Creating a national security cutter could be more demanding than building the much-vaunted DD-21 guided-missile destroyer. The U.S. Coast Guard "asked for the moon" in its Integrated Deepwater System (IDS) replacement project, which proposed replacing almost everything it had other than new patrol boats and buoy tenders. The General Accounting Office (GAO) tore into the plan because of questionable assumptions about funding and the issue of service life remaining in the various units scheduled for replacement. The IDS project may become a victim of our fascination with trying to get five pounds in a three-pound sack—but to let the project die would be a terrible mistake. In sharp contrast to the Navy, the Coast Guard always has been a great example of a government agency that thrives on adversity and keeps vessels going for decades.
The Coast Guard desperately needs new ships to replace its major cutters. Major mid-life rebuilds have been completed for the 12 high-endurance Hamilton (WHEC-715)-class and the 16 medium-endurance Reliance (WMEC615)-class cutters. The GAO suggested a similar program for the 13 medium-endurance Bear (WMEC-901) class, but time is running out. Depending on whom you believe, the Bear class is either the wave of the future or something just short of abject failure. Described as slow, cramped, overloaded, and poor sea boats, they lack the 10,000-ton towing capability of the Reliance class—which, incidentally, was not required for the new national security cutter—and could not handle the additional combat equipment planned for them in the event of military mobilization. However, the point is that the Bear class represents a working compromise between the warship-like Hamilton class and the less combat effective Reliance class. As most proposals use the Bear class as a starting point, and even the IDS illustrations are based loosely on it, my focus is on this 270-foot cutter. Another reason is that the popular Hamilton design is very old. And despite an honorable record, there are features in this 378-foot class that are neither affordable nor desirable. They are too big for some medium cutter missions and their high speed comes from two old gas turbines that inhale fuel. In short, an updated Hamilton design might be too much ship—at least to replace some of the Reliance-class cutters.
The Bear's design represented the minimum capability for enforcement of the 200-mile exclusive economic zone and—with burdensome additions—wartime service as an escort. The Coast Guard considered more substantial ships, including the Norwegian Nordkapp, but financial constraints proved to be insurmountable. While "up-sizing" the Bear would go a long way toward a satisfactory compromise, basic questions are left unresolved by the IDS request for proposal (RFP)—such as, will the Coast Guard combine the roles of high- and medium-endurance cutters in a single design? Those responsible for the IDS rightly are not comfortable with the idea of unarmed cutters. The RFP stipulates the ability to engage and destroy surface threats such as high-speed coastal craft at "beyond small and intermediate caliber gunfire effective range." It also mandates the capability to detect, track, and control aircraft and engage antiship missiles. Only the Hamilton class meets those needs and can reach the speed of 28 knots, which the RFP requires so that the national security cutter can operate around aircraft carriers. But why is it necessary for the cutter to escort a carrier? This is exactly the kind of overreaching that may doom—or at least delay—a vital program. Realistic criteria are necessary for successful engineering. This project fundamentally is about naval engineering, not rocket science and network-centric systems.
There are numerous sources of information on cutters. Commander Michael Collier urged looking back to the Campbell (WHEC-32) class of the 1930s (Proceedings, April 1994, pp. 72-74.). That well-regarded class of 327-foot cutters offers an excellent solution to the replacement problem. World War II enshrined the reputations of those ships. They were convoy escorts; later they were given additional superstructure and converted to amphibious flagships. Until the Hamilton class was introduced, the Campbells were considered the best sea boats in the service. A good naval architect could fit every feature of the Bear into the Campbell design and thereby create a ship that easily would outperform existing cutters. There are many simple ways to improve such a theoretical ship. For example, two sets of the Juniper (WALL-201) main propulsion plant would fit in the old boiler and engine rooms, offering a significant increase in speed without the problems attendant to using dissimilar engines. This layout probably would be unable to produce 28 knots, but 24 knots seems possible.
Accommodating at least one HH-60 would require an 80-foot flight deck (with an unobstructed approach from astern) and a hangar. The Campbell hull form could take the weight if the hull is extended upward to the 0-1 level to meet the edge of the flight deck—which also would increase the enclosed space beneath for other uses. Such an arrangement still would leave deck space on each beam for the boat complement and keep the fantail free for rescue work, towing, and boat launching
As suggested by the IDS RFP, acquiring the appropriate electronics suite is critical. Sensors and weapons would pose far more difficult problems. It is unlikely that the national security cutter will face only a low-level threat. If it were improved, the Navy's Mk 92 fire control system and Mk 75 gun combination—used by the Coast Guard in the Bear-class cutter—provides credible air and surface defense without overloading the vessel. The gun has sufficient stopping power to disable any ship. Whether the Navy intends to retain and support this combination is unresolved. If the services decide to drop the Mk 92 and Mk 75 combination, the alternative will mean adopting an entirely new combat suite, such as that shown in Figure 1.
The national security cutter could use more specific guidance as to the Coast Guard's fire-fighting and towing missions. The only vessels with less towing capability than the 3,000 tons called for in the new cutter's specifications are the Bear-class cutters. This function becomes more important as ships grow larger. The Coast Guard's historical role in such disasters notwithstanding, fire fighting was not included in IDS requirements. Instead, there were "national emergency response operations." In contrast, the Center for Naval Analyses produced a 1989 study on a single-role rescue and towing vessel, "Development of Tentative Operational Requirements for ATR(X)." The study showed how formidable that single mission can be. The ATR(X) disappeared from planning charts—the need for such ships did not.
On a positive note, the surface search radar replacement project has begun procuring the Raytheon SPS-73(V) to succeed the old SPS-64(V). The SPS-73(V) offers numerous improvements over its predecessor. New radars and various iterations of the ship command-and-control system are entering the fleet and establishing a historical database for the new cutter. One of the Coast Guard's more humble projects, the Juniper-class buoy tender, has produced a ship with many design features for a new national security cutter—from power train to bridge and navigation systems.
Some of the best cutters ever acquired by the Coast Guard were developments of vessels begun outside the Coast Guard. A mystical "great leap forward" is not necessary. Sound naval engineering might produce a better ship than I have outlined briefly here—but there is no doubt that the Deepwater project needs a solid foundation on which to base its critical national security cutter.
Mr. Hoback retired as a senior inspector in the U.S. Customs Service. He lives in Memphis, Tennessee.