Since the earliest introduction of radar into the air defense equation, there have been continuing efforts at electronic countermeasures. With slight variations, these countermeasures fall into one of three categories: one aircraft creating clutter on many radar screens to degrade detection and tracking, which is stand-off jamming (SOJ); a threatened aircraft deceiving an individual radar with special techniques, which is defensive electronic countermeasures (DECM); and modifying the signature characteristics of your own platform, which is called "stealth" or "low observable." The United States has been active in pursuing all three categories.
The ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System in the Navy/Marine Corps EA-6Bs is the preeminent SOJ system in the world today. The United States initially developed a number of DECM systems for different aircraft. More recent systems, such as the Airborne Self Protect Jammer and the Integrated DECM with a towed decoy, were developed for use in numerous platforms. Of course, the United States is the world leader in stealth with the F- 117, B-2, and F-22.
Overall, acceptance of SOJ into operational tactics has been mixed. The EA-613 Prowler, introduced late in the Vietnam War, seemed successful, but the data were limited. The ability to adequately assess the effectiveness of SOJ long has been a difficult, imprecise exercise, and the unknown quality of SOJ has always frustrated operators in training and combat. After Vietnam, support of SOJ was lukewarm. While some funding was provided to maintain a SOJ capability, EA-6B performance was handicapped by lack of squadrons, aircraft, and jamming pod availability. The Reagan administration finally provided sufficient funding to commission a full complement of squadrons, upgrade jamming systems, fund adequate spares, and conduct proper depot maintenance. The Prowler community has been living off this infusion of funds since, although insufficient funding during the Clinton administration has degraded EA-613 force levels and readiness.
The impressive performance of the EA-613 in Desert Storm and Kosovo has given new life to SOL With commanders needing SOJ to support missions for all types of strike platforms-including stealth aircraft-the requirement for a follow-on to the EA-613 has become obvious. In addition to lessons learned for SOJ, current U.S. policy seems to insist on minimal friendly casualties, all of which warrants optimization of the survivability triad. The EF-111 has been retired by the Air Force and the EA-6B is approaching 30 years of operational service. Although jamming systems have been upgraded incrementally over the years and improvements have been made to the Prowler airframe, a replacement will be required in 2015-2020.
The defense acquisition process calls for lengthy analysis prior to the initiation of any program. In the case of the EA-613, the initial reaction to a shortage of jammers in Kosovo generated a one-- to-two year study called an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA). In my opinion, previous studies were less formal, less costly, and much more responsive to the fleet. Today, decision-makers need a variety of studies, analyses, and recommendations to support decisions that used to be made with more insight and courage. Surely there are service-unique aspects and long-established biases to be considered; but, they are well known and will not become any easier to resolve in a year or two.
A Proposed Plan
The assumptions essential to this approach are:
The U.S. Navy will continue to lead the effort in SOJ, with Marine Corps and Air Force support.
The F/A-18F will be the basis for the follow-on aircraft. Much as the EA-613 fulfills the national commitment for SOJ today, a jamming F/A- 18 could act in similar fashion tomorrow.
The current Improved Capability III (ICAP3) program for the EA-6B will slip to 2005, but will pass operational evaluation.
Out year budget limitations will preclude funding for an independent, new SOJ program, necessitating an incremental program approach that builds on existing EA-6B equipment and fits into service funding priorities.
Today the operational EA-6B is the ICAP2 (present) configuration, with some small block variations. The following proposal would include modification of all current ICAP2 aircraft to the ICAP3 configuration, to occur between 2004 and 2010 if aircraft modifications are completed at a rate of 24 per year. The idea is to retain as many as possible of current EA-6Bs in service, while converting to what I call the "EA-18A," with next-generation jamming equipment. The EA-18A is a different platform with a different mission, not an add-on to the F/A-18. If the Navy is to continue its excellence in electronic warfare, it must maintain a dedicated community of people as well as a dedicated airplane. Wise decisionmakers recognized that distinction when the EA-6B was conceived. They took advantage of similarities with the A-6 while ensuring that the EA-6B platform was not compromised.
Use of existing ALQ-99 pods on F/A-18Fs (2001-2004): This would provide increased jamming capability to the fleet with limited development. Although there would be some integration and hardware issues, there are only two major developments that need to be undertaken: electromagnetic interference (EMI) between the high-power ALQ-99 pods and the F/A-18E/F, and a data link to allow for the control of ALQ-99 pods by a "mother ship" EA-6B. Carrier suitability issues should not be significant. If the minor aircraft modifications required for the F/A-18 were implemented on four aircraft in each F/A-18 unit, an increased jamming capability, as measured by transmitters in the air, would be available. This capability also would alleviate the shortage of EA-6Bs that will occur when they are out of service for ICAP2 to ICAP3 modifications.
EA-18A Research and Development (2001-2010): Although a full-blown development program may not be required if the proven F/A-18F is used as a starting point, major development is necessary to make it a SOJ platform. The integration of a receiver system with the frequency range, sensitivity, and speed similar to the new receiver processor group of the ICAP3 will be required. It is quite likely that much of the development of the ICAP3 system, which was primarily a new receiver and processor, could be brought forward, again reducing the cost of new development. Part of the development effort would certainly weigh what to retain and what to design. The other principal part of EA-18A development should address next-generation jammer equipment. This will involve many important issues, such as the number of transmitters per pod and the size and weight of the pod itself. Although jammers must be taken into account regardless of the follow-on platform, the scope is narrowed considerably if decision-makers can commit to the F/A-18.
EA-18A Production (2010-2020): I envision a production run of 20 airplanes per year for ten years. The defense requirements process would establish an inventory objective; however, 200 EA-18As to support all services would not be far off. Production between 2010 and 2020 would permit orderly conversion from the EA-6Bs.
The biggest problem in this plan is one of service parochialism. The only reason some voices in the Air Force and Marine Corps will call for a different platform is that they will have an already familiar aircraft in inventory. There is some validity to this position, but I submit that recent multiservice and multinational experience with the EA-- 6B demonstrated amply that a specialized aircraft can be treated as a joint asset and fully integrated into the plans and operations of all services. A single-- sited training squadron, focused maintenance issues, and a close knit community of operators and maintainers would make our defense dollars go farther. The Marines have always been part of the Prowler community; in fact, they were leaders prior to introduction of the EA-6B and were fully involved in all aspects of its development. Similarly, the Air Force had limited numbers of personnel involved with the Prowler even before retirement of the EF-111, and they are working today in EA-6B expeditionary squadrons.
Much attention is being given to use of an unmanned platform for this mission, but that approach to EA-6B replacement is too difficult to take at this time. In the future, the EA-18A clearly would be a candidate for the unmanned task, especially if developments in network-centric and electronic warfare continue to advance as anticipated.
Conclusions
This plan is technically and fiscally reasonable. While not optimal, it is the 80% solution at probably 30-50% of the cost. The process of adding ALQ-99 pods to the F/A-18F should commence immediately. It is the quickest way to alleviate today's shortage of transmitters in the air and sets the stage for having sufficient jamming assets during the EA-6B ICAP2 to ICAP3 modification. Moreover, it provides a baseline for future development of the EA-18A. Development of the next-generation pod also should be started immediately. Whatever the results of the Analysis of Alternatives specify, advanced jammers will be required.