"Combating Terrorism"
(See T. Rancich, pp. 66-69, November 2000 Proceedings)
Colonel W. Hays Parks, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired)—Conspicuously absent from Lieutenant Commander Rancich's excellent article was any mention of in-port rules of engagement (ROEs). That is because they do not exist to any credible degree.
For the past decade, the Navy has scuttled every effort to set forth criteria for helping individual soldiers, sailors, airmen, or Marines know when they may resort to deadly force to protect themselves, their comrades, or their units. "The Navy fights as units, not as individuals," the response went.
Navy resistance to ROE improvement is exacerbated by in-port philosophy. Vigorous, forward-leaning blue-water ROEs are countered by a leadership, including the local U.S. ambassador, who admonish ship commanders "not to screw up the port visit." One commander was quoted in The Washington Post as saying he would court-martial any sailor who fired his weapon, even if in self-defense. Combined with inadequate small-arms training for the ship's party, such an expression of command intent turns ship and crew that may be a tiger at sea into a sitting duck in port.
The attack on the USS Cole (DDG-67) came as no surprise to me. In lectures at war colleges and staff colleges over the past 15 years, I've highlighted this gap in our ROEs. Perhaps the Cole will serve as a wake-up call. Otherwise, good sailors gave their lives in vain.
Editor's Note: Colonel Parks will publish "Still Righting the Rules of Engagement" in the January 2001 issue of Proceedings and will appear at WEST 2001 on a panel on "Force Protection: How Do We Win the War against Terrorism?" (See page 9).
"They Must Be Sturdy"
(See I. Hansen, pp. 49-54, October 2000 Proceedings)
Lieutenant William L. Sommer, U.S. Navy—No one would disagree with Mr. Hansen's thesis that the next generation of warships must be built "sturdy." He focuses his argument, however, solely on defending the ship against airborne threats (specifically cruise missiles). The artist's illustration of the Zumwalt (DD-21)-class destroyer on page 54 is captioned, "The present portrayals of the Zumwalt (DD-21)-class land attack destroyer very likely could resemble the 'sturdy' combatant of the future, with features including a low silhouette, a single superstructure, and minimal topside clutter."
The Navy's almost single-minded obsession with antiship cruise missile defense is steering the design of the next-generation warship toward a less survivable ship. I will never claim to be a marine engineer or ship-design expert, but I do have a solid grasp of the basic laws of physics with respect to gravity and buoyancy. A fundamental law of ship design and damage control is: Freeboard equals reserve buoyancy. A ship with little to no freeboard has little to no reserve buoyancy. Once the hull is ruptured, by whatever means, the ship sinks quickly. Aside from creating the inevitable nightmare with regard to topside weapon systems preservation and maintenance, DD21's low silhouette appears to leave precious little reserve buoyancy to ensure survivability in the event of a hull breach.
The U.S. Navy has excelled in its pursuit of a solution to the air-defense problem, but at the detriment of other defenses. The DD-21 program office makes spectacular claims with regard to the ship's sensor superiority and technology, offering such things as in-stride mine avoidance, minimized radar, acoustic, infrared, and magnetic signatures, and integrated self-defenses. The fact remains that as soon as you build a better mousetrap, the mouse gets smarter. We still have to deal with the question of what happens after the ship takes a hit, regardless of the source of that damage. Since 1945, how many U.S. Navy ships have been severely damaged or sunk by aerial weapons versus mines. collisions. or groundings?
Mr. Hansen suggested that DD-21 could be built to reduce the types of damage suffered by the Eilat, Khaibar, USS Worden (CG-18), HMS Sheffield, HMS Conveyor, and USS Stark (FFG-31). What about the kinds of damage suffered by the USS Evans (DE-1023), the USS Ingersoll (DD-652), the USS Kinkaid (DD-965), the USS Princeton (CG-59), the USS Tripoli (LPH-10), the USS Gonzales (DDG-66), and most recently, the USS Cole (DDG-67)?