Close air support is an important job that should receive more attention from the Navy. Facilities at Naval Air Station Fallon in Nevada provide effective training, but more-sophisticated ranges—such as for urban warfare training—could help naval aviation become more proficient at close air support.
The Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center's carrier air wing training program at Fallon is considered the pinnacle of tactical preparation for a deploying air wing. Generally, the wing is at its highest state of team readiness at the completion of this three-and-a-half-week training course. The center's staff orchestrates two weeks of day, night, and urban scenarios in support of both conventional and special operations forces. These evolutions include the employment of general-purpose bombs and precision-guided munitions.
The Fallon Range Training Complex arguably is the best such complex in the U.S. Navy. Bravo-17 is the most developed range and serves as the primary source of air-to-ground targets. Its location in the high desert of Nevada provides a surface environment similar to that of Southwest Asia. The target arrays include several tactical-sized targets such as armored personnel carriers, M-60 tanks, Sergeant York armed vehicles, conex boxes, and various light vehicles. With the activation of the nearby electronics warfare complex, the close air support scenarios include low- and medium-altitude tactics with opposition from radar-guided threats (i.e., SA-6s and SA-8s) and shoulder-fired missiles (i.e., SA-16/18 manpads coupled with GTR-18A rockets for a visual presentation).
The Air Warfare Center's staff assists each carrier air wing with establishing close air support performance goals during its stay at Fallon. Detailed data in relation to these goals then are acquired and analyzed. Three key sets of data relate to timing, accuracy, and "no drops." Data collection in these areas began with Carrier Air Wing 14 in 1993 and concluded with the same wing in the spring of 2000. Detailed no-drop data collection began with Carrier Air Wing 8 in 1998 and concluded with Carrier Air Wing 14 in 2000. The F/A-18 Hornet and the F-14 Tomcat were the only aircraft used in these analyses.
Driven by the fact that, potentially, several combat arms must be coordinated in the execution of a close air support mission, the timing goal generally was defined as the ability to place bombs on target within plus or minus 15 seconds of the directed time on target. With 1,519 timed runs, 66.7% of the lead F/A-18s detonated their bombs within 15 seconds of the time on target. For the F-14s, 61.1% of the 734 timed runs hit within this window. Although there is a slight difference between these aircraft, both performed nearly equally in timing.
Figure 1 portrays the combined timing performance of the F/A-18 and the F-14 from 1993 to 2000. With a total of 2,253 timed passes across the target, the airborne forward air controller and the ground forward air controller can make some objective deductions. Generally, aircraft tend to be late across the target instead of early. The preponderance of Navy aircraft will place bombs on target from -5 seconds to +25 seconds around the time on target. Awareness of this tendency is an important consideration for forward air controllers as well as air crews. Forward air controllers generally want to integrate additional combat arms into close air support execution to enhance mission success and aircraft survivability.
The battlefield continues to become more complex and requires the integration of joint as well as coalition fires. This necessitates continued improvements in timing performance. Because of recent training emphases, air crew efforts, and technological improvements, naval aviation's timing performance has progressed in a positive direction over the past three years. (See Figure 3.)
With 3,578 passes across the target by the F/A-18, 53% resulted in bombs hitting within 50 meters of the target. The F-14 executed 1,173 passes, resulting in 34.7% striking within this range (see Figure 2). The difference in platform performance has resulted in the general guidance that the F/A-18 is a better selection for visual employment of general-purpose munitions. The F-14D, a small portion of the F-14 inventory, is an exception to this recommendation.
As with timing, the accuracy performance trend provides insight into air crew proficiency. Its positive direction over the past two years suggests that the combination of technological developments and focused training has resulted in improved performance (see Figure 3). During a carrier air wing's overseas deployment, maintaining this level of proficiency continues to be a challenge for strike-- fighter air crews.
Only seven Marine Corps squadrons rotated through Fallon (the last squadron in October 1999), so their performance database is relatively small. It is interesting to note that of the 381 bomb-release passes from Marine Corps aircraft, the pilots hit inside 50 meters of the target 48% of the time. This accuracy performance is similar to that of all F/A-18s at 53%. The Marine Corps F/A-18Cs' ability to strike the target within +1-15 seconds is 71%. Again, this is similar to the performance of all F/A-18s at 67%. Of course, there is more to the successful execution of a close air support mission than just timing and accuracy. Aggressive tactical employment is a much more subjective issue, and includes such things as mutual support, situational awareness, and tactics, techniques, and procedures knowledge. With regard to the objective categories of timing and accuracy, however, Navy and Marine Corps F/A-18 pilots performed nearly equally.
The bombing accuracy numbers from both services, although respectable, can be improved. One area in which there is room for progress is the number of aircraft passes across the objective area without releasing ordnance. This category, generally known as "no drops," historically has accounted for 14% of the passes through the target area. In 1998, a more detailed analysis program was put in place in an attempt to understand this situation better. Eight air wing training rotations make up this improved no-drop database. Performance analysis on these air wings' 1,484 runs revealed that 19% of the passes resulted in no drops. The failure to release ordnance because of tactical air control party errors, weather, or range control issues was not counted against the air wing.
The failure to release ordnance on almost one out of every five passes is a cause for concern. This is especially true since the Bravo-17 range is a favorable setting for air crews conducting close air support: its layout and target arrays are very familiar to most air crews; the target environment is a relatively clean, flat desert floor; and the tactical air control parties are extremely experienced. The top three reasons for pilots not releasing ordnance are lack of target or mark acquisition, erroneous switchology in the cockpit, and the failure to place the aircraft in a proper position to release ordnance. All three of these are related directly to air crew performance. Reduction in the number of no drops can be achieved by gaining tactical experience through increased air crew training.
Naval Special Warfare
Along with naval aviation, the naval special warfare community is required to be proficient in close air support. Until January 2000, the community relied on Expeditionary Warfare Training Groups Atlantic and Pacific for training. Marine Corps forward air controllers attend these same training schoolhouses. Because of limited quotas (approximately ten annually) and low course completion rates as a result of aircraft availability, however, an insufficient number of SEALs could be qualified annually.
The special warfare community can enhance the strike capability of the carrier air wing in a variety of ways, including assistance in the terminal phase of an attack. Historically, SEAL training at Fallon has included the training of select individuals to a baseline proficiency level in the terminal control of aircraft. The intent of the interactive training at Fallon was to build confidence and experience in both terminal control techniques and air crew tactics, techniques, and procedures. This significant dedication of effort and assets, however, did not result in any type of terminal controller qualification.
In October 1999, Navy Special Warfare Command and Fallon teamed to create the Navy Special Warfare Close Air Support Terminal Controller's Course. The close air support program was able to enhance its existing curriculum into a recognized, formal course of instruction. This school, whose focus is to train special warfare personnel, runs coincident with the carrier air wing training schedule. The first class was in January 2000. The expected annual graduation rate is about 48-60 personnel. The objective of the program is to qualify select personnel as NATO-recognized forward air controllers in accordance with Standard NATO Agreement 3797. The current curriculum for naval special warfare students includes approximately 38 hours of close air support academics and labs and 20-30 fixed- and rotary-wing controls per student. The field experience includes day and night operations on four different ranges, laser-guided munition employment, artillery calls for fire, and visual acquisition drills over the local town. Fallon has proved to be an ideal environment for conducting this qualification training. The result is that the Navy has increased the number of ways it can effectively strike a target.
Urban Close Air Support
Presently, the Navy does not have an urban close air support training facility. A no-drop "Army Compound" at the Bravo-17 range is the closest target array that resembles this type of cluttered environment. The only urban training complex that allows releasing ordnance is "Yodaville" in Yuma, Arizona. Because of its location, however, Navy aircraft rarely use this complex.
The Fallon Range Training Complex Requirements Document calls for the development of additional targets. This document outlines the development of an urban complex on the Bravo-20 range. Initial plans include the construction of a diverse urban environment that will allow the delivery of light inert ordnance and personnel movement. Construction was to begin in fiscal year 2001, but the Navy recently moved the $8-million urban construction plan to after 2003.
Although actual urban attacks are not executed at Fallon, training includes academic and operational instruction, and visual acquisition drills are conducted over the local town to expose air crews to the challenges of operating in a cluttered environment. In addition, the fundamentals of military aviation operations on urban terrain are employed during the personnel recovery evolution of air wing training. This noncombatant evacuation operation in the Army Compound normally involves fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft under the control of ground and airborne forward air controllers. Unfortunately, at the end of an air wing's deployment to Fallon, only a small percentage of air crews is exposed to this "limited" urban experience. The Navy urgently needs to construct a dedicated urban complex.
Leadership and Opinions
The mobility associated with the aircraft carrier gives the National Command Authority considerable flexibility in applying this instrument of naval power. Because of its responsiveness, the carrier air wing often provides the first aircraft available to strike targets. The senior Navy leadership still maintains that air interdiction is the primary offensive focus of carrier aviation. The recent conflicts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Iraq have required carrier air wings to execute interdiction missions as well as several other missions. Similar low/medium-- intensity conflicts are expected to continue in the near future.
The close air support mission, interacting closely with forces on the ground, generally has lacked high-level advocacy within the Navy. It remains a secondary priority to interdiction. As explained to me by a very senior Navy leader, the Navy conducts close air support training to "show" the Marine Corps it is concerned about this mission area. The purpose of such training, however, should not be about appeasing the Corps. As future operations will be increasingly joint, Navy aviation can expect to operate not just with Marine ground forces but also with Army, Air Force, and special warfare forces. In addition, close air support tactics, techniques, and procedures are applicable in other mission environments. These skills allow Navy air crews the flexibility to adapt successfully across varying tactical situations. Such examples include, but are not limited to, operations in urban or cluttered environments, actions in close proximity to friendly forces or noncombatants, and armed reconnaissance.
My experience has been that Navy lieutenants and lieutenant commanders are enthusiastic about the close air support mission, understand the requirements for Navy proficiency, and realize that the skills learned in training for this mission apply to other mission areas. The F-14 community has led the charge by championing the airborne forward air controller program. The naval special warfare community has increased its close air support proficiency by becoming NATO qualified, and air crew performance steadily has improved over time. On the down side, the development of an urban complex, although a priority, does not enjoy strong sponsorship or a sense of urgency. The Navy's close air support programs are forging ahead under the determined guidance of senior enlisted and company- and field-grade officers.
In June 2000, Major MacKenzie completed three-and-a-half years with the Navy at the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center as the close air-support program director. His service has included time as an A-6E bombardier/navigator, a forward air controller at 2d Marine Division, and a forward air controller instructor as an F/A-18 weapons sensor officer.