Bringing the Tomahawk missile to the Los Angeles (SSN-688) class wasn't easy.
The Tomahawk cruise missile has proved to be an electrifying weapon—and the weapon of choice among commanders who do not wish to risk pilots or ground troops. But this article is not about the spectacular success of the weapon; it is about how Tomahawk cruise missiles made their way into the submarine force.
The story begins with my assignment as project manager, Attack Submarine Acquisition Project (PMS 393), in the summer of 1979. My responsibility primarily was management of the Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class construction program. This project was not a model acquisition program. The few boats that were in the fleet were suffering from major design glitches. Those under construction, some 23 submarines, were behind schedule, mostly over budget, and had the same glitches as the operating units. As a result, the relationship between the Navy and the shipyards—especially Electric Boat (EB)—was strained at best. My first few months as PMS 393 were challenging, but the difficulties in delivering the SSN-688 class is a story for another time.
I do not know when the decision was made to place Tomahawk cruise missiles on attack submarines. I do know that one evening, as I was reviewing some files left for me by my predecessors, I came on a memorandum of understanding between my office and the attack submarine office in the Pentagon. The memorandum stated that the characteristics for the SSN-688 class would be changed for SSN-700 and later. The ships no longer would be required to load, store, or fire a nuclear torpedo. In exchange, my office agreed to install a Tomahawk capability in five SSN-688-class boats.
I thought it somewhat strange, as the new project manager, to find out by reviewing old files that I was responsible for the installation of some new weapon called Tomahawk. The following day, I asked my staff about the memo and what we were doing to comply. They told me that a reduced-cost modification request was issued to the shipbuilders to remove the nuclear torpedo capability and the shipbuilders were complying. It was not at all certain, however, that there would be cost savings. They subscribed to the notion that if there was no cost reduction then there were no funds to support the Tomahawk installation. I questioned this logic.
Reduced cost modifications would take years of negotiations with the shipbuilders. In addition, when one already is in a loss position, one is somewhat reluctant to return funds to the Navy. I decided to visit a classmate of mine from the Naval Academy, Captain Harry Yockey, who was heading up the program responsible for the submarine-launched cruise missile in the Joint Cruise Missiles Project Office. It was his view that the submarine force had signed on to meet an initial operational capability (IOC) date of July 1982. The only actions I could find ongoing in support of that objective were the memo of understanding and that a Sturgeon (SSN-637)-class submarine was designated the test platform. It became clear to me that if an IOC of July 1982 was to be met, some direction was urgently needed.
As the days went by, I realized I did not have the time to survey the Washington submarine community for consensus. Also, here was a golden opportunity to outfit an attack submarine with an attack aircraft capability. The tactical significance could be revolutionary. I needed an assessment of what alterations would be required to make the submarine capable of launching Tomahawk from a torpedo tube, what was to become known as "horizontally Tomahawk capable."
The assessment determined that the modifications to the torpedo room were insignificant. The fire control system, however, was a major stumbling block, and the radio room needed some additional pieces of equipment. The fire control system analysis led to both technical and turf issues. The turf war was waged on several fronts. The most quarrelsome was over whether to upgrade the Mk 117 Fire Control System to integrate the Tomahawk requirements, or to install a new stand-alone system for Tomahawk. Eventually, it was decided to integrate the Tomahawk needs into the existing Mk 117 system. To this day, I am not sure that was the correct technical direction, but the decision put the task of modifying the fire control system in my court as the supplier of funds. I knew that if the normal implementation process were followed there would be no July 1982 IOC. Improvisation was the order of the day.
It immediately was apparent that the computing power of the existing system was inadequate, but the Navy's computer acquisition "czar" was not authorizing the purchase of any additional computers. The solution was to install an additional operator console. And to refresh the data on the console display—and perform other functions such as over-the-horizon targeting—we would install a processor in the lower half of the console.
One of the most formidable issues facing the Los Angeles program in the late 1970s was Congress's notion that the ships were too expensive for the payload. This resulted in a review of the as-built ship by technical people and organizations to suggest cost-saving modifications. In a truly serendipitous event, they recommended that rather than use horizontal and vertical stiffening inside the ballast tanks required for structural integrity, a cost savings might accrue if this structure were changed to circumferential, transverse framing. This modification was approved and installed in two ships. The inside of the forward ballast tank group resembled a large, empty cylinder—the eventual home of vertically launched missiles.
It wasn't long after that I walked into my office early one November morning and was told that Admiral Griffiths, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Undersea Warfare, was on the telephone wanting to speak with me. The admiral wanted to know if I had heard any of the talk about placing cruise missiles in the front end of a 688. I said I had. Was it a good idea, he asked, and could it be done? I said I thought it was a great idea, and I didn't know if it could be done. He asked how he could find out if it was feasible.
This feasibility question was really two parts. First, could a Tomahawk missile be launched vertically from a submerged submarine? Second, could basic SSN-688 design and engineering support their installation? Electrical, hydraulic, ventilation, and pneumatic systems would be affected, as well as pressure hull structure. Immediately, noise and shock requirements were issues. Water flow over the missile hatches was a noise concern right up to the USS Providence (SSN-719) initial sea trial. Each concern was solved, by and large, with the application of good engineering practices. There were some unique technical and programmatic issues, however, that merit discussion.
In 1980, we needed to determine when an effort could be made to install Tomahawk and what ships were candidates. To meet the July 1982 IOC, I needed a ship that had a post-shakedown availability (PSA) during which work could be assigned without a negative impact on existing contractual arrangements. Post-shakedown availability is the period after a newly commissioned ship returns from shakedown operations at sea when shipbuilders' warranty repairs are made, plus such other new work as is authorized. I selected the USS Atlanta (SSN-712) as the first ship to be Tomahawk capable.
The Vertical Launch System (VLS) installation was much more complex. My objective was to install VLS capability in as many ships as possible, but the defining event for this notion occurred in the Pentagon one morning. Harry and I paid a visit to the attack submarine directorate for funds to do exploratory engineering and design work. We learned not only that no funds were available, but also that there was no interest in VLS among the attack submarine community. As we were leaving the Pentagon who should be coming toward us but Admiral Griffiths. He turned left and entered an office before reaching us. When we came to the "office" entered by Admiral Griffiths, it turned out to be a men's head, and the rest, as they say, is history.
To incorporate VLS into SSN-688-class submarines, both outboard and inboard modifications were required:
- Installation of missile tubes in the bow section
- Structural modifications to the forward pressure and non-pressure hulls
- Rearrangement of the forward compartment
- Development of new VLS ship systems
- Modifications to some existing systems
- Development of the combat control system
- Development of an encapsulated Tomahawk cruise missile and a new all-up-round (a modified Tomahawk cruise missile with a new capsule launching system)
The task was enormous. Experience had taught me that too much complexity would beget issues that needed constant management attention, so we tried to keep things as simple as possible. For example, ballistic missile submarines have a hovering system to maintain depth control during missile launch. 688s did not have a hovering system, and installation of one would be an additional complexity. So instead, we chose to maintain depth control using propulsion power and diving planes. The next issue was what speed was needed to maintain depth control. The answer was as much speed as could reasonably be designed into the launch system to obtain a successful launch, but no slower than five knots. This notional specification worked, although the launch system contractor was uncomfortable with specifications that said, more or less, "make it work."
The decision to shock test the all-up-round was a programmatic challenge as well as a technical problem. To perform a shock test, a "gadget" was required. Questions such as Where? and How? also were important. It was determined that the best place to do the shock testing was at the same location selected for launch testing—in an area off San Clemente Island. In fact, some of the same material and facilities used in the Polaris program in the 1950s were used to support VLS testing. In the mud in Norfolk harbor was a suitable shock vehicle. It needed a major overhaul and some modifications. I collected it and delivered it to Newport News shipyard. This test vehicle was repaired, put into operating shape, and modified by installing two missile launch tubes on the front end. This strange-looking craft was loaded on a barge and towed to San Clemente via the Panama Canal.
At this point, I needed some management assistance. I decided to go outside of Washington, and contracted with Electric Boat to provide managerial support, or as the contract read, to act as an "integrating agent." This was an unusual decision, but most of my Navy career had been spent on the deck plates on board ship or wing walls in one shipyard or another, and this environment instilled in me a sense of urgency, something I did not experience in Washington as a rule. I believed the VLS program was important, and that it needed that shipyard atmosphere. So I went to a shipyard for help.
In April 1979 Electric Boat was awarded two ships, SSN-719 and SSN-720. It also was EB that had suggested the transversely framed bow section. A cost reduction change was issued applicable to SSN-719 and SSN-720 and to SSNs 721, 722, and 723 at Newport News Shipbuilding. EB accepted the change, but Newport News said the change would not reduce the cost of its ships. At this crossroads, I provided a contract to EB to engineer and design a VLS for SSNs 719 and 720, those ships receiving the transversely framed bow section. I was in something of a dilemma. Newport News was the class design agent and thus it was customary that they perform all of the requisite class design work. While I was preparing a change order to Newport News to switch to the new bow design (so that VLS would be applicable to ships under construction in that yard), some folks from Newport News came to chat. Their position was that 12 vertical launch tubes could be accommodated in the class design bow section, and the new transversely framed bow section was not necessary for VLS installation. The notion of giving the class a Tomahawk VLS capability was catching on, and Newport News wanted to be a major player. I returned to the normal practice, and Newport News prepared the design for all VLS ships from SSN-721 on. Newport News followed the EB design lead when possible.
The selection of ships for VLS was paramount. If we waited for a full-up capability, there was no chance for near-term installation. I needed to make some critical decisions. The fire control upgrade for the Atlanta was proving very difficult, not all of which was because of Tomahawk. There was a need for a major upgrade to address operability issues in the new, all digital fire control system as well as those needed for the Tomahawk (including over-the-horizon targeting and radio room interface). Added to this were the extensive modifications to accommodate VLS. There was just no capacity to upgrade the fire control system for VLS in the near term; however, the remainder of the installation was possible. I went to the shipbuilders with an unpriced change order that said I wanted to install VLS in SSN-719 and later. There were five ships involved. All five were under contract, and construction was in progress with scheduled (contracted) completion dates. My change, if accepted by the builders, would pay all costs associated with the work, but I would not accept any delays.
The change authorized completion during PSA. Electric Boat's shipbuilders pulled the necessary design to the waterfront. Their desire to install VLS in the Providence (SSN-719) forced the design to timely completion. The Providence and Pittsburgh (SSN-720) were delivered in June and November 1985, respectively, with the system installed and operational other than fire control modifications. Newport News elected to do all the work associated with the VLS installation during the PSAs. These availabilities came about in 1986, 1987, and 1988, respectively. The SSN-724 contract and all follow-on ship construction contracts required the installation of VLS as a part of the basic contract.
The Pittsburgh sent a Navy message with a date-time group of 261345Z November 1986. The subject was "First submarine vertical launched Tomahawk missile." Paragraph two stated,
USS Pittsburgh (SSN-720) successfully shot the first submarine vertical launched Tomahawk missile on 26 Nov while submerged on the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility range. The missile was an antiship (TASN) variant.
With the successful installation of the horizontal capability in the Atlanta in 1982, the attack submarine directorate provided the funds to make the requisite alterations on the SSN-700 and all later ships, other than the five addressed in the original memorandum of understanding. The opportunity to work with the people who made the Tomahawk program successful was a high-water mark in my long career in submarines. Every member of the team should take pride in a task well done.
The 28 February 2000 issue of U.S. News & World Report carried the following story:
It was a breathless few months for the USS Miami. While on patrol in the Mediterranean Sea in November of 1998, the attack submarine was ordered to speed to the Persian Gulf to prepare for Operation Desert Fox, the four-day bombing campaign against Iraq. Once there, it fired more than 20 $750,000 Tomahawk missiles into Saddam Hussein's fiefdom. Then, with war looming in Kosovo, the Miami sprinted back to the Med, where it picked up a new load of Tomahawks. It quickly steamed into the Adriatic, where it shot its wad again last spring during the early days of the war against Yugoslavia. The back-to-back barrages made Miami the most accomplished Tomahawk shooter in the Navy's submarine force.
The Miami story is especially rewarding to those who spent seemingly endless hours debating the design and engineering of the loading platform and the handling equipment needed to support a forward rearm concept. That Miami participated in such a bombing campaign certainly confirms that attack submarines can and do deploy attack aircraft.
Captain Fox retired from the Navy in July 1987 and is now a CPA in Westerly, Rhode Island.