need of a hard look. If faced with a stationary target 25 yards away, I would perform marginally because I have had marginal training. I would be lucky to hit a moving target at any range. If the Navy expects sailors to fight and win, it has to teach them how.
Trusting sailors to know when to shoot is the harder task. It requires changing prevailing official views of Seaman Joe Sailor's ability to make judgment calls. For example, Seventh Fleet orders require a force protection officer to be stationed on the bridge 24 hours a day to be able to make the call as to whether an armed sentry can shoot in a threatening situation. Although no doubt well intended, this practice takes authority away from the sailor on the scene and puts it in hands of a higher authority who, regardless of background and training, cannot be everywhere at once—especially at night. What is the purpose of arming sailors in the first place? Their leaders tell them they are part of the best-trained, most professional naval force in the world, yet they cannot be trusted to know whether to use their weapons against intruders under a set of rules that traditionally are laid out very carefully. If the Navy expects sailors to fight and win, it needs to trust their judgment and then hold them to account.
Training and trust are the cornerstones of an effective force protection posture. If force protection is to be the responsibility of all hands, then all hands must be given the proper tools to accomplish the mission. Upgraded training in marksmanship and rules of engagement, together with trust from the chain of command, will make every sailor a rifleman.
Chief Fire Controlman Evenson is the leading chief for the Aegis weapon system division on the USS Valley Forge (CG-50).